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Here it is, hot off the press, National Strategy for Counterterrorism 2011.

White House Unveils Retooled Plan to Hunt al-Qaida by Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press. BLUF: "The United States will push ahead with more targeted drone strikes and special operations raids and fewer costly land battles like Iraq and Afghanistan in the continuing war against al-Qaida, according to a new national counterterrorism strategy unveiled Wednesday."

The Accidental Counterinsurgent?

Travel back with me a couple of decades to the Trident Room, the local watering hole at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. We could pay $3 to obtain a Trident Mug and drink unlimitedly with exceptional discounts. While we are there, we are looking for a young paratrooper on his way to earning a Masters degree in National Security Affairs. We spot him in a corner with some friends playing drinking games, which apparently he excels at because his name is still on a plaque at that bar today. So, we walk up to the young captain, and say, "Dude, guess what? One day you will be a three star general trying to build a military from scratch in Afghanistan." He'd probably think we were crazy.

Well, that "dude" in now Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell. Does he qualify as an Accidental Counterinsurgent? No, of course not, he is a professional military officer executing the mission given to him to the best of his ability. This experience is common throughout our military these days. We choose to serve, go where the nation tells us to go, and do what the nation tells us to do. We do not consider ourselves accidental.

The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin by Dr. Mark Moyar, Orbis Operations.

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Allen Vows to Slow Drawdown if Conditions Deteriorate by Leo Shane III, Stars and Stripes. BLUF: "The incoming head of U.S. forces in Afghanistan on Tuesday offered support for the president's drawdown of American troops from that battlefield but also vowed to slow down those departures if the situation begins to deteriorate."

Nominee to Run Afghan Fight Backs Drawdown by Julian E. Barnes, Wall Street Journal. BLUF: "The Marine general nominated to become the top commander in Afghanistan said he believed that the insurgency's momentum has been halted, and even reversed in key parts of the country."

Allen Vows to Emulate Petraeus' Leadership by Lisa Daniel, American Forces Press Service. BLUF: "Based on his recent time in Afghanistan, Allen said, he agrees with assessments that U.S. and NATO forces have made significant progress there, but that challenges remain. Afghan and coalition forces control much of the battle space in Afghanistan, including the capital of Kabul, which consists of one-fifth of the population, as well as other population centers in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, the general said. Military operations increasingly are being led by Afghan forces, which are on track in a surge of their own to meet a goal of 305,000 troops later this year, Allen said. Asked about the importance of Afghan forces taking over security, Allen said, 'It's essential to the strategy'."

Lt. Gen. John Allen Falls in Line on Afghanistan by Craig Whitlock, Washington Post. BLUF: "... Allen said Obama's timetable to wind down the war in Afghanistan sent a clear message to the government of President Hamid Karzai that it needs to assert itself and take more direct responsibility for fighting the Taliban."

Via Expeditionary Strike Group 2 PAO: USFF Hosts Bold Alligator 2012 Main Planning Conference

The Atlantic Fleet's largest amphibious exercise in the last 10 years continued taking shape this past week as Commander, United States Fleet Forces hosted the first of two Main Planning Conferences for Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, scheduled to take place next January and February.

Bold Alligator 2012 represents the Navy and Marine Corps' revitalization of the fundamentals of amphibious operations, strengthening their traditional role as fighters from the sea.

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Small Wars Journal Newsletter No. 3 will be sent out this Friday, 1 July. Not on our distro list? Here's what you missed on 1 May and 1 June.

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US Foreign Policy: War Fever Subisdes by Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times opinion. BLUF: "As Americans weary of the mission in Afghanistan, Democrats and Republicans alike are raising serious questions about the nation's propensity for multiple, open-ended wars. Finally."

Lessons from the Gates War Room by Greg Jaffe, Washington Post. BLUF: "In his four years in the Pentagon, Gates has become an indispensable force in the debate over two deeply unpopular wars. He's been a savvy manager of the Pentagon bureaucracy and earned a reputation as the most ruthlessly efficient defense secretary in decades."

Gates' Tenure Successful, Contradictory by Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times. BLUF: "Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates leaves office Thursday popular with the liberal Washington establishment, but not so with conservatives chafed by his budget cutting and his enthusiastic support for open gays in the ranks."

General Fritz Kroesen, U.S. Army ret., critiques the current National Military Strategy of the United States in the July 2011 issue of Army magazine. His article, The NMS and More Blank Pages, deplores "more blank pages" which, like the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, fail to link ends and ways with means, a defect that GEN Kroesen labels a "do more with less" philosophy. (H/T Warlord - COL John Collins for the pointer and intro)

Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years by Christopher Paul, RAND. Here's an overview:

The previously published RAND monograph, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A core finding was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly predicted the outcome of those 30 insurgencies. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi, exercise in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2011 Afghanistan scores in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses: Its score was lower than that in the lowest-scoring historical COIN win but higher than that in the highest-scoring COIN loss. This suggests an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue.

Read the Full Monograph: Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years .

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Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood Tragedy: Implications for the U.S. Armed Forces by Clint Watts, Foreign Policy Research Institute. From the Introduction:

Major Nidal Hasan's killing of his fellow soldiers at Ft. Hood, Texas undermines the common trust binding America's all-volunteer, multi-ethnic military force. Hasan's violence forces all service personnel to take an introspective look at their organization and persistently assess the possibility of extremists in their ranks. After Hasan's attack, many questioned the U.S. military's ability to recruit, train and retain Muslim military members without exposing service members to violent extremism. Unfortunately, Hasan's violence against fellow soldiers and fellow Americans is not unique. Recent history offers repeated examples of current or former military members conducting violent attacks in support of many different extremist causes. To ensure the integrity and safety of the all-volunteer force, the U.S. military needs a structured approach to assessing and mitigating the threat of lone-wolf extremists in the ranks.

Read the full FPRI E-Note: Major Nidal Hasan and the Fort Hood Tragedy: Implications for the U.S. Armed Forces

Leaving Iraq: Why total U.S. military withdrawal is best

by Mark Kukis

Informed Comment

Download the Full Article: Leaving Iraq: Why total U.S. military withdrawal is best

The Obama administration's move to accelerate a U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan inadvertently highlighted an unsettled question about American forces in Iraq. Will U.S. troops leave Iraq entirely at the end of 2011, as outlined in a standing agreement between Washington and Baghdad? Or will Iraq and the United States strike a new deal that allows a significant U.S. military presence to remain?

In 2009, as the U.S. withdrawal was beginning, I interviewed roughly 100 Iraqis in Baghdad at length for a book of mine recently released, Voices from Iraq: A People's History, 2003 -- 2009. The book is an oral history of the war in Iraq as told entirely by Iraqis, who spoke with candor at length with me on a wide range of topics. The subject of whether U.S. forces should stay or go came up frequently, and Iraqis generally had one of two opinions based on their sectarian identity. Shi'ites tended to be eager to see U.S. forces go -- and the sooner the better. The newly empowered Shi'ite majority often sees the U.S. presence as an impediment to the new order in Iraq, where wealth, power and privileges have been flowing into Shi'ite circles since the downfall of Saddam Hussein at the expense of the Sunni minority. (In other opinion polling, a super-majority of Iraqis has tended to want US troops out in fairly short order, a finding that remained the same over many years, and which would be consistent with the majority Shiite population of some 60% of the country being in favor of an early departure of the Americans).

Download the Full Article: Leaving Iraq: Why total U.S. military withdrawal is best

Mark Kukis is a journalist and writer now living in Boston, Massachusetts. He has written for Time, The New Republic, and Salon, and was the White House correspondent for United Press International, 1999-2001. His most recent book is Voices from Iraq: A People's History, 2003-2009

Army Worries about 'Toxic Leaders' in Ranks by Greg Jaffe, Washington Post. BLUF: "A major U.S. Army survey of leadership and morale found that more than 80 percent of Army officers and sergeants had directly observed a "toxic" leader in the last year and that about 20 percent of the respondents said that they had worked directly for one... The survey also found that 97 percent of officers and sergeants had observed an "exceptional leader" within the Army in the past year." The Army defines "toxic leaders" as "commanders who put their own needs first, micro-managed subordinates, behaved in a mean-spirited manner or displayed poor decision making."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Well, since the powers to be decided - very, very, unwisely IMHO - to do away with the Joint Irregular Warfare Center as part of the disestablishment of US Joint Forces Command, I personally think this a bit of good news. That said, all those Joint IW tasks performed by the JIWC; and considered critical by OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services won't be covered by a Service organization - nor should they. But at least the IW effort stays alive at the Combined Arms Center, at the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare and similar service-level entities.

Here's the news out of TRADOC: CAC Stands Up Irregular Warfare Cell by Colonel Chad Clark, Leavenworth Lamp. BLUF: "Irregular warfare is not so irregular. In fact, it is so prevalent and our Army has been engaged in irregular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for so long that Soldiers in non-Special Forces units have become proficient in key irregular warfare and counterinsurgency warfighting tasks. Since the end of the Vietnam War, irregular warfare has been the exclusive domain of special operations forces, but now knowledge of irregular warfare tactics has become important for all soldiers."

As an endnote - IW is not exclusively COIN ala Iraq and Afghanistan -- it includes counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and stability operations. And further - as full disclosure - I proudly worked for the JIWC up until my day-job "went away" - but that aside, my opinion on this matter is not based on that unfortunate turn of events. I think my work here at SWJ speaks volumes in regards to my passion for this subject.

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As a saved round here is a collection of IW-related quotes I began assembling last August when Secretary Gates announced the disestablishment of USJFCOM. "Senior Defense Department Officials Commentary On Irregular Warfare Related Issues" is a collection of quotes (with links) by the "powers to be" via speeches as well as articles published by or reported on a particular DOD official.

Brian Lehrer from WNYC and I discussed President Obama's Afghan policy speech and other topics relating to U.S. strategy in the region.

Click here to reach the broadcast.

Nothing follows.

Missed Direction: Washington is obsessed with U.S. progress in southern Afghanistan. But the real fight is in the east. National Journal article by Yochi Dreazen. BLUF: "... the real story is not in the south; it's in the east. Senior officers increasingly believe that the conflict will be decided in the valleys and mountain ranges of eastern Afghanistan, a violent region that abuts some of Pakistan's most unruly provinces."

The War Yet to Come: A Review of Broken Bodies, Shattered Minds

by Matt Gallagher

In light of President Obama's recent drawdown announcement, the trajectory of the Afghanistan War isn't quite so hazy anymore. "The beginning of the end," wrote one Afghanistan vet on Facebook. With Osama bin Laden dead and this plan in place, the natural inclination for American society will be to move on and narrow our concern to domestic issues, which historically tends to occur in postwar periods. That can't happen, as Dr. Ronald Glasser makes clear in his book, Broken Bodies, Shattered Minds. Glasser, the author of the acclaimed Vietnam account 365 Days and a former Army surgeon, explores the evolution of battlefield injuries and treatment from that war to now, and puts into perspective the hidden costs of lifetime care our nation will be paying for decades to come. With a new surge of veterans due to return from combat, it's all too evident that the war on the homefront is just beginning.

Matt Gallagher is the senior writing manager of the nonprofit organization Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, and spent 15 months in Iraq with the U.S. Army as an armored cavalry officer. He is the author of the war memoir Kaboom.

Washington Losing Patience with Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

by Michael Hirsh and Jamie Tarabay

The National Journal

Download the Full Article: Washington Losing Patience with Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

John Nagl is the kind of guy who brings to mind F. Scott Fitzgerald's wicked line in The Great Gatsby about people who succeed at such an early age that "everything afterward savors of anticlimax." A star at West Point and a Rhodes scholar, the native Nebraskan was only 37 when he landed on the cover of The New York Times Magazine in January 2004. In that article, Nagl offered an inside-the-Sunni-Triangle tutorial on what he came to call "graduate-level war." Nagl's mantra: "We have to outthink the enemy, not just outfight him." In an era when small but wily bands of nonuniformed insurgents could stymie America's mighty military machine with stealthy guerrilla attacks and roadside bombs planted in the night, the U.S. had to figure out how to hunt down the bad guys and cut off their support from the local population. Nagl, after studying the British and French colonial experience, as well as America's handling of the Vietnam War, helped to develop what has since become famous as U.S. "counterinsurgency doctrine," or COIN. As his celebrity grew, Nagl proselytized about it everywhere, even on The Daily Show With Jon Stewart.

By the late 2000s, the precocious Army major had become part of a brain trust around America's uber-general, David Petraeus, the commander who implemented the Iraq troop surge. Commissioned by Petraeus, Nagl helped to author the official counterinsurgency manual that has since reoriented American military doctrine, shifting the center of gravity from rough-and-ready conventional war fighters to cerebral specialists in irregular warfare and targeted response. After retiring from the Army as a lieutenant colonel in early 2008—even though he seemed to be on the fast track to four-star fame—Nagl took over a little-known think tank, the Center for a New American Security, and turned it into what journalist Tara McKelvey called "counterinsurgency central in Washington."

Download the Full Article: Washington Losing Patience with Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Rethinking Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan, New York Times op-ed by Desaix Myers. BLUF: "The job of helping Afghans build a state with functioning public services and institutions answering to an engaged civil society is plenty hard. Pumping vast amounts of money quickly - $4 billion this year - through a corrupt and fragile government doesn't make it easier. Nor do Washington's expectations, micromanagement and sense of urgency." Desaix Myers is a professor of national security studies at the National War College in Washington.