Journal

Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

by David Hollis

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

The Russian-Georgian War in August of 2008 represented a long history of geostrategic conflict between the two nations and was based on many complex factors: ¬geopolitical, legal, cultural, and economic. The 1992 South Ossetia War and the 1993 Abkhazian War resulted in the loss of the regions from Georgia to internationally unrecognized, pro-Russian local governments. Tensions had been building in the region for several years prior-to the initiation of conflict in August 2008. The war officially started on 7 August 2008 after several weeks of growing arguments over the future of the South Ossetian territory. Georgian troops initiated a military attack against South Ossetia and began a massive shelling of the town of Tskhinvali in response to alleged Russian provocation. Russia deployed additional combat troops to South Ossetia and retaliated with bombing raids into Georgian territory. Russia deployed naval forces to formally blockade Georgia and landed naval infantry (marines) on Abkhaz coast (near Georgia). The decisive ground combat operation of the campaign resulted in mechanized Russian military and Ossetian militia forces defeating the more lightly armed Georgian military forces in the only large-scale major ground combat of the war (battle for the town of Tskhinvali). Georgian tactical military defeat at the battle of Tskhinvali, operational defeat via Russian uncontested invasion of the western part of Georgia, unchallenged naval blockade of Georgia, and Georgian difficulty getting their media message out to the world, led to Georgia's strategic defeat in the war. The conflict forced approximately 25,000 Georgian residents to flee from ground combat as refugees into internal displacement. The two countries signed a ceasefire agreement a week later but tensions remain high to this day. Russia has failed to implement some of the terms of the ceasefire agreement, resulting in further loss of Georgian territory to Russian occupation.

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

David M. Hollis is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).

The Case for Decentralized Thinking

by Benjamin Summers

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

The "fog of war" has thickened over the past decade. Dynamic operating environments and information overload are two unique challenges that strategists face as we approach our tenth year of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. In our operating environment, blurred lines of distinction and sensitive battles of perception have shrunk the gap between tactics and strategy, increasing the risk of "tactical victories" turning into "strategic defeats." We face these tactical and strategic challenges in an era where information is so readily available that finding relevance is becoming increasingly difficult. While these two layers of fog hinder visibility for strategists, the Army turns towards our junior leaders to provide new viewpoints and effectively process information. By incorporating more young minds into our problem framing and solving processes, the Army has moved towards decentralizing the way that we think as an organization. Decentralized thinking works because it widens our perspective and flattens the way that we process information.

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

Ben Summers is currently serving as an assistant operations officer in the 159th Combat Aviation Brigade.

by Anton Kuruc

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Clausewitz describes war in a foreign policy context that needs to be adapted to insurgencies. This paper discusses insurgency in the context of domestic rather than foreign policy. It discusses the aspects of domestic politics that help define the role of violent coercion in domestic political discourse. This paper discusses the role of a political campaign to win domestic political competitions. It identifies key assumptions that underpin demographic planning and applies some typical political campaign planning methods to better analyze the human terrain. It also explores how the military campaign should support the overarching political campaign and to better incorporate domestic policy expertise into the whole of government counterinsurgency effort.

Clausewitz's general theory remains very useful, but it needs a different context - that of domestic politics.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Lieutenant Colonel Anton Kuruc is an infantry officer in the Australian Army who graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1986 with a Bachelor of Arts degree with a double major in Politics and History.

Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

by Michael A. Clauser

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

It's become trite to state that the solution for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is "political," and not solely "military," in nature. Both Presidents Bush and Obama made the case that the purpose of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was to provide a security space allowing for national and local governance to take hold and grow. But while President Bush found five brigades to surge into Iraq and President Obama committed 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan, neither President could find adequate numbers of —foreign and civil servants to accompany our men and women in uniform. U.S. non-military civilian numbers in both countries remain low. One senior official estimated that U.S. civilian personnel in Afghanistan total around 1,000 strong, just one percent of the military footprint in that country. Even now, most of these are found in the crowded embassy in the capital. If the U.S. is serious about winning the war in Afghanistan through a political solution, Congress should change current law and begin to draft civil servants with the right skill sets and training for national objectives abroad.

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

Michael A. Clauser served as the National Security Legislative Assistant to a senior Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He previously served in the Bush Administration in the Pentagon. The views expressed in this commentary are his own and do not reflect that of the United States Government.

Small Wars Journal

Vol 6, No. 12 is

now available. Click

here for the full issue, or directly on the titles below for single articles.

by Thomas Kirk

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

A reading of the Afghanistan's troubled history against recent explorations of the contemporary conflict question the wisdom and trajectory of the current peace talks for creating a lasting end to the violence. Current efforts at reconciliation should carefully pinpoint the country's powerbrokers and uncover Afghanistan's voiceless civil society.

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

Thomas Kirk is a researcher with Global Governance and PHD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Thomas' work investigates the role of civil society in creating the conditions for peace in contemporary conflict with particular reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

by Michael J. Faughnan

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

As the December review of our strategy in Afghanistan nears, one program that shows significant progress and will have a far reaching impact on this war torn nation is the Afghan National Security Force Literacy Program. This program's objective, overseen by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), is to provide every member of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), a third grade level of literacy. To accomplish this, we employ more than 1,000 Afghans to teach Dari and Pashto the two dominant languages in this nation.

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

Dr. Mike Faughnan is the Chief of the NTM-A / CSTC-A Education Division.

What Happens When We Lose the COG

by Jeremy Kotkin

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

GEN Petraeus' COIN Guidance is published and on the bulletin boards in hundreds of staff offices in Kabul. As the vanguard of this new policy, Afghan Hands have a charter to operate under the COIN Guidance in concert with the mission statement developed for the program: "to build long-lasting, positive partnerships with GIRoA, Afghan entities, and civilians, in order to demonstrate the long-term commitment of ISAF to build capacity and capability within Afghanistan and deny support among the Afghan people to insurgents." These two concepts, the COIN Guidance and the Afghan Hands Program intent before it, should operate in perfect harmony, each reinforcing the other. Afghan Hands, through eyes unencumbered of 9 years of standard operating tactics and procedures, should be allowed the professional scope to "get the job done" in ways which no other individual augmentee can.

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

Major Jeremy Kotkin is a Functional Area-59, Strategist, and assigned to ISAF through USFOR-A.

by Colonel Lawrence Sellin

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield", said the American colonel.

His adversary pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

That conversation occurred on 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., then Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team and Colonel Tu, Chief of the North Vietnamese Delegation.

Colonel Summers is now best known as the author of a powerful critique of the Vietnam War titled, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. It analyzed the reasons behind the US tactical victory, but strategic defeat in that conflict.

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D. is a recently retired colonel with 29 years of service in the US Army Reserve. He is a veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Helmand and Farah Provinces, Afghanistan

15 February -- 15 March 2010

by Commander Philip Pelikan, CHC, USN

Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program

"By order of the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Afghanistan, the Command Chaplain and a Muslim Chaplain (if obtainable), along with appropriate political specialists, governance advisors, and necessary security, were to engage with Islamic leadership in Helmand and Farah Provinces in discussions to enhance the relationship with key religious leaders and the communities in which they serve in order to convey the good will and otherwise positive intentions of U.S. Government and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)/NATO forces operating in the region in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its military and police forces."

This was the basic premise for the operation which subsequently took place between February and March 2010, and for which I was responsible to organize and carry out. Additionally, my responsibilities as the MEB Command Chaplain were to provide religious coverage, general pastoral care for the Marines and Sailors of 2nd MEB, and supervision of 15 chaplains.

Download the Full Article: Mullah Engagement Program

Commander Philip Pelikan is a prior-enlisted ('71-'75) U.S. Air Force Intelligence Analyst. He has been a U.S. Navy Chaplain for 21 years; 10 of which have been with the U.S. Marines. He is a priest in the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America and currently serves as the Command Chaplain for U.S. Naval Support Activity, Naples, Italy.

by David B. Edwards

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

Beginning in 2008, when news of the development of the Human Terrain Systems (HTS) program first came to public attention, a number of anthropologists began a systematic campaign to dismantle the program or at least ensure that it would never receive the imprimatur of legitimacy from professional organizations. Since the premise of HTS was that it would bring the insights of academic anthropology to the practice of military counterinsurgency, what might normally have constituted an irrelevant gesture (like the shy 9th grader deciding that she simply would not to go to the prom with the football captain, even if he asked) had some clout, in that many anthropology graduate students and unemployed PhDs who might otherwise have considered joining the program chose not to join for fear of being black listed and never landing a job in academia.

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

David B. Edwards is a professor of social science at Williams College, Williamston, MA.

An Operational Perspective

by Tim C. Leival

Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos

One of the goals of the Operational Art is to effectively translate the expression of national will, in the form of strategy, into concrete tactical tasks; preferably ones that can be assigned metrics to mark progress. This paper reflects the application of the Art in the small example of the Afghan National Army 205th Commandos and Special Forces Operational Detachment A 2132.

ODA 2132 received the mission to Combat Advise the 205th Commandos at literally the worst time imaginable. We had just lost our Detachment Commander to an IED attack that also gravely wounded our Junior Engineer. We were down to eight personnel, one of whom, our Intelligence Sergeant (18F), would be serving as escort for our Commander and would be gone for almost a month. Our pre-mission training had been focused on the more usual ODA mission set. We were grieving and dispirited, but eagerly looking to get back into the fight.

When we received our change of mission brief from LTC Heinz Dinter (Task Force 32 Commander), he made it very clear that he was assigning us to the CJSOTF-A Commander's (COL Haas) designated Main Effort not because of our limitations, but because of our strengths. As a National Guard Detachment, we have a collection of experience and education of unusual breadth and depth as well as a wealth of time spent working with indigenous soldiers in many venues. Events proved his concept to be correct and, more germane to the thesis; we had already demonstrated an adherence to the principle of Cognitive processes in prosecution of Irregular Warfare. This principle is commonly and incorrectly expressed as "putting an Afghan face" on tactical operations. Because of our life experiences, our detachment was able to correctly interpret this principle into the action of avoiding creating dependencies at any level. Properly expressed by our Junior Communications Sergeant, "An Afghan Solution to an Afghan problem" became our mantra and rallying cry when less flexible minds tried to make the Commandos into institutional mirror-images of their own light infantry organizations.

Download the Full Article: Combat Advising the ANA 205th Commandos

CW3 Tim Leival was the Detachment Commander on SFODA 2132, Co C, 1/20th SFG(A). He has served as Executive Officer, Commander, Junior Weapons Sergeant, Intelligence Sergeant and Assistant Detachment Commander on 2132, as well as XO, S4, S3, S2 and Assistant Training NCO in the same Company over the last 26 years. Prior to that, he served as Mortar Platoon Ammo Bearer and Platoon Leader in various Reserve Component Infantry units.

Readings for the Counterinsurgency Commander

by Joshua Thiel, Bryan Martin, William Marm, Christopher O'Gwin, Christopher Young, Gabriel Szody, and Douglas Borer

Download the Full Article: Beyond FM 3-24

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, United States (U.S.) Army Green Berets were active in the international sphere. Organized in small, twelve-man teams known as Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA), these specially trained soldiers were primarily engaged as teachers of Counterinsurgency (COIN) to Host Nation's (HN) military forces during Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. They were expected to not only add value to the capacity, professionalization, and operational capabilities of the HN forces, but were also expected to be the COIN subject matter experts within the U.S. military. However, ODAs rapidly evolved from teachers of COIN to practitioners of the art during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: Beyond FM 3-24

Joshua Thiel, Bryan Martin, William Marm, Christopher O'Gwin, Christopher Young, and Gabriel Szody are Majors in the United States Army Special Forces. Douglas Borer is an instructor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

by Jamie E. Hill

Download the Full Article: Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

During the mid-20th century, a number of revolutionary movements were being conducted throughout South America. Some of which applied the theories developed by Che Guevara during the Cuban Revolution in the 1950's. This paper will analyze Che Guevara's 'Foco Theory', from his work Guerrilla Warfare, in relation to the revolutions in Cuba and Bolivia. The comparison will be made to determine what methods worked in Cuba, which led to the revolution's success, and then determine to what extent the 'Foco Theory' was actually employed to reach that success. In addition, other South American dissident groups attempted to use the same theory and did not achieve the same results. As a result, there will be an analysis of the events that took place in Bolivia to determine the contributing factors to the revolution and what may have caused its failure. The end result will provide a comparison of the revolutions and determine what led to certain successes or failures and why. It will also provide an assessment of Che's theory to determine if it is useful, and valid, to the events that inspired and supported its creation.

Download the Full Article: Che Guevara: An Exploration of Revolutionary Theory

Jamie Hill grew up in Barrie, Ontario and joined the Canadian forces in 2007. He is currently a 4th year Officer Cadet at the Royal Military College of Canada and hopes to graduate in May 2011 with an Honours degree of Political Science. He is an armour officer awaiting phase training after graduation.

A Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan "Kinetic" Counterinsurgency and its Theoretical Implications

by Christian Chung

Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared

Conventional wisdom and recent developments in the study of the art of conducting "traditional" counterinsurgency (COIN) has defined the importance of a population-centric approach to COIN in which a "whole of government", integrated political component is central to an effective partnership with the host nation in ultimately defeating the insurgency.

Download the Full Article: The Killer Tiger Roared

Christian Chung is a high school senior attending a full time dual enrolled college program, at The College Academy at Broward College. The article is part of an independent original research project conducted with the Social Science department at BC on COIN.

An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

I've carefully read your commentary concerning David Galula's work on counterinsurgency and its applicability for today's COIN campaigns and you seem to identify a special kind of lesson or warning than the ones that influenced the development of FM 3-24: "its tactical brilliance was divorced from a strategic purpose. So don't repeat the same mistake. After all, France lost Algeria". So, why do you think that by embracing Galula's tactical brilliance, we tend to lose sight of the art of strategy?

That has been the whole problem with the COIN narrative that developed at least in US Army circles since the end of the Vietnam War. It was, and is, premised on the idea that the Vietnam War could have been won by better counterinsurgency tactics and operations. This is the basic nugget of an idea that had a snowball effect; in the 1980s with Andrew Krepinevich' The Army and Vietnam, then in the 1990s with John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and Lewis Sorley's A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, and more currently many of the writings of Colonel Robert Cassidy and others.

The idea of a better war through improved counterinsurgency tactics has come to define causation in the Iraq war too. Recent books like Tom Ricks's duo of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq and Linda Robinson's Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq offers the notion of a bumbling, fumbling conventional army that is doing counterinsurgency incorrectly, but because a better and enlightened general comes onto the scene combined with a few innovative new officers at the lower levels who figure out how to do counterinsurgency by the classic rule and voila the operational Army is reinvented and starts doing the things differently. And it is because the Army does things differently on the ground that it produces a transformed situation, as the narrative states. It's the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy.

Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

Relooking French Encounters in Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century

by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: A Conversation with Dr. Douglas Porch

To complement the recent interviews conducted by Octavian Manea, we reached out to the defense analysts experts at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. In the first interview of this series, Dr. John Arquilla described how he felt that French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century can inform COIN in our time. This rebuttal comes from Dr. Douglas Porch, a historian in the National Security Affairs (NSA) department. This department specializes in the study of international relations, security policy, and regional studies. NSA is unique because it brings together outstanding faculty, students from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, National Guard and various civilian agencies, and scores of international officers from dozens of countries for the sole purpose of preparing tomorrow's military and civilian leaders for emerging security challenges. Notable alumni from the NSA department include LTG William H. Caldwell.

Download the Full Article: A Conversation with Dr. Douglas Porch

Douglas Porch earned a Ph.D. from Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University. Currently, he is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Small Wars Journal Vol 6, No. 11 is now available.

Click here for

the full issue, on titles below for single articles.

by Major General Nick Carter, British Army

Download the Full Article: 800 Words on the Last Year in Afghanistan

The last year has seen significant change in southern Afghanistan. An uplift of over 20,000 US troops, and more importantly, a huge increase in Afghan security forces has more than doubled the number of forces in Helmand and Kandahar. When I arrived in southern Afghanistan last October there was one weak Afghan Army brigade in Helmand and one in Kandahar, the original capital of Afghanistan. When I left a year later these had increased to nearly six. The Afghan Police has also been uplifted by 30%. These reinforcements have made possible the disposition of our forces to be realigned so that our counter insurgency strategy can focus on protecting the population.

Download the Full Article: 800 Words on the Last Year in Afghanistan

Major General Nick Carter was ISAF Regional Commander South until November 2010. He assumed command of 6th United Kingdom Division in January 2009 and was responsible for the preparation and training of the Task Forces deploying on Operation Herrick. The Division then became a CJTF and assumed responsibility for RC-South in November 0f 2009

by Tal Tovy

Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution

In 1898, Jan Bloch published six volumes dealing with future warfare entitled The Future of War in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations. The book examines military technological developments and the techno-tactics at the end of the 19th century. As we know from history, about 15 years after the publication of the book the First World War broke out and Bloch's predictions about future warfare were almost exactly realized. But his perceptions regarding this were not accepted by his contemporaries, especially not by the senior military officers in Germany and France.

The character and range of the war surprised the higher military command of all the countries that participated in the war, which led especially on the Western front to a state of immobility.

Bloch was not the only one who foresaw the changes in the future battlefield. For example, already in the 1880s, General Sheridan, the commander of the American Army, envisioned the new character of war operations that would constitute the main methods of warfare on the Western front in Europe during the course of the First World War. From an analysis of the American Civil War (1861-1865) in which he had participated, and of the Franco-German War (1870-1871) in which he served as an observer, Sheridan claimed that the rival armies would protect themselves in dugouts and that any side that tried to go out on a direct frontal attack against enemy lines would be destroyed. Sheridan's estimate was derived from the understanding that improvements in firepower, in the rate and precision of firing, made war far more lethal and destructive.

As said before, most of the senior officer rank in Europe failed to understand the changing nature of warfare as a result of technological developments at the techno-tactical level. The immediate intellectual challenge was to comprehend the future aspects of warfare in connection with the rapid technological changes. Today the commonly accepted term for this process is Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Research in military history has proved that in many cases it was these new technologies that changed the nature of warfare. Whichever side was wise enough to develop new technologies and to integrate them into new warfare doctrines had a decisive advantage. This article attempts to claim that the operation of airborne forces during the Second World War was a military revolution at the tactical and operational level. The basis for this claim is that the activation of airborne forces led to an essential change in the perception of the concept Line of Communication (LOC). The article will first examine the sources for the use of the concept RMA and the classical aspect of the concept LOC. This is in order to provide a theoretical dimension for the examination of historical test cases. Following this, through a discussion of a number of airborne campaigns that were conducted during the Second World War, the article will exemplify these tactical and operational changes in the LOC concept.

The geophysical nature of the LOC concept constituted a paradigm for thousands of years. From the middle of the 18th century extensive theoretical literature on the subject began to be written. By an analysis of paratroop operations during the Second World War we shall try to determine whether this new operational perception was able to undermine the basic foundations of the classical LOC paradigm.

During the war, a number of airborne campaigns were carried out in all the war arenas and in the various forces. A study of geographical distribution shows that most of the campaigns including the largest ones (at the division level and above) were carried out in the arena of Western Europe first by Germany and later by the United States and Britain, and therefore the article will be focused on an analysis of the campaigns in this arena.

Historiography concerning the operation of paratroop forces during the Second World War deals mainly with the military dimension. This means their practical activation in the various battlefields and an analysis of the success or failure of this or that operation. Therefore one may divide the research literature on paratroop forces into two main groups. The first group consists of discussions about those operations in the framework of a general discussion about the military history of the Second World War. The second group consists of studies that deal only with a discussion and analysis of operations in books that are focused only on paratroop operations. This literature does not take into account the activation of paratroops during the Second World War as a tactical revolution. An additional group is the memoirs of paratroopers at all levels of command. In this literature one can find in greater detail the training techniques and battle tactics of the paratroop forces and are therefore of great value in understanding the operational nature of those units.

Download the Full Article: Airborne Troops as a Tactical and Operative Military Revolution

Dr. Tal Tovy is an assistant professor at the history department of Bar Ilan University, Israel.

A Disappearing Skill and Misunderstood Capability

by John D. Hurth and Jason W. Brokaw

Download the Full Article: Visual Tracking and the Military Tracking Team Capability:

Of all the potentially valuable skills in the military the one that is most commonly misunderstood and underestimated is Visual Tracking. Unfortunately most opinions are based on misconceptions within the civilian tracking community. Trackers who are teachers of a holistic form of tracking that focus their instruction on a spiritual aspect have crushed any true debate on the virtues of tracking as a military specialty skill. Visual Tracking is not an exclusive skill associated with the Native American, San Bushmen, Iban, or Dyak trackers.

Download the Full Article: Visual Tracking and the Military Tracking Team Capability:

John D. Hurth is a retired United States Army Special Forces soldier.

Jason W. Brokaw currently maintains active military status with the United States Army Reserves, assigned to a special operations unit as a Signals Intelligence Analyst (35N).

The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Over the past nine years United States counterinsurgency strategy reflected a reliance on Clausewitzian industrial-era tenets with a faulty emphasis on superior western technology, doctrine fixated on lethal operations, and a western skewed perspective on jus ad bellum (just cause for war). American military culture is largely responsible for the first two contextual biases, while western society is liable for the third in response to September 11, 2001. To turn this operational failure around, the U.S. military instrument of power should replace the teachings of 19th century German military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz with Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu and abandon the aforementioned contextual factors in favor of more appropriate counterinsurgency alternatives. These include an increased emphasis on civil-military relations, jus in bello (just conduct during war) through non-lethal operations, and quantifiable conflict resolution that includes negotiating with moderate Taliban militia groups, as unpalatable as that sounds to military purists. This paper stresses that moderates do not include radical Islamic terrorists or non-native fighters.

Download the Full Article: The US in Afghanistan: Follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz to Victory

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

A Mandatory Path to Build a Nation?

by Marc-Andre Lagrange

Download The Full Article: Insurgencies in South Sudan

The 2010 elections in Sudan were more than just a formal exercise for the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM/A). It was for both of them the ultimate test of the capacity of SPLM to turn from an armed insurgent/liberation movement into a government supported by a national army and set the base for separation from Khartoum regime. Immediately after its first elections, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) had to face two small scale insurgencies in Jonglei State. Led by General George Athor and David Yaw Yaw, those two insurgencies, despite their apparent limited scale, had a serious destabilizing potential for the first elected government of South Sudan.

Download The Full Article: Insurgencies in South Sudan

Marc-Andre Lagrange is humanitarian and relief aid expert specializing in the conflict zones of Africa. He worked on the ground throughout the last decade mainly in Central Africa.

by Robert Tynes

Download the Full Article: Children, the War on Terror and Decision Making

President Obama appears to be caught in a dilemma, poised between the hard rock moral choice of human rights and the cold-cocked fist of global terrorism. At least that's what his most recent decision to continue military funding to Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and Yemen seems to indicate. President Obama has waived the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 for these four countries. The law, which he supported when he was serving in the US Senate, states that the US government shall not provide military funding to governments that use or support the use of child soldiers. That is, of course, unless the President deems it in the national interest to supply military aid to the countries. In other words: national interest trumps protecting children. Yet in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared that "the promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone." What gives?

Download the Full Article: Children, the War on Terror and Decision Making

Robert Tynes is an adjunct professor in the Political Science & International Relations department at SUNY/New Paltz. His research focuses on child soldiers, political violence, and African politics.

Design and the Prospects for Artistry

by Christopher R. Paparone and George L. Topic

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Artistry

Here, we would like to open a conversation about educating military practitioners, focusing more on the artistry of design (reflective practice) involving the "where," "why," and "how." Through our normative stance (i.e. taking a "should" perspective), we hope the community of educators and senior practitioners are spurred to better appreciate what we argue are the more desirable professional qualities of artistry. To that intent, we admit we argue provocatively rather than seek to ratify the status quo. Our intent is not to suggest current practices in professional military education have no place in the future, but that they must be subordinated to greater scope and methods of design.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Artistry

Dr. Christopher R. Paparone is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Colonel George Topic, USA (Ret.), is the vice director in the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at the National Defense University.

Evolution of Thinking on the War against Terrorism 2002-2004

by D. Robert Worley

Download the Full Article From Conception to Policy

This paper provides a synthesis of information drawn from several efforts conducted by a Washington-based think tank in the 2002 to 2005 time frame. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations should be of interest to senior policy makers across the agencies of the United States Government and members of Congress. Recommendations are developed specifically for the interagency process statutorily housed in the National Security Council. The focus is on three different conceptions of the conflict and how they evolved in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The material presented remains relevant to those who study national security policy and how it is formulated. It may hold some interest for historians. It has been productively employed in a graduate program in government and security at Johns Hopkins University to evoke discussion on national security policy formation.

Download the Full Article From Conception to Policy

D. Robert Worley is a Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Institute of Government and an elected Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. He has served on the adjunct faculties of Johns Hopkins University's School of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University's Elliot School of International Affairs, and UCLA's School of Engineering and Applied Sciences.

by Irvin Oliver

Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?

With the arrival of 14 U.S. Marine M1A1 tanks in Afghanistan, it may be worth considering the wider role of armor and mechanized forces in irregular warfare. For many, the initial view may be that mechanized forces have little or no place in Afghanistan for several noted reasons -- the logistical burden of mechanized forces will further strain an already fragile supply chain; the Soviets used mechanized forces and failed; mechanized forces limit the effectiveness of counterinsurgency. While there may be some validity in all of these criticisms, they are flawed or incomplete arguments that rely on shaky assumptions. The primary consideration of the introduction of armor and mechanized forces into a situation like Afghanistan should be the means of employment and terrain considerations.

Download the Full Article: U.S. Armor in Afghanistan: Worth the Effort?

Major Irvin Oliver currently serves as an instructor of Comparative Politics at the United States Military Academy. Previously, he commanded D CO, 1-67 AR, 4th ID and he was the brigade plans officer for 2nd BCT, 4th ID.

by Gregory Conti, Dominic Larkin, David Raymond, and Edward Sobiesk

Download the Full Article: The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information

This article outlines the problem by illustrating the common use of the Social Security number as a unique identifier and pseudo-password in the military services. We illustrate the many ways, both large and small, that PII continues to be abused, as well as common misperceptions. We conclude with actionable solutions that will help correct the problem.

Download the Full Article:The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Conti is a Military Intelligence Officer and Director of West Point's Cyber Security Research Center.

Major Dominic Larkin is a Field Artillery Officer and Instructor in West Point's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Lieutenant Colonel David Raymond is an Armor Officer and Assistant Professor in West Point's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.

Colonel Edward Sobiesk is an Armor Officer and Director of West Point's Information Technology Program.

A Political-Military Path to Peace

by Linda Robinson

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

This paper presents a scenario for resolution of the Afghan conflict in a manner that achieves U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This scenario takes the current U.S. approach as the starting point and adds 1) a more detailed theory of the conflict that highlights the political effects that must be achieved; 2) emphasis on bottom-up measures that can produce momentum in the short term, and 3) a political diplomatic strategy embraced and pursued in concert by the Afghan government, the United States and key international partners. Finally, the paper identifies requirements for a smaller follow-on military force to pave the way for a long-term advisory and assistance effort.

Download the Full Article: How Afghanistan Ends

Linda Robinson served as Senior Adviser to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at US Central Command in 2009-2010.

by Robert Jordan Prescott

Download the Full Article: Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands

On August 12, 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he had ordered a thorough force structure review of the Marine Corps to determine what an expeditionary force in readiness should look like in the 21st century, echoing the intermittent characterization of the Marine Corps as a "second land army." Three days prior, Gates announced U.S. Joint Forces Command, established to foster joint doctrine and conduct joint training and experimentation, would close, asserting the "U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice" and the need for an entirely separate four star command no longer existed. Together, the two steps constitute major components of the secretary's now well-publicized initiative to enhance efficiency across the Department of Defense. The secretary's efforts are laudable, but exploring opportunities within legacy service and combatant command structures will achieve the minimum. Instead of prompting the world's premier strike force to justify itself or closing a command tasked with cultivating a joint force, the secretary should be exploring how the American military can emulate the Marine Corps and become a truly global joint force.

Download the Full Article: Second Land Armies and Excess Combatant Commands

Read more by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon. He is private consultant to defense industry, formerly in the securities industry who switched to national security after September 11, 2001. He is grateful to have the opportunity to meet and work with individuals who fight and sacrifice on behalf of our country. House of Marathon is a blog featuring essays on American Politics, International Security, and Popular Culture.

The Soviet and American Approaches to the Critical Tasks of Counter Insurgency

by Bart Howard

Download the Full Article: A Well Worn Path

The conflict in Afghanistan is clearly at the top of the list of U.S. foreign policy challenges. Each year more and more resources are committed to the effort to stabilize and secure Afghanistan. The cost of this effort is more than just monetary. U.S. "blood and treasure" is being spilled as Americans debate the potential success or failure in this enigmatic and distant country. Soon all discussion and debate will intensify on the concept of "transition" sometime in the near future.

Download the Full Article: A Well Worn Path

Colonel (Ret) Bart Howard earned a Bachelor Degree in History and was commissioned a Distinguished Military Student in Armor from Santa Clara University in 1984. He holds a Master of Military Studies and a Master of Military Science. He has commanded at the Company, Battalion and Brigade level. He currently serves as the Operations Manager in the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Editor's Note: This essay continues our conversation with the deep thinkers of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA on the need/utility of rethinking modern counterinsurgency.

by Ahmed Humayun and Ali Jafri

Download the Full Article: Karachi's Ethnic Tinderbox

Over the last month, Karachi- Pakistan's largest city and the center of its commercial and financial life - has witnessed its worst ethnic violence in years. On October 16 a wave of targeted ethnic killings began rolling across the city; four days later, more than 60 people were dead and Karachi had come to a standstill. Since then, the city has been teetering on the brink of even more bloodshed. Why is this violence erupting now?

Download the Full Article: Karachi's Ethnic Tinderbox

Ahmed Humayun is Senior Analyst at Georgetown University's Emerging Threats Project, and Ali Jafri is an Analyst at the Project. The Emerging Threats Project examines the key drivers of conflict in regions of critical interest to the United States.

by Joseph Purser

Download the Full Article: A Response to "A Shot in the Dark"

A response to A Shot in the Dark: The Futility of Long-Range Modernization Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Eric A. Hollister, published by the Institute for Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army.

The premise of A Shot in the Dark is that the operating environment of the future promises to be so complex it will overwhelm any attempt to anticipate it, especially in the long term. Therefore, argues the author, strategic planners should avoid attempts to describe the future and instead pursue incremental improvements to the force based on what they can understand now and in the near term. This attack on long-range force planning is in fact misguided, as it misidentifies the true root cause of previous Army major acquisition program failures -- institutional bias. Put another way, the article unintentionally makes the point that Service bias for and against certain military missions overwhelms the ability to objectively develop long term futures studies, and prevents logical force development based on those predictions.

Download the Full Article: A Response to "A Shot in the Dark"

Joe Purser is the Director of a small think tank in the Department of Defense charged with identifying future challenges to the joint force and implications for new concepts and capabilities.

The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense.

Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse:

Understanding Them to Counter Them

by Colonel David S. Maxwell

Download the Full Article: Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

What is going to happen on the Korean Peninsula? This is the question that plagues policy makers, strategists, and military planners in the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States (US) and in Northeast Asia (NEA).

If this question can be answered, the next question is: How will the ROK, US and the international community deal with what happens on the Korean Peninsula?

The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the potential outcomes on the Korean Peninsula following either collapse of the Kim Family Regime or following conventional and unconventional conflict with north Korea as well as to examine some of the possible ways to prepare for and deal with those outcomes. While optimistic planners and policy makers hope for a co-called "soft landing" and peaceful reunification of the Peninsula, prudence calls for planning for the worse case scenarios. This contradicts the current focus of the United States on having to "win the wars it is currently fighting" as stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). However, the worse case scenarios are, in the author's opinion, at once both the most dangerous and the most likely threats in NEA and they should be considered. Therefore soft landing and peaceful reunification scenarios will not be addressed. (however, the author hopes they would become a reality). This paper is intentionally provocative, yet only focuses on one of the many complexities of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, namely Irregular Warfare.

Download the Full Article: Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

Colonel David S. Maxwell is a US Army Special Forces officer with extensive experience in Asia to include Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College, National Defense University. He is currently a member of the faculty at the National War College. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's and do not represent National Defense University, Department of Defense or U.S. Government positions.

Note: This paper will appear as a chapter in an upcoming book to be published by the Marine Corps University Foundation, edited by Dr. Bruce Bechtol.

A briefing that accompanies this paper can be found at the following link: http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6891151/nK%20IW%20Threats%20Brief.pps

How can French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19th Century Inform COIN in our time?

by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: Interview with Dr. John Arquilla

To complement the recent interviews conducted by

Download the Full Article: Interview with Dr. John Arquilla

Dr. John Arquilla has been teaching in the special operations program at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. The themes covered in his comments above -- and many other ideas -- are developed further in his forthcoming book, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits (due spring 2011).

by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy

Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War

This Thanksgiving weekend marks when the duration of our current war in Afghanistan surpasses the duration of the Soviet-Afghan War. About nine years ago, on 13 November 2001, the U.S. backed and advised Northern Alliance forces marched into Kabul. Approximately three weeks later, on 7 December 2001, the Taliban quit Kandahar. However, chasing the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan required considerably less strategic thinking, resolve, and leadership than it does to design a long-term solution which undermines and precludes al Qaeda sanctuary here and in Pakistan. Pundits, policymakers, and the public are losing patience, wondering, why nine years on, the U.S. and its partners have not been able to yet create durable stability in Afghanistan. The reasons why it took so long to give Afghanistan the strategy and emphasis it required are manifold, and some are explained in this précis. Afghanistan is governable but it requires a government suited to its complex character. It is not the graveyard of the U.S. and NATO. Nor do the Afghans perceive our current effort as an imperial conquest.

The Afghans would welcome peace and normalcy. They have suffered predation and conflict for well over three decades, dating back to the bloodless usurpation of Zahir Shah in 1973. More importantly, collusion between al Qaeda, the Haqqanis, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and others in the Pashtun areas, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, represents the gravest threat to the homelands of the U.S. and its partners. This précis addresses the efforts to help build durable stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate sanctuary for al Qaeda and its nefarious hosts. This perspective derives from research which informed a brief the author delivered at the U.S. Army War College April 2010 Strategy Conference and an essay written for requirements at the U.S. Naval War College in May 2010 . The first part, below, framed that presentation and amplified a list of near truisms about the region. Part one also briefly identifies imperatives for success in the theater. The second part lays out the context and the rationale for the comprehensive counterinsurgency argument and the counterterrorism-light counterargument, followed by a rebuttal and a conclusion.

Download the Full Article: A Précis on the Logic of the Afghan War

Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, is serving in Afghanistan. These views stem from service there and a study on Afghanistan and Pakistan completed at the U.S. Naval War College in 2009-2010. After peer review and editing, this became an article which appeared in the August-September 2010 issue of the RUSI Journal with the title, "The Afghanistan Choice: Peace or Punishment in the Pashtun Belt." The post-peer review printed article can be found at this link. The Army War College brief can be found here.

by Frank G. Hoffman

Download the Full Article: Is Armor Antithetical to Good COIN?

Undoubtedly everyone has seen the recent report in the Washington Post on the introduction of a company of Marine M1A1 tanks into unruly Helmand province in Afghanistan.

Given the rugged terrain and complex nature of the ongoing operation there, the Marines will certainly get a moral boost out of having some armor protected firepower. Surely the Taliban is not happy about this new development unless someone's really trying for the proverbial 72 virgin martyrdom. Taliban elements will not be trying to sneak up on any isolated outposts that have a pair of tanks at the gate either. Ambushes will be more circumspect anytime a tank is escorting a unit. While many a SOF operator will tell you that the drone of an AC-130 overhead is sweet to his ears, the grunts will tell you that there is nothing like the crack and reach of a 120mm gun to keep the wolves at bay.

Download the Full Article: Is Armor Antithetical to Good COIN?

The author is a retired Marine infantryman and national security analyst. He is on the board of advisors or editorial board at Small Wars Journal, Joint Force Quarterly and Prism. These views are his own and do not reflect the policy of the Department of Defense or any agency with which he has been affiliated.

Civil Society and Counterinsurgency-- II:

Recruiting Citizen Armies for COIN

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and CounterInsurgency II

This paper will argue that expanding our capacity is an important reason for developing a powerful civil society strategy—empowering citizens, who are a greatly underutilized resource, to become active participants in COIN. A common statement of this objective would be to say this will greatly increase "our capacity" to resist insurgencies, but the real point is to increase "the societies' capacity" to resist.

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and CounterInsurgency II

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) Special Report

Download the Full Report: Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative

As statements from the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) make clear, partnering is an essential skill for Coalition Forces (CF). The ISAF Partnering Directive, dated 29 August 2009, provides clear guidance for the practice:

However, while this directive defines what partnering is—and tells us what we must do—it does not tell us how to accomplish it. And make no mistake: effective partnering is hard, complex work. Units in the field continue to struggle to figure out just how to make partnering work on the ground. Fortunately, many effective practices have emerged from the laboratories of small unit improvisation and innovation. The best of these have been incorporated into the recently COIN Collective Tasks for company and platoon level operations, and are also summarized below. But before delving into the critical "how's" of partnering, it is useful to consider more fully the factors that combine to make effective partnering such a powerful COIN tool.

Download the Full Report: Partnering: A Counterinsurgency Imperative

The CAAT observes, assesses, and reports on counterinsurgency activities; identifies best and worst practices; advises and assists commanders at all levels to enable effective, integrated counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Interview with Brigadier General (ret) Dr. Klaus Wittmann

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: A New NATO Social Contract

The previous Strategic Concepts of the Alliance were forged in some very different security environments. In that sense some of their elements are outdated. Does the Alliance need a new social contract, a new consensus? On what elements?

A new consensus is indeed required in two regards: Firstly, while in the Cold War era NATO would have fought an existential "war of necessity", with a monolithic threat unifying Allies, in the new and ever-evolving security environment it engages in "wars of choice", "discretionary operations". There consensus is much more difficult to muster, because different threat assessments, historic experiences and national interests come to the fore. Honesty is required about the fact that there are ever more marked regional groupings within the Alliance such as those advocating a global orientation (US, UK, partly Canada); others emphasizing NATO's regional character and advocating cooperative security ("old Europe", but far from being united); several new members who, particularly after the Georgia war, insist on the priority of Article 5 and collective defense; and the Southern members emphasizing the dangers in the Mediterranean region. This makes the need for re-establishing strategic consensus very obvious. Secondly, there is great disunity within the Alliance about several central themes, such as NATO's reach (regional or global), its main emphasis (Article 5 or out-of-area), the approach to Russia, nuclear policy and strategy, and the evaluation of some "novel" security challenges (including terrorism, proliferation, cyber threats, interference with energy security, and obstruction of the freedom of the seas).

My view about how the preparation of NATO's new Strategic Concept has been handled in NATO (with the Group of Experts established by the Secretary General under former Secretary of State Albright's leadership) is the following: Public debate, transparency, inclusiveness are desirable, and the "participatory process" can "loosen the ground" as it were, prepare consensus, fuel public debate and interest in NATO, get the strategic community involved, provide transparency and induce member states to clarify their positions and "show the colour of their cards". But this will not replace the political work governments must do to create or re-establish the consensus on the central contentious issues. That cannot be achieved by informal groups and seminars, and it should not be left to the drafting and negotiation process. Work on a draft cannot create political unity on highly controversial matters, it cannot replace tough decisions. Ideally, the Strategic Concept, to be agreed on at NATO's Lisbon summit, would reflect the consensus established among governments.

Download the Full Article: A New NATO Social Contract

Brigadier general (ret) Klaus Wittmann is former director of academic planning and policy at the NATO Defence College in Rome. In May 2010, he co-authored together with Ronald Asmus, Stefan Czmur, Chris Donnelly, Aivis Ronnis and Tomas Valasek a major policy paper for The Centre for European Reform (CER, London) entitled "NATO, New Allies and Reassurance". In September 2010, Klaus Wittmann also proposed an illustrative draft for the NATO's new strategic concept that can be accessed here.

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

All-In at the GIRoA Casino

by James Sisco and David C. Ellis

Download the Full Article: Gambling on the Districts

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is gambling in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Casino at a table with a crooked dealer. ISAF is preparing to go all-in at the National GIRoA table, betting that National GIRoA reform initiatives and the recent troop surge will extend accountable, responsive government to the population. At the same time, National GIRoA's dealer is dealing from the bottom of the deck to former Mujahedeen powerbrokers (and possibly the Taliban) to distribute the table's winnings (international funding and key districts) for his own benefit. ISAF needs to diversify its gamble by moving some of its chips from the National GIRoA table to the Local GIRoA table, which has a more legitimate dealer and better odds of winning.

Download the Full Article: Gambling on the Districts

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan. His previous tours include the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Deep Blue, and service in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai.

Dr. David C. Ellis is a SOCOM human terrain analyst currently deployed to Afghanistan. His research covers peacekeeping, ethnic conflict, democratization, and economic development.

by Richard N. Pedersen

Download the Full Article: Mission command

Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.

Download the Full Article: Mission command

COL Richard N. Pedersen, USA Ret., is the lead mission command analyst at the Combined Arms Center's Mission Command Battle Laboratory. He commanded a Combined IBCT Task Force with duty in combat as Commander, Regional Command-South in Afghanistan; he also commanded BCTP.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks

The US Army Organizational Culture before Emphasis on COIN:

What I saw in Iraq in 2003-06 was a US Army that was focused on destroying the enemy by killing or capturing him. The population was seen as the playing field, not the prize.

The Surge:

The surge achieved its military or tactical goal of improving security. But its stated goal was the larger, strategic one of creating a breathing space in which a political breakthrough could occur. The strategic rationale was to create a breathing space for Iraqi political leaders in which they could move forward. I think it is too early to tell if that really happened. But my gut feeling is that it didn't.

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks

Counterinsurgency Insights by Tom Ricks by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

by Marilyn Stern

Download the Full Article: From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

On October 10, 2010, an illegal Mexican immigrant was found beheaded in Phoenix, Arizona as a result of the Mexican drug wars. On October 27, 2010, drug gangs attacked the headquarters of the Los Ramones, Mexico, police department with grenades and the police force quit en masse the next day. The following research provides pertinent background to the increasing chaos at the U.S. southwest border that the federal government continues to ignore.

Download the Full Article: From the TBA to the USA: Barbarians at the Gate

Marilyn Stern is presently a Master's candidate in National Security at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Ucko

"The conceptual and institutional advances within the US military since Iraq are the product of a whole COIN community."

What was the role of David Galula in shaping the mind of the US Army or the Army Concept? Could we see him as an intellectual founding father? And what specific beliefs do you have in mind when you assess his role in shaping the organizational culture of the US military?

As certain individuals and groups within the US military again became interested in counterinsurgency, this time as a result of the persistent violence in 'post-war' Iraq, one of the more immediate reference points for how to understand this type of political violence were the scholars and theorists who had marked the US military's previous 'counterinsurgency eras', during the 1960s primarily, but also during the 1980s. In the former camp, the thinkers of the 1960s, David Galula stands as an intellectual forefather to much that was finally included in the US Army and Marine Corps' FM 3-24 counterinsurgency field manual; indeed I believe his book is one of the three works cited in the manual's acknowledgements. I think it is fair to say far fewer people have read than heard of Galula, and it would be an interesting study to go through his writings more carefully and see to what degree they apply to our understanding of counterinsurgency today. Nonetheless, even at a cursory level, Galula has been extremely helpful in conceptualizing some of the typical conundrums, dilemmas and complexities of these types of campaigns: the civilian capability gaps in theater; the political nature of counterinsurgency; the importance of popular support, etc. These were issues that US soldiers and Marines were confronting in Iraq and struggling to find answers to; Galula's seminal texts were in that context helpful.

In terms of influencing US counterinsurgency doctrine, perhaps one of Galula's main contributions is the emphasis on the political nature of these types of campaigns, and - importantly - his concomitant warning that although the fight is primarily more political than military, the military will be the most represented agency, resulting in a capability gap. Galula's answer to this conundrum is explicitly not to restrict military forces to military duties, a notion picked up on in US doctrine, which also asks the US military to go far beyond its traditional remit where and when necessary. In a sense, this line of thinking is one of the greatest distinctions between the Army's first interim COIN manual in 2004 and the final version in 2006: in doctrine (if not necessarily in other areas, such as force structure), Galula's view of military forces filling civilian capability gaps had been accepted. Of course, it should be added that all of this is much easier said than done, and perhaps some of the implications of involving military forces in civilian tasks (agriculture, sewage, project management) have not been thoroughly thought through - do the armed forces have the requires skills, the training, and how much civilian capability can one realistically expect them to fill? Also, the danger with following Galula on this point is that by doing what's necessary in the field, the armed forces may also be deterring the development of the very civilian capabilities they reluctantly usurp.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Ucko

Interview with Dr. David Ucko conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl

"Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions."

What is the legacy of David Galula for US Counterinsurgency doctrine? Is he an intellectual father?

The most important thinker in the field is probably Mao whose doctrine of insurgency understood that insurgency is not a component or a precursor of conventional war but could by itself accomplish military objectives. The greatest thinker in my eyes in COIN remains David Galula who has the enormous advantage of having studied and seen the evolution of insurgency in France during WW2, then spending a great deal of time in Asia, and really having thought through the problem for more than a decade before he practiced COIN himself for a number of years. His book is probably the single biggest influence on FM 3-24, the COIN Field Manual. David Galula is the best COIN theoretician as Kennan was for containment.

What are the lessons of Lawrence of Arabia for COIN doctrine?

Lawrence is more important for insurgency than counterinsurgency. Lawrence was an insurgent himself. The lesson I drew from him is the extraordinary difficulty of conducting COIN, drawing upon on his own thinking about how hard it was for the Turkish army to confront him. Any good strategist is going to look at the battlefield from the enemy perspective and Lawrence did this. He understood the advantages the insurgents have and the disadvantages, and that is probably the greatest insight he provided to the study of COIN. The other significant understanding is when you are working with a host nation population, either leading them in an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign; it is possible to do too much as the intervening power. Ultimately the host nation has to carry the majority of the weight.

How important is the developing of the local troops for winning a COIN campaign?

Ultimately foreign countries cannot defeat an insurgency. Only the host nation forces can do that. But the intervening powers bring enormous advantages to the fight and if you can properly integrate the host nation forces and the intervening forces you can multiply the effects of both and the natural advantages of both. That is the objective, but we have struggled to do that as effectively as we could, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl

Interview with Dr. John Nagl conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor

"Local relationships are really the key in winning a counterinsurgency."

It is usually said that insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are always competitions for legitimacy. Could you explain this?

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are essentially struggles for legitimacy and for competing visions of governance and the future. The goal of the insurgents is political power and in order to gain political power they need to show the people that either they have better programs for the future or that the government is incapable of protecting them. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for winning the trust of the population. To win, a COIN effort needs to show the people that continuing existence under the government is preferable to a not-so-certain future. The struggle for legitimacy and for competing political programs is really at the heart of COIN and insurgencies.

Why is the "population" the center of gravity in a COIN campaign?

The issue is that guerillas don't wear uniforms, but rather civilian clothes and fight among the people. It is very hard to come to grips with who is the enemy and therefore killing or capturing them is difficult at best. The Western approach to COIN is to protect the population and by doing so make it very difficult for insurgents to live among them. By isolating the insurgents from the people, their strength decreases. Living among the people and protecting them normally leads to better intelligence which leads to identifying and targeting insurgents. Moreover, by decreasing the insurgent's support among the people you can reach out to the reconcilable elements.

Download the full article: Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor

Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Decision

The proposed view of decision presented in this essay reflects quite a departure from US "PPBE" procedures, "JOPP" doctrine and Service-equivalent procedures, such as the US Army's Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process. US Joint Forces Command recently released a pamphlet that equally subordinates design as process methodology subservient to a rational-analytic model of decision-making. These depictions unfortunately portray design as just another staff method to reach sufficient commander's understanding in order to eventually reach a rational or programmatic decision.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Decision

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen

What would success and victory look like in a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation? What specific role should the Western expeditionary forces should have in this fight?

What would victory look like? It doesn't look like victory in a conventional military campaign. Insurgency is much like a disease. It has very negative symptoms that affect the whole of society. Victory in COIN is a lot less like military victory and a lot more like recovering from a disease. If you think about the last time you were sick, you may not able to get out of bed, you had to take medicine, you couldn't do the things you wanted to do, but gradually you got stronger and you were able to do more. You might have continued to take antibiotics for a few weeks until you were completely better, but basically, sooner or later, you forgot that you were sick.

When we see societies that have recovered from an insurgency, we typically don't see a single big military victory. What we see is a slow gradual improvement to the point where a society comes back to full functioning. Now in the case of Afghanistan the problem is that the country hasn't functioned properly for at least one generation. Afghanistan in particular is not a counterinsurgency in a classical sense. It is actually a stability operation. We really care about the Taliban because they make the country unstable. But there are other things that make the country unstable as well, including the Afghan government, the destabilization by Pakistan, the corruption and criminal activity, the drugs. There are a lot of things that must be dealt with. If we were to defeat the insurgents, in a military sense tomorrow, and not fix all those others problems, a new Taliban would arise next year. We must think more broadly than counterinsurgency in the context of Afghanistan.

What is the role of foreign forces? I think that the role of foreign forces is to create an environment that is conducive to stability and societal recovery. If you think that victory is when the society recovers, then what we have to do is to create an environment that fosters this recovery. But there are limits to what we can do: we can set the conditions for the Afghans to come together or Iraqis to come together and solve their problems. But the long history of counterinsurgency emphasizes that foreigners can't fix all these issues. It has to be the locals.

Download the full article: Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen

Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Lee Lacy

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

The recent removal of General Stanley McChrystal by President Barack Obama as NATO Commander in Afghanistan sheds some light on the complex relationship of the civilian government with the military in U.S. society. The issue reminds us of a similar disagreement during the Korean War between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. The essay explores the background of this complex relationship, makes comparisons between the two incidents and puts forth lessons learned. An analysis of the two incidents affirms the Constitutional provision of the primacy of civilian elected leaders over military authority. Drawing on archived material from the Truman Presidential Library, historical accounts of the Truman-MacArthur affair and current events, the essay continues the important dialogue of how civil authority and the military establishment interact. Although, first-hand accounts of the Obama-McChrystal affair will not likely be written until the President leaves office, this project serves a reference to study the doctrine of civilian control of the military, for

future generations.

Download the Full Article: A Timely Lesson from the Korean War

Lee Lacy is an Instructor for the Advanced Operations Course at the U.S. Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. Additionally, he is a Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army Reserve, currently in command of Detachment 3, 2100 Military Intelligence Group.