Journal

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Don't Call it CMOC

As the disaster assistance and humanitarian relief operation in Haiti matures, there will need to be a coordination center where the U.S. military, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), international relief organizations (IOs), and Haitian governmental ministries can prioritize aid and organize the operation. Whatever we call this coordination center, we should not call it a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMOC).

CMOCs were formed during complex humanitarian emergencies such as the post-Desert Storm Kurdistan emergency, Somalia, and the Rwanda genocide. They began as ad hoc responses to situations where no host nation government existed to manage humanitarian aid. They usually had an American military officer in charge and they filled a needed coordination function.

Eventually, they found their way into U.S. joint doctrine. In doing so, they morphed from a function that needed to be done into a doctrinal organization replete with a table of organization that is totally inappropriate for a situation like Haiti. Haiti is a simple humanitarian disaster. It has a functioning, if badly damaged, government which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised to support in her visit last week. An American led CMOC structure would undermine that objective in the eyes of the Haitian people and the world.

Download the full article: Don't Call it CMOC

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who was the J-3 (Operations Officer) for OPERATION SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh and a Military Advisor to the US Mission in the UN-led OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

For military personnel assigned to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR) in Haiti who might be looking to the Small Wars Journal for some help, I'll offer some thoughts from someone who has done a few of these things and studied them extensively.

Download the full article: Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

Colonel Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer. He was the J-3 (Operations Officer) for operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh and has done several published studies on HA/DR.

Spitting Cobra

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: 

Spitting Cobra

Editor' Note: Michael Yon recently spent some time at FOB Frontenac

with the King of Battle and produced this photo commentary.  The disciples

of Saint Barbara may tout that "long distance is the next best thing to being there,"

but next best is not good enough for a real boots on the ground journalist. 

Michael is out there, and now he's here, too.  We're privileged

to bring you some of Michael's work with his kind permission.  View his

other pieces

here at Small Wars Journal, or take a look at

Spitting Cobra

at Michal Yon Online and consider

supporting

the next dispatch of a truly independent frontline journalist.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan

since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops

in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the

reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work

is published at

Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street

Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media

outlets all around the world.

Download the full article: 

Spitting Cobra

Achieving Unity of Understanding in Counterinsurgency

by Colonel George Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David Pendall and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Steffen

Download the full article: Host Nation Information Requirements

Understanding the complex operational environment in Afghanistan means seeing the local conditions and activities and how they affect people's lives. If the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are truly focused on gaining the support of the people, we must better understand the lens through which the people are watching our efforts play out and we must know what may drive them away from supporting the government. This means understanding not only the nature of the threats to security posed by negative influences, insurgents, and terrorists but also the aspects of Governance and Development that most impact their daily lives. Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) is a category of reporting on these critical factors affecting the people in Afghanistan.

More important than the structure of government, the people are most concerned about the extension of governmental services and the ability for their national and local officials to deliver basic necessities and support for a functioning community—to include security. But the operating environment in Afghanistan is much more complex, nuanced and dynamic than answering the question of satisfactory governance- rendering a basic collection of facts, polling data, anecdotal references and statistics insufficient for true understanding within the partnered commands.

The NATO International Security Force- Afghanistan (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) is instituting a bottom up, inclusive information system to answer key information gaps and assist ISAF and Afghan Partner Commander Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). More than just asking the right questions, the ISAF and Afghan operating forces along with civilian partners in the field, must understand what the answers are that will drive resources and prioritization, providing better insight into the real issues and perceptions at local levels. The IJC has created a reporting system and fusion process to bring this information to the command in a timely, accurate and comprehensive way.

Download the full article: Host Nation Information Requirements

Colonel George Franz is the Chief, Combined Joint Analysis and Control Element for the ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel David Pendall is the Chief CJ2 Planner for the ISAF Joint Command Future Operations Planning Team in Kabul, Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Steffen is Senior Analytic Fusion Chief, within the Combined Joint Analysis and Control Element, in Kabul, Afghanistan.

From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

by Dr. Anthony Vinci

Download the full article: From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

Since the War on Terror began with the attacks of on 9/11, there has been a great amount of speculation about how to approach this war and what sort of strategy to use. The problem has been that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are so different from conventional enemies that it is difficult to know exactly how to defeat them in the traditional sense of the word. Al Qaeda and its highly dispersed, networked and franchised organization make concepts like unconditional surrender, destruction of command and control and deterrence hard to conceptualize, much less practically carry out.

Deterrence in particular was a strategic approach that the US had grown comfortable with during the Cold War and which some have tried to apply to the War on Terror. Indeed, Al Qaeda has also thought about strategy against the US in terms of deterrence. While there is some value in a deterrent approach to terrorist organizations, ultimately, it appears that it does not provide an effective defense and does not illustrate an effective offense against terrorist groups.

This article suggests an alternative strategic approach to combating Al Qaeda and in general pursuing the War on Terror. The approach might be called deferrence, as in to defer (not to be confused with deference). The central tenet of deferrence is Clausewitz's observation that time is on the side of the defender. The idea is to defer attacks by Al Qaeda and the strengthening of the Al Qaeda organization, by keeping up ongoing attacks against the organization, which then becomes forced to spend its time reacting, rather than acting offensively. Since Al Qaeda is an essentially military organization, it must continually be on the offense in order to exist. By keeping the busy trying to survive, at an acceptable level of cost and violence, the US will be provided with the time necessary to implement long-term strategies meant to undermine the group, such as ideological arguments, which will lead to the eventual fading away of the group.

Download the full article: From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

Anthony Vinci, PhD, International Relations, The London School of Economics, is the author of 'Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents' (Routledge 2008) as well as articles in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Small Wars and Insurgencies and author journals. He currently consults on national security issues.

by Vegetius

Download the full article: An Asymmetric Approach to Yemen

We are in a war of containment against radical Jihadist Islam, and Yemen is the next campaign in that conflict. How we conduct that campaign may be the critical turning point in that extended war. There are more tinderboxes for potential Jihadist outbreaks on the horizon; Somalia and several other places in Africa are among the leading candidates. We are running out of American troops to intervene in these hotspots, but we can ill afford to ignore them. Perhaps it is time to consider some asymmetric approaches to this very wicked problem.

The bad news is that Yemen is a tough nut. It is running out of oil, it has two civil war/insurgency situations, and an exponentially growing number of unemployed young men. The government only controls about a third of the country. In other words, it is a perfect breeding ground for radical Jihadists, and foreign fighters are flocking there in droves.

The good news is that Yemen is not yet a failed state. It has a functioning, if very imperfect, government. We have been able to deal with this kind of situation before. El Salvador is a good example. In that case, we were even able to take a bad government and help it become much better. The government of Yemen will not become a functioning Jeffersonian democracy in the near future, and we do not necessarily need it to become one to achieve and acceptable strategic outcome. What we do need is to have Yemen become a hostile place for radical Jihadists, and do so without committing large numbers of American troops in the process. This is where an asymmetrical approach comes in into play.

Download the full article: An Asymmetric Approach to Yemen

Vegetius is a government employee and former infantryman; he has experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

by Colonel Gregory A. Grimes

Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War

Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War

Colonel Gregory Grimes, US Army, is a Civil Affairs officer currently assigned to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters at US Africa Command.

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat: 

Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare

by David Sadowski and Jeff Becker

Download the full article:

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat

Foreword:  Idea papers are key inputs in the Joint Futures

Group's development of the Joint Operating Environment (JOE).  One of our

recent projects involved a multi-national effort to describe the "hybrid" threat. 

In the process of writing the paper, we developed something that took in more

than just the "hybrid" threat.  Although we received many favorable comments

on the paper, we felt our audience was a bit limited.  We are publishing

in the Small Wars Journal in order to generate a wider debate on this important

topic prior to including any of these ideas in the next JOE.

Excerpt:

If we are to get the future "right" we should return to first principles and

arrive at a better understanding of the context within which wars are understood,

and how adversaries will work within that context to arrange capabilities in time

and space to address their own strategic requirements.  Ultimately, the ideas

in this paper must support the Secretary of Defense's intent of re-shaping the culture

of the U.S. Armed Forces into one that is highly adaptive in its organizational

structures, in how it employs the capabilities at its disposal, and in how it conducts

operational campaign design, planning and execution. Through refining the description

of the future threat, we hope to create the correct context that helps force planners

design the future joint force. This imperative applies across all activities

of the Department from relatively small wars to large interstate conflicts, which

will be discussed later in this paper.

So what is a "hybrid" threat?  A definition that is too narrow may miss

important features of our emerging future, while a definition that is too wide defines

nothing at all.  In the case of the "hybrid" threat though, attempts to define

"hybridity" has led to a "confusion of concepts."  Instead of defining the

threat, we propose a description of the threat that is relevant across the entire

range of military operations.  That is, any actors' approach to warfare can

be described by the mix of material and cognitive capabilities it

brings to bear in conflict and war.  "Hybridity" then, should be seen as a

reflection of this underlying unity of warfare, based on an understanding of the

necessity of applying a mix of cognitive and material elements to succeed. In fact,

the ability to shift among material and cognitive approaches with agility and speed

is both the essence of the future threat, as well as of Secretary Gates' vision

of U.S. Armed Forces that are adaptive in organizational design, capabilities development,

and campaign design and execution. In short, the future threat should not be conceived

of as a category of future warfare that is distinct from other forms of warfare

but is instead the very essence of future warfare itself, and are just as applicable

to friendly forces as to our competitors and adversaries. We propose the following

as a starting point for this description:  Future threats will be entities

or movements that continually scan the environment for opportunities, and threaten

to or apply violence to affect the will and psyche of others to achieve their political

objectives.

Download the full article:

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat

David Sadowski is a senior civil servant with

USJCOM's Joint Futures Group.  He has an extensive background in air operations,

strategic and operational planning, information operations and joint concept development

and experimentation.  He retired from the U.S. Air Force in the grade of Lieutenant

Colonel in 2004, having served as a Weapon Systems Officer in the F-4E and F-111F,

a NATO Staff Officer at RHQ AFNORTH, Brunssum, The Netherlands, and numerous staff

tours within Air Combat Command.

Jeff Becker is a contracted futures analyst for

with USJCOM's Joint Futures Group, and supports a number of military, strategic

and futures studies, including three editions of the Joint Operating Environment

and other concept development and experimentation efforts in USJFCOM and throughout

the Department of Defense.  Mr. Becker has a Bachelor's degree in Political

Science from the University of Iowa, and completed his doctoral coursework (ABD)

in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.

Describe... Don't Define

by Nathan Freier

Download the full article: Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define

The emerging concept of "hybrid warfare" is one of many attempts to clarify the contemporary defense operating environment for senior Washington decisionmakers and warfighters in the field. The more intense debates occurring on the margins of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) center on hybrid threats and their impact on defense strategy and plans. Like post-QDR '06 debates on "irregular warfare" (IW), there is a great deal of buzz around hybrid warfare and challenges. In the end, how DoD leaders choose to characterize, respond to, and use outcomes of the hybrid debate will determine corporately what the defense enterprise means by "balance" and how it operationalizes "balance" in the future.

There is a cautionary tale for DoD in the post-QDR '06 quest to define IW. Those familiar with that process know that it ended with a definition few — if any — fully accept to this day. Amazingly, DoD's IW work succeeded in saying too much, too little, or nothing at all depending on one's particular point of view.

Look closely at the definition of IW and it appears to be just another description of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The torrent of "presentism" characterizing contemporary defense discussions about IW is responsible for this. Defense strategists and concept developers tend to project current "irregular" challenges — classical insurgency and terrorism in and around the Middle East and Muslim world — as DoD's dominant IW demands into an uncertain and indefinite future. This may prove grossly insufficient. However, the current defense era's sensational start (9/11) makes it quite difficult to break free from conventional wisdom long enough to explore IW more broadly.

Download the full article: Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define

Nathan Freier is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS and a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Freier joined CSIS in 2008, after a 20 year army career as a field artillery officer and strategist. During his last eight years of military service, Freier was a key player in numerous strategy development and strategic planning efforts at Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and on two senior-level military staffs in Iraq.

Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

A Holistic Perspective

by Colonel Cindy Jebb and Colonel Richard Lacquement

Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

The purpose of this paper is to provide our observations and preliminary thoughts concerning the way ahead for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) based on our work as part of the Quick-Look Assessment team from 3-19 December 2009. We both had the pleasure to work closely with members of the command whose professionalism and enthusiasm were deeply inspiring. The command confronts great challenges as it pursues a mission vital to coalition success. We are qualified optimists about the potential success of the mission. The most important source of our optimism for eventual mission success comes from our observations of the tremendous talent and dedication of the individuals assigned to this command. We were also heartened by our interaction with individuals from other commands and with many impressive Afghan partners.

COL Jebb primarily worked with the Afghan National Army (ANA) Development office while COL Lacquement primarily worked with the CJ5. Both offices are comprised of selfless, dedicated, and smart professionals. Of particular note, COL Jebb had the terrific experience to interact with senior advisors to the Ministers/General Staff (COLs Mike Barbee, Jim Campbell, Fred Manzo, Tom Donovan, and Kevin Cotten, as well as the senior advisor for ANA development, COL David Henley); COL Lacquement benefitted immensely from the support and collaboration of many CJ5 officers, particularly, COL Don Bigger, COL E.G. Clayburn, LtCol Steve Tilbrook and LTC Norm Fuss and from JAG, COL Tom Umberg.

While here, we both sought to understand the needs of NTM-A/CSTC-A on behalf of our home institutions, the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army War College (USMA and USAWC), so that we can best match faculty skill sets, interest, and availability to provide future support if requested. At the very least, this experience will facilitate reach-back efforts for the future. We were able to learn a great deal due to the open command climate and everyone's generosity with his/her thoughts and time. Finally, we offer our sincere gratitude to LTG Caldwell, Dr. Kem, and CAPT Mark Hagerott for enabling this fascinating experience and to MAJ Jon Klug for coordinating the visit and support.

Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

Colonel Cindy Jebb is a Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. Colonel Richard Lacquement is Director of the Military History and Strategy Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

Download the full article: Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

Hubris hates history and the latter keeps thus getting an opportunity to repeat itself. Nowhere is this as true as the killing fields of Afghanistan. The sad saga of First Anglo-Afghan War shows how lives of so many were lost in the merciless gorges and blood-thirsty passes between Kabul and Jalalabad, mainly because of the strategic blunders, outright dishonesty and unforgivable chicanery of a few. The story of this war also reveals that, more than the fierce Afghan or his treacherous terrain, the inept and indecisive leadership of the empire was to blame for getting buried in Afghanistan and helping that land become the 'graveyard of empires'.

Some trivia to start with. The war lasted from 1839 to 1842. Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, a Durrani Pashtun, was the legitimate King of Afghanistan before being ousted by the Anglo-Indian army of occupation. The name of the puppet installed by the British was Shah Shuja -- a man expelled in disgrace years before the war and someone who could never hope to step beyond Khyber Pass without foreign assistance.

As seemingly ear-less wise men continue to blunder in that unfortunate land, here are some echoes from the past. Instead of counting the trees, I have focused on the big picture to see how a war that happened 170 years ago could shed some light on the one being fought today.

Download the full article: Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan's Command and Staff College in Quetta.

Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

by Jeffrey Race

Download the full article: Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

Now being reprinted in an updated and expanded edition, War Comes to Long An was first published in 1972 and was the book I longed to buy in 1965 as the most junior lieutenant in Vietnam—but could nowhere find. Thereby hangs this tale of my adventures then in Vietnam and since elsewhere—a tale with implications for the creative process in academic writing, for the study of institutional change and of the learning disabilities of military institutions, and for priorities in public policy-making in America and elsewhere.

Birthing War Comes to Long An changed my life. I had no inkling when I began the project with trepidation in mid-1967 at the age of 24—using my own funds to satisfy my private curiosity—how it would change both my life and the lives of so many others. Perhaps these notes on the creation of that work may inspire others so inclined to dare the same creative act that summoned me, while at the same time illuminating some issues of public policy.

Between the covers of War Comes to Long An, I kept myself out. In these pages I beg to convey the private side of that public act, inseparable from the process of creation and from what came next. Some readers may find what follows entertaining or amusing; a few may find it helpful or even stimulating. You are my real target.

Download the full article: Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

Jeffrey Race is author of War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. This landmark study of the Vietnamese conflict, examined through the lens of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the rural province of Long An up until American intervention in the area, offers a human, balanced, penetrating account of war. Two new forewords by Robert K. Brigham of Vassar College and Jeffrey Record of the Air War College explore the book's enduring influence. A new end chapter offers previously unpublished scholarship on the conflict. The new version is to be published soon by University of California Press.

by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

Download the full article: Yemen's Strategic Boxes

As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news. The December 2009 raids on al Qaida with some level of US support -- together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen -- have re-emphasized Yemen's importance in regional and international security.

One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country's impact on external security. Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida's operations in and from Yemen. Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia. Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how —the government of Yemen will cooperate with other countries.

From Sana'a's perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security. Al Qaida certainly is one, but the other two -- the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the south around Aden -- probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen government. Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap among them in the future is even more worrisome. These specific threats are even further exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact on Yemen's capability to respond adequately.

Download the full article: Yemen's Strategic Boxes

Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is an associate professor with American Military University, and a contract instructor with the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in national counterterrorism strategy development. He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and OIF.

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Weimann

Download the full article: The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy

"War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war. Good example, discipline and control (good leadership) can only reduce the problem."

- - Comment on Small Wars Journal discussion board thread titled "The Kill Company" dated 15 July 2009 concerning The New Yorker Article, "The Kill Company" by Kaffi Khatchadourian, July 6 2009

Looking at the latest edition of the DOD Joint Operations Manual (Joint Operations JP 3.0), you noticed, under the "Summary of Changes Section", the addition of three new Principles of Joint Operations (Principle of War). There, in the change section, it states that the publication:

"Establishes 12 "principles of joint operations" by adding three "other principles" — restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy — to the traditional nine "principles of war"

The Department of Defense use to have only nine "principles of war' that included Mass, Objective, Offensive, Security, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Surprise and Simplicity. These principles were burned into the minds of entry level lieutenants with the permanency of a branding iron during their initial officer training using the acronym "MOOSE MUSS". Ahhh yes, good old MOOSE MUSS; because of it most officers will never forget those nine strategic principles of war. The change also raises a question; why, after more than forty years of military institutionalization, did the Department of Defense changed the "Principles of War" with three additions.

Because the original nine principles are based on Clausewitz's work "On War", they represented a young officer's initial introduction to military strategy. Of course, strategy is the realm of generals and junior officers need to know only the basics. Back then, most officers fully agreed to that unwritten rule because they recognized that the basic operation and function of an M-60 machine gun would be much more valuable working at that "eyeball-to-eyeball" level of war. Junior officers and NCOs trusted that the generals had their backs on that strategy thing.

Download the full article: The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Weimann's career spans 24 years as an US Marine Infantry Officer including participating in Desert Shield and Storm with the 2nd Marine Division. He retired in 1996, and lives with his family to Raleigh, NC where he works as an information technology program and project manager. He is also a contributing editor of the Defend Our Marines Web site (www.defendourmarines.com).

Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities

Developing the capabilities and capacities of FSFs (foreign security forces) has become a significant tenet of U.S. strategic dialogue on how to safeguard its interests at home and abroad from terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, criminal organizations with global reach or third party states which sponsor non state organizations. The United States recognizes that the destabilization of, and security threats to other states and political bodies are relative to its own interests as they may involve mutual enemies, or give rise to conditions in which its enemies may find beneficial. As such the U.S. may promote a cooperative "venture" where interests are identified as beneficial to both the U.S. and another entity, but which may be limited in nature and may not signify and enduring partnership.

It is important to understand that these cooperative ventures may be pursued for different reasons to support different ends; ends which may not always align with the long term goals of the U.S., but may support limited cooperation. These mutual interests may not always be apparent while in the making, and may only come forward as objectives and conditions change; for example when another state or organizations realizes that its previous policies no longer promote, but may in fact inhibit or work against the realization of its own objectives. The term venture itself implies a certain level of existing risk where one's membership is based more on conditions than certainty and long term commitment.

Ventures that involve the provision of security may require the U.S. to support the development of the capabilities of foreign security forces of other venture members. This concept of developing capability and capacity assumes that, based on mutual interests, the capabilities developed in a FSF will be employed in such a manner that they will support member objectives in the venture. However, it should not assume that those capabilities will not be employed otherwise at the conclusion of the venture. Capabilities once they are developed may have a life that extends beyond the original purpose. Understanding the nature of the venture is important for its members as it defines how much equity and effort a given member may assume relative to the expectations of the outcomes.

Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities

Major Rob Thornton is assigned to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) as an Army FA 59 Strategic Plans and Policy officer. The opinions and thoughts expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of JCISFA. Major Thornton was a contributing writer to the recently published the JCISFA SFA (Security Force Assistance) Planner's Guide to FSF (Foreign Security Force) Force Development.

Changing the Face of the Arghandab

by Captain Jonathan Pan

Download the full article: One Week with Task Force Buffalo

A rebuttal to Sean Naylor's Army Times Article, "Stryker soldiers say commanders failed them."

ARGHANDAB RIVER VALLEY, Afghanistan -- Sitting on the banks of the Arghandab River is the Baba Sahib Shrine. It provides a great view to the verdant Arghandab Valley, which is in stark contrast to the rest of the dusty province.

One can see the magnificent Baba Sahib shrine from the Arghandab District Center, which is where Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment (Task Force Buffalo), 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) centered their counterinsurgency efforts. While one can enjoy a lush view of the Arghandab River Valley and its beautiful sites from the district center- that is probably the last thing on the unit's mind.

Task Force Buffalo has suffered a lot of casualties and has therefore been the subject of over a dozen articles over the past few months. Through the fog of war and the emotional loss of comrades, it is difficult to see the good being done. Yet, facts show that Task Force Buffalo has helped many Arghandab residents who braved staying in the district while the Taliban campaigned to infiltrate Kandahar City from the north. However, it is discouraging to not see any articles in relation to their stability and development efforts. Here is a one-week snapshot at the activities of Task Force Buffalo in Arghandab.

Download the full article: One Week with Task Force Buffalo

Captain Jonathan Pan is the Economics Development Officer, Task Force Stryker (5/2 ID SBCT) in Afghanistan.

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Into Thine Hand I Commit My Spirit

Arghandab, Afghanistan

New Year's Eve, 2009

On this small base surrounded by a mixture of enemy and friendly territory, a memorial has been erected just next to the Chapel. Inside the tepee are 21 photos of 21 soldiers killed during the first months of a year-long tour of duty. The fallen will belong forever to the honor rolls of the 1-17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, and they will join the sacred list of names of those who have given their lives in service of the United States of America.

The symbol of the 2nd Infantry Division is the Indian Head. At night, soldiers of the "Indian Head Division" can be seen passing by the tepee, sometimes stopping to peer inside before walking into the darkness.

Download the full article: Into Thine Hand I Commit My Spirit

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars.

by Colonel David S. Maxwell

Download the full article: A Short Response to AF-PAK and South Asia Hands

In his article, Should AF/PAK Hands be South Asia Hands?, Lieutenant Munson makes some very good points. I offer a few observations and comments to build his discussion.

First, it has taken us this long to develop the AF-PAK Hands program after we have been at war for 8 plus years. We are clearly learning and adapting but what about anticipating (as Cohen and Gooch remind us in Military Misfortune)? Clearly we have to win the war we are in and I think AF-PAK Hands can make an important long term contribution (long term because it takes years to develop the language and cultural expertise to have the kind of understanding of the politics and culture necessary to be able to effectively advise military leaders and policy makers). I think we should also adapt the SOF truth for a broader understanding -- "Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur." The same holds true for area expertise -- you cannot wait for the crisis to occur to begin developing the area expertise necessary to deal with the emergency or the war. One of the important lessons that has been learned since 9-11 is how important cultural, political, and economic understanding and expertise is to political-military operations in the Era of Persistent Conflict.

Given the above, while we applaud and support the AF-PAK hands program (I agree it is the right thing to do -- but better late than never), we should be asking ourselves what other "hands" program should there be? Should we have a "Korea Hands" as the outcome to the "Korea Problem" is going to bring challenges as complex as we have ever seen and understanding North Korean culture is going to be critical to dealing with the challenges there. Should we have a "China Hands" program (though perhaps a little different than the China Hands we had in the pre-WWII Marines and in the State Department) anticipating China's rise to a near peer competitor and at least a regional hegemon? Should we have an "Africa Hands" program as we anticipate the future challenges on that continent? Of course we could go on and call for "Hands" programs around the world.

Download the full article: A Short Response to AF-PAK and South Asia Hands

Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer with command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and the Continental U.S., and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth and the National War College of the National Defense University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and do not represent any U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or U.S. Army Special Operations Command positions.

How the India-Pakistan Relationship Shapes the War in Afghanistan

by Lieutenant Mark Munson

Download the full article: Should AF/PAK Hands be South Asia Hands?

Seeking to develop a community of regional experts in local languages and cultures, and with the intent to sustain the deployment of those experts to the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater, the Department of Defense recently announced the creation of the "AF/PAK Hands" program. While this program demonstrates a laudable commitment by DoD towards building the intellectual capacity within the military to win the fight in Afghanistan, the focus of AF/PAK Hands on the languages and culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan (in particular the Pashtun border region) demonstrates a lack of strategic awareness of the decisive role that larger South Asian relationships (particularly that between India and Pakistan) play in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Most importantly, while Pakistani cooperation is necessary for the defeat of al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistani attitudes towards India may prevent that full cooperation in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan cannot be won if Pakistan does not shift its national security efforts from deterrence of India towards defeating its own internal Islamist insurgency. As currently proposed, the Pashtu, Dari, and Urdu speakers trained as part of AF/PAK Hands will not be able to provide commanders with critical insights into the strategic aspects of the India-Pakistan dynamic.

The Navy's announcement of its participation in the new Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) Program in September 2009 stated that "the objective of the APH program is to identify, select, train, and manage a cohort of experts in order to bring greater unity and cohesion to the fight in Afghanistan." Selected from "a mix of designators and ratings" and "specifically selected to capitalize on, or further develop, proficiencies in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, regional languages, and culture," the program is designed to place personnel with tailored regional expertise "in positions of strategic influence to ensure progress towards achieving U.S. government objectives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region."

This essay will not address whether devoting U.S. military manpower (or encouraging and rewarding participation in this program) to fight a war in the hinterlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan is wise. It seems reasonable to assume that the expertise and real-world operational experience gleaned by all DoD personnel, even those in the sea services, participating in this war will be directly applicable to their jobs when they return to their respective branches of service and will enhance the U.S. military's overall war-fighting capacity.

Download the full article: Should AF/PAK Hands be South Asia Hands?

Lieutenant Mark Munson currently serves as the Intelligence Officer for Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR. He has previously served onboard U.S.S ESSEX (LHD 2) and at the Office of Naval Intelligence.

A Short Response to Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham

by Colonel Gian P. Gentile

Download the full article: War is about Killing and Destruction

I feel sorry for the British Army for they seem to have been taken in by the American Army's consumption with Counterinsurgency and its theoretical premise that military force can "change entire societies" for the better. Of course this quote is attributed to one of America's leading Counterinsurgency experts retired Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.

The irony is that the American Coin experts in their own campaign to transform the American Army to a Counterinsurgency force from 2005 to 2007 used the British Army as an example of the proper way to do "classic" Coin: e.g., Malaya, and Sir Robert Thompson's recommendations for the United States in Vietnam. Yet as the Iraq Triumph Narrative is now written, the British Army lost their way and failed in Iraq where the Americans succeeded. Now, just as with the American Army, the British Army based on this essay by Mackay and Tatham have succumbed to the flawed theories and notions promoted by General Rupert Smith in his hugely influential but deeply flawed book The Utility of Force.

Download the full article: War is about Killing and Destruction

Gian Gentile is a serving American Army Colonel and teaches military history at West Point. He commanded a Cavalry Squadron in West Baghdad in 2006.

by Vegetius

Download the full article: End States vs. Strategies

I don't know who came up with the term "exit strategy", but if he (or she) is still alive he should be taken out and shot. An exit is not a strategy; it is a retreat. There is nothing wrong with cutting losses and running if the situation dictates, but let's call it what it is. However, let's also make sure that the war is lost before we resort to that. In Iraq and Afghanistan we have stated exit strategies, but no clear stated vision of what we want either nation to look like when we are done.

If getting out of these two wars is our only objective, we need to fire the entire national security apparatus and replace its personnel with divorce lawyers; they are the true exit strategists.

The great strategists in history have always had clear end states of what they had in mind for the strategic landscape that they were dealing with and knew how to match those ends to available means. Perhaps the greatest practitioner of this approach in modern times was Otto Von Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had a clear vision of a greater Germany united under Prussian leadership. He moved carefully to make this happen with three limited objective wars in which he diplomatically outmaneuvered his opponents, isolating his intended victims from military and political outside support. In doing so, he always ensured that the Prussian military did not stray outside his intended use for armed force in achieving the desired end state.

Our strategic situation is obviously different. Today, we are engaged in a war against radical Islamic expansionism rather than the kind of voluntary wars of dynastic expansion that Bismarck engineered. Our situation is more similar to that of the Byzantine Empire, and we have the same enemy, albeit in a new incarnation; that being expansionist radical Islamic Jihad. The Byzantine grand strategy of containing radical Jihadist Islam succeeded for approximately seven centuries. The Eastern Roman Empire had a comprehensible strategic framework for dealing with this Jihadist threat. Thus far, we do not.

Download the full article: End States vs. Strategies

The author is a government employee and a former infantryman.

From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence

by Major General Andrew Mackay and Commander Steve Tatham

Republished with permission of the authors.

Download the full article: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence

This paper represents nearly two years of work and active consideration -- both in the academic domain and in the field of conflict -- of the problems confronting the British military in contemporary and future conflict. At its heart is the belief that future campaigns will need to focus on altering the behaviours of others, either in advance -- and therefore deterring conflict -- or as a coupled component in the process of combat and post combat operations. It takes the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as its principal case study and examines the thought processes -- falling outside more conventional military wisdom and training -- that lay behind the Commander's decisions to mount an influence-led deployment, one that specifically sought to reduce hard kinetic engagement and place the consent of the population at the centre of the operational design. Indeed the paper argues that success in battle will demand as much understanding of social psychology, culture and economics as it does military art and science. It examines the corporate structures available within the MoD to support that decision and, finding them lacking, suggests not only how a new strategic communication structure might evolve to meet future demands but also how the provision of education, learning, unlearning and relearning at every level, from Commander to strategic Corporal, is likely to be the pre-eminent factor in success in future conflict.

Download the full article: Complexity, Adaptation and Influence

In a 29-year career, Major General Andrew Mackay has seen operational service in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. In 2008 he was awarded the CBE for his command of 52 Brigade in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Promoted Major General in 2009 his last appointment in the British Army was as General Officer Commanding Scotland and Northern England.

Steve Tatham is a Commander in the Royal Navy and has experience from operations in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. He holds an M Phil from Cambridge University, and is the author of 'Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion' and 'Strategic Communication: A Primer'. He is just completing his PhD in Strategic Communication in Future Conflict.

by Major Bryan Carroll and Dr. David A. Anderson

Download the full article: Afghanistan Governed by a Federal System with Autonomous Regions

It is debatable whether Afghanistan meets most accepted definitions of a nation-state. Afghanistan has historically been governed by local and tribal leaders with short-lived attempts at a strong central unitary government. Whenever there has been a strong central government, it has relatively quickly been removed from power. The people of Afghanistan resent strong central government and demonstrate this through their repeated revolts and coups that follow any bold government intrusion in their tribal lives. This historical trend raises questions about the United States' current efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's central government. We assert that Afghanistan should not be governed by a central government but by a federal system with strongly autonomous areas.

We begin with a brief background discussion of the recent history of Afghani governance and ethnic demographics. The second section defines a federal system and an autonomous region, detailing their respective strengths and weaknesses as a form of governance. The third section presents case studies of the countries of Belgium, Spain, and the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq. Both Belgium and Spain are examples of nation-states that are made-up of strong ethnic groups in which a federal system with autonomous regions has helped to stabilize. The region of Kurdistan within Iraq is an example of a country using an autonomous region to decrease ethnic violence and separatist movements with a positive outcome. The fourth section analyzes the country case studies focusing upon the applied strengths exhibited by these chosen political systems in relation to four prescribed assessment criteria. The study then looks for historical parallels between these federal systems of government with autonomous region(s) and the current situation in Afghanistan, as well as the current challenges facing Afghanistan that could be alleviated utilizing this alternative political system.

Download the full article: Afghanistan Governed by a Federal System with Autonomous Regions

Major Bryan Carroll is a United States Army Infantry Officer and graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies with a Masters of Military Art and Science in Theater Operations. His undergraduate degrees in History and International Relations are from Norwich Military University. He has deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has served within Airborne and Stryker Infantry assignments. He is currently preparing to return to Afghanistan.

Dr. David A. Anderson is a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. He is now a professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he teaches strategic and operational studies, as well as economics. He is also an adjunct professor for Webster University, Missouri, where he teaches various international relations courses. He has published numerous articles on military and international relations related topics.

How Effective Has USSOCOM Been in Fighting the Long War?

by Yasotay

Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?

The establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987 with the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1987 was designed to fix the problems with Special Operations that were brought to light after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt at Desert One in 1980. Congress did what the military establishment would not. This legislation provided unity of command and control for Special Operations Forces and elevated Special Operations to a near peer with the Services giving it "service-like" responsibilities as well as a little used Combatant Command authority.

However, in 2009, perhaps it is time for Congress to review their handiwork. Of course many outside the military establishment are enamored with the myth and romanticism of Special Operations. There are so many "groupies" among staffers and in academia that it is hard to see Special Operations for what it really is and what it has become. And within the military, Special Operations has been "hijacked" by a group of hyper-conventional Ranger types and other supporting elements that Special Operations and most important, its heart and soul -- Special Forces - has lost its way. There are so many in and out of the military who claim ties to Special Operations that it is unlikely that there will ever be a critical look at USSOCOM and what it has become.

There is no doubt that Special Operations Forces, including from across the spectrum: the hyper-conventional Special Mission Units including the Rangers and Special Operations Aviation, as well the SEALs, the Air Commandos, the MARSOC Marines and the intellectual, indirect approach experts in Special Forces such as Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations, have made tremendous contributions to the United States' fight against terrorists and insurgents. However, it is important to note that they have done this working for the Combatant Commanders (formerly regional Commander in Chiefs) and Ambassadors and not under USSOCOM.

So let's take a broad look at USSOCOM and specifically focus on its headquarters and what it has done for our nation since 9-11 and what it has become. Congress might want to delve into some of these issues and ask some hard questions.

Download the full article: Does The United States Still Need USSCOM?

Yasotay was a Mongol Warlord and fierce fighter who marauded all over Asia aggressively vanquishing any foe by any means. The author is a patriotic American who has been associated with Special Operations in Tampa for more than 20 years. The views he expresses are as a frequent observer of SOF and they are a distillation as a result of numerous conversations with SOF operators at all levels.

Update:

Abolish SOCOM - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Does The United States Still Need a USSOCOM? - Professional Soldiers discussion forum

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Arghandab and the Battle for Kandahar

People are confused about the war. The situation is difficult to resolve even for those who are here. For most of us, the conflict remains out of focus, lacking reference of almost any sort. Vertigo leaves us seeking orientation from places like Vietnam—where most of us never have been. So sad are our motley pundits-cum-navigators that those who have never have been to Afghanistan or Vietnam shamelessly use one to reference the other. We saw this in Iraq.

The most we can do is pay attention, study hard, and try to bring something into focus that is always rolling, yawing, and seemingly changing course randomly, in more dimensions than even astronauts must consider. All while gauging dozens of factors, such as Afghan Opinion, Coalition Will, Enemy Will and Capacity, Resources, Regional Actors (and, of course, the Thoroughly Unexpected). Nobody will ever understand all these dynamic factors and track them at once and through time. That's the bad news.

The good news is that a tiger doesn't need to completely understand the jungle to survive, navigate, and then dominate. It is not necessary to know every anthropological and historical nuance of the people here. If that were the case, our Coalition of over forty nations would not exist. More important is to realize that they are humans like us. They get hungry, happy, sad, and angry; they make friends and enemies (to the Nth degree); they are neither supermen nor vermin. They're just people.

But it always helps to know as much as you can. This will take much time, many dispatches, and hard, dangerous work.

Download the full article: Arghandab and the Battle for Kandahar

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation.

by Dr. Mark Moyar

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency and Professional Military Education

Major Niel Smith's article "Integrating COIN into Army Professional Education" contains valuable insights and has provoked a large amount of fruitful dialogue on the Small Wars Journal website. What follows here is intended to add some thoughts to the discussion, to point out some challenges involved in achieving change, and to offer suggestions for overcoming those challenges. Although I am a professor at the Marine Corps University, these views are strictly my own, not those of the Marine Corps University.

When I was a course director at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, I was responsible for adding large amounts of COIN instruction to the core curriculum from 2005 to 2007. Most of what I know, therefore, is based on Marine education, which is different in important ways from Army education. The much smaller size of the former allows it to change more quickly, and Marine culture puts less emphasis on doctrine than Army culture. Nevertheless, I think that much of what has been learned from teaching COIN at Marine Corps PME schools is applicable to the Army.

The educational outcomes specified on page 3 of Smith's article, derived from a 2007 conference at Ft. Leavenworth, are very useful. PME schools are accustomed to developing course content based on such a set of outcomes. This list attaches much weight to doctrine, and particularly to FM 3-24. Although I think FM 3-24 is a pretty good document, I have some serious reservations about it, and some of the commentaries on Smith's article also reflect concern about FM 3-24, for instance the validity of the "hearts-and-minds" theory that undergirds much of the manual. If you asked 100 COIN experts what they thought of FM 3-24 and what they thought should be taught about COIN in PME, you would get 100 different opinions. Given the lack of consensus, it becomes very difficult to get very specific on what we should teach on COIN.

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency and Professional Military Education

Dr. Mark Moyar is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps University and author of three books on counterinsurgency, most recently A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq.

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and Mr. Hakim Hazim

Download the full article: Domestic Radical Islamic Insurgency

The contention being made is that governmental officials are downplaying a threat to the US homeland—that compromised of a small, yet virulent, component of domestic radical Islamic insurgency derived from the actions of one and two man cells. While a well intended policy, such actions may be in actuality setting up our nation for some sort of disaster down the road.

With this said, no overarching conspiracy is implied to be taking place with the suppression of this threat, but rather that incremental policies and decisions appear to be promoting this public policy. The motivations behind such policies surely vary but appear to be centered on not unnecessarily alarming the American public or causing them further fear and consternation. With the burden of economic hardships, high levels of unemployment, bankruptcies, and foreclosures, health concerns over the H1N1 virus, and the other trials and tribulations of today's world, the American public is, in a sense, being protected for its own good. Further, due to both considerations of 'political correctness' on one hand and appropriate concerns over 'witch hunts' and Islam-bashing on the other, any discussion of domestic Islamic self-radicalization quickly becomes a highly politicized topic. As a result, it is officially better to attribute any form of violence undertaken due to self-radicalization as a manifestation of mental health issues or heightened emotional states instead of being symptomatic of radical Islamic yearnings derived from one's own internalized metric of rationality.

One may argue that, in order to ensure an appropriate homeland security posture, the perception of threat and the actual threat that exists should always be closely intertwined. Not only should the American government be accurate in its understanding of what the actual threats to homeland security are but it is critical that the American public also be informed and educated in a similar manner. The greater the divergence between the threat reality that exists and the perception of that reality held by the American public, the greater the potential for some sort of disaster to take place.

Download the full article: Domestic Radical Islamic Insurgency

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is CEO of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation. He has over 150 published works including essays, papers, and edited books focusing on terrorism and homeland security. He can be reached at [email protected].

Hakim Hazim is the founder of Relevant Now, a nationally recognized consultancy company. His research expertise includes sociological intelligence, realism, mentoring, gangs, radicalization processes, urban and social decay, and law enforcement approaches to the mentally ill and cognitively challenged. He can be reached at [email protected].

by Vegetius

Download the full article: Needed: An Exorcism in Kandahar

It is said that President Obama is looking for a proof of concept for General McChrystal's proposed strategy in Afghanistan. Kandahar is probably is an excellent place to start. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal by Michael Phillips, NATO forces will soon attempt to retake Kandahar from the Taliban who are in de facto control of Afghanistan's second city.

Kandahar is critical on a number of levels. Most importantly, it is the heart of the Pashtu dominated portion of Afghanistan; the Pashtu led Taliban movement was born there. Second, Kandahar sits at a key crossroads on the ancient Silk Road between the west and Asia; it is strategically vital to control of Afghanistan. The Afghan government never lost Kandahar in a military sense, but the Taliban dominates its soul; its shadow government dispenses a rough form of governance and justice that competes favorably with the warlord dominated kleptocracy that pretends to run the city.

A few hundred American and Canadian trainers are allowed to be billeted in the city by the Taliban because they pose no real threat and chasing them out would bring unwanted attention to the cadres of the Taliban who are the real rulers of the city.

If the Phillips article is correct, the first phase of NATO plan for wresting control of the city from Taliban domination is sound. The coalition commander will attempt to isolate it and control all traffic in and out. This is a good strategy for laying siege to any city in conventional or irregular warfare. Where the plan breaks down is in its second phase.

Download the full article: Needed: An Exorcism in Kandahar

The author is a government employee who is a former infantryman.

by Major Niel Smith

Download the full article: Integrating COIN into Army Professional Education

In the eight years since the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has failed to integrate counterinsurgency (COIN) into Professional Military Education (PME). Counterinsurgency instruction remains uneven in quantity and quality throughout Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) institutions, which have failed to define standards, competencies and outcomes for COIN education. This lack of consistency contributes to ongoing operational confusion and poor execution of operations in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom due to lack of common concept of what counterinsurgency is and what it entails, despite great advances in COIN application and execution by troops in the field.

Integrating COIN into PME is crucial for improving the ability of the Army to wage our current wars. Ideally, two officers or NCO's educated at differing TRADOC schoolhouses should emerge with similar skills and knowledge competencies on doctrine and staff processes. This synchronization is crucial to allowing large staffs with multiple specialties to operate seamlessly using shared understandings of the operational environment. No such standardization exists for the topic of COIN, despite adequate published doctrine and historical military literature.

TRADOC must address this shortcoming in one of its key areas of responsibility. This paper will outline several actions executable within the TRADOC commander's existing authority to address these problems.

Download the full article: Integrating COIN into Army Professional Education

Major Niel Smith is a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He served as operations officer at the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center from 2007 to 2009.

Subsidize Other Crops, Not Poppy

by Allison Brown

Download the full article: Why Buy Something We Hate?

Buying the Afghan opium crop is an idea that has been around for a while but recently has been appearing in various forms in mainstream media. We should not consider buying the crop because paying farmers for their opium is likely to increase poppy production, and because a poppy subsidy must be continued until there is no more illegal demand for drugs. People wanting to change farming practices in Afghanistan should consider price competition, purchase competition, farmer risk avoidance, and the fact that much poppy cultivation is coerced, before they suggest subsidizing poppy.

Download the full article: Why Buy Something We Hate?

Allison Brown has over twenty-five years professional experience providing business development services to urban and rural development projects in developing economies. She is also a technical specialist on the use of agriculture and economic interventions in Counter Narcotics programs.

by Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Killebrew-Conwell

Download the full article: Afghanistan: Education and Literacy

I've seen a lot of news about how the solution for Afghanistan is schools, and I agree, with reservations. Provided they get a chance, educated Afghans can change this country for the better. But sweeping claims that schooling will fix Afghanistan's ills better than the military coalition rest on a false dilemma.

The largest educational endeavor in Afghanistan is the Afghan National Army's literacy programs, which are designed, funded, directed, and inspected by the military coalition. All soldiers who enlist in the ANA receive literacy training -- ranging from learning numbers so soldiers can read speedometers and bank balances to intensive English language classes for specialties that need them.

No NGO that provides education has facilities and access to a cross section of the Afghan population like coalition forces. Afghan soldiers learn with soldiers from other tribes and places, slowly imbibing nationalism and patriotism as well as literacy. To some in the West, "nationalism" and "patriotism" have negative connotations, but compared to the dangerous limitations of tribalism and its bloody history in Afghanistan, nationalism and patriotism broaden intellectual horizons and provide less volatile perspectives.

Download the full article: Afghanistan: Education and Literacy

Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Killebrew-Conwell, U.S. Army, is an advisor with the Afghan National Army

by Vegetius

Download the full article: The Myth of Hearts and Minds

Hearts and Minds is a wonderful name for a teen romance novel, but I've always thought it to be a poor name for a counterinsurgency concept. The idea of winning the hearts and minds of the population carries the connotation that there is somehow a magic formula that will turn the population from —puppets of the insurgency into enthusiastic supporters of the national government. The reality is that the key to defeating an insurgency is in shaping the human terrain so that the host nation can conduct governance and economic development in conditions approaching normalcy.

In most insurgencies, the bulk of the population is sitting on the fence. Success for the insurgent is usually achieved when the majority of the population is actively supporting his cause. If this becomes the case, any foreign power supporting a counterinsurgency effort is in a great deal of trouble. When faced with this situation, the Romans would simply eliminate the population as they notably did in ending the Jewish Revolt in the First Century AD. This option is not likely to be adopted in either in Afghanistan or Iraq as we now call this type of solution "ethnic cleansing", which international tribunals generally frown upon. In Iraq, we were able to temporarily remove large segments of the population prior to the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004, but that should be an option of last resort.

Shaping the human terrain has three stages, but before those can occur, the area in question needs to be secure enough that some form of human interaction with the population is possible. During the first phase, significant combat action may still be taking place in parts of the area of operations (doctrinally referred to as "battle space" today), but in subsequent phases, kinetic action should be on a steady decrease.

Download the full article: The Myth of Hearts and Minds

The author is a government employee and a former infantryman.

by Major David J. Painter, Major Mark C. Weaver and Major Scott C. White.

Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare is a master's thesis to be published next month by the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Thesis Abstract:

A thorough understanding of Irregular Warfare (IW) and the principles of organizational theory and design will enable the Department of Defense (DoD) to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the IW Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities. We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages. First, we define irregular warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors. We introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the critical success factors. We conclude that the DoD should reorganize certain elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command by incorporating existing capabilities, focusing on conducting operations within the IW Environment, and implementing our critical success factors.

Download the full thesis: Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare

The authors would like to thank the U.S. Special Operations Command for allowing us to further our professional education within our respective career fields. We would also like to thank the staff of Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, for their mentorship throughout the writing of this thesis. Finally, we thank Dr. Hy Rothstein and Dr. Eric Jansen for their instruction and guidance as we addressed the complexity of Irregular Warfare in this thesis.

by Major Derek E. Lane and Dr. David A. Anderson

Download the full article: AFRICOM: Reconstruction and Stability

Africa Command (AFRICOM), given its unique command structure with coequal deputy commanders from the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD), has an opportunity to partner with African countries and apply theater security cooperation (TSC) and reconstruction and stability (R&S) operations in a more integrated and coherent whole of government approach. However, it will face challenges to integrate all instruments of national power and eliminate interagency (IA) parochialisms in conjunction with a requirement to solicit input from African nations in support of common goals. In order to be successful, AFRICOM must identify a process model through which it will employ its resources that will contain elements of numerous United States Government Department and Agencies (USG-D/A) while coordinating U.S. efforts with international partners, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private venture organizations (PVO) and of critical importance, African nations. After providing a historical perspective on military/interagency integration efforts, along with lessons learned in their application in Iraq and Afghanistan, this paper outlines a way to achieve unified action within AFRICOM via unity of command and unity of effort incorporating all elements of national power. We feature a process that focuses on empowering the Provincial Reconstruction Team-Enhanced (PRT-E) concept enabled through a defined functional command and control structure as the means to achieve regional objectives.

Download the full article: AFRICOM: Reconstruction and Stability

Major Derek E. Lane, USMC, is a career Communications Officer. He is a recent graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and is currently serving as the J6, Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida.

Dr. David A. Anderson is a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. He is currently a professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he teaches strategic and operational studies, as well as economics. He is also an adjunct professor for Webster University, Missouri, where he teaches various international relations courses. He has published numerous articles on military and international relations related topics.

by Vegetius

Download the full article: A Strategy of Exhaustion

Most Jihads do not die with a bang; they have historically gone out with a whimper. The first great wave of Islamic holy war effectively petered out within a century of the death of the Prophet Mohammed and Arabs were no longer actively leaders in the expansion of the Muslim faith after the tenth century A.D. when the peoples of the Turk branch of the Eurasian peoples picked up the banner of Islam. The last of a succession of waves of pre-industrial Jihad petered out at the walls of Vienna in 1683. As we deal with post-industrial Jihad, we may be able to learn something about Islamic holy wars of expansion that have been dealt with in the past.

Jihad was a powerful enough force that it was impossible to permanently defeat by purely military means. Unlike their Christian foes, the Muslim holy warriors were generally content to stop killing when their enemies surrendered and decided to convert to Islam. Jihads died because they reached a point of exhaustion. The most fervent warriors who sought martyrdom in battle could get it easily. This eventually left the Jihad bereft of its most enthusiastic fighters. Those less fanatic or more skillful collected enough slaves and riches in the holy wars to feel that God had rewarded them on earth for their fervor, and settled down to enjoy the good life that successful Jihad made possible. A final element in the death of successive waves of Jihad was internal dissention and struggles for power among the Jihadist leadership. The contest for control for leadership of the first Caliphate began almost immediately with the death of the Prophet Mohammed and culminated in the great Sunni-Shiite schism.

As Edward Luttwak points out in his new book, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, the Byzantines studied this new enemy closely and came to realize that their only hope of survival against the lethal threat of expansionist Jihadism was a strategy of exhaustion. Luttwak's work is the first really comprehensive modern study of how the Eastern Roman empire survived and largely thrived in the face of expansionist Islam for eight centuries.

Download the full article: A Strategy of Exhaustion

The author is a government employee and a former infantryman.

A Preliminary Commentary

by Charles Cameron

Download the full article: The Hasan Slide Presentation

There is no place as private as the interior of a human skull: the mind remains inviolate.

Words can reveal some of what goes on inside us, actions can speak some of our intents and passions forcefully, at times explosively. And yet there is no place more secret -- and what a hint, a phrase, a gesture, a speech or an explosion cannot reveal, what even the best forensic examination can only label a probability, is the complex interweaving of thoughts half thought, doubts entertained, emotions pushing on through, and clashing, building at times to a perfect storm perhaps, with all doubts and constraints cast aside and the emotions unleashed in a blind and defining moment.

Major Nidal Malik Hasan MD MPH, a psychiatrist in the U.S. Army, has now been charged with multiple specifications of premeditated murder in the mass shooting at Fort Hood, under Article 188 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Assuming that Major Hasan was in fact the shooter at Fort Hood and that, as alleged, he shouted "Allahu Akbar" during the event, the main question of fact and interpretation now would be whether Hasan was more an introvert under pressure whose "break" took the jihadist cry "Allahu Akbar" as its outlet, or a patient and long-standing lone wolf jihadist of the sort abu Musab al-Suri calls for (Jim Lacey, A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad, p. 19), or a wannabe with failed or actual al Qaeda connections, or an al Qaeda or related "soldier" under orders.

This analysis attempts to provide some leads in that inquiry, by a careful reading of the only substantial documentation we have from Major Hasan himself, which may throw light on his trajectory.

Download the full article: The Hasan Slide Presentation

Charles Cameron is an independent scholar and writer, and was at one time a Principal Researcher with the Center for Millennial Studies at Boston University. He would like to thank Stephen O'Leary, Richard Landes and David Cook for their encouragement and support over the years, the members of the NRM mailing list and particularly Jean Rosenfeld, Jayne Seminaire Docherty, Phil Arnold and John R Hall for their thoughts on this subject, David Ronfeldt, Ibn Siqilli and Leah Farrall among others for recent interactions, Mark Safranski for graciously allowing him to guest-blog on Zenpundit, and Howard Rheingold and the Brainstorms community, the folks at TMN, and Jaen Martens and Kevin Murphy for various other forms of hospitality.

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

Download the full article: Afghanistan: Seven Fundamental Questions

I know we live in a world that is real and is moved by minds -- thinking, manipulating, conniving, conspiring, calculating and masquerading minds. Our world therefore seldom has a place for 'sentiments' -- pure, sincere, honest and spontaneous as sentiments are. But when it comes to war in Afghanistan, I am not deterred by the tyranny of the trend. I like, in fact I am forced, to think through my heart. What else can you do when you see images of your countrymen; innocent and unsuspecting men, women and children; ripped apart by other human beings exploding in their midst almost on a daily basis? How can I not worry about my daughter when I see a pale and empty face of a mother in Kabul or Peshawar, bent like a broken branch of an old, dried up tree; over the dead body of her child? How can I not cry when the soul of my nation is hit and hurt by violence that is so inextricably linked with bloodshed beyond the snaky Khyber Pass? For us in Pakistan, the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan and astride Durand Line is the most seminal endeavor of our history. If this war is won, the entire world stands to benefit. But if it is lost, one country that will be hurt the most is Pakistan -- my daughter's home and her future. War astride the Durand Line is therefore so personal to so many of us.

This war is also extremely personal for thousands of American mothers who await and pray for the safe return of their sons and daughters: bright young men and women who deserve to live and who must never be wasted just because someone considers it politically expedient to continue to muddle along and because setting the course right needs some statesmanship and may also involve some political cost.

Download the full article: Afghanistan: Seven Fundamental Questions

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan's Command and Staff College in Quetta.

by Colonel Gian Gentile

Download the full article: A Better Understanding of the Vietnam War

Thanks to Senator Kerry for his excellent and very accurate article in Newsweek, "Beware the Revisionists," on the serious flaws of a certain strain of Vietnam War history. This flawed history coalesces around a number of highly problematic assumptions like the war could have been won if the United States had not lost its political will because by 1972 pacification was working, or that more troops could have done the trick, or that better tactics and methods earlier applied in 1965 could have won the war. Senator Kerry's points concerning this flawed Vietnam history is actually supported by a general consensus of scholarly historians that still is in line with one of the most well known and respected of them all, Professor George Herring of the University of Kentucky, who states in his book The Longest War that for the United States:

Herring's clear and profound observation of the Vietnam War is still correct and supported by a consensus of historians. Yet there has been this incorrect interpretation of the history of Vietnam that argues that when the wrong General (Westmoreland) was removed after the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the right General was put in place (Abrams) things then turned around on a dime, the American Army started doing classic Coin and had actually pacified the South—had essentially won the war through better Coin tactics—but the American people and their political leaders lost their will and therefore the war. No, this interpretation is dubious.

Download the full article: A Better Understanding of the Vietnam War

The author is a serving Army Colonel. He commanded a Cavalry Squadron in West Baghdad in 2006.

Crime and Terrorism

by Colonel Robert Killebrew

Download the full article: Crime and Terrorism

The U.S. has been at war in Iraq and Afghanistan now for eight years, and a great deal of our best thinking and most focused military development has quite rightly gone into fighting those two conflicts. We have built an effective counterinsurgency doctrine, we have re-equipped and re-re-equipped our forces, and we have perforce built huge bases of experience in dealing with Islamic insurgent and terror organizations. This is as it should be -- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' admonition to "win the war you're in" is right on target.

In those eight years, though, as we have focused on the wars we're in, there have been some profound changes in the structure of global terrorism, particularly with regard to the relationship between terrorist movements and international crime. According to a panel of experts at a recent conference sponsored by the Center for a New American Security, terrorism and crime have now merged, to such an extent that all terrorist movements -- all of them -- have become partly criminal organizations to fund their operations, expand their reach -- and incidentally make the people on top extremely rich, while lower-level zealots continue to be recruited for suicide missions.

Download the full article: Crime and Terrorism

Robert B. Killebrew is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Killebrew is a retired Army colonel who served 30 years in a variety of assignments that included Special Forces, tours in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, XVIII Airborne Corps, high-level war planning assignments and instructor duty at the Army War College.

by Bing West

Download the full article: Afghanistan Trip Report

Having recently returned from Afghanistan -- thanks to the hospitality of Generals Petraeus and McChrystal - I'd like to share a few thoughts. By way of context, let me state my frame of reference. As a former assistant secretary of defense for international security, I am familiar with Washington dynamics; but I believe COIN is decided at the small unit level, not in national capitals. I was 18 months in Vietnam, have written five books on COIN and made 20 trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. This was my third Afghanistan visit in quick succession (April-May, June-July and October). My observations are based on forty to fifty shuras and patrols -- several on extended missions -- that included numerous small-arms engagements and fire missions. I talked with about 500 Marines and Afghan security forces of all ranks. The observations here are derived from that sample.

Download the full article: Afghanistan Trip Report

Francis J. 'Bing' West is a Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. In Vietnam, he was a member of the Marine Force Recon team that initiated Operation Stingray - sustained attacks behind enemy lines. He also saw action in the villages with a Combined Action Platoon and wrote The Village , a narrative of a Marine squad that lived for 485 days in a Vietnamese village. During the Vietnam time period, he wrote a series of monographs for The Rand Corporation on counterinsurgency and the nature of small unit combat. West is also the author of Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Naval Forces and National Security, The Pepperdogs: A Novel, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah and The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq.

by Colonel William F. Mullen III

Download the full article: Turning Fallujah

Fallujah is a city that has taken on a tremendous amount of significance because of what happened there from April to December of 2004. It has become one of the touchstone battles of the Marine Corps involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom because of the intensity of the fighting and the number of Marines and Sailors killed or wounded there. It is not a large city in either the space it occupies, or the amount of people that claim it as home. It is a compact, dirty, beat up town that always had a sinister reputation under the Saddam Hussein regime as a smuggling and black market center. This went very nicely with its additional claim to fame as the "city of Mosques" due to the large number of Mosques located within its' boundaries. Its people have been known to be, and still very much are, very xenophobic as their general attitude seems to be "it is us Fallujans against the world." This was directed not only at coalition forces, but also at any Iraqis who were not specifically from Fallujah. It is certainly not a place that will show up as a vacation hot spot any time soon. My personal involvement there started in December 2004 when I went out to Iraq on a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). I was the Operations Officer for Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 8 and we would be replacing RCT 1 in February, 2005. It finished, at least for now, when I departed the area in October, 2007 as the commander of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) having just spent the previous 7 months in control of the city.

This paper is not an attempt to tell how we did everything right and solved the riddle of "turning Fallujah" from being a constant source of trouble and anxiety, to an example of what could be accomplished in Iraq given the proper COIN techniques. We did not do everything right and our success there, such as it was, could only be described as the culmination of years of dedicated struggle and effort on the part of thousands of Marines, Soldiers and Sailors, as well as members of the Iraqi security forces, many of whom were wounded or killed there. It was also a result of the fortunate coming together of several different events, all happening around the same time, which also happened to coincide with my battalion's arrival in March, 2007. This paper will briefly provide what I know of the history of Fallujah from 2004-2007, the techniques we used as an RCT to try and maintain control of both the town and the surrounding area during 2005 and early 2006, some lessons learned that I took away from observing the units that operated underneath RCT 8 during that year (one of which was 2/6, but under a different commander), the preparations we made in 2/6 after I took over to be ready to return to Fallujah, and finally the specific steps we took to capitalize on the conditions we found when we arrived there in late March, 2007. I firmly believe that it was the preparations we made while training prior to the deployment that enabled us to recognize what was happening in Fallujah and turn it to our advantage. We also developed an approach to turning Fallujah that resonated with the citizens of Fallujah to a degree and generated a level of success that well surpassed what we expected. It was an amazing experience and I feel privileged to have been a part of it.

Download the full article: Turning Fallujah

Colonel William F. Mullen III, USMC, is the Director of the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group of the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command. In July 2002 he reported to the J-3 Directorate of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon for duty as an Action Officer in the PACOM and then the CENTCOM sections of the Joint Operations Division. In May 2003, he was assigned as the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Regional Operations until he returned to Camp Lejeune in June 2004 as the Plans Officer for the 2nd Marine Division. In October, 2004 he was assigned as the Operations Officer for the 8th Marine Regiment and deployed with them to Fallujah, Iraq from February 2005 to February 2006. In June, 2006, he assumed command of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines and returned to Fallujah, Iraq from March to October, 2007. He was promoted to Colonel on 1 Oct, 2007 and reported to the Naval War College as a student in March, 2008 and graduated in March, 2009.

How Applying Lessons from our Successes and Failures in Iraq Can Shape a Winning Strategy in Afghanistan

by Lydia Khalil

Download the full article: Iraq the Model?

"This was a reckless intervention and no one has ever succeeded in occupying this land." "We are sacrificing young lives in the name of an unachievable mission." "This conflict has no end in sight." No, this is not the prevailing mood on Afghanistan. These were comments bandied about just a couple of years ago when the United States was faced with the same uncertainty about how to move forward in Iraq. The tone in 2006-2007 was much the same as it is now, as the United States is again facing an unpopular war with questionable ties to its national interests.

The U.S.'s experiences in Iraq should not be ignored as the Obama administration considers what is to be done in Afghanistan and attempts to answer the same questions-- "Do we stay the course?" "Do we reinforce our efforts?" Or "do we scale back our objectives?"

Before critics can cry that Iraq and Afghanistan are too different to draw comparisons, let us acknowledge the differences. Afghanistan is a largely rural, tribal culture with low levels of development. Iraq is more urban, has more resources, a history of highly centralized government and relatively high levels of development. Both countries have their own histories with outside powers.

Context matters, but these differences do not take away from the fact that there are broad lessons that can be applied that go beyond the specifics of each nation and the precise circumstances of international involvement with them.

Download the full article: Iraq the Model?

Lydia Khalil is an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She was a governance advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad in 2003-2004 and a former counterterrorism analyst with the New York Police Department.

A Review Essay

by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong

Download the full article: The Influence of Seapower Upon Small Wars

Over the past decade the United States has rediscovered the challenges of counter-insurgency, unconventional operations, and hybrid wars. Much of the discussion and development of twenty-first century warfare has been led by the efforts of land forces. The United States Army and Marine Corps worked together jointly to develop a new counter-insurgency doctrine, studying the past as a way to help focus the experiences of the present. While the role of air power has also been sharply debated, the role of sea power has had little discussion. Maritime forces have long played a vital role in small wars, from the mercenary army led by Naval Agent William Eaton and his Marines in the First Barbary War to riverine forces in the Mekong Delta during Vietnam. It is time for Sailors, Marines, and Guardsmen to learn from their history, and realize that they have a central role in today's global conflict.

The following three books provide important background for members of the sea services and students of complex modern warfare when approaching today's global challenges. Counter-insurgency doctrine is founded on the experiences of the past. The effort to develop naval irregular warfare would benefit greatly by plotting a similar course. These books are selected neither because they provide a comprehensive view of the subject, nor because they share a philosophical approach. Instead, they are books that provide a starting point from which a study of naval power in small wars can set sail.

Download the full article: The Influence of Seapower Upon Small Wars

Lieutenant Commander Benjamin "BJ" Armstrong is a Naval Aviator who has served as an Amphibious Search and Rescue and Special Warfare Pilot and an Advanced Helicopter Flight Instructor. He holds a MA in military history and has written on air power and naval history. He is a prior SWJ contributor and his articles and reviews have appeared in numerous journals including Defense & Security Analysis, Strategic Insights, and The Journal of Military History.

Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

by Dr. Tony Corn

Download the full article: Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?

At this particular juncture, the U.S. simply cannot afford a 500 billion dollar open-ended escalation. Nor can it opt for an incremental ("middle road") strategy which would fail to create the psychological effects required in both the West and Afghanistan.

A temporary 40,000 surge is doable, but only if the core of the Obama strategy is a "Kilcullen-Biden" plan combining convocation of a loya jirga domestically with a regionalization of the Afghan question diplomatically. Let's go massive for a limited time, and "clear, hold, and build" as much as we can. If it does not work, a regional negotiation provides ample cover for a drawdown.

COIN diehards will argue that in the absence an explicit long-term commitment, large segments of the Afghan population will continue to do fencing-sitting. Guess what: if the West is "the West" rather than just another Bananastan, it is because, from the British in 1688 to the Americans in 1776, and from the French in 1789 to the Romanians in 1989, Westerners decided that to "live free or die" was a more honorable option than forever "fencing-sitting." At the end of the day, if 30 million Afghans want to be known as a nation of fence-sitters un—to stand up to 15,000 insurgents, it is their problem first, that of their immediate neighbors second, and only third that of the West itself.

COIN Maximalists and Minimalist can at least agree on one thing: whatever the option chosen, McChrystal is the man for the job. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, the ISAF Commander has a grasp of tribal politics worthy of a professional anthropologist. On the other hand, reading between the lines of the report, it is not hard to see that General McChrystal has the kind of quiet determination that led a General Foch, on the eve of the Marne offensive, to defiantly report:

Hard pressed on my right. My center is yielding. Impossible to maneuver. Situation excellent. I shall attack.

Download the full article: Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?

Dr. Tony Corn is the author of "World War IV as Fourth-Generation Warfare" (Policy Review, January 2006). He is currently on leave from the State Department and writing a book on The Long War. This article is a follow-up to "The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home: Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations" published in Small Wars Journal on September 18, 2009 (before the release of the McChrystal report). The opinions expressed in this essay are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the U.S. State Department or the U.S. government.

by Stephen Phillips

Download the full article: Widening the Spectrum of Insurgency

Warfare blogs, Department of Defense forums, and defense industry conferences have debated terms surrounding the current global conflict. This clash has a myriad descriptive names such as "The Global War on Terrorism," "The Long War," and "Overseas Contingency Operation." Similarly, defense pundits have wrestled with the terms, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, and terrorism. Another definition that must be reviewed is "insurgency."

Two salient questions are the catalyst for this discussion. First, should criminal enterprises that want to remove rather than replace government control and seek a passive rather than a complicit populous fit into the definition of insurgency? Second, can a non-violent overthrow of a government, a "velvet revolution," be called an insurgency?

Download the full article: Widening the Spectrum of Insurgency

Stephen Phillips is a member of the Senior Professional Staff in the National Security Analysis Department at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He is also a Naval Reservist serving as a faculty member at the National Defense Intelligence College. The views herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the organizations with which he is affiliated.

by Adam Elkus and Captain Crispin Burke

Download the full article: Speculative Fiction and National Security

The counterinsurgency (COIN) canon—read by NATO's top officials—includes writing from illustrious military minds such as David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and David Kilcullen. But according to Andrew Exum, a former Army Ranger who operates the military blog "Abu Muqawama," it might also have room for George Lucas as well. Exum recently ignited a rambunctious discussion in the political blogosphere by posting an email from his cousin, a Marine Corps officer in Afghanistan, concerning a rather unorthodox topic in defense affairs: the strategy of Star Wars. Exum's cousin asked a simple question: why did the Rebel Alliance in Star Wars fight as a conventional force, rather than an insurgency?

While the Star Wars-themed post provides an example of Exum's often freewheeling and snarky style, he and his curious cousin are by no means alone in the defense community. There are many closet sci-fi fans in the military and especially within the civilian policy wonk world. Moreover, science fiction writers use the creative process to imagine future warfare, and military theorists' predictions of future warfare often resemble science fiction.

History will always be the most useful source of quality defense analysis. The chief danger of deep futurism, fictional or not, is that it often neglects history and extrapolates present conditions to the future. At worst, speculation can tie us to one powerful (and often times erroneous) image of the future. However, speculative fiction paired with the study of history and present experience can enable creative rethinking of present conditions in an allegorical context, getting around self-imposed conceptual barriers.

Download the full article: Speculative Fiction and National Security

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently contributing to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

Captain Crispin Burke is a UH-60 helicopter pilot with assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, and most recently, the 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. He writes for Small Wars Journal and under the name "Starbuck" at his blog, Wings Over Iraq.

A Short Recommendation for a Possible Revision of the National Security Act of 1947

by Colonel David S. Maxwell

Download the full article: A National Security Act of 2009?

"The Interagency is broken" is a refrain heard daily inside the beltway and in conflict areas around the world. It is also quite popular to make the call for a Goldwater-Nichols type legislation to do for the Interagency what that legislation did for the US Military and Joint operations, assignments, and professional military education. Assuming that the Interagency needs to be repaired, the issue is how to reform the organizations, processes, and education and training in the Interagency so that the United States can achieve a "whole of government" approach to National Security challenges of the future and prevent situations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Download the full article: A National Security Act of 2009?

Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer with command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and CONUS, and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth and the National War College, National Defense University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and represent no U.S. Government or Department of Defense positions.

The Role of Department of Defense in Foreign Economic Development

by Thomas J. Lapato

Download the Summary Article (24pp double spaced) or the Complete Article (96+ pp).

Tom Lapato's paper was the blue ribbon paper from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Class of 2009 and is republished here with his kind permission. It offers motivation for students on athletic scholarships everywhere and provides insights into operationalizing the E in DIME, an essential element of engagement and national power.

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The battles of the 21st century will be fought in global markets and in corporate boardrooms as much as in more traditional combat venues. The Cold War ended with a whimper as the Soviet Union went bankrupt competing with American defense spending while ignoring the economic needs of its people. Terrorist organizations seek out failing states to establish their headquarters and networks using the economic disadvantages of the populations to recruit enemies against American ideals. It is no surprise that the main target of al-Qaeda's attacks on America was the financial center of the world. Even our most powerful near-peer rival, China, has softened its military stance while intending to subvert US power through economic means. Russia also appears —to flex its economic muscle through its outflows of energy to achieve greater advantage over its European neighbors and US allies. The current global economic crisis threatens stability and security throughout the world. The Department of Defense (DOD) must develop a class of economic warriors that will be able to lead the country in these non-conventional battles.

It is an optimal time to address the DOD's role in foreign economic development. Secretary Robert Gates has been vocal about the need for the defense establishment to continue to transform to avoid mistakes from the recent past. Instead of funding expensive, technology driven programs that take years to develop and are aimed at a direct involvement against another industrialized state, Gates has repeatedly called for "employing indirect approaches" where building the capacities of allies, partners, and of fragile states will be just as important as the kinetic approaches generally favored by the US military:

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Tom Lapato was an Industry Fellow from KPMG LLP at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), National Defense University (NDU) during the 2009 academic year. His paper, "Business as Usual? The Role of the Department of Defense in Foreign Economic Development" was a product of his Business Transformation Agency (BTA)-sponsored Research Fellowship through the ICAF writing program. Mr. Lapato's paper earned the NDU President's Strategic Vision Award for the class of 2009. Mr. Lapato was guided throughout the research and writing process by his ICAF Research Advisor, Mr. Tom Hauser, along with his sponsor at the BTA, Mr. Bob Love.

Download the Summary Article (24pp double spaced) or the Complete Article (96+ pp).

Lessons Learned from the Hezbollah-Israeli War

by Ehsan Ahrari

Download the full article: China's Preoccupation with Asymmetric War

Chinese leaders have decided long ago that, in the wake of a conflict, their military cannot fight and win a battle against the U.S. military on a force-on-force basis. However, that reality was not going to discourage a country whose strategic culture has produced original thinkers of the caliber and reputation of Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong.

In answering this question, one has to remind onself of a few famous quotes of Sun Tzu: "All warfare is based on deception." "If your enemy ... is in superior strength, evade him..." and "Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant." One must also recall Unrestricted War, published in 1999, by two senior Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. It stated that, when faced with a technologically superior enemy, it is "necessary to dare to completely upset the order of the cards in one's hands and reorganize them in accordance with the needs of war and the interests of a nation."

The conventional wisdom regarding China's asymmetric war doctrine is that it is "aimed at finding key vulnerabilities in American forces." In the post-9/11 era, that doctrine is focused not only on military-related susceptibilities, but also on other weak points. In this context, one has to keep in mind Chang Mengxiong's concept of "assassin's mace" ("shashou jian"). Using the analogy of acupuncture for fighting asymmetric wars, this concept argues that even a superpower like the United States has a great number of points of vulnerabilities. If the focus of asymmetric attack is on those points, then the military giant can be brought down by a "weak" power like China.

Download the full article: China's Preoccupation with Asymmetric War

Ehsan Ahrari is Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. This essay was originally prepared as part of his testimony at the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March 2007.

by John Noonan

Full article: An Interview with Peter Godwin

Sometimes the most effective COIN lessons are found in the strangest of places. Some time ago, while researching Zimbabwe's staggering collapse under the Robert Mugabe regime, I stumbled upon When a Crocodile Eats the Sun -- a deeply moving memoir of Zimbabwe's corrosive rot, told by native Zimbabwean reporter, Mr. Peter Godwin. Godwin spun his tale with an enviably smooth narration, blending microcosmic personal tragedies with macrocosmic political and economic failures into a sad, powerful account of a functional nation-state's collapse. When I finished reading, I wanted more. Digging into Godwin's Amazon.com author history, I came across Mukiwa, the fascinating autobiography of a white boy growing up in colonial Africa (and winner of the Orwell Prize for political writing).

Mukiwa spans multiple governments in a single country, as Godwin's wonderfully interesting experiences stretch from Rhodesia as a British Crown Colony, to an international pariah, to an undeclared Republic, an unrecognized hybrid state in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and finally to Mugabe's Zimbabwe. While Mukiwa isn't necessarily a war memoir (though Godwin did spend much of his career as a war correspondent), several chapters are dedicated to his time serving with the British South Africa Police during the Rhodesian Bush War. So poignant were the stories from Godwin's tour, I sent a copy to a close friend serving in Afghanistan. He too was taken with how simply and effectively Godwin laid out basic COIN principles, so much so that he had his NCOs read the chapters that I had bookmarked.

I reached out to Mr. Godwin, now a professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, who generously agreed to sit down for an interview.

Full article: An Interview with Peter Godwin

John Noonan is a national security and defense writer with The Weekly Standard and Military.com. Both Mukiwa and When a Crocodile Eats the Sun are available for purchase at Amazon.com.