Blog Posts

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Nominee to Lead Joint Chiefs Warns Against Deep Cuts by Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times. BLUF: "Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, President Obama's nominee to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned on Tuesday that proposed cuts in the military budget of up to $1 trillion would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk."

Army General Martin E. Dempsey testified today during his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We hope when he puts on his purple suit he will see fit to continue his history of blogging here at SWJ from time to time. While commanding TRADOC he invited our motley crew to Gettysburg for a Senior Leader Conference and we can attest that his repertoire goes well beyond The Chairman of Board's (a.k.a. The Voice, The King of Crooners, Ol' Blue Eyes) song list. In the meantime enjoy this piece posted here previously:

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What lessons can we learn from the way the U.S. ends its wars?

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

After a long and risky advance far from their supply base, U.S. Army and Marine Corps units smash through the last enemy defenses and advance into the enemy's capital. The opposing president flees and his government collapses. The relatively small U.S. force now finds itself responsible for running the city, while an insurgency that threatens the army's supply line begins to boil. Meanwhile, as the U.S. president attempts to rein in an envoy who is disregarding his orders, he must also figure out how to convert an apparent battlefield triumph into the strategic goals he established at the beginning of the war.

Scenes from Baghdad in 2003? Perhaps, but these could be flashes of Mexico City in September 1847 where Gen. Winfield Scott's army had just arrived after a seven-month march from Veracruz. Like George W. Bush, President James K. Polk found himself in possession of the enemy's capital, but without a counterpart with whom to negotiate a final peace. The war had lasted longer and was more costly than Polk had anticipated. His army -- tiny and inexperienced before the war -- had pulled off daring feats spanning the continent. But now as a result of the unexpected collapse of the Mexican government, Polk risked getting bogged down with "nation-building" and battling insurgents determined to gain control of the road between Mexico City and his army's supplies in Veracruz. Polk kept his focus on his original war aims, the direct westward expansion of the United States to the Pacific Ocean. His envoy negotiated a peace treaty with one of Mexico's Supreme Court justices and Polk withdrew his army from Mexico a few months later.

Needless to say, very few of America's wars have ended so cleanly or delivered so completely on their prewar expectations. To help figure out why, Gen. Martin Dempsey, in 2009 the commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and soon to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commissioned some of the country's leading military historians to examine how the United States has concluded its wars. Col. Matthew Moten, head of West Point's history department, recruited 15 distinguished military historians to each write one chapter of Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars. Beginning with Yorktown and the negotiations that ended the Revolutionary War to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Between War and Peace brings many perspectives to the long-neglected subject of how America's generals and top policymakers have struggled with war's messy "endgame."

Click below to read more ...

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Jason Fritz comments on SWJ's Evolving the COIN Field Manual: A Case for Reform by Carl Prine, Crispin Burke, and Michael Few with The Prine-Burke-Few Doctrine and the COINdinistra Manual at Ink Spots. In particular Jason adds to the list of concise points on why the current doctrine is insufficient.

Also see Andrew Exum's take at Abu Muqawama, Revising FM 3-24. Ex's primary criticism of FM 3-24 is the doctrine's weakness with respect to waging counterinsurgency as a third party.

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You Can't Blame Me: Propaganda of the Deed

I imagine that over the next year, many folks will scramble to separate themselves from Iraq and Afghanistan regardless of the various pitch and chord they recorded over the last couple of years composing enlightened remedies of a better war. I heart their woes and empathize with their attempts to overcome human nature, an endeavor that intense thought and new ideas can transcend the natural order of things.

Unfortunately, there is no combination or bumper sticker approach that can overcome this specific law of human nature. In the fringe areas of modernity, perhaps it is time to reconsider more Machiavellian or Hobbesian approach to those newly introduced to the democratic, capitalist approach found in our National Security Strategy.

*At Least 80 Are Dead in Norway Shooting - NYT*

"Norway suffered dual attacks on Friday when powerful explosions shook the government center here and, shortly after, a gunman stalked youths at an island summer camp for young members of the governing Labor Party. The police arrested a Norwegian in connection with both attacks, which killed at least 87 people and stunned this ordinarily placid nation..."

*91 Killed in Norway Island Massacre, Capital Blast - AP*

"A Norwegian dressed as a police officer gunned down at least 84 people at an island youth retreat before being arrested, police said Saturday. Investigators are still searching the surrounding waters, where people fled the attack, which followed an explosion in nearby Oslo that killed seven."

Bomb Blast, Gun Assault Terrorize Norway - VOA

Violent attacks savaged normally peaceful Norway on Friday, with an Oslo bomb blast killing at least seven people and then a gunman disguised as a police officer opening fire on a youth camp. The twin assaults occurred within hours of each other, although it was not immediately clear they were linked.

The mid-afternoon bomb blast rocked Norway's government headquarters and also set the nearby oil ministry building on fire. Hundreds of windows in the 17-story government headquarters were shattered, as were others in buildings as far as 400 meters away. Thick, black smoke billowed from some of the offices, and streets in the normally quiet neighborhood were littered with debris from the explosion. Authorities said at least seven people were killed and numerous others injured.

Hours later, police reported that a gunman disguised as a police officer opened fire on youths attending a camp sponsored by the ruling Labour Party. At least five people were wounded in the attack. Authorities said they dispatched anti-terror police to the campsite on Utoeya Island south of Oslo...

CNA, a research group that studies terrorism, said a terror group, Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami (the Helpers of the Global Jihad) claimed responsibility for the attacks. The Islamist organization said the attacks were in response to the presence of Norwegian troops in Afghanistan as part of the U.S.-led international fight against the Taliban and Islamic insurgents, as well as insults against the Prophet Mohammed...

Update: Norwegian Blamed for Deadly Twin Attacks - VOA

... Norway's Justice Minister told reporters that the man who carried out the attack on the island is Norwegian and that he is now in custody. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg also addressed reporters. He said what he called the "cowardly attack" will not destroy Norway's democracy or its "commitment to a better world." ...

*At Least 91 Dead in Norway Shooting, Bomb Attack - Reuters*

*Man Arrested at Camp Shooting Linked to Bombing in Oslo - AP*

*Norway Suspect Described as Right-wing Christian - LAT*

*Gunman's Background Puzzles Police in Norway - AP*

*Analysis: Questions Over Far-Right Link in Norwegian Attacks - Reuters*

More

Blasts and Gun Attack in Norway; 7 Dead - NYT

Blast Rocks Oslo; Gunman Attacks Youth Camp - WP

Deadly Attacks Shake Norway - WSJ

Oslo Bomb Blast Kills at Least 7, Injures Several - LAT

Twin Terror Attacks Shock Norway - BBC

Norway Struck by 2 Deadly Attacks - CNN

Seven Dead in Oslo Bomb; Nine Killed at Youth Camp - TT

Seven Dead as Bomb Rocks Norway; 10 Dead at Youth Camp - G&M

Oslo Hit by Bomb Explosion and Youths Shot at Camp - TG

Blast in Oslo Government Buildings - Reuters

Blast Witnesses: 'The Explosion Was Immense' - CNN

Oslo Police Say 9-10 People Killed at Youth Camp - AP

Nine, Perhaps 10, Killed in Norway Shooting - Reuters

Norway Police Says Believe Shooting Linked to Blast - Reuters

Norway Attack: Likely Suspected Groups - Reuters

Oslo Attack Speculation Centers on Kurdish Group - WP

Factbox: Norway Security Outlook: 'Increased Uncertainty' - Reuters

Oslo Bomb Latest Updates - BBC

Video, Map, Updates of Oslo Explosion - NYT

Oslo Bombing's Aftermath, Captured on Camera - Time

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Two interesting pieces at The Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy):

Doubts about Leahy's Afghanistan Plan by Dr. Milton Osborne

...in every counter-insurgency campaign of which I am aware, the goal of overcoming insurgents through programs that emphasise civic as well as military action can only be contemplated when both the non-military personnel who are carrying out that action and their clients can be protected.

It seems evident to me that such a situation does not exist in Afghanistan, and is not likely to be achieved in any foreseeable future, whatever brave statements are made to the contrary.

Our Undeserved COIN Reputation by Major General (Ret) Jim Molan

... I never met anyone in any position of authority who said that success in these wars could be achieved by military forces alone, but the creation of relative security for the people by the use of military or para-military forces is the first and most essential step. Security does not have to be perfect. But political, social and economic progress will not occur while the local population has the insurgent or terrorist tearing their collective throat out...

Both authors were writing in response to Time Running Out to Fix Strategy for Afghanistan by Peter Leahy (former Chief of the Australian Army) in The Australian.

... The West has mistaken killing terrorists and counter-insurgency warfare for nation building. All three are needed but at different times and different degrees. It is clear the only way to deal with many of today's terrorists is to strengthen our defences and kill those who maintain their murderous intent. We can conduct raids on them in their lairs with drones as in Pakistan and raw air power as in Libya. But these actions are also likely to destabilise the countries we attack and generate more terrorists then we kill. So counter-insurgency and nation building will still be needed...

Some Safety Advice for the U.S. Military by Jeffrey Goldberg, The Atlantic. BLUF: "... I was sitting, at one point, next to an American man of obvious military bearing, a real barrel-chested freedom fighter sort, who wore a polo shirt inscribed with the words, "Army Aviation Association." He was also carrying a camouflage tactical rucksack with his last name stitched on the back. He seemed like a senior-enough guy to have a Google profile, so I typed into my iPhone his last name, plus Afghanistan, plus "army aviation" and came up with his exact identity in 20 seconds. He is one of the key leaders of the military's drone programs in Afghanistan. Now if I weren't a patriot, but instead an anti-American jihadist, I might have seen this as an opportunity to do some damage..."

Exclusive: Inside Darpa's Secret Afghan Spy Machine by Noah Shachtman at Wired's Danger Room. BLUF: "The Pentagon's top researchers have rushed a classified and controversial intelligence program into Afghanistan. Known as "Nexus 7," and previously undisclosed as a war-zone surveillance effort, it ties together everything from spy radars to fruit prices in order to glean clues about Afghan instability... But those efforts are drawing fire from some frontline intel operators who see Nexus 7 as little more than a glorified grad-school project, wasting tens of millions on duplicative technology that has nothing to do with stopping the Taliban."

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Sadr says Iraqis employed with US are outcasts

by Louai Beshara

AFP

BLUF "Boycott them and reject them," he said about Iraqis who were still working for American forces or the embassy, or who had worked with them in the past but had shown no remorse.

He said translators were also to remain outcasts: "It is forbidden to work with them also."

Much more at Yahoo News

Understanding 'The Death of American Strategy' by Colonel Gian P. Gentile, Infinity Journal. (registration required - no cost). Here's the overview:

In the 3rd Issue of Infinity Journal (Summer 2011), respected U.S. Army Colonel, Professor of Military History at West Point, and combat battalion commander in Iraq, Gian P. Gentile writes on "The Death of American Strategy". In the article, Gentile relays to his readers that the tactics of so-called Population-Centric Counterinsurgency (Pop-COIN) has "slayed" American strategy. As was to be expected, some reactions to the article have been critical, including a post on the webpage of the highly respected and notable National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). While that post in particular did contain some solid points that are more than worthy of further analysis, unfortunately they were overshadowed by personal attacks on Gentile. The purpose here is not to return fire on any specific critic but rather to offer a clearer interpretation of what the original article intended to get across — a message that has seemingly become distorted by faulty analysis and unfortunate assaults on character rather than on ideas.

Understanding 'The Death of American Strategy'.

Via the British Embassy in DC: Afghans Taking the Lead in Lashkar Gah Security

British troops have formally handed the lead responsibility for security to Afghan Forces in the capital of Helmand Province today - a significant milestone in a process of transition that will continue to 2014 and beyond.

Lashkar Gah, where British troops have operated since 2006, is the fourth of seven districts across Afghanistan where responsibility for security is gradually shifting from ISAF forces to their Afghan counterparts.

Afghan Army and Police units have been assuming responsibility for security in the town over recent months. Today, no coalition troops are involved in the day-to-day security of the bustling town.

British forces will stay in the remainder of Central Helmand province where they will continue to develop the capability and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Although security in Lashkar Gah is good, work in other areas will continue to ensure UK forces remain on track to withdraw combat forces by the end of 2014.

Foreign Secretary William Hague said:

The UK and our ISAF partners remain committed to helping the Afghan Government ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes an operating base for international terrorism.

Although UK forces will no longer be in a combat role in Afghanistan by 2015, we will continue to provide military and development assistance. We are preparing a strong, long term partnership with Afghanistan based on diplomacy, trade and development that will continue beyond the end of transition.

For more please see here.

Also, in his latest blog, Head of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Michael O'Neill said the principal criterion to assess progress is not what we have done ourselves, but what Afghan authorities can do in future.

For more on supporting Afghan leadership visit the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Global Conversations Blog.

... "trying to find decent guidance on non-lethal/non-kinetic targeting." Please post thoughts / leads / pointers in comments below, provide link if applicable. Thanks much!

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The 2011-2012 U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) was published online on 11 July and can be found at this link. The KSIL is published annually for the purpose of making students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are, or should be, of special importance to the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army. The list is a compilation of input from the faculty at the U.S. Army War College, as well as from civilian and military experts across the field of defense studies.

The Arab Upheavals and the Future of the U.S. Military Policies and Presence in the Middle East and the Gulf by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Summary excerpt follows:

The political and social upheaval in the Arab World known as the Arab Spring is one of the most significant set of events to unfold in the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. The United States seeks a democratic outcome to all of these conflicts and is also concerned about the human rights of demonstrators in countries where they are treated with brutality. Additionally, traditional U.S. concerns for the region discussed by President Obama in a May 19, 2011, address include: (1) fighting terrorism, (2) opposing nuclear proliferation, (3) supporting freedom of commerce, including commerce in oil, and, (4) supporting Israel and the Middle East peace effort. Currently, the Arab Spring has had only a limited impact on these U.S. interests. The Arab monarchies, which are allied with the United States, appear to be the least vulnerable to regional unrest (except for Bahrain) and are moving rapidly to increase the stake of individual citizens within their political systems so as to prevent serious unrest. Bahrain, by contrast, is simmering with sectarian anger after the brutal suppression of its mostly Shi'ite demonstrators. Despite this situation, the United States can probably be more helpful to Shi'ites in that country by remaining engaged with the Bahraini government which has already shown itself responsive to some U.S. concerns about building an inclusive society.

The Arab Upheavals and the Future of the U.S. Military Policies and Presence in the Middle East and the Gulf.

The Changing Face of Afghanistan, 2001-08 by Colonel Deborah Hanagan, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Brief synopsis follows:

Based on the reporting of major American news media, one could have drawn the conclusion that the Bush administration had paid little attention to Afghanistan or that its strategy focused mainly on military operations in the country. This conclusion would have been inaccurate. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush articulated his broad foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and laid out a strategy that included the main instruments of U.S. national power: diplomatic, economic, and military. He also recognized the United States could not achieve its objectives unilaterally; he welcomed and strongly supported cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and the international community. The U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan was multilateral and multinational from the beginning in 2001. The administration also constantly assessed the progress being made, as well as the challenges, and it was flexible enough to adjust its strategy to address challenges and changing conditions in the country and the region. This paper is a review of the broad dimensions of the Bush administration's Afghanistan policy and what was achieved over the course of 7 1/2 years, as well as some of the ongoing challenges.

The Changing Face of Afghanistan, 2001-08.