Blog Posts

Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection by Franklin D. Kramer, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

Irregular conflict poses a wicked problem—with contradictory and changing requirements, multiple stakeholders, many interdependencies, and problems that keep evolving. Successful resolution demands strategies that can produce satisfactory results despite imperfections in motivations, capabilities, and techniques. Based on an analysis of successful irregular conflict resolutions, this article proposes a framework and broad set of techniques. In undertaking to generate "good enough" resolutions, a combination of competitive, collaborative, and authoritative approaches will allow for greater flexibility and effectiveness. The problem of changing behaviors is the critical element. Doing so will require understanding multiple critical actors and their often conflicting objectives, and applying, within the context of a multiphased adaptive approach, the techniques of persistent security, thoughtful interactions with key groups including the importance of a favorable base from which to build, establishment of appropriate and sometimes multiple and even competing structures, the control of spoilers, the management of hatred, close scrutiny of economic actions including the importance of absorptive capacity and the synergistic consequences of projects and the potential for corruption, the limitation of sanctuaries, and the use of negotiations.

Read the full article: Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection.

Gangs, Netwar, and "Communiter Counterinsurgency" in Haiti by David C. Becker, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

Haiti, the epitome of a fragile state, has been receiving international assistance via repeated UN missions and U.S. interventions for more than 20 years. Criminal gangs exploited the country's sovereignty gap by wresting control over territory from the state and acquiring legitimacy among certain poor populations. The gangs can be understood as a network of "violence entrepreneurs" operating within a complex environment, a system of systems within the slums. While not as sophisticated as major international criminal organizations, between 2006 and 2007 the politically connected criminal gangs constituted a major challenge for the state and the UN peacekeeping mission, as well as a threat to national stability. The U.S. Government funded an innovative and integrated effort, the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI), to counter the threat by investing in an analogous but countervailing approach reinforcing "social entrepreneurs" and their networks. This supplanted undesirable feedback loop effects with ones that enhance and consolidate stability. Risky participatory and community-led stabilization interventions marginalized and undermined gangs on their home turf. Using development tools for stabilization purposes, HSI stabilization goals were political rather than "needs-based" in nature. While the flexible and comprehensive approach generated important gains, there were also lessons learned and recognition of the initiative's limitations.

Read the full article: Gangs, Netwar, and "Communiter Counterinsurgency" in Haiti.

International Support for State-building: Flawed Consensus by Stephen D. Krasner, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

Conventional wisdom holds that the most important challenge for state development is the creation of effective institutions. The major objective for external actors engaged in state-building is to enhance capacity in target states. This perspective, which tacitly takes the ideal typical Weberian state as the ultimate objective, is deeply flawed. The Weberian ideal, in which a fully autonomous state effectively governs its own territory, is unattainable for many poorly governed or failed states. Governance may improve, but it will be problematic. The central state may not be able to provide security across its territory or even have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. External actors may share executive authority. Services might be provided by independent service providers rather than by the state. Policy could be more effectively framed if decisionmakers abandoned their commitment to conventional sovereignty and recognized the variety of authority structures, not only horizontally within states but also vertically between them, that exist in the contemporary international system.

Read the full article: International Support for State-building: Flawed Consensus.

Law Enforcement Capacity-building in African Postconflict Communities by Bruce Baker, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

In the post conflict environment, disbanded armed groups and militias maintain a "clan" affiliation with their ex-fighting colleagues. Generally marginalized from the rest of society and accustomed to violent conflict resolution, their crime rates frequently escalate after the official end of war. Where the police are not sufficiently effective and resources are limited, these ex-combatant nonstate actors may have a part to play as local law enforcement groups in unarmed crime prevention and investigation. This article analyzes arguments for and against donor support and development of such nonstate actors as providers of public goods and services. The challenge is to distinguish between "reformable" individuals and those "beyond reform." Donors can utilize several criteria. First, are the nonstate entities popularly supported? Second, are they inclusive in providing services to all social groups? Third, do they conduct themselves with professionalism, operating without exploitation, extortion, or corruption? The article concludes with practical steps as to how such nonstate police actors might be strengthened including leadership development, intergroup nonviolent dispute resolution skills, enhancing existing links between state and nonstate actors, creating area policing networks, and establishing policing oversight frameworks.

Read the full article: Law Enforcement Capacity-building in African Postconflict Communities.

Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances by Douglas Farah, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

Transnational criminal organizations, networks, and terrorist groups are increasingly helping each other move products, money, weapons, personnel, and goods. They accomplish this through an informal network or series of overlapping pipelines. These pipelines can be best understood as recombinant chains with links that can couple and decouple as necessary to meet the interests of the networks involved. Many operate in "alternatively governed" spaces outside of direct state control or within criminal state enterprises. A criminal state counts on the integration of the state's leadership into the criminal enterprise and the use of public services—such as licensing, issuance of official documents, regulatory regimes, border control—for illicit purposes. A further variation of the criminal state occurs when a state franchises part of its territory to nonstate groups, with the protection of the central government or a regional power sharing the profits. The author shows that understanding and addressing these threats requires capacity-building in human intelligence collection and prosecuting transnational criminal organizations.

Read the full article: Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliances.

Forging a Comprehensive Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations by Robert L. Caslen, Jr., and Bradley S. Loudon, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

The United States will face a myriad of new strategic challenges and opportunities in the 21st century that will further test its capability to succeed in an increasingly competitive, dynamic, and uncertain operating environment. The single most important prerequisite to success in future counterinsurgency operations is the establishment of conditions that facilitate and enable a whole-of-government approach that is forged from a unity of effort and purpose. To realize this, key governmental stakeholders must foster permissive rather than restrictive organizational environments where cooperation and coordination are the standard rather than the exception. While this transformation of agency culture represents an enduring effort on the part of key stakeholders, the authors of this article offer several short-term solutions based on first-hand experiences upholding American foreign policy "at the tip of the spear" as military commanders. These include the elimination of interdepartmental barriers and the establishment of innovative training and educational paradigms. The most pressing obstacle is arrogance that hinders our cultural understanding of the fabric of the host nation society and our ability to establish relationships and partnerships based on mutual trust and respect.

Read the full article: Forging a Comprehensive Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations.

Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond by Colonel Bob Killebrew, NDU's Prism. Here's the abstract:

Transnational crime and criminal networks have grown to such proportions that they have become a global problem. Large-scale crime, terrorism, insurgency, and piracy are blending into transnational criminal networks, capable of holding ground and challenging the power of the state, and threatening the basic fabric of society. Overcoming transnational crime requires the United States to merge domestic and international strategies. Domestically, the U.S. must do more to enable local police to integrate their effort and to develop, analyze, and share intelligence on narco-gangs and the cartels. Other domestic requirements for a successful anticartel strategy include better treatment for drug users, immigration reform, rehabilitation, and an all-out effort to move gangs out of schools. Internationally, the U.S. must adopt a long-range foreign policy strategy to help struggling states to restore the rule of law and civic security. The U.S. should partner with states already engaged in the "cartel wars." Colombia and Mexico may be the two Latin states with the best chance of becoming anchors of success in the Western Hemisphere.

Read the full article: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond.

... please tell me this is an example of sensationalized reporting or the source is a bald-faced liar. If not, then let's stop debating whether we should call this an insurgency or not and start debating whether the events down south are part of our world or a Mad Max world:

 

Narco Gangster Reveals the Underworld by Dane Schiller of the Houston Chronicle. BLUF: "Cartels have taken cruelty up a notch, says one drug trafficker: kidnapping bus passengers for gladiator-like fights to the death."

The Trans-Border Institute has released the results of a new survey of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in nine different Mexican states. The survey is part of a series of studies, titled the Justiciabarometro (Justice Barometer), which examines the performance of Mexico's criminal justice system through the assessments of those who operate it.

The results are summarized in two recent reports co-authored by Matthew C. Ingram, Octavio Rodrí­guez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk. The full report (135 pages, 14.1MB) can be found here and the special report (32 pages, 4.6 MB) can be found here.

Continue on for a brief summary of the results...

Achieving Victory in Afghanistan Requires More Than Just "Afghan Good Enough"

by Colin P. Clarke

During my three months at ISAF headquarters, a commonly heard expression around the base was the term "Afghan Good Enough." Ostensibly, this translates to doing the best one can—given the resources available—even if the end product is less than optimal.

But the troubling reality is that the term is more than just a pejorative colloquialism used by Westerners to describe what they view as half-hearted efforts or the jury-rigging that accompanies commonplace tasks. "Afghan Good Enough" represents a harbinger for the future of the Afghan state and diminishing support for what has become an unpopular war in many NATO capitals, from Ottawa to Berlin.

Colin P. Clarke is a project associate at the RAND Corporation and a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. He recently spent three months embedded with CJIATF-Shafafiyat at HQ ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan. The opinions and views expressed in this article are the author's alone, and do not represent the RAND Corporation, the University of Pittsburgh, or CJIATF-Shafafiyat.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

As a retired Marine I never thought it my place to comment on the beret (I thought the patrol cap great and professional). That said, the issue is all but OBE - Army Nixes the Beret for ACUs, Offers Alternative to Velcro by Bill Murphy Jr., Stars and Stripes. BLUF: "The soft patrol cap will replace the black beret, at least for wear with the Army combat uniform, the Army announced Saturday."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Lawmakers Push for New Afghan Strategy by Scott Wilson and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post. BLUF: "Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill are applying fresh pressure on the Obama administration to draw down U.S. troops in Afghanistan faster than many military leaders say is responsible, forcing the president to balance his party's demands with his generals' on-the-ground assessment as he nears another milestone in the war."

Afghan Taliban Cede Ground in the South, but Fears Linger by Carlotta Gall, New York Times. BLUF: "... while many Afghans say the Taliban have been weakened - some say irreparably - the familiar conundrum of Afghanistan applies: what happens when the foreign troops leave?"

As troop drawdown nears, is NATO surge working in Afghanistan? Christian Science Monitor special report by Anna Mulrine and Tom A. Peter. BLUF: "As Obama's promise of a troop drawdown nears, the US military says the surge of tens of thousands of NATO reinforcements that began last year has won some and lost some against the Taliban but needs more time to succeed."

Also, US troops confident of Afghan war counterinsurgency strategy by Tom A. Peter, Christian Science Monitor. BLUF: "The counterinsurgency strategy of the Afghan war surge shows signs of success, say US troops, who point to fewer attacks better local relations."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

The U.S. isn't militarizing intelligence, it's civilianizing the military.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Need to fight a war? Recruit a civilian, not a soldier

2) The U.S. military should get ready to taste its own precision-guided medicine

Need to fight a war? Recruit a civilian, not a soldier

Last week, the Washington Post's David Ignatius discussed how the line between the Central Intelligence Agency's covert intelligence activities and the Pentagon's military operations began blurring as George W. Bush's administration ramped up its war on terrorism. In his column, Ignatius took some swipes at former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for exceeding his authority by encroaching on turf legally reserved to the CIA. The Defense Department also was criticized for taking on too many diplomatic and foreign aid responsibilities as well. Ignatius expressed concern that without clearer boundaries separating covert intelligence-gathering from military operations, "people at home and abroad may worry about a possible 'militarization' of U.S. intelligence."

Ignatius missed the larger and far more significant change that continues to this day. In order to survive and compete against the military power enjoyed by national armies, modern irregular adversaries -- such as the Viet Cong, Iraq's insurgents, the Taliban, and virtually all other modern revolutionaries -- "civilianized" their military operations. Rumsfeld's intrusions onto CIA and State Department turf were initial attempts at civilianizing U.S. military operations. Whether it realizes it or not, the U.S. government continues to civilianize its own military operations in an attempt to keep pace with the tactics employed by the irregular adversaries it is struggling to suppress. This trend has continued after Rumsfeld's departure from government and has significant implications for how the United States will fight irregular adversaries in the future.

In modern irregular warfare, the most difficult problem is identifying and finding the enemy. Insurgents benefit from the "home-field advantage" and their ability to blend in with the civilian population. It is natural that when U.S. military forces are tasked with rooting out insurgent cells in such situations, they seek to infiltrate the same civilian population to gain target intelligence. It should, therefore, be no surprise to find the U.S. military's special operations units behaving more like the CIA's operatives and agents, whose civilian status is a better match to the mission.

The CIA has used its authorities and relative flexibility to assemble a blend of covert civilian and paramilitary capabilities, a blend much more suited for modern irregular warfare. As a civilian intelligence agency, the CIA has the authority and resources to establish relationships with a variety of indigenous partners, some official and some not. According to Bob Woodward's Obama's Wars, the CIA has recruited a large Afghan paramilitary force, a combined covert intelligence and military force that can engage in a wider range of activities than a standard Afghan army unit. The CIA has poached many former special operations soldiers into its own paramilitary ranks. These paramilitary operatives have the authority to do everything they used to do while they were in the military -- such as organizing direct action raids -- while also performing operations limited to the CIA, such as covert missions inside countries not at war with the United States.

Meanwhile, the utility of conventional ground forces continues to diminish.

Click through to read more ...

Power and Policy in Syria: The Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations, and Democracy in the Modern Middle East

by Radwan Ziadeh.

Published by I.B. Tauris, New York. 219 pages, 2011.

Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Radwan Ziadeh is an academic who teaches at Harvard and George Washington University. His current book is a nuanced look at the methods by which the current Syrian regime maintains a monopoly hold on power. The book opens with Syrian independence from French colonial rule in 1946. It discusses the stressors of that period that led to the creation of more radical political parties, successive government collapses (in 1954 four governments were formed and collapsed, and the grip of ideological thinking as well as dogmatism to cope with this instability. Ziadeh offers an interesting observation of Syrian political history, dividing its period into three republics (formation in 1946, unification with Egypt in 1958, and the revolutionary state 1963 to the present). The author is able to tie together strands of political history from an Arab and Syrian perspective, which makes the volume useful for Foreign Area Officer, and those analyzing Syria within the intelligence community and United States Central Command. It lays out the birth and evolution of the different organs of the security apparatus, which now exceeds 700,000 operatives in 2004.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Obama Formally Nominates Allen for Afghanistan Post - American Forces Press Service.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 2011 -- President Barack Obama has formally nominated Marine Corps Lt. Gen. John R. Allen to receive a fourth star and serve as the next commander of International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced today.

Obama also nominated Army Lt. Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of 1st Corps, Fort Lewis and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., to also serve as deputy ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan commander and as commander of ISAF Joint Command, Gates announced.

The president announced at the White House April 28 that he intended to name Allen the first Marine to command all U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Allen served as deputy commander of U.S. Central Command until June 2, when he became special assistant to Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the Senate confirms his nomination, Allen would replace the retiring Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, whom Obama has nominated to become the next CIA director. Current CIA director Leon E. Panetta is testifying in his confirmation hearing today to become the next defense secretary after Gates retires June 30.

Afghan Sitrep: A Grunt from the Front Sounds Off by Chuck Spinney of Time Magazine's Battleland Blog. BLUF: "Why doesn't anyone listen to the guys that know? Ivory-tower intellectuals in think tanks get listened to, but they are not walking the ground as a grunt or a combat arms dude."

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The Constant Adversary by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon. BLUF: "President Obama has yet to deliver a dedicated address on defense matters; taming the Department of Defense bureaucracy will take purposeful and comprehensive presidential leadership."

Testing the Afghan Exit Ramps by David Ignatius, Washington Post. BLUF: "Inevitably, this debate is partly a numbers game: The rapid-withdrawal advocates want a timetable for removing all 30,000 of the "surge" troops Obama decided to send in December 2009. The "stay the course" proponents want a modest reduction of 3,000 to 5,000 troops, which is all they think conditions allow. A 'split the difference' caucus argues for a cutback that hits five figures - something around 10,000."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.