Journal

Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan

by Lara M. Dadkhah, Small Wars Journal

Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

American airpower seems to have lost some of its mystique in the war in Afghanistan. American air dominance, including its ability to conduct airstrikes in close air support of coalition troops, has been and continues to be critical to the Afghan war effort. Close air support, in particular, is allowing the United States and NATO to fight an energized insurgency with far fewer troops than it needs. Yet if one follows press reports from the Afghan theatre, what Eliot Cohen once characterized as an "unusually seductive form of military strength," has become a source of consternation for the United States and a ready cudgel with which to beat America's troubled prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Tragic news stories of American airstrikes gone wrong and their resultant civilian casualties trump more mundane analyses of the Afghan government's failings or the (by now routine) atrocities committed by Afghan insurgents. American airpower, it seems, has become a victim of its own misunderstood successes in the Persian Gulf War and Kosovo bombing campaign. Its famed precision makes any costly error unacceptable, inflames Afghan and international public opinion, and forces American defense officials and military leaders to observe endless rituals of public apology. The irreconcilable conflict between the immutably violent nature of war and the fiction of a "bloodless" use of force has trapped the United States between the Scylla of military exigency and the Charybdis of public sentiment.

This paper will briefly examine the issue of airstrikes during close air support (CAS) operations in the Afghan theatre. It will give a broad overview of the use of airpower in OEF, then examine the controversy surrounding American airstrikes in Afghanistan. It will take the position that given the existing constraints on the American war effort (troop shortages, the vast and difficult Afghan terrain, limited human intelligence, cross-border insurgent sanctuaries, and increased insurgent activity), CAS is vital to the prosecution of the Afghan war. It will further argue that, even as mounting civilian casualties are alienating the Afghan populace, excessive restraint in the use of airstrikes may be handicapping U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts.

Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Random Thoughts on Irregular Warfare and Security Assistance

by Colonel David Maxwell, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Random Thoughts on Irregular Warfare and Security Assistance (Full PDF Article)

As we continue the debate on how we are going to organize our forces for operations in the Irregular Warfare and we think about enabling other forces would like to think a couple of things before we chase new "shiny things" as in new "designer organizations."

First we need to look at ourselves critically and ask if we have been able to develop effective strategies and campaign plans and then support and execute them, respectively. I think that most all of our challenges can be attributed to our strategies and campaign plans (and I will caveat this and say we need to understand that in this world of irregular warfare, complex operations and hybrid warfare there is no cookie cutter strategy or campaign plan template that will work the first time, every time. We need to be agile and flexible and be able to adapt to constantly morphing conditions). But I would say that this is where we need to focus most of all because our forces at the tactical level from all Services have proven very adept and capable and have demonstrated that they are truly learning organizations.

The second point that no one talks about are authorities and processes. If we are going to truly be effective in the Security Force Assistance, Building Partner Capacity, Train, Advise and Assist, COIN, Foreign Internal Defense areas (or whatever we what to call these types of operations -- what is the flavor of the month right now?? J But I digress with my sarcasm). Our security assistance processes are broken and not supportive of whatever strategies and campaign plans we may develop. We do not have agile processes that allow us to rapidly and effectively support our friends, partners, or allies. We have Congressional constraints and limitations placed on us for political reasons that are sometimes (and perhaps often) counter to objectives or end states we are trying to achieve from a security perspective. But all the talk of an Advisory Corps whether in the military or a combined civilian-military one will be moot if we do not update, simplify, streamline, and make effective our security assistance processes and redesign them so they can support national and regional and Country Team strategies and campaign plans...

Random Thoughts on Irregular Warfare and Security Assistance (Full PDF Article)

Theory to Strategy

How to Defeat al Qaeda in Iraq and around the Globe

by Dr. Paul R. Chabot, Small Wars Journal

Theory to Strategy (Full PDF Article)

The U.S., Coalition and Iraqi forces have made great progress in combating al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Today, AQI is severely damaged and limited in its operational potential. However, despite all best efforts, AQI has adjusted to internal and external pressures and remains a threat to the region and national security.

AQI fits the academic definition of a resilient organization. It's aware of challenges, continues to make sense of its environment, learns from failure, adjusts to difficulties and creates or uses resiliency characteristics to sustain itself in what I describe as a resiliency cycle. If U.S., Coalition and Iraqi pressure where to be released on AQI, it would reconstitute itself with a vengeance and wreak havoc throughout the region, yet again.

What this strategy proposes is to simultaneously attack each of AQI's resiliency characteristics by the asset best suited for that mission. As such, AQI will shrink further, much like applying pressure to all sides of a balloon. Results are measured, evaluated, reassessed and refocused. The process of attacking the resiliency charactertics begins again, thereby further shrinking the organization. This process repeats itself over and over, much like peeling back layers of an onion. Eventually, AQI will be so severely shrunk and damaged, that it is but remnants compared to its previous strength. It is at this stage, in its weakest form, that it most susceptible to organizational failure.

This strategy can be a blue-print for fighting not only al Qaeda, but all terrorist organization including criminal/drug trafficking organizations and sophisticated street and prison gangs, worldwide. Simply, such horrific organizations must either adapt to pressures or collapse upon itself like a dying star. Those organizations able to sustain despite such pressure and survive, exhibit resiliency and therefore contain resiliency characteristics. It is these resiliency characteristics that we must focus our efforts upon to bring about the destruction of such evil organizations. It is a precise, focused strategy requiring leadership, resources and patience.

Theory to Strategy (Full PDF Article)

The Army We Need

by Dr. John Nagl, Small Wars Journal

The Army We Need (Full PDF Article)

It is a huge pleasure for me to be back at Fort Benning. My last visit here was more than 20 years ago, during the hot summer of 1986, when Sergeant Airborne pinned silver wings to my bony chest with a vigor that would today result in a court martial. Something has been lost and something gained since the demise of that particular custom, which was perhaps more important in a peacetime army than it is in one that is at war, as ours is today.

You know that better than do I. Most of you have two tours in Operations Iraqi Freedom and/or Operation Enduring Freedom, as do your instructors. Your story is the story of the United States Army over the past seven years. You have had to adapt units that were designed for a different kind of war to conduct counterinsurgency operations. You succeeded—but, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in a speech at NDU three months ago that I was privileged to attend, your job was harder than it had to be.

The Army We Need (Full PDF Article)

The COIN Graduate Seminar

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal

The COIN Graduate Seminar (Full PDF Article)

Military analysts and pundits have often dubbed counterinsurgency the "graduate level of war." Dissenters protest that full spectrum operations—with their mixture of conventional and irregular warfare—are truly the graduate level of conflict. We do not take a position on this debate, as we honor the contributions of both conventional and unconventional soldiers. However, it is indisputable that irregular warfare--like any form of human conflict--is immensely complex. Approaching it requires a holistic—if not eccentric—approach that defies the simplistic political debates and strategic orthodoxies commonly found in popular discussions of issues such Iraq and Afghanistan. But this begs the question of how we would ideally advance the discussion to something more nuanced. If counterinsurgency is truly the "graduate level" of war, it needs its very own Graduate Seminar.

What readings and films would we assign to students in the Seminar? We've outlined everything bellow under the "Syllabus" heading. The material here, though exhaustive, is by no means comprehensive. We have opted to emphasize the diversity of intellectual approaches involved in conceptualizing war and power as well as more recent military irregular warfare research. Our aim is to engage the entire spectrum of irregular conflict, from counter-terrorism to speculations about the future of war.

Some of our readings and films—drawn from the humanities and popular culture--may strike the reader as odd choices, but our eclecticism is intentional. "Out of the box" thinking is often praised but rarely honored due to institutional, political, and intellectual cultures that police discourses and close minds. Likewise, we have also included military theorists whose ideas have sparked controversy. Even if one violently disagrees with certain theories of war and peace, it is important to engage with their arguments.

Given the sheer amount of material, readings and passages from each book would be selected to provide a comprehensive approach. The first unit, counterterrorism, covers operational, political, legal, and cultural issues associated with CT. The second unit, counterinsurgency, examines both classical and modern counterinsurgency theory. It also examines case studies of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, looking at contemporary successes and failures. The third unit, criminal insurgency, examines insurgencies waged by gangs, cartels, and other criminal actors. Lastly, the fourth unit, future warfare, engages speculation about the future of conflict through study of past and present predictive literature. We offer this list for discussion and debate.

The COIN Graduate Seminar (Full PDF Article)

On the Future and Options

by Jason Fritz, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

On the Future and Options (Full PDF Article)

Andrew Bacevich's defense of COL Gian Gentile in October's Atlantic, while well intentioned, was both flawed and misguided. Concerns about the U.S. military's focus on counterinsurgency and stability operations at the expense of conventional war-fighting abilities are real and warrant a significant discussion on how to strike a balance between the two ends of the spectrum of conflict. However, Gentile's arguments that he defends drive that discussion to the extreme end of the spectrum and would leave the U.S. military few options to defend against the plethora of security challenges that face the nation today and in the future.

Gentile's main arguments are that too much credit has been given GEN David Petraeus for the change in strategy in Iraq, that the decline in violence in Iraq is primarily attributable to the United States buying the allegiance of the Sons of Iraq, and that the U.S. military focuses too much on counterinsurgency doctrine to the detriment of its high intensity warfare skills. A corollary to this last critique is that U.S. forces will likely not -- and really should not -- fight irregular-war conflicts in the future. Bacevich's article not only supported Gentile's ideas but also stated that those who disagreed with him, like LTC (Ret.) John Nagl, were trying to mold the nation's fighting forces in order to continue to fight "one, two, many Iraqs to come."

On the Future and Options (Full PDF Article)

Questioning a Deity

A Contemplation of Maneuver Motivated by the 2008 Israeli Armor Corps Association "Land Maneuver in the 21st Century" Conference

by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, Small Wars Journal

Questioning a Deity (Full PDF Article)

On September 16-17, 2008, the Israeli Armor Corps Association hosted its second annual conference, this entitled "Land Maneuver in the 21st Century. The centerpiece for speaker presentations and related discussions was "maneuver:" what it is, what it should be, and its relevance to security operations in light of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other recent or continuing conflicts. An international speaker slate proposed a broad spectrum of thinking in that regard, a spectrum ranging from general acceptance of the current definition of maneuver to considerably expanding what the concept encompasses.

This document considers maneuver in light of these speaker presentations and the discussion stimulated by them. First sampling maneuver historically, it follows with an analysis of how theorists, doctrine writers, and military personnel conceive of maneuver in the first decade of the 21st century. These dual foundation stones of history and current thinking serve to underpin presentation of the treatment given the topic during the conference. The closing analysis considers the implications of thinking of maneuver in terms different than is currently the case...or, contrarily, the impact if it instead remains unchanged.

The document will be of interest to individuals in the armed forces, academics, and others desiring to investigate alternative conceptualizations of maneuver in the 21st century.

Questioning a Deity (Full PDF Article)

The UN recently decided to do something about Somali piracy this month. They have not said exactly what that something is. Shipping companies are losing hundreds of millions. Navies don't know how to legally deal with the pirates even if they capture them. Liberals point out that that the Somali pirates are fishermen, merely defending their fishing grounds by asymmetrical means against first and second world fishing fleets that are denuding their offshore harvesting areas. Conservatives claim that the Somali pirates are nothing more than seagoing gangsters who are after quick cash and who find honor and a neat way to get hot chicks by being brigands. Both views have elements of truth. The question is whether this is a national security crisis? It is not. No great American interests are at stake other than international law of the sea and preventing piracy from becoming a trendy thing to do in other places such as the Straits of Malacca which already have a pirate problem. During the recent election, much noise was made about encouraging multilateralism. Eliminating piracy is a problem custom made for a multilateral solution.

We need to avoid becoming entrapped in a "let Uncle Sam do it" situation just because we have the world's largest and most powerful navy which has excess capacity because Iraq and Afghanistan are mostly land wars. This is why we need to avoid those who call for a blockade of Somalia. Blockades are expensive things. The coast of Somalia rivals the size of the American southeastern seaboard, and it took hundreds of Union ships to blockade the Confederacy during our Civil War. We have the only navy in the world that could do such a thing and not one U.S. merchant ship has so far been lost to the Pirates. The Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, Turks, Chinese, and other seagoing nations have much more at stake than we do; this problem is ripe for a coalition solution, and it can be solved; they need to create an effective coalition in order to solve the problem.

The best way to stop the Somali pirates is not at sea through convoys and blockades; we are not dealing with the German High Seas Fleet or even the Confederate Navy here. The best way to do it is to seize and occupy their fishing village bases along the northern coast of Somalia, which the UN resolution authorizes, and then give the locals something productive to do with themselves besides brigandage. This does not need to be done by U.S. Marines, but it will take good troops. The Somalis like to fight and they are entrepreneurial; if they are not given something productive to do once a coalition stops piracy, they will make armed resistance to an occupation force pay as they did from 1993 to 1995...

The SWORD Model of Counterinsurgency

A Summary and Update

by John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, Small Wars Journal

The SWORD Model of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States military turned its back on counterinsurgency (COIN). Except for a few Special Forces officers and soldiers, and a handful of others, there was no interest or effort devoted to COIN. America was never again going to fight a war like that. All of the Army's attention was devoted to stopping the Soviet armored hordes on the North German Plain and in the Fulda Gap by means of the Active Defense promulgated in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations. By that time, the curriculum at the Army's mid-level school for officers, the Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, had almost completely eliminated any reference to COIN. In the late 1970s there was even a concerted effort to purge the CGSC files of any curriculum references to COIN! Only through the heroic efforts of LTC Don Vought, who hid the offending material in files on terrorism (which was the new topic du jour), were the lessons of the past saved for future generations of doctrine writers and officer students.

By 1981 there had been some minor changes. Communist insurgents (the FSLN) had seized power in Nicaragua in 1979. Other communist insurgents were attempting the same in neighboring El Salvador and the Carter Administration was beginning to support the government, however, unsavory. There was also a worrisome insurgency sputtering along in the Philippines and the U.S. was beginning to provide limited assistance to the anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan. These developments resulted in a new manual, FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981), which was primarily a rehash of the COIN manuals of the Vietnam era. In 1981, the United States Southern Command sent a team of officers to El Salvador, headed by Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner, to assess the situation and recommend a strategy for American support to the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF). The result was the famous Woerner Report, produced in draft but never finalized or published. Nevertheless, it provided the U.S. COIN support strategy until the war ended 11 years later. One of its recommendations was an expanded security assistance effort which resulted in the "birth" of the 55 man U.S. Mil Group. Its first commander was Colonel John Waghelstein who went to El Salvador with the promise that he would command the 7th Special Forces Group on his return.

The war in El Salvador, which appeared to be going badly even into 1984, sparked some interest at the highest levels of the Army. That year, the Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell R. Thurman, asked the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the Army War College if it could conduct research to determine the "correlates of success" in COIN. The question, posed in that form, implied a quantitative study with a fairly large number of cases. Coincidentally, SSI had just hired Manwaring -- then a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel, who had recently come off several years of active duty in the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In his civilian life, Manwaring had been an academic political scientist and was trained to design and conduct that type of research. Manwaring became the lead researcher on the project which resulted in the SWORD Model.

The intent of this article is threefold. First, it addresses the methodology and development of the SWORD Model in context. Second, it reports the findings of the research using the model. And, third, it addresses the utility of the model both in light of the two major strategic approaches to counterinsurgency and, especially, at the operational and tactical levels of war.

The SWORD Model of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency

by Major Matthew R. Modarelli, Small Wars Journal

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), each service is assigned military police officers, special investigators, and special agents charged with countering every kind of criminal activity. These personnel are highly skilled in obtaining evidence (i.e. actionable intelligence) to disrupt and neutralize criminals and their illicit networks. It is precisely this skill set that when applied to an insurgency simplifies the process of targeting and neutralizing insurgent leaders, subsequently leading to overall more effective security operations. Using current cultural training and linguist support, this DoD capability could be organized immediately and assigned to jurisdictions (i.e. battle space, province, or theater level) in a given occupied country. By adopting a military government and law enforcement (LE) command and control (C2) structure, military forces would be able to focus on restoring security and justice to occupied areas using police techniques. Organized within a proper military government C2 structure, security operations could be kept in lock-step with local, provincial and theater-level counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. With no interagency support available for the foreseeable future, the DoD must turn to its own organic capabilities immediately and organize appropriately to support the functions needed to maintain security while properly identifying and neutralizing insurgent leaders and groups.

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) William Stevenson, Major Marshall Ecklund, Major Hun Soo Kim and Major Robert Billings, Small Wars Journal

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing (Full PDF Article)

September 11, 2001 the Global War on Terror began. This global war has brought to life a timeless tactic called irregular warfare (IW). IW is difficult to define, explain, and employ. Yet, with no firm understanding or consensus on what IW actually means, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) on 11 September 2007. Version 1.0 of the IW JOC proposes that IW is a protracted form of warfare, on a global or regional scale, that will require new capability development. Fortunately, for the Joint Warfighter, the intent of the IW JOC was only to further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence future IW concepts and capability development. As presented, the definitions and concepts in the IW JOC have unnecessarily created confusion within the DoD by ignoring more than fifty years of experience and doctrine related to the challenges faced by the post-Cold War world and after the events of September 11, 2001.

The history of IW needs closer examination to capture those lessons learned to advance the IW discussion beyond the IW JOC. Given the significance and long-term DoD investments in the concepts presented in the IW JOC, this paper will analyze whether DoD has presented an appropriate definition of IW based on a doctrinal review of IW's roots. The paper will also look at the doctrinal relationship between Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and IW. If necessary, the authors will propose a more fitting definition for IW that is aligned with its doctrinal characterization.

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing (Full PDF Article)

Smarter, Not Harsher

by Matthew Alexander, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Smarter, Not Harsher (Full PDF Article)

TV shows like 24 incorporate interrogations and the use of torture under the "ticking bomb" scenario because it is dramatic and entertaining. The myriad of cop shows on TV (including NYPD Blue, CSI, Law & Order, and The Shield) consistently use harsh and forceful interrogation scenes to build excitement, it is a favorite topic of talking head political shows, and was a major topic in the recent presidential debates.

What's interesting to me is that the debate over torture in interrogations is morally important, but pragmatically irrelevant. Politicians and bureaucrats supporting the current administration have put in Herculean efforts to legalize harsh techniques, labeled "enhanced interrogation techniques," and to keep them classified. These methods are in complete contradiction to the standards that we expect our own troops, when captured, to be afforded and they are incompatible with American principles. Enhanced interrogation techniques are torture by the standards of the Geneva Conventions which we proclaim to uphold. What's most important, they are neither the most efficient nor reliable methods of achieving cooperation.

Smarter, Not Harsher (Full PDF Article)

U.S. Special Operations

Personal Opinions

by Colonel John M. Collins, Small Wars Journal

U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article)

Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, here are the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:

- Humans are more important than hardware

- Their quality is more important than quantities

- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced

- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur

When General Stiner sent me on a Cook's tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where USASOC commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him "they're wonderful," then said, "I wrote 'em."

If asked to start over from scratch, I would add one word to the fourth bullet so it would read "Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur." Otherwise, I believe they are still solid as bricks, but wish that whoever enshrined the first four had retained Number 5, which says "Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance." That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive "us versus everybody else" attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.

U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article)

Building Adaptive Leaders

The Army Can Adapt Its Institution (Pt. 1)

by Major Donald E. Vandergriff, Small Wars Journal

Building Adaptive Leaders (Full PDF Article)

Warfare has evolved to the point that the central idea is that small unit leaders in direct contact with the enemy can see and react to situational changes much faster than could the more senior leaders in the rear. This occurs despite the advent of information technology. This technology laid over an Industrial age hierarchal force structure confined with leaders developed through an industrial age personnel system can make it tempting for leaders to micromanage. Thus, the decision cycle slows down. But, warfare now demands something different. Small unit leaders who were once only concerned with choosing which battle drill now make decisions which have strategic implications. The question arises, how can we evolve the current way of developing leaders and Soldiers (Marines as well) that prepares them earlier to be complex problem solvers?

The Army acknowledges the need for change. The Army has begun an evolution in the way we develop—train, educate, access, promote and select—leaders, specifically how do we evolve adaptability. It is now implementing two training and leadership development models. In part I, I will discuss the Adaptive Leader Methodology (ALM) as an approach to develop adaptability and decision making skills. In part II, I will discuss Outcomes Based Training & Education (OBT&E).

Building Adaptive Leaders (Full PDF Article)

Distinguishing Between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense

Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead

by Major Derek C. Jenkins, Small Wars Journal

Distinguishing Between SFA and FID (Full PDF Article)

There is confusion and a disconnect between Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). It is unclear how or if they support an overarching theme. For years the US Armed Forces have used the FID construct to describe how the military element of US foreign policy supports internal security assistance to friendly nations. Recently, the Secretary of Defense (SecDEF) promulgated a newer, larger construct called SFA. Many in the military view SFA as when U.S. and partner forces rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

The new paradigm comes from a realization as spelled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), that the U.S. must train partner forces rather than just provide security for them. This grew out of a void in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. No secret here, the QDR states that we need "multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise" and "deploy and engage with partner nations" . As a result the SecDEF created the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in 2006. This center is the U.S. Armed Forces focal point for SFA.

This paper will frame the basics for comparison between the current paradigm (FID) and the new one (SFA). Then it will describe why both of these elements fit under a Building Partnership (BP) framework. This framework should be clearly and appropriately described in one doctrinal theme.

Distinguishing Between SFA and FID (Full PDF Article)

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony

by Major General William B. Garrett III

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony (Full PDF Article)

On behalf of the entire SETAF team, I would like to thank the leadership at U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe, who have been instrumental in helping us transform to assume our new role.

We are honored and privileged to be the first members of U.S. Army Africa. This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead.

In Africa, we face a set of security challenges that may be unprecedented in complexity and scope -- presenting dilemmas that do not lend themselves to a simple choice between use of force or diplomacy.

Members of the international community have long asked for increased global attention to African issues -- particularly since genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, acts of terror, and crimes against humanity have come to symbolize modern conflict in Africa.

The creation of Africa Command, and now U.S. Army Africa, reflects our Nation's determination to commit to a lasting security relationship with Africa -- a long neglected continent whose impoverished people remain vulnerable to the ideology of violent extremism.

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony (Full PDF Article)

Joint, Interagency, and International Organization Economic Planning Integration

by Dr. David Anderson and Major Lawrence Walton, Small Wars Journal

Economic Planning Integration (Full PDF Article)

Objective, mass, and unity of effort have long been used as Principles of War. An objective is a clear obtainable goal, and mass refers to merging the efforts of different organizations to achieve decisive effects. However, it is only possible to gain the necessary mass towards achieving an objective through unity of effort (JP 3-0, 2006).

The President and the National Security Council are responsible for insuring that the whole of government is unified toward achieving national strategic objectives. However, unity of effort at the national strategic level does not always translate into unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels.

The economic instrument of national power requires unity of effort between the military, Other Government Agencies (OGAs), and International Organizations (IOs) to achieve contingency operational objectives. There is a growing volume of evidence from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that suggests that these organizations have not been effectively integrated towards achieving economic contingency operational objectives creating operational risk. Unity of effort and decisively massing the institutional capabilities of the military, OGAs, and IOs are essential to achieving contingency operational planning objectives.

This paper examines how well integrated the Military, Other Government Agencies (OGA), and International Organizations (IO) economic functions are in contingency planning, and how well this integration reduces the operational risks in achieving contingency operational objectives. It will do so by first assessing current U.S. policy/directives and military doctrine addressing economics-related activities, and then by comparing/analyzing the military operational planning process with OGA/IO economic-related functions and widely accepted economic factors that influence economic development.

Economic Planning Integration (Full PDF Article)

Reconstruction in South Baghdad

by Captain Steve McGregor, Small Wars Journal

Reconstruction in South Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

Humanitarian aid is increasingly becoming more important to US military operations—not only because the military works more closely with aid agencies than ever before but because the military now implements great amounts of aid. According to a recent study by the Washington Post in August of this year, the US military has spent over 2.8 billion dollars on aid projects through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) .

As military commanders deal with how to properly implement aid the aid community is struggling to redefine itself. Many strategists and writers believe aid needs reform. David Rieff, when speaking before the Carnegie Council in support of his book "A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis," argues that in Sudan aid organizations were "logisticians to the war effort of the belligerents, that in effect what Operation Lifeline Sudan was doing, whilst doing a great deal of good by saving lives, the humanitarians were in effect allowing the war to continue." In another article, anthropologist Alex de Waal charges the aid community with over-estimating damage, creating false need, and unnecessarily complex programs.

On the other hand, humanitarian aid implemented by the US military in Iraq is reinforcing stability and quickening the peace. One area of Iraq this is particularly noticeable is Yusufiya, where Task Force 3-187 was able to completely transfer their area of responsibility back to Iraqi control.

Reconstruction in South Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

An Irregular Focus on What Has Been

by Sam Brannen, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

With the release of its new directive on irregular warfare (IW) the Pentagon has demonstrated seriousness of purpose to fight the last war. The directive (3000.07) comes more than 7 years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and over 5 years after the invasion of Iraq, and it argues that the Department of Defense (DoD) should recognize that "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare" and deserves similar preparedness and development of capabilities.

Beyond the statement of the obvious a day late and a dollar short, the directive incorrectly characterizes the future of warfare. Leading defense analysts—most notably Frank Hoffman and Steve Biddle—have argued in convincing fashion that the next wars the United States fight will be an undifferentiated blend of what the Pentagon has now formally parsed as irregular warfare and traditional warfare. In an analysis of the 2006 Lebanon campaign, Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman found that "Hezbollah's methods were...somewhere between the popular conceptions of guerilla and conventional warfare—but so are most military actors', whether state or nonstate." Hezbollah blended tactics and even strategic end goals of conventional and irregular warfare. The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognizes that "These modes of warfare [traditional and irregular] may appear individually or in combination, spanning the spectrum of warfare and intertwining hard and soft power." So why does the IW directive—which should be derived from the NDS—make no mention of this reality?

The IW directive is further contradictory to existing Department guidance in its categorization of stabilization operations as a subset of IW. For example, the Army's new Field Manual 3-07 on Stabilization Operations places stability operations on an equal footing with traditional warfare. FM 3-07 is in turn derived from DoD directive 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, which declared that stability operations "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations."

In his recent monograph on how to account for inevitable surprise in defense planning Nate Freier argues, "Senior defense and military leadership naturally err on the side of what is known and practiced at the expense of preparing for what is less well-known but perhaps more dangerous." Institutional change already underway, Freier observes, is pursued by the defense establishment despite research and analysis of the future security environment that may make a compelling case to prepare for something else entirely.

There is also the institutional issue of where the IW directive places most of the impetus for change related to irregular warfare: at the newly-established U.S. Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (JFCOM IWC) and with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). These Combatant Commands have little actual influence over how the Services—and in particular, the Army—go about training and equipping their general purpose forces. Overall U.S. preparedness for this new strategic environment will hinge almost entirely on the commitment of regional Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs to the process.

Sam Brannen is a fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on projects related to defense strategy and policy, Middle East security (especially U.S.-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey-Iraq issues), and U.S. national security reform.

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory

by Dalton Fury, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory (Full PDF Article)

For the past several months I've had the great opportunity to insert my voice into the public debate about what in the world we should do about UBL. This question arose during a 6 hour interview taping for a 13 minute 60 Minutes episode, again during a short stint on Hannity's America, some time with Brain Kilmeade and Geraldo Rivera on FOX's The Strategy Room, during The Rachel Maddow Show, and again on CNN. Moreover, in between tapings, a half dozen print media interviews, and scores of radio stations that air across the nation, most recently The Laura Ingraham Show, asked the same question. All this because I was simply the guy who couldn't get the job done back at the beginning of the GWOT. So, my opinion and analysis is as good or bad as the next guys as we are all painfully aware -- UBL still thumbs his nose at us every day.

From my very far removed perspective of the battlefield where all assumptions are taken from open source developments, three key themes are at the top of my "to do list" to turn the tide on the war in Afghanistan. The first two are no-brainers and have been called for by numerous Think Tanks and dedicated analysts who are more talented and more "in the know" than I presently am. Negotiating with moderate Taliban and focusing US funding for Pakistan on the COIN fight even appears at the top of Secretary Gates' personal way ahead.

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory (Full PDF Article)

Security Force Assistance Case Study: Mosul, Iraq

by Major Rob Thornton, Dr. John Fishel and Dr. Marc Tyrrell

SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Major Rob Thornton of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in coordination with Dr. John Fishel of the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Marc Tyrrell of Carleton University, and Mr. Mark Lauber also of JCISFA sat down to write the Mosul Case study with the goals of considering the requirements generated in the pursuit of policy and military objectives in complex conditions, and making some observations and recommendations about how DoD might better address those requirements. To this end the Case Study is built around a specific place, Mosul, Iraq over a short period of time, 2006-2007. The Case Study is designed to give the reader both an understanding of content and context of the environment, and of the objective and the subjective nature of the participants.

Within the study we found there are areas across DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel and Facilities) that might be adapted in such a way that reduces risk at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, as well as risk to the institutions which must consider the broad range of roles, missions and capabilities required of them. Principal to this is the understanding that you can not improve our capabilities to conduct these types of missions by simply addressing one aspect of DOTMLPF. In fact, to attempt to do so usually results in unintended consequences in other areas, some of which may not be known until they have manifested themselves as critical deficits.

The Mosul Case Study raises some questions about the nature of how we see ourselves as an institution, what we value, and how those values translate into enabling capabilities. One of the questions the study considers is the value of individual personalities and skills apart from context of collective leadership. The Case Study and the interviews show that one size does not fit all, cookie cutter solutions and approaches generally produce problems not solve them, and that personality may matter as much or more than other skills and attributes.

SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq (Full PDF Article)

A Wicked Brew

Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of Africa

by Tim Sullivan, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)

The recent surge in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has again revealed the vulnerability of U.S. and allied interests to transnational, unconventional security threats—and demonstrated just how confounded we remain in determining the appropriate responses to these challenges. Somali piracy has now become more than simply a nuisance: the explosion in attacks has the potential to disrupt international trade (at least one major international shipping firm has announced plans to shift its transit routes), and further destabilize the volatile Horn of Africa region. The audacity of recent hijackings, combined with an uncoordinated and anemic international response, portends a growing threat. In reaction to the news that the pirates had seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker, 450 miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the sentiments of many analysts and observers when he said that he was "stunned" by the Somali pirates' range of operations.

A more disturbing element of the Somali piracy phenomenon is the apparent connection between the pirates and the country's militant Islamist movement. Though it hasn't been making the front pages, Somalia is in the throes of a protracted insurgency. The country's primary Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, was recently added to the State Department's list of terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The group has emerged as the successor (and was the former militia) of Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which in the summer of 2006 came close to unseating the country's Transitional Federal Government (TFG); the ICU was eventually defeated by the TFG with the help of the Ethiopian military.

A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)

COIN Perspectives From On Point

Lessons Learned in Iraq

by Sergeant Michael Hanson, Small Wars Journal

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

Tanks and artillery don't defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".

This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.

So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts

by Captain Timothy Hsia, Small Wars Journal

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (Full PDF Article)

The construction of Combat Outposts (COPs) by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq has been almost unanimously described in positive terms by defense analysts and military officers as a means through which to carry out its counterinsurgency efforts. Despite the existence of hundreds of COPs on today's battlefields, the term Combat Outpost is not even doctrinally defined in any military field manual. Soldiers in today's battlefields routinely reference COPs as anything from a patrol base to anything smaller then a Forward Operating Base. Doctrine notwithstanding, countless Soldiers and Marines today currently operate out of COPs.

No two COPs are alike. The most significant difference between any two COPs is its relation to an urban center. Urban COPs require much greater security requirements and oftentimes less infrastructure development, whereas COPs established in rural locations often have better natural defensive measures (stand off distance) while requiring more logistical and engineering support in order to sustain forces occupying the COP. COPs do not materialize overnight and this paper seeks to cover several aspects of COP building and establishment.

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (Full PDF Article)

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility

by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal Book Review

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

Mark Ethan Grotelueschen. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

The newspapers today are filled with references to evolving Army doctrine in support of our national security interests. Very recently, the Army unveiled a new doctrinal publication highlighting the requirement for "nation-building" missions as well as conventional combat. This new field manual on Stability Operations comes on the heels of the groundbreaking counterinsurgency manual co-authored with the Marine Corps in 2006. Mired in Iraq, the Army jump-started its doctrine process under the leadership of forward thinkers like General David Petraeus. However, both documents have their critics arguing that the Army is headed in the wrong direction. Claiming the Army is guilty of losing focus of its "core warfighting" skills, these critics stress that the Army must be preparing for major ground combat operations. Spending too much time on non-traditional skills is, in their view, a "dangerous distraction."

This is not the first time the Army has wrestled with doctrinal controversy. In a well-written book on the First World War, author Mark Ethan Grotelueschen addresses the competing views about the nature of war within the US Army at the dawn of the 20th Century. Although there are many books on American operations in France, they are generally memoires or unit histories, all falling short of true campaign studies that tell us why the Americans fought the way they did. Mr. Grotelueschen provides us with an extensively researched book on how the Army actually prepared for the war and how it adapted its doctrine during the war to take advantage of lessons learned. It is highly recommended.

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Small Wars Journal

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

In the fall of 2006, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated to a level worse than at any other period during the previous three years of U.S. occupation. Violence was on the rise and attacks by insurgents continued to increase even after the top Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, was killed by U.S. forces. Calls for a drawdown of U.S. troops gained considerable support in Washington as policymakers questioned whether long-term stability in Iraq was achievable or if continued U.S. presence would merely add to the growing number of casualties. Reinforcing the perception that U.S. forces were not making sufficient gains was the release of a Marine Corps intelligence report stating that the struggle against Sunni insurgents in Al Anbar Province could not be won militarily.

U.S. military commanders concluded that the best way to improve the security situation in Iraq was to adopt a more proactive "clear-hold-build" strategy supported by a significant increase in the number of ground combat units. This increase in forces, often referred to simply as "the surge", introduced five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency.

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. As the U.S. struggles to find a viable solution to this problem, calls for an Iraq-type surge of forces to help stabilize security and set conditions for political and economic improvement in Afghanistan have increased. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both acknowledged that additional forces are needed in Afghanistan but have not specifically outlined how many or what type. Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure.

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right

So What Do We Do Now?

by Robert Haddick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Small Wars Journal readers are no doubt familiar with the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile about the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats. (See Shawn Brimley's excellent summary of the argument for a refresher.)

I have concluded that both men are right; their arguments are not mutually exclusive. But if both men are right, how should the U.S. organize, train, and employ its ground forces?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how to succeed against irregular adversaries, while restoring a more credible deterrence against conventional high-intensity threats.

Main Points

1. The Long War, characterized by persistent tribal and ethnic conflicts, is a reality. Some of these conflicts will threaten U.S. interests. John Nagl is correct when he argues that the U.S. needs military forces that are specially adapted for success in persistent irregular warfare.

2. But Gian Gentile is also right -- the U.S. has an interest in maintaining its military resource commitment low and its strategic flexibility high. The U.S. should not drain away its limited endurance, prestige, and resources on open-ended medium-intensity engagements in the Islamic world or anywhere else.

3. The answer is to create Nagl's Combat Advisor Corps and use it to for Phase 0 and 1 operations -- prevention, shaping, and deterrence. The more attention the U.S. gives to Phase 0-1 operations, the fewer Phase 2-4 operations America's general purpose forces will have to fight.

4. Making a greater commitment to Phase 0-1 operations will allow the U.S. to seize the initiative in the irregular warfare domain, control US operational tempo, and regulate U.S. military resource usage.

5. Advisor Corps Phase 0-1 operations are an economy-of-force mission. When successful, they will allow the rest of the U.S. military, including the large majority of U.S. ground combat power, to prepare for major combat contingencies, thus enhancing strategic deterrence.

6. A professional and well-trained Advisor Corps will also have the mission of establishing relationships with sub-national ethnic and tribal groupings. These relationships will provide U.S. decision-makers with greater flexibility when dealing with future irregular conflicts.

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Getting the Basics Right

A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan

by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center -- Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to [email protected] or [email protected].

Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan's war.

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) -- the list goes on -- it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent's influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space -- literally and figuratively -- for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability.

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

Editor's note: we're pleased to publish this Veterans Day reflection by Colonel David Sutherland. To his thoughtful words, we would merely add here's also to the many Iraqi patriots shaping their country, and the countless others making do as best they can amidst the bravery of their countrymen and ours.

One year ago today, November 11, 2007, our Brigade Combat Team began its redeployment from Diyala province, Iraq, back to Fort Hood, Texas. As we remember our veterans, I think about those brave men and women who participated in the surge operations that led to improvements seen in Iraq today.

The Greywolf Brigade began its deployment to Iraq in October 2006. Our formation consisted of approximately 5,000 of our nation's finest men and women from all branches of our Armed Services, Department of Defense civilians, Department of State, and other interagency and Coalition partners. For 14 months, they poured their hearts and souls into the mission -- a mission that required we bind-up the wounds of the innocent and reestablish rule of law, while at the same time combating a depraved enemy, devoid of human decency.

No one, to include myself, was able to fathom the reality we were about to face as we deployed to Diyala province -- a complex area of Sunni, Shia and Kurd, that quickly became the primary battleground of the fight faced in Iraq. Reality, however, struck quickly at my base's aid station during the first week of our deployment.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN

Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness

by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren, Small Wars Journal

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems which met CM needs within counterinsurgency (COIN) to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons.... Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a COIN environment.

Collection Management (CM) has long been considered the bane of any intelligence officer's existence, even in the days of force-on-force doctrine when intelligence operations were much simpler than they are today. Those of us in the S2 section of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division operating in the Karkh Security District (KSD) of Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08, felt no differently about CM when we took over our area of operations (AO). We began those operations with three basic assumptions:

That CM was somehow an irrelevant, if not exactly a dinosaur of Cold War intelligence art.

That enemy focused priority intelligence requirements (PIR) would drive our knowledge management (KM) system.

That after five years of war we would find a KM system in place that met the commander's needs in counter-insurgency (COIN).

War like life is a journey of discovery and the flaws in those assumptions revealed themselves in ten "A Ha!" moments during our journey. We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems, which met CM needs within a COIN environment to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons. After six months of development, we implemented an improved CM cycle that optimized our unit capabilities and mitigated our weaknesses - one that supported our balanced lethal and non-lethal operational tempo. Improving our CM cycle compounded our successes within our unique, high-density, urban AO. We combined doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches to ensure our PIR were linked directly to the BCT Commander's decision points, and his desired effects. Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Even though our experience was highly specific, the lessons we learned are universal and can be applied to any operational environment.

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Counterinsurgency Operations

Khost Province, Afghanistan

by Ensign Robert J. Bebber, Ph.D., Small Wars Journal

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

The counterinsurgency (or COIN) in Khost province was supposed to represent the "crown jewel" in American COIN doctrine and tactics. Afghan President Hamid Karzai called Khost a "provincial model of success," and former CENTCOM commander ADM William J. Fallon described it as "a wonderful example" for the entire country. (Armed Forces Press Service 2007) Anne Marlow (2008) wrote a glowing review of recent efforts in the province in 2008 for The Weekly Standard, suggesting that the forward positioning of small platoons at "Force Protection Facilities" or FPFs, which are located in the district centers of the province, along with the substantial increase in the number and scope of projects such as road, schools, wells and diversion dams through the provincial reconstruction team, had cracked the code for American counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Within a couple months, as the security situation continued to deteriorate, she was backtracking on her assessment of why American counterinsurgency strategy was "successful" in Khost province by suggesting that that it had more to do with the "role of commanders' personalities may be larger than we want to acknowledge." The previous commanders were "brilliant and personable," leading one to conclude that the individuals who replaced them were less so.

If only it were that easy, then we could merely charm our way to victory. But any knowledgeable assessment of the counterinsurgency effort in Khost would not conclude that the war was going well. Hype and publicity cannot hide the fact that the situation was growing dire, both in Khost and throughout the country.

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams

by Commander Michael Hallett, Small Wars Journal

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

The promulgation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as the overarching reconstruction and development policy guidance in conjunction with the development of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOIRA) capabilities over the past 6 years, (as seen in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the 2007 creation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)) has significantly influenced the Afghan environmental dynamics and has thus created new opportunities for PRTs to engage in governance support activities.

Responding to this situation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Strategic Vision issued at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 said the following on PRTs: "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) play a significant role in enabling security, governance and development. We pledge to provide all the PRTs need, enhance their unity of effort, strengthen their civilian component and further align their development strategies with Afghan Government priorities until such a time as Afghan Government institutions are strong enough to render PRTs unnecessary." Enabling this ultimate transition requires that PRTs shift from helping the people of Afghanistan directly through activities like project, funding, medical assistance and disaster relief materials provision to supporting the government of Afghanistan in executing these activities. Or, as some have put it, Afghan government capabilities have advanced to the point that it is "time to take off the training wheels".

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism

Clash of Icon Worship

by Colonel William M. Darley, Small Wars Journal

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

In its January/February 2006 edition, Foreign Affairs published a rather odd article (for a journal that otherwise specializes in political analysis and commentary) that appeared to get much less attention than it really deserved. In the article, titled "A Natural History of Peace," Stanford Professor Robert M. Sapolsky compares and contrasts human aggressive tendencies with well-documented propensities for violence among several species of primates, and develops a case suggesting that human aggression of the kind that produces warfare mainly stems from the genetic impulses rooted in humans as primates (not a new suggestion of itself). But more significantly, he offers proof extracted from a now robust body of field work that even strong genetic tendencies for violence in certain species of primates can be mitigated by exposure to the equivalent of "cultural" forces. He singles out from the body of such observations the case history of one group of baboons (a particularly aggressive and violent species of primate) that he calls the Forest Troop, the intensely aggressive behavior of which was ameliorated after exposure to the more peaceful and tolerant "mores" of another baboon troop of an identical species with which the Forest Troop had come in contact. He concludes by asserting that "some primate species can make peace despite violent traits that seem built into their natures." He goes on to muse, "The challenge now is to figure out under what conditions that can happen, and whether humans can manage the trick themselves."

Sapolsky's argument frames the issues associated with the current global conflict in which the United States is now engaged in a potentially very useful light: as a biological problem best understood and dealt with using means specifically tailored to deal with human genetic tendencies in order to promote cooperation and tolerance instead of competitive violence. This stands in contrast to the current approach which appears to assume that the conflict mainly results from a combination of cultural and economic factors that can be dealt with by a strategy that combines selected violence, targeted monetary investments mixed, and cross cultural messages through so called strategic communications. However, understanding the problem as having its roots in primordial genetic urges would focus the search for solutions in a somewhat different way. The first step would be exploring in detail root biological causes for aggressive behaviors in the human species as a member of the family of primates, and then formulating specific measures (not just confined to persuasion or economic investment) needed to channel such biologically behaviors in ways that are conducive to peaceful social co-existence.

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency

by Colonel Robert C. Jones, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Currently there are many voices speaking at once, all competing for attention as to their unique perspective as to what is causing the current unrest in the world. Far too much focus is placed on the tactic of "terrorism," and many are far too quick to simply label those who apply that tactic as "terrorists." While certainly this characterization is true, it is not particularly helpful. Instead, I believe it is best to look at the purpose for a man's actions rather than his actions themselves in order to best judge, and thereby label him. Most that we are so quick to label as terrorists are actually insurgents. Bin Laden, however, is no insurgent. Mr. Bin Laden is in fact a terrorist. He is using his Al Qaeda network to wage a regional unconventional warfare campaign to leverage many nationalist insurgent movements that lay within Muslim populaces in states where those populaces are experiencing poor governance, from the Philippines in the East, to England in the West.

Some who speak on this topic have expertise born of years of engagement at the tactical level, and their perspective reflects that experience. Others who speak have little to no direct experience, but have read and studied the problem in great detail based upon the experience of others. The principles I offer below are my own, and are born of (and limited by) my own experience and studies. They are intended to be neither too tactical, nor too theoretical. They are intended instead to provide what I like to call "pure strategy." These are not insights that are deemed strategic based upon the level of command to which they apply; but are instead intended to be strategic in that they offer fundamental truths on the nature of insurgency that can be applied at every level of command. Hopefully these can guide squad leaders and presidents alike, and help them all to be a little more successful in their endeavors.

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Character and the Special Forces Soldier

by Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

On a recent Friday I had the opportunity to address some of the finest Soldiers in the United States Army. These young men were graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course -- not an easy feat. Having spent 27 years in the special operations arena, I understood their excitement and how proud they felt during the ceremony; I had sat in a similar chair myself. However, it was important to me that their families understand exactly what their loved ones signed on for. And, in further thinking, it's also important to me that the citizens of this country know the dedication and professionalism that is embodied in the men of Special Forces. It is to that end, that I share my graduation remarks with you.

Intuitively, I think we all know how hard our graduates work for the privilege of wearing a Green Beret. But did you know that some of these young men have been in training for more than two, maybe three years? This doesn't count the months they spent just physically preparing themselves before the course began or the countless hours spent with rucksacks on their back in total solitude, usually very early in the morning or very late at night but almost always on their own time because they had other obligations that filled their day. Appreciate the fact that 75 percent of the Soldiers, mostly airborne Soldiers and many with combat experience who began the course, are no longer here today. This is the Army's most physically demanding course. Scholastically, each Soldier must master more than 1,000 critical tasks, specific to his assigned specialty and hundreds of advanced war-fighting tasks, plus demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language before they graduate. There is simply not a more demanding school in the entire U.S. Army.

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

America's Financial Crisis

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq

by Captain Timothy Hsia, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

News coverage of the 700 billion dollar bailout of Wall Street by the government have briefly mentioned that the government's bill for rebuilding Wall Street will turn out to be monetarily equivalent to the costs associated with the Iraq War. To alleviate credit concerns, the Treasury Department has established a troubled asset relief program (TARP). Ideally, TARP and the financial bailout will prevent a broadening of the credit crisis from imperiling America's long term growth while also fueling the global economy. Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury Secretary, will be hard pressed to find any historical financial incident of today's magnitude when examining our nation's history which can serve as a historical waypoint. Nonetheless, he should perhaps reflect upon the immediate past as America's endeavors to reconstruct Iraq proffer vital lessons which can greatly assist today's financial mandarins as they seek to unwind the country's financial Gordian knot. The lessons learned from the government's ongoing reconstruction of Iraq apply in many cases to the current credit restoration, and it would be foolhardy for government officials to ignore these parallels.

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan

Al Qaeda Propaganda

by Major Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the myth that Al Qaeda is a far more superior practitioner of the war of ideas because it has proven that it knows far less about the "American street" than supposedly the U.S. does about the "Arab street." This is highlighted by Al Qaeda's use of an American convert to be their voice to the U.S. The question that is open to interpretation is of what use is such a person at all to Al Qaeda given that it is doubtful that he is able to gather any significant following amongst Muslims in the Arab world and is considered nothing more than a "bloated buffoon" in the United States?

Al Qaeda's use of Adam Gadahn is little more than an opportunistic publicity stunt designed to garner as much media exposure as possible because the spokesman is an American. So who is this Adam Gadahn? He is not a mystery. He is not an enigma. Rather Adam Yahiye Gadahn is really Adam Pearlman born in Oregon and raised in Orange County, California. Phil Pearlman (Adam's father) was a 1960's radical who suffered an identity crisis (much like Adam) that resulted in the change of the Pearlman surname to "Gadahn".

To understand the message one must understand the messenger and his motivations. The scientific community has yet to create a standard profile of a "typical" terrorist because there is doubt that a single arch-type exists. However, when terrorism is viewed with other serial predatory crimes (murder, rape, sexual assault) the common thread shared by the perpetrators is exhaustive dreaming and planning of executing such an event and those engrossed in such mental exercises are prone in their late teens/early twenties to escalate from fantasy to reality. Adam Gadahn's own history paints a life of failure, wanting to be important while surrounding himself with violent images and messages. Gadahn's own writings described having a "yawning emptiness" and seeking ways "to fill that void" by turning away from Death Metal to studying Islam at the Islamic Society of Orange County where he fell in with a group of young fundamentalists.

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

To Further Afghan Reconciliation

Fight Harder

by Joseph Collins

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

It's official. Everyone from the Pentagon to Saudi Arabia thinks that reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government is a good idea and a step toward settling the conflict in Afghanistan. A few deluded analysts even see dealing with the Taliban as the Afghan equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. One wonders whether war weariness, success with reconciliation in Iraq, and a lack of familiarity with the Afghan context may not be pushing us toward a tactical error or worse, an endless round of talking with an illegitimate adversary that believes it has the upper hand.

Reconciliation in Afghanistan is fraught with complications. For one, there is no Taliban per se. In the south we have Mullah Omar's "old" Taliban, but in the East, the toughest fighters come from the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi Islami, both of which work closely with Al Qaeda. Complicating the issue even more, there is now a multi-branch Pakistani Taliban, some of whom operate in both countries. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban and its friends seem to be well tolerated by Pakistani authorities who are now in conflict with their own Taliban.

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

Populace-Centric Engagement

A Positive Change of Strategic Perspective for Winning the Long War

by Colonel Robert C. Jones, Small Wars Journal

Populace-Centric Engagement (Full PDF Article)

How one looks at a problem shapes the solution sets that are developed to resolve it. To date U.S. engagement for the Long War has focused on the defeat of Al Qaeda and a growing number of affiliate non-state Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). This strategy recognizes that populaces are important, but places that importance below that of efforts to capture or kill senior VEO leadership and the development of counterterrorist capacity in the existing governments of the countries where these VEOs reside. This strategy naturally lends itself to a family of engagement that requires a Department of Defense lead, with Department of State in support. Populace-Centric Engagement shifts the focus to understanding and supporting populaces around the world, and assisting them in attaining good governance on their own terms, and produces positive secondary effects.

Populace-Centric Engagement (Full PDF Article)

Framing a Problem

The Problem with Sound Advice Prepared in Advance

by Tom Clark and Brian Blew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Framing a Problem (Full PDF Article)

We often create conditions to receive good advice. Sometimes, advice comes in advance. For example, "when in doubt do the right thing" or "do good and don't bunch up." In a recent blog entry, Dr Jack recounted that the Director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has defined doctrine as "sound military advice prepared in advance."

Accordingly, FM-3-0, Operations, offers some sage advice -- frame and reframe the problem. Framing the problem -- what does this mean? Perhaps framing the advice will be helpful.

Framing a Problem (Full PDF Article)

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan

by Noureddine Jebnoun, Small Wars Journal

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The Afghan geopolitical terrain, which historically never had the reputation of being easy to negotiate, has made life particularly difficult for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its allies, which have witnessed internal political quarrels being added to the tactical military failures.

The Taliban guerrilla and the Arab fighters who joined them had no chance to militarily defeat the modern Western armies deployed in Afghanistan. But in contemporary asymmetrical warfare, an unvanquished guerrilla is a victorious guerrilla. However, in the seven years of NATO's deployment, the Taliban have not ceased extending their influence over Afghan territory. Far from being confined in the South, they have multiplied their attacks, reaching Jalalabad, the largest city in eastern region of the country, and even the capital, Kabul, which lived in relative peace until a year ago.

At the root of this failure are several mistakes of analysis, mostly but not limited to American origin. The European allies are not absolved from the same mistakes. Western public opinion conflates al-Qaeda and Taliban, thinking of them as one organization. This confusion, when wanting to justify war leads to rejection of any negotiation with the Taliban.

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Manhunting...from the Sea (Full PDF Article)

Although once considered little more than a nuisance and a force protection issue for overseas troops, terrorism will remain the top priority of our national security strategy for the foreseeable future. Regardless of the form in which a terrorist threat manifest itself, be it a state-sponsored global group, decentralized extremist cells, or just rogue individuals, Americans can no longer ignore stateless actors who have the ability to inflict serious harm on our citizens and economy. As the lethality and effectiveness of individual terrorist attacks grows, the ability to take down individual leaders or their networks becomes an increasingly urgent mission set for the military. Manhunting -- finding and neutralizing high value individual targets -- is now an integral part of irregular warfare operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism. These types of precision terrorist targeting operations, combined with sound counterinsurgency techniques, have proven effective in ongoing campaigns against the FARC in Colombia, Islamic insurgents in the Philippines, and Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Terrorists seek refuge in terrain that allows them to stay undercover from conventional targeting methods. These under-governed areas may include rugged mountainous, jungle, and coastal environments, or urban terrain where they can hide among the population. Over half of the terrorist safe havens listed in the 2008 State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Country Reports are in coastal countries or littoral areas. The Sinjar Records, a declassified database of Al-Qa'ida documents captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in Iraq provide another data set indicating terrorist proximity to the sea. All of the 328 individuals in those records who traveled to Iraq to fight against coalition forces or engage in suicide bombing missions originated from just seven different Middle East countries with coastlines of various lengths. Given the nomadic nature of terrorists and the proximity of many potential targets to the sea, distributed maritime forces are a natural player in manhunting efforts...

Manhunting...from the Sea (Full PDF Article)

Inside the Surge

1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah

by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, Small Wars Journal

Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah (Full PDF Article)

I had the privilege of commanding the 1st Battalion, 5th US Cavalry in Ameriyah from November 2006 until January of 2008. I have watched a debate on our actions unfold since last summer as we started having success in Ameriyah, but have refrained from jumping into the middle of it up to now. I acknowledge that I am not an unbiased observer, which is why I have avoided this debate. However, since the operations of 1-5 CAV under my command have become a part of the discussion I believe it is time that I jump in and try to clarify some of the facts about our operations and also offer some thoughts.

I start by emphasizing that I appreciate the efforts of 8-10 CAV and the other units in Baghdad that preceded us. My comments are in no way intended to question their dedication or valor, nor suggest that they did not conduct COIN operations. I fully appreciate the sacrifices made by Col. Gian Gentile and his battalion. However, I disagree with Gian's position on the importance of the surge and the change in operational focus that accompanied it.

Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah (Full PDF Article)

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict

by Tom Clark and Bruce Stanley, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict (Full PDF Article)

Can we have a meaningful discussion of full spectrum operations in one dimension? If we take the 2008 edition of FM 3-0, Operations, spectrum of conflict at face value the answer is yes. As depicted, full spectrum operations consist of a "ways" based framework. Such a framework stands in stark contrast to the remainder of FM 3-0 as well as other new doctrine manuals such as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations.

All good models clarify complex topics. In using a simple model there is a danger of losing the clarity and completeness necessary to gain understanding. This is the problem with a one-dimension model to explain full spectrum operations -- we traded clarity and completeness for simplicity.

FM 3-0, Operations, tells us that military operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors. A contributing factor to complexity is the integration of activities of government and non-government entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired end state. Full spectrum operations involves more than simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, tells us counterinsurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. Political power is the central issue as each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Counterinsurgents use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, tells us that our military history is one of stability operations punctuated by episodes of major combat. Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.

In the Fall 2006 Air and Space Power Journal, Dr Jack Kem wrote that transformation effects are difficult to assess under a one-dimension model. He proposes that effective transformation involves four specific considerations: the strategic context, the ends or purpose for transformation, ways or methods to achieve the ends, and means or resources to accomplish the ways.

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict (Full PDF Article)

The Personnel System at War

A View from the Generation at the Tip of the Spear

by Robert Goldich, Small Wars Journal

The Personnel System at War (Full PDF Article)

Five junior officers, all veterans of combat, recently came together for a day-long dialogue with current and former senior manpower and personnel officials from the Department of Defense. Their major assessment was that an "industrial age" personnel system is being used to fight an "information age" war.

This frank assessment was sponsored by Anita K. Blair, the acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Ms. Blair's purpose in bringing the two groups together was twofold. First, it provided an opportunity for senior manpower and personnel officials, both active duty and retired, from the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to hear, first-hand, the experiences of a group of five young officers who had served in Iraq, and their views of how personnel issues affected operations. Second, it also afforded the young officers, all of whom have published and commented on their wartime experiences in various electronic and print media, a chance to gain knowledge about current policies and practices from the perspectives of current senior defense leadership.

The five officers came from a variety of backgrounds. Four were Army, one Marine Corps; one was a woman; ages varied, approximately, from 27 to 39. One was an active Army major in the Aviation Branch, currently transitioning to a Strategist MOS; he commanded an aviation unit in Iraq as a captain. Another was an Army Reserve captain commissioned in Military Intelligence, who served as an operations planner and intelligence officer in an infantry brigade in Iraq. A third remains in the Army Reserve as a captain, also in Military Intelligence; she spent two tours in Iraq, one as a supply officer for an MI brigade and her second as commander of a tactical human intelligence team, and has also returned twice to Iraq for shorter tours as a contractor working on intelligence matters. A fourth has recently left the Army Reserve as a captain; a Military Police officer and a lawyer (although not a JAG officer), he spent a year in Iraq as an adviser to the Iraqi Police. The final officer, a Marine Corps Reserve infantry major, served in a Force Reconnaissance unit in the initial Iraq invasion in 2003 and as an adviser to the Iraqi Army in 2006-2007.

The Personnel System at War (Full PDF Article)

A Soldier's View

by Colonel Gian Gentile, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

A Soldier's View (Full PDF Article)

Since Andrew Bacevich placed me in the "Conservative" camp in his Atlantic article and based on the two outstanding pieces just penned in SWJ by Shawn Brimley and Tom Donnelly I thought I would add a few comments of my own. As Joint Force Quarterly editor Colonel (retired) David Gurney has stated publicly on this blog, myself and John Nagl have a set of point-counterpoint articles due out in the next edition of JFQ that address the Bacevich Atlantic article and the issues involved.

First, I thought that Shawn Brimley's SWJ oped, "Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives" drew out very well and accurately the points that Bacevich only touched on and did not develop in his Atlantic piece.

I also found much to agree with in Tom Donnelly's "One Crusader's View." I especially liked his points at the end of the article where he articulated that the future of war is not just more Iraqs and Afghanistans but potentially conflicts that will require the American Army to have competencies at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. And Tom's acknowledgment that there is still a need in the American army for armor platforms that he states are still (and implicitly in the future) "powerful formations" warmed the cockles of my cavalryman's heart. I do, however, take issue in degree with what Tom said about current American Army doctrine. He said that "conventional force operational doctrine [did not] disappear with the publication of the counterinsurgency manual." True, but not in sprit since the organizing principle of the current three American Army doctrinal manuals (FM 3-24, FM 3-0, and FM 3-24) has become nation building and not fighting has in a sense eclipsed the "conventional" side of the Army. I develop this argument much more in the upcoming JFQ piece.

A Soldier's View (Full PDF Article)

One Crusader's View

by Thomas Donnelly, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

One Crusader's View (Full PDF Article)

We have a great duty to perform and we shall show ourselves a weak and poor-spirited people if we fail to set about doing it, or if we fail to do it aright.

--Theodore Roosevelt

America's Part of the World's Work

Lincoln Club Dinner

February 1899

A century later and with the painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan ever in our minds, TR's call to American greatness can seem hubristic, jingoistic, anachronistic and its unguarded moments (and to a politically correct sensibility) outright racist. But Shawn Brimley's recent "Mediating between Crusaders and Conservatives" called this quote to my mind. Brimley's piece advances the original future-land-force-structure argument to its ultimate and proper point: what do we think about America's employment of its military, and most particularly the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, over the next generation? At its indivisible core, this is a debate about American purposes in the world.

Brimley's crusaders-or-conservatives taxonomy is likewise not a bad way to frame the landscape of debate; simplicity and clarity are indeed virtues and certainly ones that Roosevelt would have approved of. Yes, there many nuances among observers on all sides and indeed many points of analysis that those with profoundly divergent conclusions can agree upon. But let me offer an unreconstructed "crusader's" view, meant to explain more fully several issues than Brimley glossed over. Most of what follows will focus on the purposes of U.S. land forces in the Middle East, but I will also end with a few observations about force structure and size.

One Crusader's View (Full PDF Article)

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives

by Shawn Brimley, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives (Full PDF Article)

The long simmering debate over American defense strategy, re-ignited by Andrew Bacevich's article in The Atlantic (and usefully stoked by Small Wars Journal), is perhaps the most important facing America's defense community. Mere weeks from the election of a new President, the debate over whether Iraq and Afghanistan are harbingers of why, where, and how America will fight its next wars helps to frame the context within which the next administration will decide how to construct a defense budget during a deepening economic downturn. The debate is real and the stakes are high.

In his article, Bacevich framed the debate as one between the crusaders, those who believe that Iraq and Afghanistan are but opening salvos in a generational long war, and those he labels the conservatives, who believe that organizing America's military to transform entire societies is a fool's errand. An oversimplified summary of each view might read as follows:

Crusaders: If 9/11 and the subsequent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything, it is that America's 21st century enemies are likely to exploit weak and failing states to export terrorism, instability, and extremism. The era of episodic or periodic conflict is over, and America's military had better get prepared for an era of persistent conflict, one in which instability anywhere can pose threats to America's interests anywhere. In the conflicts of the 21st century, the U.S. military will not be able to kill its way to victory, but must instead focus on transforming societies in order to address the grievances that manifest into powerful threats against America's interests. The types of capabilities most in demand for success in Iraq and Afghanistan -- linguists, trainers, combat advisors, civil affairs and intelligence experts -- are exactly the capabilities we will need in the future. Simply expanding so-called "white" special operations forces or marginal improvements in Army and Marine Corps capabilities will not prove sufficient. America's ground forces need to transform for a future of small wars and insurgencies, and if that means taking risk in more conventional capabilities like field artillery or armor, so be it.

Conservatives: If 9/11 and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us anything, it is that American power has limits. We cannot transform entire societies, and the notion that America needs to be persistently deployed as part of a generational long war is exactly what our enemies most desire. The most important variables in Iraq and Afghanistan are the actions of the various political actors -- we are not in control of the outcomes and never have been. Yes, weak and failing states can play host to those that may threaten us, but the answer is not to engage U.S. ground forces in a global Manichean counterinsurgency or pacification campaign in the quicksand of the Muslim world, because to do so would permanently mire America in a series of unwinnable wars. America's Army and Marine Corps as currently organized are more than sufficient to wage the counterinsurgencies we find ourselves in today, and the attempt to dramatically retool our ground forces for a never-ending long war imposes great risks to America's ability to defend against an uncertain future. With rising powers such as India, China and Russia poised to challenge American dominance, to embrace an era of persistent conflict is a recipe for a kind of permanent strategic distraction that will prove corrosive to America's power and global prestige...

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives (Full PDF Article)

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations

by Myrtle Vacirca-Quinn, M.D. Sternfeld and Luis Carlos Montalván

Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations (Full PDF Article)

The endemic problem of not having enough highly skilled and capable Civil Affairs personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan has negatively affected the Post 9/11 era of US military operations. The Civil Affairs (CA) problems of post-invasion Iraq should not have led our senior defense policy makers to move CA into the Regular Army as Secretary Rumsfeld directed. Rather, CA and Psychological Operations (colloquially known as PSYOP) should have been kept in the Special Operations Community.

In the first Gulf War, Civil Affairs (CA) worked well because it was part of US Special Operations Command. CA operators, specifically men and women of the Kuwait Task Force, planned post-combat reconstitution and reconstruction of Kuwait almost 6 months prior to the allied liberation. Indeed, post-combat planning began during the pre-combat phase called Operation Desert Shield.

This advanced detailed planning was very much in keeping with the tradition of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first overseas intelligence and military special operations agency. In Italy during World War II, OSS operations began with detailed plans produced beforehand at Camp Lee, Virginia.

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations (Full PDF Article)

Between Clausewitz and Mao

Dynamic Evolutions of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2008)

by Thomas Renard and Stéphane Taillat, Small Wars Journal

Between Clausewitz and Mao (Full PDF Article)

Insurgencies are dynamic, not static. The idea of dynamic insurgencies was previously developed by Mao Zadong. In his book, Mao described guerrilla warfare as a pyramidal process divided into three linear but not definitive phases - from propaganda to conventional warfare - which means that the guerrilla must follow the order of the different phases, but maintains the possibility to move back and forth between them.

Mao's dynamic guerrilla, due to its linearity, explains only partly the tactical shifts adopted by insurgents. Therefore, in order to mirror the real dynamism of modern insurgencies, we propose a second model of dynamic insurgencies based on three operational poles: the terror pole, the guerrilla pole, and the conventional warfare pole. The three poles create a triangle of tactical possibilities, in which every insurgent action takes place.

Concretely, this means that a group closer to the terror pole will mainly rely on acts of terrorism, while maintaining a more or less pronounced aspect of guerrilla warfare, or even of conventional warfare, depending on its proximity to the other poles. This is to say - most groups do not rely on a single pole.

Between Clausewitz and Mao (Full PDF Article)