Journal

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Dispatch: Scent of Weakness

Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

25 March 2010

Dogs have been trained to carry bombs to attack enemies for decades. The Soviets and others have used dogs as low-tech smart bombs. Yet canine platoons likely would rebel if they caught scent they were being duped to die.

Today, more sophisticated people employ men (mostly) to deliver bombs in Afghanistan. Gullible souls are selected, conditioned, trained and deployed. Malleable minds are identified then loaded with psychic software that uses their minds to create a vision. Evil persons of superior intellect identify the raw material—that raw material might be an engineer from a stable family—and trains them to fetch myths.

Suicide attackers have murdered countless thousands of people around the world. They go by various names, such as Kamikaze, Black Tiger, and Martyr.

Download the full article: Dispatch: Scent of Weakness

Join Michael Yon for updates and other content at Facebook and Twitter.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Warthog

Kandahar, Afghanistan

23 March 2010

The mission required crossing a bridge that had been blown up a couple hours earlier by a suicide car bomber. The attacker hit a convoy from the 82nd Airborne, killing American soldier Ian Gelig. Now with a hole in the bridge and recovery operations underway, our mission was cancelled. So I called the Air Force to see if they were busy. Yes, it turns out, the Air Force is busy every day, but Captain Kristen Duncan took me down to the ramp where the A-10 "Warthogs" are parked.

Download the full article: Warthog

Join Michael Yon for updates and other content at Facebook and Twitter.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

A Concept for the Fight in Afghanistan

by Major Joseph A. Jackson

Download the full article: Moving Artillery Forward

The United States Army is no stranger to mountainous and high-altitude war fighting. American history contains many instances of successfully executed mountain conflicts. Central to this success was the movement and use of artillery in direct support of those campaigns. The first notable American instance of moving artillery across mountainous terrain occurred when Colonel Henry Knox's Continental Army soldiers wheeled, sledged, and levered the guns from Fort Ticonderoga across the Berkshire Mountains in the winter of 1776. These fifty-nine assorted cannon became the deciding factor in General George Washington's siege of Boston. Other notable campaigns include the U.S. Army operations in the Italian Alps during WWII, the Taebaek Range of Korea, and the Annamite Range in Vietnam. Each of these locations and conditions provides ample instruction on artillery use in mountain warfare; yet this time fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan is proving to be a greater challenge than anticipated.

Strategists and commanders who consider employment of artillery in Afghanistan should take a fresh look at history, doctrine, and tactical concepts. Doing so will ensure artillery can employ optimally, and in sufficient strength, and of the correct caliber to create the tactical conditions for success. Without a significant increase in firepower delivered by a correspondingly lightweight and maneuverable field howitzer, the long-range fight in Afghanistan will devolve into an even deadlier and protracted conflict.

Solely relying on technology and precision munitions incrementally applied across the current arsenal will not achieve the conditions to exploit and pursue the insurgent fighters ever higher and farther into the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Operational planners, artillery professionals, congressional staffers, and military acquisition officers should examine these relevant histories, review doctrine, and consider their implications. These sources serve as a guide to develop successful and sustained operational approaches to combat the Afghan insurgency. They also provide a reference for adaptive tactics and procurement requirements for weapons needed in protracted high-altitude mountain warfare.

Download the full article: Moving Artillery Forward

Major Joseph A. Jackson is a U.S. Army Field Artillery officer with deployment and combat experiences in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He earned a bachelor's degree in history and Russian from Purdue University and master's degrees from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. Major Jackson is presently serving his second tour in Afghanistan with the NATO Training Mission, (NTM-A).

by Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan

Download the full article: A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare

Taliban Warfare has occupied news headlines in the global information expanse for over a decade. It is also a topic of choice for academics and scholars. However, the subject is often viewed and analyzed in a subjective rather than objective manner. It is mostly looked at across the prism of terrorism - atrocities and crimes against humanity committed by a group of non-state, though not stateless, bandits. Seldom has a theorist or practitioner picked up the pen to draw on the military aspects of the war so as to reach correct conclusions as to how could this war come to an acceptable-by-all end. This line of thought and reasoning might hold good for a given category of politicians but the students of military strategy and those involved in kinetic operations in a counterinsurgency campaign remain bewildered on the nature of the war. There is a need to understand Taliban as people, not monster, and as warriors not gangsters. Likewise, Taliban Warfare is required to be understood in correct military perspective rather than a mere act of crime, terrorism or banditry.

Download the full article: A Strategic Perspective on Taliban Warfare

Lieutenant Colonel Ehsan Mehmood Khan hails from Pakistan and is pursuing a Masters in Strategic Security Studies at National Defense University, Washington D.C. He has served in the low intensity conflict zone bordering Afghanistan. His research papers and op-eds frequently appear in prestigious military magazines and national newspapers. He writes on current affairs, security issues and military strategy.

the value of intimate local knowledge or to replicate thorough local cultural understanding.

However, just because we'll never get it perfect doesn't mean you can't get it better. 

Here's how one unit expanded and applied their local knowledge. Consider these techniques

as a force multiplier (+/- quality control?) for your local SMEs.

The Tribal Configuration Matrix

by Jeffrey A. Sinclair, Colonel US Army, Bud P. Cook, Ph.D.,  and Hamad Abdelnour,

BS/EE

Download the full article:

The

Tribal Configuration Matrix

Nearly every military commander in Iraq and Afghanistan developed some form of

process to analyze indigenous populations to determine agendas and motivations in

geographical centers tied to security. In the past five years success in this effort

has been mixed based upon the level of violence in any given area and often the

level of experience and talent among ground forces or the analysts that support

their efforts.

In 2008 I was introduced to a unique tool in the early development phase by my

assigned Human Terrain Team. This data call system known as the Tribal Configuration

Matrix (TCM) established the first documented baseline for effects based operations

in our Brigade's Operational Environment. This tribal network tool resulted in a

reconfiguration of the brigade staff to full time effects groups focused on tribal

networks in lethal and non-lethal targeting, the new Rule of Law, and political

party influences under the recently elected provincial governments. The unique understanding

of the sub-tribal powers and their relationships allowed the brigade to rapidly

shift from COIN to Foreign Internal Defense and cement the gains of the previous

five years through functional relationships with tribal and institutional leaders.

Download the full article:

The

Tribal Configuration Matrix

Col. Jeffrey A. Sinclair is the Commanding Officer of the 172nd Infantry Brigade

headquartered in Grafenwohr Germany.  He has served in Afghanistan and Iraq

as a Task Force and Brigade Combat Team Commander. 

Bud P. Cook, Ph.D. is a former Human Terrain Team Social Scientist assigned

to the 172nd Infantry Brigade at FOB Kalsu Iraq.  He is currently a Senior

Social Scientist with Tech Project Inc. 

Hamad Abdelnour is a Human Terrain Team Research Manager and is currently

OCONUS.

Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions

by Bing West

Download the full article: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions

The seizure of Marja in Helmand Province was the largest operation in the Afghanistan war, conducted by approximately 2,500 American and 1,500 Afghan troops versus 400-800 insurgents. Chris Chivers of the New York Times moved with Battalion 3-6, Mike Phillips of the Wall Street Journal with 1-6, Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the Washington Post with 1-6 and with the brigade headquarters. I went up to Now Zad, began the operation with 1-6 and spent most of the month in southern Marja with Task Force Commando, comprised of 40 Marines and Special Forces and 400 askars and police. Marja marked my third embed with Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) units.

The basic question is whether the seizure of Marja was sui generis, with few techniques of general applicability, or was an example, like Tal Afar in the Iraq war, with wider implications.

Let's look at what happened, why, and what carries forward?

Download the full article: Applying Counterinsurgency to Local Conditions

Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine, has made two dozen extended trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. The author of The Village and The Strongest Tribe, he is currently writing a book about the war in Afghanistan.

by Colonel Ellen Haring

Download the full article: Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

Today, violent conflict in the Pashtun tribal belt in Afghanistan and Pakistan is increasing and a number of experts are attempting to understand the dynamics driving this conflict. An examination of two key identities of the Pashtun people reveals how religious identity is being mobilized by one group for political purposes and ethnic identity is inadvertently being threatened by another group. The resulting vortex of threat and mobilization are the source of this increased violence. This paper analyzes the ethnic and religious identities of the Pashtun people to illustrate how identities are used to influence conflict and it will then offer ways for the US and the international community to adjust their activities to reduce conflict in the Pashtun tribal belt.

Download the full article: Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

Colonel Ellen Haring is a civil affairs officer assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command at USJFCOM but currently serving as an assistant professor for the US Army's Command and General Staff College. She teaches a range of topics related to strategic and operational planning for the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations. She holds a masters degree in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University and her graduate studies and personal interests are in conflict analysis and resolution with a regional focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

by Michael Miklaucic

Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy

Shock and awe don't leave much room for empathy. The doctrine, technically known as "rapid dominance" may have devastated the military capability of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in short order, but America's failure to win the peace in either Iraq or Afghanistan with overwhelming military force has galvanized a profound re-thinking of the concept of war, the process of peace, and the challenges of failing states. This is evident in national strategies, doctrines, policies, manuals and the quadrennial defense review, as well as countless other official and unofficial statements, both military and civilian. Reflection on such a scale on so many levels and across such a broad range of disciplines and agencies is rare and impressive. The output has been dramatic, the implied self-criticism penetrating, and the insights promising, but there is a potentially a profound misunderstanding at the heart of much of this that could result in failure, defeat, and death.

The central epiphany of the new thinking is the recognition that the object of war, at least of the kind of wars that have been prevalent in recent decades, is the people. This message comes through clearly in such documents as the recent military field manuals on counterinsurgency, stabilization operations and unconventional warfare, not to mention General McChrystal's recent strategic analysis of the Afghanistan war. The population dimension has also been re-discovered by diplomats who lament the loss of our previously robust public diplomacy capacity. For the development community the focus and main constituency for their efforts has traditionally been the population, though on occasion that focus has been lost in the halls and offices of ministries throughout the developing world capitals.

Download the full article: The Tea Fallacy

Michael Miklaucic is Director of Research and PRISIM Editor for National Defence University's Center for Complex Operations.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Man Dogs

In David Galula's 1964 book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, he states:

Mr. Galula described Afghanistan almost perfectly. Instead of jungle-covered mountains are some of the most extreme folds on planet Earth: The "abode of snow," the Himalaya. Afghan elevations dwarf Mount Rainier. By comparison, the great Colorado Rockies are the Pygmy Snow Hills. Meanwhile, down in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, Galula's "swamps" are the "Green Zones," where most of the current fighting occurs.

Yet the experienced Mr. Galula omitted a crucial factor that describes the Afghan war: A heavily armed, warring amalgam of peoples, whose national sport and pastime is guerrilla warfare. British officer John Masters variously described in Bugles and a Tiger: My life in the Gurkhas that life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness for some tribesmen includes vendettas, guerrilla warfare and lots of guns.

This weekend, on Saturday night, mass murderers struck. Taliban terrorists used bombs and other weapons in Kandahar City to murder about 35 people. They wounded another five dozen, and damaged about forty homes, according to reports. Enthusiasm to commit wholesale murder is one of the enemy's prime weaknesses.

About 12 miles from the suicide attacks on Saturday night, is the runway at Kandahar Airfield, where operations continue every minute of the day.

Download the full article: Man Dogs

Join Michael Yon for updates and other content at Facebook and Twitter.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

Forgotten Lessons from a Misunderstood Conflict

by Commander H. Canuel

Download the full article: French Counterinsurgency in Algeria

While Henry Kissinger encouraged President Bush to read Alistair Horne's seminal study of the Algerian War of Independence, A Savage War of Peace, during the debate on the troop surge to Iraq, this conflict remains largely ignored as a source of inspiration for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Iraq and Afghanistan have generated a new body of literature on the subject but authors studying the pre-9/11 era continue to look for lessons largely through the American and British experience of fighting communist insurgents in the jungles of Vietnam and Malaya. Much less exists when it comes to drawing lessons regarding the conduct of operations in a large, desert-like, Middle-eastern country where a widespread insurgency is conducted in both urban and countryside environments by different elements of a Muslim population often motivated by diverging tribal, nationalist and Islamist aims.

The Algerian War of Independence does provide such similarities in terms of geography and topography, social makeup, as well as military and insurgent forces at play. The French, however, lost Algeria after eight years of bitter fighting and the subject is further obscured by the emotions surrounding the atrocities by both sides, thus making the collation of objective testimonies difficult. Most confusing, though, are the circumstances specific to a troubled France at the time, such as the profound tensions that existed between citizens in the métropole and French immigrants in Algeria proper, the continued effort to resume its former place as a major power in the world, the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, as well as the return to power of de Gaulle amidst popular turmoil and threatened coup d'état by the military.

Nevertheless, once these various elements are peeled away, one realizes that the Algerian conflict offers an indispensable insight, truly relevant to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations (COIN) in today's security environment. While avoiding the political debate over the validity of France's claim over her North African possession, this article will demonstrate that French military forces actually waged a successful campaign in Algeria, virtually eliminating the insurgent forces in the field but losing the war at home. Such success was long in the making, following years of trial and errors before culminating in the required, all-encompassing structure under the plan Challe of 1959. Before drawing such conclusions, however, the reader must be introduced to the conflict that started rather innocuously in the morning hours of the Toussaint of 1954.

Download the full article: French Counterinsurgency in Algeria

Commander Hugues Canuel assumed command of the replenishment ship PRESERVER in December 2009. He holds two MAs from the Royal Military College of Canada and is a graduate of the Command and Staff Course at the Canadian Forces College. He has deployed twice to Southwest Asia since 9/11. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Forces.

Book Review by Major Ian S. Davis

Download the full article: Understanding Terror Networks

Citation: Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 220 pages. $29.95 hardcover.

The global Salafi jihad is a complex social movement intent on the defeat of Western powers and the establishment of the Caliphate. Marc Sageman's Understanding Terror Networks examines the ideological foundation Safali jihad organizations and the role that social networks play in the expansion of radical Islamic extremism throughout the world. Sageman's diverse professional background with both practical and scientific experience lends to the credibility of his research-based argument. A Harvard graduate with doctoral degrees in medicine and political sociology from New York University, Sageman served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Islamabad, Pakistan during the Afghan-Soviet war from 1987 to 1989. After leaving the Foreign Service in 1991, he entered the field of forensic psychology and studied the psychological and sociological explanations of collective violence. Sageman's arguments are free of political bias and supported by scholarly literature and empirical data. The first two chapters of the book, "The Origins of the Jihad" and "Evolution of the Jihad," examine the ideological foundation of the Salafi jihad. The next three chapters, "The Mujahedin," "Joining the Jihad," and "Social Networks," examine the psychological, sociological, and organizational factors of the global Salafi jihad. Finally, Sageman offers recommendations for illuminating and defeating Salafi jihad networks.

Download the full article: Understanding Terror Networks

Major Ian Davis has over 22 years of active duty service with the majority of his career assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in key enlisted and officer operational billets. He is currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in the Defense Analysis program.

Breaking Down the Arguments

by Jeffrey Dressler and Reza Jan

Download the full article: A Sea Change in Pakistan?

Pakistani forces have seized a number of high-ranking Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) leaders in recent weeks. Pakistan has actively supported the QST in Afghanistan (which it created in 1995) as a proxy force to ensure Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan and defend against Indian encroachment there. The recent arrests have caused a flurry of speculation about possible changes in Pakistani policy. Some analysts argue that these recent arrests signal Pakistan's wholesale abandonment of the Afghan Taliban while others are quick to dismiss these actions as self-serving. Pakistani decision making is rarely so clear, however, especially regarding an issue of such momentous importance. There appears to be a fissure in Pakistan's long-standing support for the QST.

Download the full article: A Sea Change in Pakistan?

Jeffrey Dressler is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and author of the recent report "Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy." Reza Jan is a Researcher at Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute and recent author of "The FATA Conflict after South Waziristan: Pakistan's War against Militants Continues in Orakzai, Kurram, Bajaur, and North Waziristan."

by Captain Andrew R. Feitt

Download the full article: Countering the IMU in Afghanistan

Foreign Fighters (FF) have always played a significant role in the conflicts in Afghanistan. Whether it was the large numbers of Arabs, Central Asians, and others who swelled the ranks of the mujahidin during the Soviet invasion or the al-Qa'ida and other Islamist fighters who buttressed the Taliban's forces during the late 1990s and the past decade, well-equipped and motivated FF groups have provided a manifest benefit to their allies. Outside of al-Qa'ida itself, one of the most numerous and active FF groups operating in Afghanistan is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Though its members and operations are focused in only a handful of districts in Afghanistan, the IMU's disciplined fighters form an elite training cadre acting as a true combat multiplier for the Afghan Taliban, and thus its influence is felt exponentially across much of the country's south. In places like the Deh Chopan district of Zabul province, the IMU is a critical piece of the local insurgency. However, the past year has dealt a series of setbacks to the group: from the possible death of their leader, Tahir Yuldashev, to the large-scale Pakistani Military operations directed against their safe havens in Waziristan. Deprived of leadership and under pressure in Pakistan, the IMU is now at a crossroads regarding its future in the Afghan conflict. This article will briefly examine the history of the IMU in southern Afghanistan; their importance to the Taliban insurgency, and examine how to best counter the group's dangerous influence in light of General McChrystal's population-centric focus and the addition of 30,000 new U.S. soldiers to the country.

The IMU has its origins in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The victory of the mujahidin and the collapse of Communism formed a nexus of burgeoning Islamism across Central Asia. It was in the volatile Fergana Valley at the crux of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, where a young mullah named Tahir Yuldashev and a former Soviet paratrooper with the nom du guerre 'Juma Namangani' first began to organize an Islamist movement against the autocratic Uzbek government of Islam Karimov. When the government cracked down on their movement in 1992, Yuldashev and Namangani fled to neighboring Tajikistan. Following that country's descent into civil war a short time later, they again fled -- this time to Afghanistan. It was during this period that the rebel Uzbek movement grew closer to the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, and took on its current character.

Download the full article: Countering the IMU in Afghanistan

Captain Andrew R. Feitt is a Military Intelligence officer assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). He has deployed to Iraq in 2005 and 2007 with the 3rd Infantry Division, and to Afghanistan in 2009 with the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne).

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: The Bridge

Shah Wali Kot, Afghanistan

11 March 2009

The military axiom that "amateurs talk strategy while professionals talk logistics" has special meaning in Afghanistan. During the Soviet war, though the Bear comprised Afghanistan's entire northern border, the Afghan resistance was frequently able to block Soviet logistical operations, which were dependent on scant roads, tunnels and corridors. Captured Soviet logistics convoys often supplied the Mujahidin.

Logistics in landlocked Afghanistan are exceptionally tough because the country is a transportation nightmare of impassable mountains, barren deserts, rugged landscape with only capillary roads and airports.

When we lose a bridge, we can't just detour twenty miles to the next one, as we might on the plains of Europe. In Afghanistan, there might not be another route for hundreds of miles. Conversely, Afghan fighters, who have used guerilla warfare tactics for decades -- centuries even -- lack our tanks, vehicles and massive supply lines, leaving them less dependent on infrastructure. Most of the guerrillas we face are from the immediate area. Their corn comes from their own stalks; ours comes from other continents.

Download the full article: The Bridge

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Eric Jardine

Download the full article: Buying the Enemy: Demobilization Programs in the Midst of COIN

On January 28th, 2010, leaders from 70 nations met in London for a conference on the future of Afghanistan. Among the various topics that were discussed, which included the combat of government corruption and the training of the Afghan National Army, one subject in particular rose to a place of prominence. This was the proposal for a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund that would facilitate the demobilization and reintegration of Taliban and other insurgent fighters back into Afghan society. As the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, stated in his opening address to the assembled delegates, "We are today establishing an international trust fund to finance this Afghan-led peace and reintegration program to provide an economic alternative to those who have none." Immediately following the conference, pledges of support were given and the Fund's revenues swelled to an estimated 500 million dollars.

The basic premise of the Fund is that a properly structured program can provide an incentive for Taliban fighters to renounce violence and to reintegrate into Afghan society. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has endorsed the Fund, while also revealing something of its basic assumption, stating: "We expect that a lot of the foot soldiers on the battlefield will be leaving the Taliban [as a result of the fund] because many of them ... are tired of fighting." The fund is intended, therefore, to provide a material incentive for disillusioned guerrillas to quit the battle, particularly those that have chosen violence out of sheer economic necessity. Such a targeting is also liable to be fairly effective, because, according to some U.S. estimates, as many as 80 percent of Taliban insurgents are fighting only out of the need for money and not out of any broader ideological design. While the accuracy of this statistical figure could be disputed, the typical seasonal lull in insurgency intensity, which tends to correspond to periods of agricultural demand for laborers, does suggest that if proper incentives could be constructed many individuals might choose to work rather than to fight.

The use of such an incentive program appears to be quite promising and it has won numerous adherents within the United States' mission in Afghanistan. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, for example, rhetorically stated with reference to the fund, that: "The people out there we are talking about are not the ideological leaders. And isn't it a lot better to invite them off the battlefield through a program of jobs, land, [and] integration, than it is to have to try and kill everyone one of them?" Similarly, the top American General in-theatre, Stanley McChrystal, argued that, "A political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome," and "reintegration of fighters can take a lot of energy out of the current levels of insurgency."

Similar programs have, of course, been used in other counterinsurgencies. During the British conduct of counterinsurgency in Malaya 1948-1960, a fund was established to encourage communist guerrillas to turn in their arms and to demobilize in exchange for 350 dollars and a sack of rice. This program failed in many of its objectives, with only an approximate 20 percent of arms and insurgents turning themselves over to the authorities. These rewards were offered during the early stages of the insurgency, when ideological fervor was strongest and the outcome of the struggle was still in question. And so, in this instance, the incentives were too weak to properly induce insurgency fighters to quit the battle.

Download the full article: Buying the Enemy: Demobilization Programs in the Midst of COIN

Eric Jardine is a Ph.D. candidate in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, and a Ph.D. Student Fellow of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University. He has written award-winning essays on civil-military relations and the conduct of counterinsurgency and has published articles in The Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, SITREP, The Canadian Military Journal, and Strategic Datalink. His Doctoral research focuses upon the conduct and the resolution of counterinsurgencies, with a particular focus on Algeria, Indo-China and Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Putting the "I" in the COIN Team

The German General Staff system had it faults, but as T. N. Dupuy pointed out in has classic study, A Genius for War , it produced a system that institutionalized excellence at the tactical and operational levels of war from the defeat of Napoleon to the final moments of World War II. No-one who has ever served on or with a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Iraq or Afghanistan is likely to equate PRTs with the Germans who wore the purple stripe on their trousers. However, the Germans had one thing that PRTs could use; that being a shared vision and mission focus.

PRTs are, by nature, interagency bodies. There, we find their potential strength and their shared weakness. Each member of a PRT brings with him or her, the strength of his parent organization as well as its institutional baggage. If the members of the team cannot create a shared vision and shed some of that baggage, the team becomes dysfunctional. PRTs which develop a shared vision and mission focus inevitably will become key elements to the counterinsurgency effort; those that do not, become liabilities. Institutionalizing excellence in PRT performance should become a key goal as we move forward in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Download the full article: Putting the "I" in the COIN Team

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He recently left the State Department after a year-long tour as the Senior Governance Advisor to and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq.

by Dr. Mark Moyar

Download the full article: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost

At last week's SAIS/Texas Tech conference "Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost: Counterinsurgency from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan," the final panel assessed which lessons of the past have been applied or should be applied, and which have been disregarded or should be disregarded. As a member of that panel, and as someone who has visited Afghanistan recently, I think that the contents of the discussion will interest many readers of the Small Wars Journal, so I have recorded what I consider the most important lessons learned and lessons lost.

In a series of panels spanning two days, the conference concentrated for the most part on the relevance of counterinsurgency practices from Vietnam and Iraq to the current war in Afghanistan. One common theme was that we need to protect the population as Creighton Abrams and David Petraeus did, and as William Westmoreland and George Casey did not. Another was that we need to allocate more resources and people to non-military activities. Some speakers and audience members argued that we have been too concerned with a "top-down" approach in Afghanistan and ought to focus instead on "bottom-up" solutions like Vietnam's CIDGs in Vietnam and the Sons of Iraq, because the central governments in all three cases were weak. The most pessimistically inclined argued that Vietnam showed that an indigenous government without legitimacy and a powerful cause can never win a counterinsurgency and thus the Afghan enterprise is doomed.

This discourse is emblematic of much of what one hears about counterinsurgency today in government conference rooms, military lecture halls, newspaper offices, and think tanks. It is based on flawed interpretations of history as well as a misunderstanding of the nature of counterinsurgency, and therefore is in dire need of correction. Although there is value in discussing the merits of tactics centered on the population versus tactics centered on the enemy, or military activities versus non-military activities, or "top-down" approaches versus "bottom-up" approaches, those discussions do not get us very far. They also distract attention from the most important factor in the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency—the people responsible for leading counterinsurgency activities.

Download the full article: Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost

Dr. Mark Moyar is professor of national security affairs at the Marine Corps University and author of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (2009), Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (2006), and Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam (1997, new edition 2007).

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

Download the full article: Is There an Islamic Way of War?

Times have surely changed since that noon of March 10, 1982, when President Ronald Reagan dedicated the March 22nd launch of the Columbia Space Shuttle to the valiant Afghans and termed their struggle (Jihad) against the occupation forces of Soviet Union as a representation of 'man's highest aspirations for freedom'. While I remorsefully recognize any nation's right to change and chop morality in the service of supreme national interest, I refuse to respect those dishonest historians and scare-mongering 'experts' who consider it their right to drag a great faith and its messenger into this ugly fight over heaps of sands that hide a lot of oil.

I profess and practice the same great faith as Osama bin Laden and yet the country that I have pledged my life to has lost more than 2500 soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians in our hot pursuit of Bin Laden's gang over the last ten years. Thousands of Muslims across the world have died in the bloodshed caused by large armies of proud nations and small bands of determined fanatics resolved to bomb themselves into paradise. To say that any religion, let alone Islam, can condone or approve killing of innocent bystanders is not only ridiculous but also a lie that has already had catastrophic consequences for humanity. This wholesale branding and stereotyping of a faith, that essentially is a literal extension of Judeo-Christian religious tradition, has pitched two sister civilizations against each other. Evil arguments and wicked debates nurtured in the dark hatcheries of criminal minds have engendered seemingly insurmountable levels of misunderstanding, distrust and animosity.

Fear mongering has become the fastest growing industry over the last ten years in the global fight against terrorism. Thousands of books and articles written by self-proclaimed terror experts, war correspondents and regional gurus have perpetrated intellectual sabotage on the unsuspecting minds of readers and viewers. No limits seem to have been respected in the exercise of intelligence and intellect in defining the 'enemy'. With dehumanization of faceless terrorists, many a legitimate freedom struggle and a whole faith professed by no less than 1.5 billion people have been condemned. Unfortunately, countless sane minds have fallen prey to the vagaries of dishonest words and perverted pictures.

Download the full article: Is There an Islamic Way of War?

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan's Command and Staff College in Quetta.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Of Concern

Monday, 08 March 2010

Kandahar, Afghanistan

Yesterday, an American involved in the war effort handed me a document. It was an email from a Lieutenant Colonel in the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan. His unit is in combat seven days a week. To be clear, I did not get the email from the officer and I have never met him.

The email is about the abysmal, unsafe conditions which some of our most dedicated troops are living in, at a remote base run by the Spanish military in Afghanistan. All deletions [xxx] are by me. I have the entire email. The serious and disturbing allegations are found in the second and third paragraphs.

Please note, that the failure to support permanent US troops at this Spanish base constitutes real negligence about their ultimate safety. And that comes on top of a degree of harassment that is shocking among allies.

Download the full article: Of Concern

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Ken Guest, 'RAM' Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards

Download the full article: The Tribal Path -- A Better Alternative?

The current internationally agreed strategy for Afghanistan is unlikely to work as it has been based on flawed assumptions or hopes.

What Afghanistan really needs is a central government with a light but effective footprint, empowered tribal leaders, and a small, professional, well-trained army and police force in support of tribal security forces, provided by and controlled by the tribes. If these could be established and put into effect, they could revolutionise the situation in Afghanistan.

An independent and authoritative study is urgently needed to establish the viability of the tribal path and, more importantly perhaps, how to get on it and follow it successfully.

Download the full article: The Tribal Path -- A Better Alternative?

Ken Guest is a former Royal Marine and photo-journalist. He is currently working in Kabul and has now been closely involved with Afghanistan for 29 years. During their struggle against the Soviets he probably spent more time inside Afghanistan, living and working with the Mujahedin, than any other Western witness to that conflict. A sizable part of this time was with Jalalludin Haqanni, who now runs the Taliban campaign on the Eastern border. He has also drunk tea and discussed religion with Osama bin Laden. As a result of that past, he has a first hand knowledge of not just how the ordinary Afghan thinks, but how the Taliban and Al Qaeda think and act. Ken has written, contributed to and illustrated several books eg Flashpoint! and British Battles.

'RAM' Seeger is a former Royal Marine who left the corps in 1976 after commanding the Special Boat Service. He won a Military Cross with 40 Commando during the Borneo confrontation, was an instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and attended the Army staff college at Camberley. After leaving the Corps he set up a Special Force for the Sultan of Oman and then became a security consultant. During the early 1980s he made a number of trips into occupied Afghanistan to give training and help to the Mujahedin. Most of these were to the Panshir valley and for the benefit of the followers of Ahmed Shah Massoud. After this he did an MA degree in War Studies at King's College London. In 2001 he lobbied for Western support of Abdul Hak, along with Ken Guest and another friend and colleague -- Sir John Gunston.

Lucy Morgan Edwards first worked in Afghanistan running urban development projects in Kandahar and Herat. After spending five years there as a journalist and election monitor she became political advisor to Francesc Vendrell, the EU Special Representative. She is currently writing a book on Abdul Haq, and like Ken and RAM, feels that the West missed a great opportunity by not backing him in 2001. She is married to the Director of Law for the International Committee of the Red Cross.

by James Q. Roberts

Download the full article: Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency

We can debate whether we are at war with Al Qaeda, but rest assured Al Qaeda is at war with us. The targets, methods, diversity, geographic dispersion, and lethality or near lethality of the recent series of Al Qaeda inspired attacks should cause us to reassess the very nature of this conflict.

Attacks in the last few months include a shooting spree by U.S. Army Major Dr. Nidal Hasan, at Fort Hood; an attempted aircraft bombing by Abdulmuttalab, a Nigerian, over Detroit; an axe attack by Muhamed Geele, a Somali, in Denmark; and a precision suicide bombing by Dr. al-Bawali, a Jordanian, in Khost, Afghanistan. Only al-Balawi had ever been to Afghanistan or Pakistan; and he was apparently sent there by the Jordanian intelligence service, perhaps with help or urging by our Central Intelligence Agency.

These events show that Al Qaeda franchisees are operating without need of direction from the corporate headquarters. Al Qaeda today is a flat, dispersed, multi-celled structure which executes on "commander's intent" not waiting for orders from above. Actors self radicalize, seek out and connect with inspirational figures like Al Aulaqi in Yemen, and execute plots independent of commands from senior leaders.

This paper proposes a change in our approach. It argues that Al Qaeda is conducting an "outsurgency"- similar to, but different from - an insurgency. Furthermore, that this movement is underpinned by virulent and violent Zawahirist ideology, and that containment (as in the context of the Cold War) and counterinsurgency doctrines might be adapted to form the basis of an improved U.S. national strategy to combat Al Qaeda.

Download the full article: Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency

James Q. Roberts is the Principal Director (Special Operations and Combating Terrorism), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

These are his personal observations, and do not represent OSD, DoD, or USG policy.

Implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy

Northeast Afghanistan, May 07 -- July 08

by Major Nathan Springer

Download the full article: Implementing a Population-Centric COIN Strategy

This paper will examine the successful implementation of population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in northeastern Afghanistan through the lens of my experiences executing it in my area of operations as an Army Troop Commander from May 2007 -- January 2008 and as the Squadron Fires Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) Officer in Charge, responsible for the squadron's application of non-lethal effects in the northern Konar provincial districts of Naray and Ghaziabad and the eastern Nuristan provincial district of Kamdesh. I will recount how my unit, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173rd ABCT, arrived at the decision to apply a population-centric strategy and will outline the differences between an enemy-centric and population-centric focus, the transition points between the two strategies and within the population-centric strategy, and implementation of the population-centric strategy by line of operation. Finally, I will describe a battlefield calculus in terms of the time, patience, and personal relationships required to immediately empower the traditional Afghan leadership and population, from the village and the tribal levels on up, and at the same time marginalize and isolate the insurgency.

I have had the privilege of deploying to both Iraq and Afghanistan where I witnessed the implementation of two disparate strategies within the context of the War on Terror. My first deployment, OIF II in 2004-05, was set in Iraq's Sunni Triangle within a Squadron Area of Operation (AO) that stretched from Samarra north to Tikrit. My Squadron implemented an enemy-centric strategy. The enemy-centric strategy worked well in the most volatile central and southern portions of our expansive AO but we failed to recognize the situation was different in our northern AO. I didn't know it then but our Squadron missed a potentially game-changing 'transition point' in that portion of our AO. A transition point is a key juncture where the operating environment necessitates the implementation of a new strategy or the adaptation of an existing strategy to accommodate the fluid conditions on the ground. It would take a deployment to Afghanistan in 2007-08 and the implementation of a population-centric strategy for me to fully digest this and to assign full relevance to transition points, whether they represented a 180 shift from a wholly enemy-centric to a population-centric strategy, like our missed opportunity in Iraq, or the simple recognition of the transition points within our population-centric strategy in Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Implementing a Population-Centric COIN Strategy

Major Nathan Springer, U.S. Army, is Chief of Operations of the U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: A Thank You to U.S. Service Members

Dear Michael Yon,

Today we were sent your story of February 14, 2010. The "unknown" Canadian is our son Danny. He is a 23-year-old solider from Vancouver, Canada.

Your photographs were extraordinary and have impacted so many people here in Canada. There has been an outpouring of affection for the Americans who helped Danny in his moment of need. For that, we thank you for recording these acts of kindness into history.

Danny's injuries were the result of an explosion on February 12, 2010. Four Canadian soldiers were injured and tragically one Canadian soldier was killed. Within 20 minutes of the explosion, Danny was airlifted by helicopter to Kandahar. Upon arrival he received emergency surgery that saved his life and prepared him for the flight to Bagram that you were on.

After landing in Bagram, Danny was again airlifted by a US transport aircraft to the US Army run Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. There he underwent additional surgery that closed up his wounds. Once stabilized, the Canadian government dispatched a Challenger jet to bring him home. This afternoon in Vancouver, the shrapnel that did all the damage to him was finally removed. Danny is now recovering in hospital.

This was Danny's second tour of duty in Afghanistan and his platoon on this tour has had heavy causalities and injuries. Physically, Danny will overcome his injuries. He also has the support of his family, his friends and his community to deal with the emotional side of this war. Our hearts go out to those families who have had the loss of a solider or who have had to deal with greater injuries.

Danny and his whole family are very grateful, and are actually overwhelmed, by the support he received while in US care. The Canadian military have also been wonderful. It is our intention to personally thank everyone who worked so hard to save Danny's life. We have already made contact with Major Deborah "Lucy" Lehker to thank her.

Sincerely,

Jim & Holly

Download the full article: A Thank You to U.S. Service Members

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

A Civilian's View

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism

Every twenty years or so, our Army has a furious internal debate over what kind of army it wants to be. We are not talking about an argument over civilian driven social experimentation such as the controversy over gays in the military; this one involves basic disagreement on how America's Army should doctrinally fight. With the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, nobody cherishes doctrine more than the U.S. Army and Air Force. The Marines consider doctrine to be a polite suggestion, and the Navy generally refuses to recognize the concept altogether.

The current debate raging among Army professionals is over how we should deal with insurgencies such as Iraq and Afghanistan. One side holds that the best way to defeat an insurgency is to win over the populace; this is loosely called population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN). The other school holds that the correct course is to kill the insurgents and destroy their cadres; this is known as counterterrorism (CT). The debate is less about tactics than it is about the future philosophical orientation of the Army beyond Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He recently left the State Department after a year tour in Iraq.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Whispers

Around Afghanistan

22 February 2010

"Johnny Boy" Captain John Holland was walking out to the aircraft just as I arrived at the flight line.

Captain Holland asked, "Are you ready?"

"Yes Sir."

The Marjah offensive—billed as the biggest US/NATO/Afghan assault on the Taliban ever—had begun. With it, the attention of nearly all the reporters covering Afghanistan is focused on Marjah. Yet fighting continues across the country, in provinces with names unfamiliar to most people. Men and women are wounded. Some die. Some are saved by dedicated medical crews, and by the pilots who fly into combat to ferry wounded to some of the best trauma facilities in the world, right here in Afghanistan. This story is about the people who care for our troops, wounded correspondents, and many other people, day in, day out.

Download the full article: Whispers

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Tilbrook (Australian Army), Lieutenant Colonel Frank Elgin (Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Colonel Ian Kippen (British Army), and Major Grant Martin (U.S. Army)

Download the full article: Supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan

At the end of the 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan, the government of the United Kingdom announced that "a more stable and secure Afghanistan is vital to our national security and to that of the wider world." The plan for the Afghans to take the lead in their own security by early 2011 came with an increase in Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 305,000, enhanced provincial and lower-level government capability, and measures to tackle corruption. These are demanding tasks, given the increase in recent violence. Promises of International debt relief and aid could mean little without stability, but stability is untenable without security and legitimate governance. So what are we doing to achieve this vision of a stable and secure Afghanistan?

On 21 November 2009, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the U.S. Headquarters charged with training and advising the Afghan Police, Army, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Defense closed its doors. Well, not quite. CSTC-A never really went away; for political and monetary reasons it still exists, mainly to provide a link to U.S. funding and activities beyond the remit of Coalition Nations. What took its place is a new, 3-star General Officer Headquarters: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), commanded by Lieutenant-General William B. Caldwell IV, recently the commander of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, KS. Elevating the command to a 3-star position was more than a symbol of President Obama's refocusing of the effort in Afghanistan on building the capacity of the ANSF, the new command comes with a possible increase of $15 billion over the next three years and the transfer of authority for training fully to NATO.

Download the full article: Supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Tilbrook (Australian Army), Lieutenant Colonel Frank Elgin (Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Colonel Ian Kippen (British Army), and Major Grant Martin (U.S. Army) are assigned to the headquarters of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

A Six-Pack of Books

by Captain Kelly Jones and Major Scott Shaw

Download the full article: Jump Starting Your Professional Reading Program

Full Disclosure: We, the authors of this article, are die-hard readers. We love reading, especially anything that can help make us and our Soldiers more effective leaders in this profession of ours in which learning is an absolute imperative. We've incorporated professional reading into our personal development, and we've integrated it as a fundamental part of our leader development program in our units. Additionally, over the past four years we have led the "Pro Reading" part of the Platoon Leader and Company Command online professional forums, which members can find at http://ProReading.army.mil. In that role, we've been exposed to what other members of the profession are reading and what books are making an impact on leaders across our Army.

If one thing is clear about our current fight, it is that junior leaders are being given much more autonomy than many of us ever had. In order to deal with the ever increasing responsibilities of today's platoon leaders, we, the company commanders and field grade officers of our Army, must give these young bucks and buckettes the tools to succeed. This includes the nurturing of analytical skills (Troop Leading Procedures) in conjunction with the intuitive leadership skills that are necessary in combat, and the ability to deal with the aftermath of combat as well. The question is how to do that without breaking the bank. When the price of a platoon leader learning his or her trade could be the life of a Soldier or several Soldiers, then we owe it to those Soldiers to educate their leaders before entering the fray.

One powerful way to develop your leaders is through a professional reading program. The fundamental assumption informing this article is that professional reading is critical not only to individual development but also to collective learning and development in our units. Many of you are undoubtedly saying, "It's too hard. My platoon leaders aren't interested. And, I don't have the time to do it when I am in between deployments." We hear what you are saying and counter it with, "If we could figure out how to do it, then you can too." A dedicated professional reading program costs the unit less than a hundred dollars -- and if you have a library near-by, possibly nothing -- and builds the mental Rolodex of a platoon leader.

To jump-start a reading program, you have to start out with some sort of "What do I want to get out of this?" question. That may seem intuitive, but many leaders just throw out random books, and the result is less than desirable. With the hundreds of books and multitudes of reading lists out there for a platoon leader, how do you narrow down the scope of your reading to what is applicable to you? We don't have the answer, but we would like to share some suggestions. Based on our experience, we offer six books that we believe are classic volumes to give to platoon leaders to start discussion on issues from the tactical to the ethical and everything in between.

Download the full article: Jump Starting Your Professional Reading Program

Captain Kelly S Jones is a recent graduate of the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course and is the Executive Officer of a Civil Affairs Company. He received a B.S. from Clarion University of Pennsylvania. His military education includes Mounted Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Airborne and the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course. He has served both as a Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in 1-34 AR, Fort Riley, Kansas and Iraq.

Major Scott Shaw is the Bde AS-3 in 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division. He received a B.S. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Norwich University, and an M.M.A.S from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served as a Headquarters and Rifle Company Commander in Afghanistan and Iraq and led a Battalion Military Transition Team in Iraq.

Kelly and Scott continue to work with CompanyCommand.com's Pro-Reading Forum and welcome comments and ideas to help promote professional reading at the company and battalion level.

by William S. McCallister

Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah

Initial reports are optimistic. The combined Afghan and Coalition forces have successfully penetrated into the Taliban heartland and are well on their way toward securing a key population center. Taliban resistance is weak and disorganized. The local market-place has been liberated from the poppy-mafia. The Afghan national flag flies once again over Marjah.

The popular press describes the battle for Marjah in simple cause and effect narratives. The Taliban, disorganized and weak have quit the town. Civil administrators stand ready to assume the reigns of governance and to initiate economic reforms. Economic development projects will attract the local population to the central government. Enhanced security will encourage the locals to pledge their loyalty to the Karzai regime.

Reshaping the political economy of Marjah is a critical task in winning Afghanistan's population centric counterinsurgency. Afghan forces must be able to compel law and order, impose taxes and draft manpower. They must build new schools, set up health clinics, upgrade the irrigation system, fix the roads and convince farmers and merchants to cultivate and sell something other than poppies and opium. The premise is simple: secure the market-place, fix, upgrade and adapt the infrastructure, administer market commodities and you command the population.

While simple cause and effect narratives make for good reading, cultural complexity is inseparable from the study of cause and effect, especially in a place like Marjah. We continually espouse what we believe ought to happen but rarely how a given political or economic initiative might actually play itself out within a given cultural context. What might the Afghan approach to gaining a foothold in Marjah look like? How might the landowners, merchants and farmers, civil administrators, leaders of the Afghan National Army (ANA), local police, local fighters, and allies of the Taliban interact with one another? How might the imposition of government authority in Marjah play itself out? How might elements of the ANA and police support government administrators in imposing a central authority?

Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, McCallister served in numerous infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University, Department of the Navy Science and Technology, DARPA, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI). He continues to study current events in Iraq and Afghanistan in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments.

Download Volume 6, No. 2

Small Wars Journal Volume 6, No. 2 includes the winners of Question #1 from our

writing competition. 

Question #2 winners were published in

Issue No. 1.  Congratulations

to:

Together Very Well":  The Problem of Population Control and Legitimacy

in Stability Operations, by Dr. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh

through Micro Level Actions, by Brad Fultz

Violence in Small Wars, by William Harris

 We are also pleased to present:

by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Senator's Son: An Iraq War Novel, by Luke S. Larson

Afghanistan, by Major Mehar Omar Khan (previously

published in Small Wars Journal)

Download Volume 6, No. 2

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Adam Ray

18 February 2010

Kandahar, Afghanistan

On Feb. 9th, in a field near a road, an Afghan soldier squatted to relieve himself. He picked the wrong spot. A bomb exploded, blowing off a leg, and he died. Captain John Weatherly, Commander of Charlie Company of the 4-23 Infantry at FOB Price in Helmand Province, mentioned that in passing as he described the series of events that led to the death of Specialist -- now Sergeant -- Adam Ray, a vigorous 23 year old, born in Tampa, Florida. The bomb the Afghan stumbled upon was near the IED that struck Adam.

Without the thousands of culverts underneath, the roads of Afghanistan would be flooded and washed away during the snow melts and rains. In safe countries, drivers pay as little attention to culverts as we would to telephone poles. As a practical matter they are invisible to us.

In the war zone that is Afghanistan, life and limb depend on noticing normally mundane things like culverts. They are a favorite hiding spot for the Taliban to plant bombs intended to kill Americans driving the roads. Hundreds, even thousands of pounds of explosives can be stuffed inside, launching our vehicles into the sky, flipping them over and over, sometimes killing all. And so, in some areas, soldiers on missions must stop dozens of times to check culverts for explosives. Since we do this every day in front of thousands of Afghans, they know our patterns. In addition to planting bombs in culverts, they plant mines and other bombs near culverts, to get men who stop to check.

Download the full article: Adam Ray

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Captain Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo

Download the full article: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women

By fits and starts, United States and allied military forces are realizing how difficult it will be to win the war in Afghanistan without half its population, the Afghan women.

One of the few military efforts aimed at earning the support of women began a year ago when a handful of female U.S. Marines and a civilian linguist formed the first "Female Engagement Team" (pronounced "FET"). The team visited rural Pashtun women in their homes and distributed humanitarian supplies, in the process earning the goodwill of women who, before they had spoken with the Marine team, had viewed international troops with fear.

Since then, more FETs have stood up. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade now employs several teams on an intermittent basis in southern Afghanistan. U.S. soldiers and airmen in the country's east run FETs that, in cooperation with district governments, teach health classes to local women. All international and Afghan security forces were ordered in November to establish FETs of their own.

Download the full article: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women

Captain Matt Pottinger is a U.S. Marine based at International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Kabul. He co-founded and trained the first Female Engagement Team in February 2009.

Hali Jilani is a Pashtun-American who has worked at the grassroots level in war and conflict zones for two decades. Fluent in Pashto, she is serving in southern Afghanistan as Task Force Leatherneck's cultural advisor.

Claire Russo is a civilian advisor to the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan. She deployed as a Marine officer to Anbar Province, Iraq, in 2006.

by David Mason

Download the full article: Seven Pillars of Ambiguity

These thoughts are penned a few weeks short of a yearlong tour to Iraq. Having worked in cultures across continents in a variety of roles over a number of years, I thought the approach outlined in this paper might be of use to others working in different cultures generally and Arab culture in particular. So, imagine this, you are on your way to Iraq or Afghanistan to be an Advisor where you will likely sit down with a host government official.

TE Lawrence and Ricklefs talk about what you must do. They provide Articles and Rules. This paper on the other hand, outlines what you do not know.

The Seven Pillars of Ambiguity are those things that, unless you are native to the country, you can never really know. What you can do however, is recognize your knowledge gap and work to close it. By understanding the pillars and working to inform yourself, you will feel more confident as an Advisor, and better able to usefully and meaningfully contribute to the mission.

These points are not rules to live by. Rather, they are a test. They set out what you do not know and challenge you to research and try to understand. While they are interdependent, sometimes one will be more important than another, or not be important at all. If you are planning on being an interlocutor, a middle man between one culture and another, these are the things you must think about before you go, to prepare yourself for your deployment. They might be useful when you get there too.

Download the full article: Seven Pillars of Ambiguity

David Mason is a former French Foreign Legion paratrooper, former Senior Advisor in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and three times in Iraq, as Policy Advisor to the Australian Commander, Senior Advisor in the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Interior. He is also international lawyer specializing in the Laws of War, and a Reserve Major in the Australian Army Legal Corps. He formerly held the role as Counsel, International Law, in the Australian Department of Defence. Among other academic qualifications he holds an LLM from the Australian National University and is a Barrister of the High Court of Australia.

by Major Jeremy Kotkin

Download the full article: R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend." This proverb which has become a mainstay of foreign policy courses of action has, in fact, pushed the United States to make horrifically misguided and ignorant decisions about how to view challenges across the globe and the ways and means used to confront them. With this proverb in mind, and often with the best of intentions in tow, organs of U.S. national security have walked blindly into situations where our own ignorance became the single most crippling factor to long term success of a program. In turn, this has allowed U.S. strategy to be high jacked by naí¯ve and/or stunningly blinded officials and officers entrusted with defense of our nation. One such official was the Honorable Charles N. Wilson of Texas. His fervent and black and white view of a problem led him to get into bed with a culture, a paradigm, and a mission which had positively no bearing on our national security. Unknowingly, he coupled U.S. foreign policy with a growing and insatiable malevolent influence in the region, and still today, 30 years later, we cannot extricate ourselves from it. The poison he and idealists such as him injected into the veins of our foreign policy runs that deep.

This essay is not simply an interpretation of history to condemn the legacy of a politician. To be sure, the causal events were not Mr. Wilson's doing alone. Two presidencies and a heavy involvement of a handful of CIA officers (who, since rising up the political ladder, are now responsible for current DoD policy) agreed with Mr. Wilson's call to arms and orchestrated and funded his goals. Mr. Wilson has a laudable history of altruistic domestic policies and exertions. Unfortunately, they are not the endowment he will be remembered for. The overriding goal here is to provide a warning for future Strategists. Solutions to wicked problems must be found from within the entire environment of systems and their context in time. Mr. Wilson's solution was, unfortunately, the easy way out which made no effort to consider second- and third-order effects. No realistic appreciation was given to what system we were injecting ourselves into. Finally, this essay is also a condemnation of proxy wars. In the author's view, it is foreign policy cowardice. Using unwitting "means" as the ways to our ends is abhorrent. Abhorrent even when, on the surface, it seems like a noble cause or that the goals of the puppet are temporarily the same as the master. It is as detestable when the Iranians share shaped-charge technology with Arab insurgents to murder Americans as it was to get Afghan mujahedeen to our geopolitical dirty work.

Download the full article: R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Major Jeremy Kotkin entered the US Air Force as a communicator in 1995. He spent 12 years in the USAF and among numerous other overseas assignments, deployed to Italy and Bosnia with NATO/SFOR for Operation JOINT FORGE. In 2008, he performed an inter-service transfer to the US Army and entered as a Functional Area-59, Strategist, assigned to the J5 shop at USSOCOM. In 2009 he was selected to become part of CJCS's Afghan Hands Program and is currently attending Dari language training.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Patterns

This is a story of warfighting and technology, and what life is like on the ground for our troops, as they do their best in war.

Last night a soldier from the 82nd Airborne Division was killed. The attack occurred just hours before the 82nd was to relieve 1-17th Infantry from duties in portions of the Arghandab River Valley near Kandahar.

Earlier that morning, soldiers from 1st Platoon, B-company (1-17th) had taken me on a short, easy mission out to a micro-base called "Brick 1." The Platoon leader was 1st Lieutenant Ryan Fadden, while SFC Dimico was the platoon sergeant. The platoon was ready. Despite the filthy environment, weapons were clean, the gear was sorted and the men were in good spirits and a business-like frame of mind. They seemed confident. It looked like Lieutenant Fadden and SFC Dimico were on their jobs. The battalion had lost 21 men KIA during the first several months of combat—the Brigade lost 31. An article was about to be published in the Army Times which might lead one to believe that the 1-17th is not combat-ready. The author, Sean Naylor, is as highly respected as he is experienced, and so his words are taken seriously. Yet during my first week, despite serious stresses in some places, the men seemed ready.

And so 1st Platoon drove in their Strykers from COP Jelawur, stopping a couple kilometers away from a small ANA (Afghan National Army) base just on the edge of the Green Zone of the Arghandab River near Kandahar. The heavy Stryker ramps hissed and dropped with a dull thump. The soldiers piled from the backs of the four machines. Two white dogs with wagging tails greeted the men, and the men greeted the dogs as if they were old buddies.

Download the full article: Patterns

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

A Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency

Special to the Small Wars Journal

by Colonel G. L. Lamborn, USAR (Ret.)

Download the full article: Jihad of the Pen

This small work is dedicated to all those who use the power of their minds guided by courage, humility, resourcefulness and compassion to achieve a better world in which the forces of tyranny, hatred, fanaticism, and ignorance are defeated.

In reading this small work, the practitioner must keep in mind the following. In Islam, the concept of "jihad" (the Arabic word means "struggle") consists of two aspects. The Lesser Jihad -- with which the world is unfortunately somewhat familiar -- is defined as "armed resistance in defense of the faith and the Believers,"—but only under prescribed conditions and under properly authorized leadership.

What most non-Muslims do not know is that in Islam the Greater Jihad is the struggle that takes place inwardly -- within each soul and person. It is a great struggle to conquer one's own evil and base desires, and triumph over one's own ignorance, barbarity and spiritual darkness. The Greater Jihad is Islam's great challenge to build a better world, one Believer at a time. Unfortunately, thanks to the cruel deeds of a relatively small number of extremists, the newspaper version of "jihad" has imprinted only a warped definition of the Lesser Jihad as meaning torture, murder, fanaticism, hatred, and xenophobia.

I chose the title "Jihad of the Pen" partly because the Prophet had once said: "The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr." In part, the title also derives from my fervent belief that the jihad of the pen is the battle all people must wage against ignorance everywhere. Each primary school student today, whether in America or Afghanistan, is carrying on his or her personal "Jihad of the Pen." For it is only through education and a true spirituality that enlightenment -- and peace on Earth -- can someday be realized. And for those of us who must fight the forces of an evil new Dark Age on the battlefield of ideas, "Jihad of the Pen" is equally appropriate. Firepower cannot defeat an Idea; only a better and more compelling Idea can overcome its cruel adversary. When spurred to action by blind hatred and fanaticism, ignorance is mankind's greatest enemy.

Ours is truly a struggle of the pen.

Download the full article: Jihad of the Pen

The author wishes to offer his grateful thanks to the following individuals for their help, expert advice, encouragement, and professional fellowship over the years. Several of the following individuals offered timely, insightful comments on this work while it was still in draft. All contributed over the years to the author's understanding of political warfare and influence operations in support of counterinsurgency efforts.

Dr. Arturo G. Munoz, RAND Corporation; Colonel Grant Newsham, USMC; Dr. John J. LeBeau, George C. Marshall Center; Dr. John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Dr. David Kilcullen, The Crumpton Group; and Dr. Amin Tarzi, Marine Corps University. Special thanks go to Mr. Jack Shea, Department of Defense, Mr. Jason H. Campbell, RAND Corporation; and Captain David M. Lamborn, U.S. Army, for reviewing the manuscript on their own time and making valuable suggestions.

Special thanks also are due to Ms. Cassandra Sheehan for her help with the text, especially with regard to the charts, footnotes and bibliography and to Mr. Tor Achekzai, The MASY Group, who reviewed the Pashto-language proposed military Code of Conduct found in section 23. Author also wishes to thank many others who, though not named, at various times in the author's past have been of assistance. All are deeply appreciated.

by Colonel Edwin K. Burkett

Download the full article: Health Engagement in Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Health engagement can be an invaluable component of all types of military actions and can be particularly useful in FID operations as U.S. joint medical personnel can be employed across the full spectrum of operations and span the entire spectrum of FID. Although it has played an important role in almost all conflicts dating back several centuries, health engagement is only recently being recognized as an important component of security cooperation. The type of health engagement employed will vary according to the current capabilities of both the partner nation military (and / or other designated security forces) medical forces and the partner civilian health sector and their respective roles in that nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program. Health engagement by U.S. forces may include varying degrees of military-to-military activities as well as Medical Civil-Military Operations (MCMO) if indicated in accordance with the host military needs. Commander objectives will determine the appropriate balance given the situation at hand. In some countries the military and civilian health systems may be completely separate while in other nations the two systems may be integrated, necessitating a unified approach.

Health sector support to FID may be direct or indirect. Direct support often involves training and mentoring partner military medical forces and can occur at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Training is focused to assist the development of a partner military health system that enhances the operational capacity and capability of its forces. Indirect support might include security assistance, personnel exchange programs, and multinational exercises. The desired outcome is long-range, self-sustaining or self-perpetuating improvements in the host nation's health sector that support and enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the host nation military. Accomplishing these objectives typically requires U.S. military medical forces to partner with other U.S. Government agencies to help address nation-specific political, governance, legal, economic, technological, and cultural aspects of FID, especially as they impact the health sector.

In addition, mil-to-mil FID activities may indirectly impact the civilian health system; therefore, careful advance planning must be done to ensure that any indirect effects are accounted for appropriately. In addition to long-term efforts that build host nation health sector capacity; short-term support of critical areas by U.S. health forces, such as serving as health advisors in combat, can also be effective FID tools that meet critical temporary partner needs or catalyze capacity building actions by the partner.

Download the full article: Health Engagement in Foreign Internal Defense

Colonel (Dr.) Edwin K. Burkett is the Chief, Global Health Branch, in the Office of the Command Surgeon, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. Col Burkett is a Family Physician, Flight Surgeon, and Air Force International Health Specialist with skills in foreign language and culture, civil-military cooperation, and operational health engagement. Col Burkett co-authored a USJFCOM White Paper entitled Emerging Challenges in Medical Stability Operations and has presented health engagement related topics at several military medicine conferences and training venues.

Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

by John P. Sullivan

Download the full article: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

Transnational criminal organizations and gangs are threatening state institutions throughout the Americas. In extreme circumstances, cartels, gangs or maras, drug trafficking organizations, and their paramilitary enforcers are waging de facto criminal insurgencies to free themselves from the influence of the state.

A wide variety of criminal gangs are waging war amongst themselves and against the state. Rampant criminal violence enabled by corruption and weak state institutions has allowed some criminal enterprises to develop virtual or parallel states. These contested or "temporary autonomous" zones create what theorist John Robb calls "hollow states" with areas where the legitimacy of the state is severely challenged. These fragile, sometimes lawless zones (or criminal enclaves) cover territory ranging from individual neighborhoods, favelas or colonias to entire cities—such as Ciudad Juaréz—to large segments of exurban terrain in Guatemala's Petén province, and sparsely policed areas on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.

As a consequence, the Americas are increasingly besieged by the violence and corrupting influences of criminal actors exploiting stateless territories (criminal enclaves and mafia-dominated municipalities) linked to the global criminal economy to build economic muscle and, potentially, political might.

Download the full article: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010).

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Seven

American forces are stationed at bases far and wide around Afghanistan. Some bases are like towns, such as Camp Bastion, Kandahar Airfield, and Bagram Airfield. But mostly they are small, often occupied by only a handful of troops.

Logistics into Afghanistan is a nightmare, and it only gets worse after you cross the border from the north or from Pakistan. By comparison, Iraq "logs" was like a run to a convenience store down the road. Afghan logs are more like driving from Miami to Seattle for grocery shopping, and then driving the groceries back to Miami while under threat of attack. Not a speck of exaggeration in that statement. Enemy logs interdiction was a large constituent of the Soviet defeat, despite that the Soviet Union comprised the entire northern border of Afghanistan. When the Soviet hammer tried to crack the Afghan rock, the hammer shattered. The Soviets can easily put people in space and keep them there, but they couldn't handle backdoor logistics during their Afghan war. It's easier to keep people in space than to supply our war here.

Our Coalition is stunningly more effective at logistics than were the Soviets. For instance, when the British were resupplying small FOBs near Sangin last year—just a short drive from the origin at Camp Bastion—the monthly convoys were major operations that drained needed combat power, and still vehicles were destroyed with casualties. So powerful are some of the bombs that they can launch the ultra-armored American MRAPs into the air, flipping them like turtles, often breaking the backs of soldiers. Even today, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is making moves to facilitate allies to get more counter-IED gear, such as MRAPs, which seems like a good move because some allies are risk-averse to the point of being ineffective (not that MRAPs are going to save them). By air, when a civilian helicopter was trying to resupply at Sangin, it was shot down just outside the base, killing the crew and at least one child on the ground. Make no mistake: this is a worthy enemy.

Without the U.S. Air Force, we would need thousands more troops here just to run convoys, and bringing in those troops would require more convoys to supply their needs. It's okay to use contractors to bring supplies in from Pakistan or from the north, but driving up into those mountains and other remote locations would be suicidal.

Download the full article: Seven

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke

Download the full article: Operational Design: Promise and Problems

Approaches to Operational Design have become increasingly prominent in both Army and Joint contexts. Design, like all doctrines, is a product of specific political, organizational, and cultural forces, events, and influences both unique to the armed services and external to them. A product born of the US military's experience in counterinsurgency and nation-building campaigns, Design is a process best applied in the planning of campaigns and major operations. It is part of a general family of ideas inspired by FM 3-0 Operations. There are, however, substantial risks in the adoption of Design that must be addressed. Additionally, campaigning needs to be thought of as an aspect of strategy rather than a wholly separate operational level in order to best implement American strategic objectives.

We will first attempt to define the concept within the prism of recent military doctrine and the general idea of campaign design. We will then examine the doctrine's major claims about complexity in military affairs before moving on to a discussion of concerns over Design vis-a-vis more traditional planning ideas, and conclude with some recommendations about the evolution of campaign design in relationship to strategy.

Download the full article: Operational Design: Promise and Problems

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

Captain Crispin Burke is a UH-60 helicopter pilot with assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, and most recently, the 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. He writes for Small Wars Journal and under the name "Starbuck" at his blog, Wings Over Iraq.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Special Delivery

American troops are spread widely across Afghanistan. Some are remote and accessibility is difficult. In 2008, I was with six soldiers in Zabul Province who didn't even get mail for three months. They had no email. They were on the moon. Six courageous men, in the middle of nowhere, and their nearest backup was a small Special Forces team about five hours away. Resupply to these small outposts is crucial, difficult, and would require major effort by ground. Enter the United States Air Force.

Download the full article: Special Delivery

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

by Dr. Dan G. Cox

Download the full article: A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

Recent events in Iran involving the questionable election results that placed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into his second term as president have raised the levels of public outcry and consternation both inside Iran and internationally. The political pundits and policymakers are speculating on what this means for the future of Iran and how this situation will end. The debate is premature and largely facile at this point, but what is interesting is that the initial Iranian government reaction to the potential insurgency bubbling up from disgruntled Moussavi supporters provides a well-suited test case for some of the commonly accepted counterinsurgency (COIN) tenants. An embryonic insurgent movement borne of deep resentment against the Iranian government and the de facto rulers of Iran, the Supreme Council, coupled with an extremely harsh COIN reaction creates an experimental situation which allows scholars, practitioners, and policymakers a rare opportunity to analyze, in real time, COIN theory.

Download the full article: A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

Dr. Dan G. Cox is an Associate Professor of Political Science, U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies. His most recent book is Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa published in July 2009 by the University Press of New England.

The Way Forward in Afghanistan

by Steffen Merten

Download the full article: Tribal Engagement: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Following the cooption of the powerful Shinwari tribe of eastern Afghanistan last week, it seems defense planners have finally realized the unsophisticated reality that tribes form the fabric of Afghan society. The compounded impotence of the Karzai regime and the recent successes of direct tribal engagement have highlighted the potential of empowering tribal institutions, but years after the success of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq, why are we only now choosing to tap the power centers that have driven the history of Afghanistan for centuries? Perhaps it is Afghanistan's imperial legacy, which speaks to the "ungovernable" nature of tribes that have devoured armies whole, or perhaps naive political hopes for a robust central government, a situation more or less unknown in Afghan history. A third possibility may lie in the popular myth that the "backward and anarchic" habits of tribes preclude their integration within the institutions of a modern nation-state, lest their inherently belligerent and barbaric nature lead to its ruin. Whether stalled by daydreams of a different political reality in Afghanistan or by recalcitrant Afghan elites in Kabul, recent developments suggest that warfighters and scholars like Major Jim Gant, author of "One Tribe at a Time" and an outspoken advocate of tribal engagement, seem to be gaining traction within the defense establishment. But the question remains: what will a tribal strategy spell for the future of Afghanistan?

Download the full article: Tribal Engagement: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Steffen Merten is a Human Terrain researcher specializing in Middle Eastern tribal systems and a former social network analysis researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School Core Lab. Merten served in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003-2004 and is currently developing an integrated methodology for modeling tribal systems.

Download Volume 6, No. 1

We are bringing back Small Wars Journal in proper multi-article journal style

in a formatted-to-print PDF, just like we

did in the old days.  We

will continue to put out good articles as quickly as we can online, and we will

regularly assemble select content into issues.

Read on for the line-up of Small Wars Journal Volume 6, No. 1 including the winners of Question #2 from our

writing competition. 

Look for Question #1 winners in the next issue very soon.

Cartel v. Cartel:

Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Download the full article: Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

As the decade ends, Mexico's criminal insurgency continues. Yet the narco-war in 2010 is not identical to the violence that began three years ago. Mexico's criminal insurgency at the beginning of 2010 is distinguished by three main trends: continuing (though increasingly diffused) violence against the state, increasing militarization of the Mexican state's response, and a growing feeling of defeat among some within Mexican policy circles. Additionally, the conflict has assumed broader transnational dimensions.

On the surface, the conflict has entered into a period of seeming stasis. But it is a bloody stalemate—and the war promises to continue simmering well into this year and beyond. According to the Mexican press, 2009 may have been the bloodiest year of the war, with 7,600 Mexicans perishing in the drug war. Whatever the nature of the conflict, the danger still remains to American interests. As we have noted before, loose talk of a Mexican "failed state" obscures the real problem of a subtler breakdown of government authority and bolstering of the parallel authorities that cartels have already created.

Download the full article: Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). His research focuses on counterinsurgency, intelligence, terrorism, urban operations, and post-conflict policing. He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010).

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

An Alternative

by Captain Joshua McLaughlin

Download the full article: The al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative

This article stems from a series of posts I recently wrote at al Sahwa, and is intended to offer an alternative to the commonly accepted "franchise" model that is frequently discussed in reference to al Qaeda (AQ) on a global scale. Just a few examples of the widespread use of the word "franchise" are available here, here, here and here. My intent is not to provide an operational framework or design for AQ subordinates at the operational or tactical levels; instead, my aim is to supplant "franchise" with "conglomerate" as the most representative business model for the relationship between AQ and its affiliate groups.

Download the full article: The al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative

Captain Joshua McLaughlin is a recent graduate of the Field Artillery Captains Career Course. His most recent operational assignment was with 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry in Mosul, Iraq as the Task Force Fire Support Officer. He also blogs at al Sahwa.

by Major Ali Iqbal

Download the full article: Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

As an international military student in Fort Leavenworth, I am constantly exposed to public, US Government and international opinion on how to succeed/just stay afloat and not sink in the quagmire of that perilous place called "Afghanistan". Ranging from complex solutions like rebuilding the entire state on the western paradigm, to the irresponsible suggestion of adapting the "It is what it is" policy by creating "Chaositan" - they are all out there on the table. However, as already concluded by many intellectuals, the permanent solution to Afghanistan will be the solution which the Afghans want, not what we sitting many a mile away keep conjecturing about. The harsh reality is that the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated as the Taliban are continuously spreading their influence and cashing in on the frustrations of the people - an ideal force multiplier for the insurgents to leverage for furthering their designs. The main reason why the situation has become so precarious is that the bulk of the country, more precisely east and south east consisting of Pashtuns, is convinced that the Taliban are their real saviors and not the apathetic government in Kabul or ISAF forces. Let us consider why these poor, religiously inclined and simple people favor the "Dark Side" rather than us "Knights in Shining Armor".

Download the full article: Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

Major Ali Iqbal, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as an instructor in School of Armor and Pakistan Military Academy and has twice served as brigade operations officer in an infantry and armor brigade. He has also served as United Nations Military Observer in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Pakistan and has a master's degree in Arts and Science of Warfare.

Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

by Colonel Buck Elton

Download the full article: Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

Buck Elton is the Commander of Joint Special Operations Air Component-Haiti. Small Wars Journal inadvertently received an e-mail update from Buck to his family and friends. SWJ asked if we could publish his insightful account and he most graciously agreed. What follows addresses many issues now appearing in the press -- here is a boots on the ground perspective.

Download the full article: Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

More:

Airfield Support in Haiti - Department of State DipNote

Teleconference Briefing on Relief Efforts in Haiti - DoS Telecon with Col. Buck Elton

2010 Earthquake in Haiti - DoS Information Portal

A Clausewitzian Case Study

by Adam Elkus

Download the full article: Do Ideas Matter?

"Ideas matter," the new Army Capstone Concept declares. Ideas certainly do matter, and doctrine can be the key to victory or defeat. But it is immensely difficult to predict the form that ideas will eventually take. The reception and dilution of Clausewitzian theory in American military doctrine suggests that influence is contingent--and the end product of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine's continuing evolution in American strategy is unlikely to conform to the predictions of either COIN's most fervent admirers or detractors.

Download the full article: Do Ideas Matter?

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

by Colonel Robert Killebrew

Download the full article: War, "Like War", or Something Else?

Bob Killebrew, a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, is heading up a major study on the relationships between gangs, the Chavez government, and U.S. national security. What follows is the central question that is evolving from the study -- is this war? Or something like war? Opinions are not only welcome -- but encouraged; it's Bob Killebrew at [email protected].

Purveyors of "Fourth Generation War" have suggested that future warfare will have certain characteristics; that it will be decentralized, complex and transnational; it will involve actors from many networks, and that it will involve political, social, military and economic factors.

What, then, do we make of the activities of Venezuela, Iran, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Mexican drug cartels and the Latino gangs both destabilizing Central America and operating on our streets today? All are acting from different motives, all are highly organized and, in some cases, networked organizations, and all are, for different reasons, threats to the national security of the United States. And all are connected by the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. and to other countries.

Download the full article: War, "Like War", or Something Else?

Robert B. Killebrew is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Killebrew is a retired Army colonel who served 30 years in a variety of assignments that included Special Forces, tours in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, XVIII Airborne Corps, high-level war planning assignments and instructor duty at the Army War College.

by Captain Gina Cairns-McFeeters, Captain John Shapiro, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Nettleton, Lieutenant Colonel Sonya Finely and Lieutenant Commander Daryk Zirkle

Download the full article: Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

In this era of persistent conflict, the US faces a myriad of challenges—conventional and irregular, with adversaries who increasingly take advantage of the information environment. Fundamentally, we must change our mindset and incorporate the human terrain—and the effects of information warfare—into our operational analysis and planning. While al Qaeda and its adherents try to frame current conflicts as a "clash of civilizations," in reality there is a struggle within Islam to determine the way ahead in the 21st century. Ambassador Holbrooke stated it best: "defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance." In order to achieve success, we must fully understand the power of information and the requirements for intelligence and influence—both being conducted in competition with the adversary's information campaign that complements their dynamic and flat networked organizations. The information components of counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies are the underlying foundation for all other COIN activities.

Download the full article: Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

Captain Gina Cairns-McFeeters, U.S. Navy, was the Chief, Multinational Force-Iraq IO Cell and led Strategic IO efforts for Iraq. Captain John Shapiro, U.S. Navy, was Multinational-West IO Liaison Officer to the MNF-I IO Cell. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Nettleton, U.S. Army, was the Officer in Charge, Cyber Support Element -- Iraq and provided computer network operations support to MNF-I. Lieutenant Colonel Sonya Finely, U.S. Army, was the Deputy Director, Commander's Initiative Group, MNF-I and assisted the director of the Commanding General's personal staff. Lieutenant Commander Daryk Zirkle, U.S. Navy, was the Information Operations Planner, MNF-I IO and provided planning and staff support to Strategic IO efforts.