Journal

The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

by Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson

Download the Full Article: The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

On April 5th 2010 the website Wikileaks, historically known for publicizing sensitive and sometimes classified documents online, released classified cockpit footage of an American helicopter strike on armed insurgents in New Baghdad, Iraq that took place on July 12th 2007. Wikileaks posted 39 minutes of "research" video along with 17 minutes of "edited" content purported to show American troops killing Iraqi civilians and two Reuters journalists in cold blood. The posting received more than 5,000,000 views; commentary from the public was transnational in scope and condemnatory of perceived American action. This type of online messaging is picked up by, and used as an influence tool, by groups seeking a) to discredit Western nations; b) to drive negative perception of the West; and c) to recruit newcomers for physical, material and emotional support for causes espousing violence and terrorist action.

Download the Full Article: The Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" Case Study

Larisa Breton is a strategic communications engagement and influence specialist with a wealth of US Government, commercial digital, and traditional multimedia experience.

Adam Pearson is a Cyber Investigator with Striker Pierce Investigations, LLC, and has over 12 years experience with the Intelligence Community in both the military and civilian world.

Cholera in Haiti?

Send in the Marines

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Cholera in Haiti? Send in the Marines

The Cholera outbreak in Haiti is an utterly avoidable disaster; and it is likely to be exacerbated by the approach of Hurricane Thomas, but it is one that can still be contained if we act quickly. Cholera is one of the world's most preventable diseases. It is primarily caused by drinking contaminated water although poor sanitation practices exacerbate it. The reason that this outbreak is so inexcusable is that billions have been poured into the country since the January earthquake and some of the most experienced disaster relief organizations in world are on the scene. These include OXFAM; which is probably the most experienced non-governmental organization in the world in dealing with clean water issues, and the United Nations Development Program which has a long history with such emergencies. One can only presume that the Haitian government, which has retaken the lead in recovery, got so consumed with rubble removal and rebuilding that it took its eye off the public health ball. This isn't the time to find fault; the disaster requires immediate help before this epidemic becomes a debacle.

Download the Full Article: Cholera in Haiti? Send in the Marines

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer. He is a veteran of disaster relief operations in Bangladesh, Somalia, and the Philippines. He has published several academic studies on humanitarian relief operations.

Operation Yarborough and U.S. Army Special Forces in Southern Iraq (January -- June 2008)

by Duane L. Mosier

Download the Full Article: The Road to Al Amarah

Stability in Iraq and the overall outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom were in question during the spring and summer of 2007 as the "Surge," the offensive campaign implemented by General David Petraeus, was taking root. Coalition casualties peaked in 2007 with 961 fatalities in Iraq (up from 872 the previous year) as the coalition focused on the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad, the north, and west of Iraq. As a result of the coalition focus, the majority of Surge related brigades were centered on or near the dense population center of Baghdad leaving few available forces to monitor southern Iraq.

Download the Full Article: The Road to Al Amarah

Major Duane L. Mosier served as the SFOD-A 5331 Detachment Commander during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM V and participated with fellow members of the detachment in Operation YARBOROUGH as well as several of the associated events discussed in this article.

Lessons from Vietnam

by Franz-Stefan Gady

Download the Full Article: Negotiating with the Taliban

Despite many critical voices of the overuse of the Vietnam War metaphor when talking about the war in Afghanistan there are many striking similarities between the last years of the Vietnam War and the Obama administrations attempt to extract US combat forces from Afghanistan. I therefore think it is important, given the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon in November and the looming withdrawal of NATO forces from the region, to examine the Nixon administration's effort to win the Vietnam War on the negotiation table and to have in Nixon's words "Peace with Honor".

Download the Full Article: Negotiating with the Taliban

Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute.

Is it possible to have Center of Gravity given all the Fog and Friction?

by Grant M. Martin

Download the Full Article: COIN, Complexity, and Full-Spectrum Warfare

The United States Army uses a concept called the Center of Gravity (CoG) to help determine where the focus of efforts should be during warfare. For instance, during recent U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) practical exercises, students many times identified an enemy's most powerful corps or armored division as the Operational CoG that must be defeated in order for U.S. forces to be successful in a conventional fight. In counterinsurgency exercises the CoG was usually identified as "the will of the people", in fact many instructors stifled debate by insinuating there was no alternative. Students took hours to debate CoGs and usually arrived at a consensual conclusion that was widely regarded as wrong by the students. This follows statements made by senior-ranking field grade guest instructors such as, "CoG analysis has never helped me understand a problem" and "getting the CoG right isn't important, doing the thinking is." The possibility that CoG analysis may offer no greater understanding of the true nature of a conflict should cause military professionals concern.

Download the Full Article: COIN, Complexity, and Full-Spectrum Warfare

MAJ Grant Martin is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer assigned to the NATO Training Mission- Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

Since the end of the Cold War—and especially since 9/11—civil society has become an important potential strategic instrument for both foreign and national security policy. This is obvious from the logic of the new challenges that have appeared from the "weak states" that have become the new priorities for policy. Governments from Pakistan to Egypt are weak because they do not control—or command allegiance from—their largely independent, tribal societies, and they lack the capacity to provide effective leadership for change. The organizations that have an important role to play in influencing these societies are civil society organizations (CSOs), and they need to become active in order to promote significant change.

Download the Full Article: Civil Society and Counterinsurgency

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

Roughly on time (go us!) here's

volume 6, number 10

of Small Wars Journal. It continues our emerging m.o. of presenting an index of

all the Journal articles published in the past month.  This month, in

addition to a few select reprints, we debut some new material with the issue and

present content on two broad themes: 1. Defining the nature and environment of

current warfare; 2. Negotiating the peace. .......

Where, When, and Why Should the U.S. Intervene?

by Carol E. B. Choksy and Jamsheed K. Choksy

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Abstract. Despite the backlash from American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq during the presidency of George W. Bush, the administration of President Barack Obama is finding its international stability and reconstruction involvements expanding. But the U.S. currently possesses neither the resources nor the political will or the public support to maintain sufficiently large military and civilian forces for lasting S&R in more than a few key locales. So why does intervention benefit the U.S.? What are the factors most effective in predicting where S&R may become necessary? How can the U.S. assess the degree of threat when deciding whether to intervene or not?

Download the Full Article: Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nations

Carol E. B. Choksy is adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University. She also is CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is a professor of Central Eurasian, International, Iranian, and Islamic Studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. Additionally, he is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities.

This research was supported by the Indiana Complex Operations Partnership (InCOP) through Indiana University, Bloomington.

by Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti

Download the Full Article: Building Bridges in Afghanistan

The debate on Afghan nation building has pivoted on the duration of America's presence. The concept of joint India-Pakistan teams across military training, government and development spectrums, presents a wildcard that carries the potential of correcting systemic flaws and resource deficiencies, and also promises to reduce deep rooted mistrusts between rivals India and Pakistan. Joint Indo-Pak nation building teams could concurrently yield four positive results- provide additional resources, bridge ethnic and political polarities, foster cooperation between India and Pakistan and device means to enable them to verify each other's role, and ultimately, present a mechanism to ensure Afghanistan's neutrality.

Download the Full Article: Building Bridges in Afghanistan

Kaustav Chakrabarti is a junior fellow in the Centre for International Relations at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. His research interests include Pakistan, insurgency, civil military relations, and nuclear security.

Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

As we arrive to this fifth in a series of essays on design philosophy, it is a good place to pause, step back, and re-appreciate that the meaning of "design" is metaphoric (as are many of its derivative meanings). The root prefix "de-" is from Latin and means "of." "Sign" has Latin roots, meaning "image." Originally, the word design was closely related to "of image" or human imagination. Interestingly, Webster's Third New International Unabridged Dictionary has dozens of definitions for the word; nevertheless, those who have imported the term to identify it with professional practice borrowed meaning from the field of architecture, signifying "design" is concerned with "the art and science of building." Hence, it is no wonder that those who have used design to speak to professional practice borrow other meanings from architectural design. One such metaphor is "framing;" after all, how can one construct a building without frames? Several images come to mind -- structural frames (that can be blue-printed), roof frames (to block adverse weather), window frames (to see through), door frames (to walk through), and so on.

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Frame Reflection

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from the University of South Florida; master's degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, the U.S. Naval War College, and the Army War College; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Pennsylvania State University. On active duty he served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Bosnia.

by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brandon J. Gorman

Download the Full Article: CSIS's Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story

We were recently sent the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 21 July 2010 improvised explosive device (IED) metrics for Afghanistan report. This report illustrates a significant spike in IED activity in Afghanistan over the past year. This report also suggests that in this same period there has been an exponential decrease in the number of IEDs found by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) due to local national tips or turn-ins. Upon reviewing this report, we can understand why one might argue that the current counterinsurgency (COIN) operational design in Afghanistan is flawed and/or in part responsible for the seemingly increasing IED threat. For a variety of reasons, we discourage anyone from using this report to draw conclusions on the tactical conduct of the fight in Afghanistan today, especially conclusions about how best to counter the IED threat.

We caution against doing so because the experiences of the Marines, Sailors, and Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers that we had the privilege to serve with in southern Helmand Province from October 2009 to May 2010 completely contradict the seemingly logical conclusion that one might make from the report: IED incidents continue to grow while IED turn-ins due to local national tips appear to be exponentially decreasing; therefore, more troops and resources in Afghanistan have not led to greater security and cooperation for and among the population, but rather increasing hostility between ISAF/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Afghan people.

Download the Full Article: CSIS's Afghanistan IED Metrics Report Does Not Tell the Whole Story

From October 2009 to May 2010, Captain Gorman and Captain Cuomo served as Easy Company and Fox Company Commanders, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, respectively, in Garmsir District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The views expressed herein are their own and do not represent those of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

That may also Mitigate IEDs

by Eric T. Furey

Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan

This paper intends to provoke thought on the connection between Stability Operations and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) reduction. Stability Operations emphasizes the need for a simultaneous bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government approach in order to "...outsmart the insurgents and wrest away the initiative." Ultimately, the end state is to link the informal (traditional) local sub-national consensus governance structures with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghan Central Government) at the district level. Therefore, one may reasonably ask whether an engagement program with local villagers might also diminish the IED threat.

Experience demonstrates it can. Interviews with US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (Special Forces Team{s}) conducting the Local Defense Initiative program from July 2009 until January 2010 provide evidence that a population-centric, bottom-up local engagement program within the rural areas of Afghanistan can reduce the number of IED incidents. What was further revealed was that indigenous reporting of IEDs and related information increased proportionately to the degree of trust, respect, and credibility developed between local village elders and United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets).

Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan

Eric Furey is a retired US Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel. He served as a Red Team Leader and as part of the first Red Team (Alternative Perspective) to deploy with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan from July 2008 to January 2009. He along with his fellow Red Teamers wrote the initial concept and plan for Tribal Engagement. In addition, they created a Tribal Engagement Fusion Cell. Their efforts became the genesis for subsequent local engagement activities in Afghanistan.

by Thomas Talley

Download the Full Article: Southern Sudan - the Four Theses

This paper is not about the likelihood of war in Southern Sudan -- it is about the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a war in Southern Sudan. As with many other interested observers, I have been following the development of Southern Sudan's upcoming referendum with great interest, and increasingly, with a degree of alarm. This paper intends to be predictive -- by discussing the three elements that I believe to be missing from the current discussions and analysis, I intend to show where the official U.S. policy (COA 1) is leading us. Accordingly, this paper will not elaborate further on the other two courses of action. Stated another way, this paper will discuss what will be, whereas the other courses of action offer insight into what could be, or even what should be. Those discussions are conversations for a different audience.

Download the Full Article: Southern Sudan - the Four Theses

Thomas Talley, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, is a Strategic Plans and Policy Officer (Functional Area 59), currently assigned to U.S. Africa Command.

A Primer on Tribal Political Systems

by Stan Wiechnik

Download the Full Article: Governance in the Raw

This paper will introduce the reader to some different types of pre-state or tribal governance systems a person is likely to find in portions of the planet where people are living at just above the subsistence level and there is limited or no state influence. While each culture may be unique, certain commonalities can be seen between tribal people living across the globe. The intended audience for this paper is the practitioner working with these people, be they military or civilian, who are trying to influence the group without necessary trying to change it. To achieve this, a better understanding than might be provided by being told you are going to be dealing with a tribal society might be helpful.

Download the Full Article: Governance in the Raw

Major Stan Wiechnik deployed to Afghanistan as a company commander and Iraq as a battalion executive officer. Currently, he serves in the ROTC Department at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts.

by Mark Schapiro and Stephen Petzold

Download the Full Article: Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort

Over the past year within the restless province of Ninewa Iraq, the "Team Ninewa" concept was born. This concept is a highly successful model of U.S. civilian-military cooperation that resulted in an unprecedented unity of effort among the State Department and U.S. military goals/objectives in the region. This unity of effort led to tens of millions of dollars in savings on redundant projects and a highly effective use of Defense and State Department funding streams targeted at very specific local communities. Key to this strategy was "thinking small" -- de-prioritizing large infrastructure projects in favor of income-generating activities for neglected economic actors among Ninewa's myriad ethnic groups and business associations.

Download the Full Article: Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort

Mark Schapiro, a career foreign service officer with the State Department, recently completed an assignment in Iraq as the Economic Chief in the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team.

Major Stephen Petzold is the S9 of 2nd "Spartan" AAB, 3rd Infantry Division, currently deployed in northern Iraq.

Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

This is the fourth in a series of short Small Wars Journal articles on design. The thesis of the present essay (#4) is that, especially in a military context, dialogue is central to the method of design. In the midst of operating in highly volatile, uncertain, complex and uncertain (high "VUCA") environmental niches we have to continuously design meaning and find clever ways to communicate about that unique, novel, and highly contextual, wicked situation. We have to continuously and collectively MAKE SENSE when commonsense (the presumed esoteric "science" found in professional groups) does not seem to help. Dialogue is the condition that enables such collective sensemaking.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Critical Dialogue

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

by Dr. Bernard I. Finel

Download the Full Article: Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan

The policy debate in Washington over Afghanistan periodically lurches from irrational exuberance over the prospects of defeating the insurgency there to a sullen "throw the baby out with the bathwater" phase where everyone begins to talk about an "exit strategy" without much sense of what is left behind. In December 2009, the strategy was to defeat the insurgency, end corruption, and train up a viable Afghan national security apparatus. By later spring 2010, pessimism had set in and prominent analysts both inside and outside the government are now talking about much more modest goals focused on counter-terrorism and regional militias. With the firing of General Stanley McChrystal and his replacement with counterinsurgency guru General David Petraeus, enthusiasm is again on the upswing.

Unfortunately, neither the overly optimistic assessments nor the overly pessimist are likely to be borne out. As a practical matter the United States is unlikely to be able to fully defeat the insurgency -- not necessarily because any shortfalls in military capacity, but rather because of the fundamental implausibility of the non-military elements of modern counterinsurgency doctrine. Economic development is hard enough to promote under ideal circumstances; it is virtually impossible under conditions of "opposed development" where an armed group is actively trying to prevent the initiative from being successful. Anti-corruption initiatives are rarely successful as well and anti-drug programs almost always fail. Clearing insurgent controlled areas is relatively easy. Holding those areas against insurgent activities is costly but not fundamentally impossible. But building responsive and resilient local governance is at this point purely in the realm of conjecture.

But if the counterinsurgency model is flawed in its overly optimistic assessment of the non-military tools available, the alternative approach focused on a rapid transition to a smaller footprint in Afghanistan is also flawed. A smaller footprint approach would have made sense back in 2009, and it may be the best long-term approach. But for the next 12-24 months at least the United States is going to have in the neighborhood of 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. The key is to use this deployment to best effect.

Download the Full Article: Planning a Military Campaign to Support Negotiations in Afghanistan

Dr. Bernard I. Finel is currently an Associate Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the American Security Project, a non-partisan think tank located in Washington, D.C. and Executive Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He holds a BA in international relations from Tufts University and an MA and Ph.D. in international relations from Georgetown. His views are my own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

by David Malet

Download the Full Article: In Afghanistan, Less is More

Two recent developments have brought optimism to some Afghanistan-watchers. The first is the appointment of General David Petraeus as commander of the United States Forces. Petraeus is credited as the architect of the Surge of troops that brought greater levels of stability to Iraq in 2007 when all had seemed lost there, and the hope is that he can cause lightning to strike twice. The second is an anti-Taliban uprising in the Gizab district that perhaps signals a newfound willingness by even Pashtun tribesmen, the Afghan demographic most closely tied to the Taliban, to turn against it and ally with the United States. The Washington Post quoted American officials as claiming the Gizab revolt as "the most important thing that has happened in southern Afghanistan this year" and heralding a "breakthrough" if only the patterns of involvement by local tribesmen could be discerned.

Download the Full Article: In Afghanistan, Less is More

Dr. David Malet is Director of the Center for the Study of Homeland Security and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University-Pueblo. From 2000-2003 he served on the defense and foreign affairs staff of U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk

Some pundits have questioned the wisdom of General Petraeus' decision that allows certain Taliban leaders safe passage to conduct preliminary peace negations with the Afghan government. He has been second guessed before and has generally proven the critics wrong; there are three good reasons to believe that his decision was the right one.

Download the Full Article: Afghanistan: It Never Hurts to Talk

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who is now a defense consultant and professor at the George Washington University Elliott School.

by David C. Ellis and James Sisco

Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State

The failure of ISAF's COIN strategy to achieve its political objectives is the result of a conceptual error in its COIN implementation framework. Though ISAF places meeting the needs of the population at the center of its strategy, attempting to do so through a kleptocratic, illegitimate, and unaccountable Afghan national government (GIRoA) will not succeed. This conceptual error is due to a reading of COIN theory that defines "the counterinsurgent" doctrinally as the national government. Thus, while ISAF strategy now claims to adopt a population centric, district-focused COIN strategy, it still tries with predictable results to reach the population top down through the very kleptocratic government that has precipitated the current political crisis.

Download the Full Article: Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legitimate State

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan. His previous tours include the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, Deep Blue, and service in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai.

Dr. David C. Ellis is a SOCOM human terrain analyst currently deployed to Afghanistan. His research covers peacekeeping, ethnic conflict, democratization, and economic development.

by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan

Download the Full Article: Looking for the Hedgehog Idea

Originally published in Australian Army Journal, and republished here with permission of the Journal, this article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.

Download the Full Article: Looking for the Hedgehog Idea

by Tripp McCullar

Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought

The purpose of this piece is to argue that the Information Revolution will ultimately eclipse most of history's widely-accepted RMAs due to its ability to "empower the weak" by (1) widely propagating strategic weapons technology, (2) rendering traditional military organization near-obsolete, (3) providing open access to mass social mobilization platforms, and (4) bypassing the development of industrialized mobility to achieve strategic effects.

Download the Full Article: The Rising Dominance of the Information Revolution within RMA Thought

MAJ Tripp McCullar is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer and recent graduate of the Naval Postgaduate School Special Operations masters program. He is currently assigned to DIA.

by Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a modern-day nightmare. After more than a decade of conflict, the country's eastern region is known for its seemingly unending human misery. Mass murder, forced displacements, and the horrible distinction of being the world's "rape capital" embody Thomas Hobbes' description of life in an anarchic world, (i.e. nasty, brutish, and short.) Reports two weeks ago of hundreds of women, girls, and babies being gang-raped by rebels and tribesmen within miles of a United Nations peacekeepers' camp only serve as the most recent chapters in an epic tragedy ("Congo mass rape numbers rise to 240—UN," BBC).

Download the Full Article: A Better, Bad Choice

Richard Wrona is a U.S. Army officer presently serving as a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Humanizing "The Man:"

Strengthening Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download the Full Article: Humanizing the "Man"

In this paper, I will argue there are three great challenges the coalition forces need to overcome in their search for narratives that resonate with Afghans and that ultimately will promote support for the coalition and for the government. First is the traditional and tribal Afghan antagonism to outsiders. Second is the lack of a stake that ordinary Afghans have in the larger system. And the third involves a conflict in impact of major activities in the country, a conflict between programs that empower Afghans and programs that disempower them.

Download the Full Article: Humanizing the "Man"

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

by Daniel R. DePetris

Download the Full Article: Arming the U.S. Military for the Future

There is a huge debate brewing in Washington today about the current health and state of the U.S. Military. And with good reason; virtually every branch of the military has been stretched to the brink over the past decade. 100,000 American soldiers are expected to be in Afghanistan by the end of this summer; 50,000 American troops will remain in Iraq for at least another year; and nearly 30,000 are deployed in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korean aggression. All of this is not to be outdone by the tens of thousands more who are stationed in bases all across the European continent.

Download the Full Article: Arming the U.S. Military for the Future

Daniel R. DePetris is a graduate candidate in the political science department at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University..

by Anthony Tsontakis

Download the Full Article: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran

Evidence made public over the course of the last year compellingly supports the conclusion that Iran's nuclear program is not peaceful, contrary to every maxim of Iran's stated policy, including a religious decree by Iran's Supreme Leader that says Islam forbids the production and use of nuclear weapons. As a result, and because confidence in the good faith and ultimate justice of the Iranian government yields, as it must, to the painful experience of endless disappointment, a consensus against Iran's nuclear activity has been emerging internationally.

Download the Full Article: The Prospect for a Unified International Policy on Iran

Anthony Tsontakis is a small business owner based in Phoenix, Arizona. He recently earned a J.D. from the Phoenix School of Law, where he served as Managing Editor for the Phoenix Law Review. Mr. Tsontakis previously served as a law clerk for the Arizona Department of Homeland Security, the Arizona State Legislature, and the Arizona Secretary of State.

Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis

This episode attempts to expose the myth that design is a "methodology" that leads to "understanding" that eventually leads to good military planning as suggested in the US Army's latest doctrine, particularly its Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process. The focus is to reveal the issues associated with "mission analysis," that is, the breaking down of a "problem" into manageable tasks that, when all put together into a military plan or order, serve to solve the overall "problem." Beyond conventional, "force-on-force" fights, this essay argues that mission analysis is a misconception when it comes to framing complex operations.

Download the Full Article: Design and the Prospects for Mission Analysis

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

by Kevin Meredith, Sergio Villarreal, and Mitchel Wilkinson

Download The Full Article: The De-evolution of Insurgency

In this article we will examine contemporary definitions of insurgencies as presented in The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24), compare the insurgency in Afghanistan to other insurgencies and present an argument that the present situation in Afghanistan is in-fact, not an insurgency. In our conclusion, we will present a theory that the situation in Afghanistan more closely resembles a synergy of criminal elements that have coalesced into a loosely organized front to form an anti-government, anti-coalition movement that has insurgent elements involved. Our theory also suggests that there is a cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan that includes the growth of insurgency and the de-evolution of insurgency as a part of a constantly changing Chaotic Cannibalistic State; a state of being that consists of groups of people in perpetual conflict, feeding on each other until a foreign body is introduced, at which point they frenzy on the foreign body, sapping strength and resources until the foreign body must limp away.

Download The Full Article: The De-evolution of Insurgency

Colonel Kevin Meredith is an Armor Officer who served in various command and staff positions in combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, he serves as Team Leader of a Human Terrain Analysis Team in Southern Afghanistan.

Major (ret.) Sergio Villarreal is a PhD Candidate in Psychology who serves as a social scientist on a Human Terrain Analysis Team in southern Afghanistan. He has experience as a military advisor in Colombia and Afghanistan.

Dr. Mitchel Wilkinson is a social scientist on a Human Terrain Analysis Team in Southern Afghanistan. Previously, he served in advisory duties in Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, and Vietnam, and he is a former instructor at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University.

The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift

The United States currently faces two strategic level non-state (network) threats—but only one of them is openly recognized. Al Qaeda, and other elements of radical Islam, have been recognized as the #1 threat since the 11 September 2001 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 Americans and caused well over 100 billion dollars in infrastructure damage, emergency response, and economic disruption. This threat which garners ongoing media attention, however, on many fronts pales in comparison to that represented by the drug cartels and narco-gangs which for decades now have been evolving, mutating, and growing in capabilities and power in the Americas. While presently viewed as a 'crime and law enforcement issue', as Al Qaeda was pre 9-11, this more subtle and encompassing strategic threat has resulted in the deaths of well over 100,000 citizens of the Americas (roughly 30,000 in Mexico alone in the last 4 years) and has caused the destabilization of a number of nations including Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras, and witnessed the rise of heightened narco influence within regions of the US homeland along its Southern Border. Economically, the sustained damage and disruption caused by drug cartel and narco-gang activities to private individuals, local economies, and governmental bodies is well past the trillion dollar mark and rising. Both of these non-state (network) threats challenge the institutions of the many nations affected, the loyalty of the indigenous populations to the state itself, and are indicative of the 'war over social and political organization' now being waged in various regions of the globe.

Download the Full Article: The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift

Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history. Training taken includes that provided by DHS, FLETC, DIA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC, NTOA, and private security entities in counter-terrorism, counter-surveillance, incident-response, force protection, and intelligence. Dr. Bunker has been involved in red teaming and counter-terrorism exercises and has provided operations support within Los Angeles County.

by Torie Rose DeGhett

Download the Full Article: The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War

The purpose of this article is to explore the use of private military contractors as a policy tool and their place in the context of rapidly changing ways of fighting wars. Its primary goal is to defy the conventional wisdom of contractors as overpaid, gun-toting mercenaries who wreak havoc in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The hope is that this article shows a bigger picture, correcting misinformation and highlighting the real problems with privatization, namely the lack of bureaucratic clarity and control, and offering solutions.

Download the Full Article: The Misunderstood Private Dynamic of Modern War

Torie Rose DeGhett is a freelance writer. She can be found on-line at www.thepoliticalnotebook.tumblr.com.

by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik

Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities

Whether in Iraq or in the United States arguments remain as to the origins of the war as well as how it was conducted. But equally certain is this: most of the Iraqis that I've talked to are grateful for the American troops and families who have sacrificed so much and to the other nations of the coalition who have also contributed sons, daughters, and treasure to eliminate the Saddam regime and help create the evident progress in their country. They know that war is not over in Iraq, even if Iraq's enemies are far weaker than they had been. They also understand that Iraqi is in a far better place today than it was in 2006, and each year finds more progress. They may be frustrated that progress is not faster or more widespread, but they are not ungrateful for the freedoms and opportunities they now have.

Acknowledging this progress, President Obama outlined a "new page" for Iraq and highlighted the importance of a continued Iraqi/US relationship. This relationship appropriately rests upon Iraq's growing ability to "help itself," but recognizes the essential role the US can play in Iraq's future. I have returned to Iraq three times since I had responsibility for accelerating the growth of the Iraqi Security Forces during the 2007-8 surge, and in my view, the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi Police Forces need assistance in the following three important priority areas.

Download the Full Article: Iraqi Police Priorities

LTG James Dubik (ret.) is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). He is the author of Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan, a policy proposal and analytical work on the growth of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan. Prior to joining ISW, General Dubik was the commander of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) from June 2007 to July 2008.

An Invading Force's Presence in a Foreign Land is its own Enemy

by Ali Iqbal

Download the Full Article: Bismarck's Lesson on COIN

An invading foreign force, on completion of its objectives i.e. regime change through violent means or having inflicted sufficient losses to a targeted group, should not prolong its stay and assume the role of occupiers. This tendency infuriates local passion built on independent beliefs, cultural biases, religious differences and historic events. This complex/non- linear environment poses tremendous challenges for an outsider to transform the invaded country and bring it to a desired level of stability. On the other hand, the same environment presents lucrative opportunities for non-state and other state actors who intend exploiting the volatile situation to further their agendas/interests. The actors relevant to this theory include a foreign force, which can be composed of a single nation or a coalition, local populace of the invaded country, non-state actors within, and outside the invaded country and regional/neighboring countries having negative or positive interests in the invaded country and the foreign force.

Download the Full Article: Bismarck's Lesson on COIN

Major Ali Iqbal, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as an instructor in School of Armor and Pakistan Military Academy and has twice served as brigade operations officer in an infantry and armor brigade. He has also served as United Nations Military Observer in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Pakistan and has a master's degree in Arts and Science of Warfare.

by Kashif Taher

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

The most immediate threat to the security of Pakistan is an Islamist insurgency raging in the north-west tribal regions. They have launched a deadly campaign of terror attacks throughout Pakistan over the last few years which have killed large number of civilians and non-civilians alike, devastated infrastructure, and hindered NATO success in Afghanistan. They may be also harbouring high-ranking members of Al-Qaeda. The insurgents are affiliated with various militant groups which pose a threat to the wider region, especially Afghanistan. Tackling this network is necessary to reverse the destabilisation of the Pakistani state and to ensure NATO success in Afghanistan. In 2009 the Pakistani army attempted to pacify this threat in its stronghold of the South Waziristan region in north-west Pakistan. This discussion aims to apply counterinsurgency principles to this particular war and recommend improvements counterinsurgency operators can make for future campaigns. In fact, the counterinsurgents succeeded militarily but the lack of infrastructure building will not ensure South Waziristan does not fall back into the control of the insurgents.

Download the Full Article: Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Kashif Taher is a researcher and analyst for the Transnational Crisis Project. He graduated in July from the University of Reading with a BA in Politics and International Relations.

Recent Counterinsurgency Operations in Southern Afghanistan

by Brett Van Ess

Download the Full Article: The Fight for Marjah

In early 2010, in response to violent and rampant insurgent operations in the long-held Taliban stronghold of Marjah, located in central Helmand province, the International Security Assistance Force and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan began implementing a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy stands in contrast to the counternarcotics and counterterrorism focus in Marjah from 2001 to late 2009. Initial elements of this new campaign plan were implemented in February 2010 when Operation Moshtarak began in Marjah.

This paper details the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Marjah over the last year. The first section of the paper provides a background on operations in Marjah from prior to 2009 and an explanation of the structural organization of insurgent forces in Marjah. The second section of the paper describes Operation Moshtarak, the February 2010 assault on Marjah. This section details efforts by ISAF and Afghan forces to clear insurgents from their stronghold in Marjah as well as the actions by insurgent fighters to target ISAF forces and to maintain their influence over the population through intimidation. The paper concludes with a discussion of governance and policing efforts in Marjah. Counterinsurgent forces struggled to form a legitimate political authority and police force capable of convincing the local population that a new governing authority would bring security to Marjah. The case study of Marjah provides useful examples of successful and failed tactics and policies for future COIN operations in southern Afghanistan.

Download the Full Article: The Fight for Marjah

Brett Van Ess was an Institute for the Study of War contributor during the spring and summer of 2010. He is currently a graduate student at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He has also studied at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and holds a MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies from Hawaii Pacific University. Brett was formerly a United States Marine. This report was concluded in early September 2010.

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling

Download the Full Article: Breaking Ranks?

There is no constitutional principle more important to a democracy than civilian control of the military. Unless the armed guardians of the state remain strictly subordinate to civil authority, no other liberty can long remain safe. In "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional," (Joint Force Quarterly) Lt. Col. Andrew Milburn challenges this vital constitutional principle, arguing that "there are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order."

Milburn bases this argument on three propositions. First, that a military officer's commission and professional standing "grant him moral autonomy and obligate him to disobey an order he deems immoral." Importantly, Milburn defines an immoral order as one "likely to harm the institution writ large—the Nation, military, and subordinates." Second, that "the military professional's obligation to disobey is an important check and balance in the execution of policy." Finally, that "the military officer must understand that this dilemma demands either acceptance of responsibility or wholehearted disobedience."

The first proposition elevates military officers to the status of morally autonomous actors ultimately accountable only to their own consciences. Unlike other government officials, Milburn's military professional may substitute his judgment for the will of the public as expressed in law and the lawful orders of elected or appointed leaders. The benchmark by which Milburn's morally autonomous professional makes such a judgment is the individual officer's morality. Milburn's moral criteria are particularly interesting -- the wellbeing of the Nation, the military and subordinates are co-equal priorities. Indeed, Milburn asserts that military officers have "sworn to defend the Constitution and safeguard the welfare of his subordinates."

Download the Full Article: Breaking Ranks?

Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Yingling is an Army officer who has served three tours of duty in Iraq and is currently a professor of security studies at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army or Defense Department.

Stabilizing One Village at a Time

by M. Shands Pickett

Download the Full Article: The Village Engagement Center

ISAF's brigade-level assets are hamstrung by a forward operating base-centric footprint. To partner effectively with Afghans, the various teams (or "functional enablers" in ISAF parlance) must establish a presence in the villages they hope to assist—a whole-of-place concept called the Village Engagement Center (VECs). Only full-time interaction outside the base gates with both local Afghans and GIRoA counterparts will give ISAF's functional enablers the village-level contextual knowledge necessary to create meaningful change. This is an idea with precedence from the Marines' Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam to a program, the Village Stability Platform (VSP), currently operated by Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. The Village Engagement Center is not another new capability but is instead an organizing principle for existing assets. It pushes those functional enablers off of ISAF bases, thereby helping Afghan communities to resist insurgent pressures while increasing their stake in GIRoA's success.

Download the Full Article: The Village Engagement Center

M. Shands Pickett is an analyst with the Human Terrain Team attached to TF White Eagle in Ghazni Province. He holds an MA in U.S. Foreign Policy from The George Washington University. The views of the author do not necessarily reflect the official policies and positions of the Human Terrain System, U.S. Army, ISAF or the U.S. Government.

by Mike Lydon

Download the Full Article: Right Tech Solutions for USAF SFA

For the USAF, Airpower and SFA is a ticket out of constant employment of our US forces, aircraft and tax dollars. The USAF must build the capability to directly engage, teach, and support the smaller, poor nations that need our expertise, helping them to defeat local or global terrorist networks and stabilize their local regions.

Download the Full Article: Right Tech Solutions for USAF SFA

Lt Col Michael Lydon is a staff officer in17AF A5/8 Ramstein, Germany, the USAF force provider that directs the USAF Security Force Assistance program for AFRICOM. Mike is a C-130 Command Pilot with two tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a former USAF liaison officer to the Joint IED Defeat Organization and founding member of the HAF A5R-Q Irregular Warfare Office. The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force or Defense Department.

Penny Packets Revisited:

How the USAF Should Adapt to 21st Century Irregular Warfare

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: Penny Packets Revisited

This white paper will argue that C2DE in irregular warfare conflicts should be replaced with decentralized control, decentralized execution (DCDE) in a 'penny packets revisited' format utilizing lessons drawn from the French military in Algeria. This is a three part argument and requires the Air Force to adapt turbo-prop platforms in lieu of their preferred F-22s/F-16s and decentralize them at locally positioned forward operating bases within each irregular area of operations requiring ground assets. Lastly, the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC), Joint Air Tasking Cycle, Joint Air and Space Operations Plan, Air Operations Directive, and Master Air Attack Plan all need significant dismantlement and refinement in irregular conflict environments for this 'penny packets revisited' to work.

Download the Full Article: Penny Packets Revisited

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Science from the Air Force. He participated in two deployments to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A Question of Super-Empowerment

by Adam Elkus and Captain Crispin Burke

Download the Full Article: A Question of Super-Empowerment

Military operations have always been subjected to the effects of disruptive powers far beyond the control of the field commander. From the court intrigues of the past to today's domestic catfights, politics has definitely never stopped at the water's edge. Events such as the recent series of WikiLeaks scandals and Rolling Stone's expose on General Stanley McChrystal are evolutionary, rather than revolutionary in nature.

Nevertheless, analysts and pundits have pointed out that modern information technology and media have allowed elements beyond the military's direct control—so-called "super-empowered" individuals—greater opportunities to alter state policy through disruptive actions. However, neither WikiLeaks nor the McChrystal scandal significantly altered war policy. Momentary disruption, no matter how severe, does not matter if the basic policy remains unchanged. Both cases suggest that we ought to have a more tempered view of technology, individual influence, and change.

Download the Full Article: A Question of Super-Empowerment

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing on foreign policy and security. He has published on defense issues in Small Wars Journal, West Point Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, Defense Concepts, and other publications. He is currently the Associate Editor of Red Team Journal. He is currently pursuing graduate study at Georgetown in security studies.

Captain Crispin Burke is a UH-60 helicopter pilot with assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, and the 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. He is currently an observer/controller at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. He writes for Small Wars Journal and under the name "Starbuck at his blog, Wings Over Iraq.

by Dale C. Eikmeier

Download the Full Article: Design for Napoleon's Corporal

This explanation of FM 5-0's Design is for the Everyman, or as the title suggests the proverbial Napoleon's Corporal. It is for those with a need to use Design but lack a100 plus hours of specialized Design instruction. The focus here is on the "how to" techniques of Design rather than its cognitive theories. More simply this is about telling time, not building a watch. The techniques offered are only suggestions or aids, not prescriptions. These techniques are meant to serve as start points or considerations as the Design process starts and hopefully contribute to a better Design outcome.

Download the Full Article: Design for Napoleon's Corporal

Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier (Ret) is a faculty member in the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He also served on the faculty at the U.S. Army War College. COL Eikmeier served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Iraq, Qatar, Germany and Korea.

Brussels, Belgium

September 27, 2010

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV

Commanding General, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

Read LTG Caldwell's Full Prepared Remarks to NATO's Military Committee

If we do not continue to resource the training mission in Afghanistan, we will definitely delay transition.

Tactical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring without a self-sustaining Afghan Security Force. To create this force, we must professionalize the police, army, and air forces; create viable logistics and medical systems; and improve the infrastructure and the institutions that train and educate them...above all, we MUST have the trainers to develop them. We cannot meet our goals without the resources to achieve them. As our Secretary General said recently, "no trainers, no transition."

This transition to Afghan lead is critical to Afghanistan and requires Afghan soldiers and police that are capable of independent security operations and have the capacity to generate and sustain their own forces. To do this, we must support the Afghan government in the development of this capacity, while building systems to set the conditions for transitioning the lead ...in other words ...developing the Afghan National Security Force is transition.

As SACEUR said earlier this month while visiting us in Afghanistan, "Training is Job One." Our most urgent need to accomplish this job is getting the coalition trainers required. We are at a critical stage in the development of the Afghan National Security Force. This past year our focus was on generating quantity...combat formations, battalions that we sent into the fight. But now, we must create a force that can generate, equip, and sustain itself to serve and protect its people; therefore, we must build the critical support formations over the next year, and professionalize this force. Accomplishing this will require additional NATO institutional trainers with special skill sets...skill sets to create and develop Afghan logisticians, maintainers, communicators, intel analysts, and the leaders this security force requires. The majority of this increase occurs in the six month period between this December... and next May. If we do not resource this critical phase of the mission...and resource it soon...the Afghan National Security Force will not be self-sufficient... in time to begin the process of transition next year. If they are not self-sufficient, then we... cannot transition...

Read LTG Caldwell's Full Prepared Remarks to NATO's Military Committee

SWJ Editors' Note: Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan. You can access LTG Caldwell's NTM-A / CSTC-A speeches, interviews, videos, and blog entries here.

Tough Choices for Advisors, Mentors and Teams Leaders

by Gene C. Kamena

Download the Full Article: Mission and Morality

In a recent article published in Foreign Affairs, Robert M. Gates, our Secretary of Defense, stated "Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole." The number of military advisors, mentors and special team leaders, directly involved in training our allies continues to grow and will be of keen interest for some time to come.

Advisors and team leaders undergo specialized training and for the most part are prepared to face the challenges of their duties. However there is one shortfall, a gap so to speak, in the training of advisors, mentors and team leaders (grouped and termed "advisors" for the purposes of this article.) Advisors often confront crime, corruption and immorality (CCI) on the part of our host nation partners -- a task requiring more attention, research and resources.

Download the Full Article: Mission and Morality

Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. He is a retired Army Infantry Colonel.

Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as a Modern American Foreign Policy

by Captain Nathan Finney

Download the Full Article: A Culture of Inclusion

Observers and commentators on modern American foreign policy have consistently identified that collaboration between the elements of national power appear to be punctuated by years of uncoordinated programs and internecine fighting. In the past the U.S. approach (to foreign policy) was a rather messy amalgam of the dominant preoccupations of the Department of Defense, State Department, and USAID, oftentimes in that order. Broadly speaking, the Pentagon views fragile and post-conflict states primarily through the national security prism, as part of a larger counterterrorist and counterinsurgency agenda, with a particular focus on the Muslim world; the State Department is preoccupied with transforming a wider range of weak and war-torn states into effective democracies; and USAID regards state weakness as a developmental challenge to be addressed by working with local actors to create the institutional foundations of good governance and economic growth.

In response a 3D (defense, diplomacy, and development) approach is a recent concept described by senior U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of Defense in his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University and the then Secretary of State-select in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. This approach highlights the need for an increased focus on balancing defense, diplomatic, and developmental elements of national power. It provides "a national security tool chest that has been enhanced with a wide variety of capabilities which would flow from the integration of our nation's soft power."

Download the Full Article: A Culture of Inclusion

Captain Nathan K. Finney, U.S. Army, is a strategist and currently serving with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in Kabul, Afghanistan. Captain Finney was previously a doctrine writer and wrote the Security Sector Reform section of Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations.

by Francisco José Moreno

Download the Full Article: Terrorism, COIN, and National Security

As a reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and to destroy his organization. The pursuit of bin Laden and Al Qaeda soon became a battle against the Taliban and as time passed the original mission receded into the background.

The Taliban lost control of the government, but it did not wither away. As the search for terrorists in Afghanistan turned into an all-out war against the Taliban, the 9/11 connection became increasingly difficult to retain. New reasons for staying in Afghanistan were then offered. In March 2003 the U.S. undertook the invasion of Iraq. While the new explanations for the Afghanistan war had been a stretch, the attack on Iraq obeyed no discernible logic and the attempts to justify it were mere fabrications. Despite the repugnant character of his regime, Saddam Hussein had no involvement with 9/11 and, as far as anyone has been able to show, posed no threat to any vital American interest.

The balance sheet of American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq is not a positive one.

Download the Full Article: Terrorism, COIN, and National Security

Francisco Jose Moreno is a political and economic consultant based in Miami, FL, who has published numerous books and articles on U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security. He was a professor of political science at New York University for over 20 years, chair of the NYU Politics Department, and a lecturer of economics at the University of California, Berkeley. Prior to his academic career, Dr. Moreno served six years in the U.S Army and Army Reserve, including four years in Army Intelligence and Psychological Warfare. Mr. Moreno holds a PhD from NYU as well as degrees in Law and Economics from Havana University.

Overcoming Afghanistan's Geopolitical Barriers

by James C. Larsen and Scott Kesterson

Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer

This strategic and operational-level proposal discusses some of the important dynamics at play in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, as observed by the authors from 2002 - 2009. It identifies key, positive catalysts that have been largely overlooked or under emphasized by the Coalition, its international and interagency partners, and the Afghanistan National Security Forces. The authors believe that these catalysts, if applied in a geographically focused and integrated manner, rapidly expand social networks across tribes, increase the amount and fidelity of human intelligence, and multiply areas of influence to overcome Afghanistan's geopolitical boundaries. This proposal offers an Afghan-centric and network-centric approach to counterinsurgency that ultimately leads to insurgent defeat in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, as well as a unified Afghanistan with rule of law and economic prosperity.

Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer

Colonel James C. Larsen is an active duty Infantry Officer who served in various command and staff positions during multiple deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Panama, and Bosnia. Currently, he serves as the Commander of the Warrior Transition Brigade, WRAMC.

Scott Kesterson is an Emmy Award winning videographer and documentary filmmaker who's first film At War is due for release in late 2010.

Conflict resolution and the problem with being 'reasonable'

by Imogen Baxter and Robert Crowcroft

Download the Full Article: The Troubles in Northern Ireland

Recent events have brought a stark warning that, when it comes to peacemaking and the resolution of conflicts, pinning hopes on goodwill, or asking people to be 'reasonable', is just not enough. The morass between Israel and the Palestinian territories, in Afghanistan, or in Iraq, illustrate that every week. Now we have had another reminder, much closer to home, from an old foe. There have been multiple incidents related to dissident Republican terrorist groups. Indeed, there has been a significant surge in dissident activity throughout this year, including widespread rioting in Catholic areas of Belfast in July. On 14 August, a bomb detonated in a wheelie bin in Lurgan, injuring three children. Beforehand warnings were given of a bomb being placed near a school; the suspicion is that the device exploded prematurely, it being intended to kill the police officers searching in response to the school threat. That night, police officers investigating warnings of other devices were attacked by petrol bombs and missiles. On 16 August, Patrick Mercer MP expressed the view that Oglaigh na hEireann, a splinter group from the Continuity IRA, aim to renew attacks on British targets. When faced with this kind of situation, it is all too easy to simply cross our fingers and hope for the best. It is similarly tempting to shout 'Oh, come on!' at the television screen. But hoping for 'reasonableness' as a means of resolving conflict is inadequate, and Northern Ireland illustrates this point well; perhaps too well.

One of the worst fallacies in contemporary public life is the plea that if only people were more 'reasonable', problems could be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. The academic Professor Mary Kaldor, in a major book on modern war, actually contends that 'No solution is workable based on the political goals of the warring parties ... Once the values of inclusion, tolerance, and mutual respect are established, the territorial solutions will easily follow.' The unstated assumption in this view of the world is that if we approach a problem in a spirit of conciliation and willingness to see the other side's point of view, a successful compromise can be found. But this underrates the sheer difficulty of reconciling conflicting interests; of bridging gaps; and locating solutions. Look at the ongoing border tensions involving Venezuela, the Columbian government, and the FARC rebels. Clearly, human reason can only take us so far. The blunt truth is that people will disagree over really important things, and are sometimes —to fight, and kill, each other. In its implications this is tragic, and saying it often provokes hostility. But realising its essential truth should be part of debate in a mature democracy. It is comforting to think that if we were only more reasonable everything would be alright. Unfortunately it isn't true.

Download the Full Article: The Troubles in Northern Ireland

Imogen Baxter studies International History and Politics at the University of Leeds; this essay is adapted from an undergraduate piece that won an international award. Dr. Robert Crowcroft is a specialist in British politics and defence, and the author of 'Attlee's War' (I.B. Tauris, forthcoming 2011). He is currently researching the relationship between the British Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office.

Is this the Army's EBO?

by Andrew B. Nocks

Download the Full Article: The Mumbo-Jumbo of Design

The United States Army (and Joint Community) has been on a Design path before. In 2002, the United States Air Force began its campaign to explain to the broader joint community the power and value of the emergent concept of Effects-based Operations (EBO). In a condition setting white paper, it stated upfront that "...the concept of EBO is not well understood and requires further elaboration to ensure it is used properly. EBO is not a new form of warfighting, nor does it displace any of the currently recognized forms of warfare. EBO is a way of thinking or a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects required to achieve desired national security outcomes."

The joint community embraced what the Air Force was selling and EBO began its proliferation across the services, to include the United States Army. "While EBO is not a joint or Army doctrinally approved concept, many commanders have found EBO beneficial, and incorporated aspects of the concept into their decision-making and staff process. Effects-based operations is both a way of thinking about operations and a set of processes and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing operations." After a period of several years and continuous dialogue, discussion and debate internal and external to the Army, in July 2008 General James N. Mattis, USMC, who commanded the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), issued a decree that EBO in and of itself was dead as a foundational concept for joint or service operations. General Mattis stated " After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in EBO, ONA, and SoSA have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational personnel.... It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations."

Download the Full Article: The Mumbo-Jumbo of Design

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Nocks, U.S. Army, Retired, serves as an Assistant Professor in the Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. He holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and a M.S. in Administration from Central Michigan University. He served in numerous command, operations and planning positions during his 22 years of active duty service. His last operational assignment was with the 3rd US Army, Coalition Forces Land Component Command's (CFLCC) Deep Operation Coordination Cell (DOCC) during OEF-1.

by John D. Johnson

Download the Full Article: The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat

Iran's position in the Middle East is unique. Iran is a Persian country surrounded by Arabs and other non-Persian ethnic groups. Iran is a Shia Muslim country surrounded by mostly Sunni Muslims and some Christians. It sees the presence of Western militaries in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, Iran perceives an existential threat. Feeling threatened, Iran continues to develop offensive and defensive military capabilities including long-range ballistic missiles and proxy groups, and probably views a nuclear-armed ballistic missile as a credible deterrent against an external attack.

The threats posed by Iran's ballistic missiles and the nexus of Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs are of great concern to the U.S., NATO, and the international community. While Iran claims its missiles are defensive in nature and its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, insufficient cooperation and transparency on Iran's part leaves these claims open to serious debate.

Given Iran's military capabilities and ambiguous intent, the international community has gone to great lengths to engage Iran diplomatically. The U.S., NATO members and Middle Eastern countries have also engaged in threat mitigation activities including non-proliferation efforts, economic sanctions and the deployment of missile defense systems.

In September 2009, President Barack Obama announced a new U.S. missile defense policy for Europe called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The new U.S. approach is largely based upon the growing threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile capability.

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO will consider the Iranian ballistic missile threat and decide whether to make missile defense of Alliance territory a NATO mission.

This article examines NATO and U.S. perspectives of the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missiles, reviews missile defense policies, and makes recommendations related to NATO missile defense policy as follows:

- NATO should make missile defense a NATO mission at its November Summit.

- NATO should merge the U.S. PAA capabilities with NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capabilities to create one overarching NATO missile defense shield.

- NATO members should agree to provide funding and to make national contributions to the overall missile defense shield (e.g., Aegis-capable ships and the purchase of SM-3 missiles for those ships).

- NATO should increase cooperation with Russia on missile defense, particularly where PAA plans are being laid to place future missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe.

- NATO should intensify nuclear and missile nonproliferation strategies vis-í -vis Iran; the U.S. and NATO must engage countries such as Russia, Turkey, China and India to find common ground on the implementation of UNSC sanctions.

This article first looks at perspectives of the Iranian ballistic missile threat, followed by a review of NATO and U.S. missile defense policy for Europe, and concludes with several analytical findings.

Download the Full Article: The Iranian Ballistic Missile Threat

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Senior Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He holds a B.A. Degree in Business Finance from Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas, a M.A. Degree in International Relations from Alliant International University, San Diego, California, and a M.M.A.S. Degree in Strategy from the U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. LTC Johnson has served in a variety of command and staff positions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army Staff, U.S. Army Europe, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (Baghdad), III Corps, U.S. Division South-Iraq (Basra), 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, and 501st Military Intelligence Brigade.

by Roy Keyes

Download the Full Article: Hezbollah: The Party of God

Viewed as both hero and villain, Hezbollah is possibly the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world today. Hezbollah's worldview is fueled by the perception that the Muslim world is experiencing a period of deep crisis and as a result, members of the organization are encouraged to strike at the forces of evil in the world in order to accelerate the final battle between Muslims and the West (Hezbollah Dossier, 2009).

Download the Full Article: Hezbollah: The Party of God

Roy Keyes graduated from American Military University in 2010 with a BA in Intelligence Studies Specializing in Terrorism Studies. He is an amateur military historian who concentrates on World War II and the current Global War on Terror. He runs a small blog called Cowboy Jihad which follows events in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

by Ronald Holt

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

What would be the effect if we had small integrated groups of former Taliban and US Special Operators working together, masquerading as Taliban, living off the villagers as the Taliban do, and feeding USSOCOM actionable HUMINT?

This short paper is designed to be a "thought-piece" with the purpose of stimulating "out of the box" ideas. Pseudo Operations involve recruiting and training ex-insurgents to operate as insurgents and produce intelligence, cause enemy casualties, and create distrust between the local population and the insurgents. Such on the ground intelligence gives a deeper picture of enemy intentions, infiltration routes and support amongst the local population. Real- time intelligence can lay the groundwork for successful direct actions missions. Sometimes pseudo-operators will disguise themselves as members of adjacent countries' military in order to operate in enemy sanctuaries. In this paper I will argue that Pseudo-Ops might be of use given the current situation in AFPAK and particularly in southern Afghanistan and in areas of Pakistan such as North Waziristan or even Baluchistan.

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

Dr. Ronald Holt is a tenured Professor of Anthropology and Fulbright Scholar. He was the senior social scientist for Human Terrain Team AF-1 at FOB Salerno Afghanistan in 2008. Dr. Holt has done fieldwork in several Islamic countries and with Native American tribes.