Blog Posts

Crisis in Yemen, the Rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and U.S. National Security - Highlights from today's American Enterprise Institute event in Washington, D.C., can be found at the link. Participants included Christopher Boucek, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Edmund J. Hull, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen; Katheline Zimmerman, AEI; and Frederick W. Kagan, AEI.

Event summary follows: The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy toward Yemen beyond counterterrorism, panelists concluded Tuesday at the American Enterprise Institute. Katherine Zimmerman, an analyst and the Gulf of Aden Team Lead for AEI's Critical Threats Project, outlined the six most likely and dangerous crisis scenarios in Yemen that could result from the current political stalemate, including the collapse of Yemen's economy or a mass-casualty attack on the United States by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Frederick W. Kagan, the director of AEI's Critical Threats Project, argued that the United States, in addition to its regional and international partners, has a vested interest in preventing Yemen from complete state collapse. Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that while current American strategy is focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism, the greatest threat facing Yemenis daily is the looming meltdown of their economy--not al Qaeda.

Ambassador Edmund J. Hull described the challenges of on-the-ground implementation of a comprehensive strategy, given the limited ability of US officials to operate beyond the capital, San'a, due to security concerns. The panelists advocated drawing on the lessons from the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to fine-tune an appropriate approach to Yemen that links development gains and security gains.

Here are some recent items from the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute:

Cyber Infrastructure Protection edited by Dr. Tarek N. Saadawi and Colonel Louis H. Jordan, Jr. This book provides an integrated view and a comprehensive framework of the various issues relating to cyber infrastructure protection. It provides the foundation for long-term policy development, a roadmap for cyber security, and an analysis of technology challenges that impede cyber infrastructure protection. The book is divided into three main parts. Part I deals with strategy and policy issues related to cyber security. It provides a theory of cyberpower, a discussion of Internet survivability as well as large scale data breaches and the role of cyberpower in humanitarian assistance. Part II covers social and legal aspects of cyber infrastructure protection and it provides discussions concernsing the attack dynamics of politically and religiously motivated hackers. Part III discusses the technical aspects of cyber infrastructure protection including the resilience of data centers, intrusion detection, and a strong focus on IP-networks.

The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies by Dr. Geraint Hughes. The author examines historical and contemporary examples of military involvement in counterterrorism, outlining the specific roles which the armed forces of liberal democracies have performed in combating terrorism, both in a domestic and international context. He describes the political, strategic, conceptual, diplomatic, and ethical problems that can arise when a state's armed forces become engaged in counterterrorism, and argues that military power can only be employed as part of a coordinated counterterrorist strategy aimed at the containment and frustration—rather than the physical elimination—of the terrorist group(s) concerned.

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response by Brigadier Andrew Smith. Surprise is a familiar term in military writings and is enshrined in most nations' doctrine. Surprises that emerge in tactics, however, can also operate at the strategic and operational levels and are particularly dangerous because they can test the relevance and adaptability of military forces and the "institutional" defense establishments that create, develop, and sustain them. A military establishment that is too slow to recognize and respond to such surprises places its nation's interests at grave risk. Western nations are contemplating major reductions in defense spending, with consequent limitations on force structure. As the range of enemy capabilities that a force will be able to match, qualitatively and quantitatively, becomes smaller, the potential for operational and strategic surprise will increase. A key conclusion from this analysis is the critical role of strategic leadership in recognizing the scale of surprise and in forcing the necessary institutional response. At a time when budgets will not allow surprise to be addressed by maintaining large and technically diverse forces at high readiness, the ability to recognize and respond adroitly to operational and strategic surprise may be a critical requirement for a modern defense establishment.

Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Russia by Dr. Stephen J. Blank. The war in Afghanistan has added considerably to the strategic significance of Central Asia due to its proximity to the conflict. Moreover, the continuation of the war increasingly involves the vital interests of many other actors other than the U.S. and NATO forces currently there. This monograph, taken from SSI's conference with European and Russian scholars in 2010, provides a comprehensive analysis of the means and objectives of Russia's involvement in Central Asia. It also provides Russian perspectives concerning the other actors in Central Asia and how Moscow views the policy significance of those efforts.

Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century by Dr. Colin S. Gray. Power is one of the more contestable concepts in political theory. In recent decades, scholars and commentators have chosen to distinguish between two kinds of power, "hard" and "soft." The former is achieved through military threat or use, and by means of economic menace or reward. The latter is the ability to have influence by co-opting others to share some of one's values and, as a consequence, to share some key elements on one's agenda for international order and security. Whereas hard power obliges its addressees to consider their interests in terms mainly of calculable costs and benefits, soft power works through the persuasive potency of ideas that foreigners find attractive. It is highly desirable if much of the world external to America wants, or can be brought to want, a great deal of what America happens to favor also. Coalitions of the genuinely —have to be vastly superior to the alternatives.

Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict by Colonel Tony Pfaff. The character of irregular warfare has challenged the American "way of war" in a number of ways. Not only does it challenge how U.S. forces fight, it also brings into question the ethical norms that they employ to govern the fighting. The resulting confusion is especially evident in the public debate over the use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, traditional just war thinking has permitted collateral damage that has undermined the civil order that those military operations are intended to impose, while at the same time has prohibited Soldiers from killing or detaining the enemy who threatens that order in the first place. These counterintuitive outcomes suggest that the traditional view needs to be revised in light of the demands of combating irregular threats. Revising this view will have to take into account the emphasis that combating irregular threats places on populations rather than on military capability. In doing so, it expands the ends and means of war requiring Soldiers to not only defend the state, but to impose civil-order outside the state as well. These complications fundamentally change the character of warfare and require Soldiers to rethink where they may accept and place risk when balancing the ethical demands of their profession. This point has important implications for the way the United States should fight irregular wars and the norms they should employ to govern them.

Colloquium Brief: American Society and Its Profession of Arms colloquium brief by Dr. Leonard Wong. SSI's inaugural "online only" colloquium brief provides key insights, videos, photos, and panel summaries from the U.S. Army War College's 22nd Annual Strategy Conference that took place on April 5-7, 2011.

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Tracking Down Mortenson's Schools In Pakistan - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Special Report. BLUF: "As suspicions swirl about the authenticity of events in Three Cups of Tea, RFE's on-the-ground reporting has uncovered evidence that at least two of Greg Mortenson's schools not only exist but are serving their scholastic purpose. Through interviews with school officials, villagers, and the families of students in Pakistan's remote northwest, Radio Mashaal has learned that even if people don't recognize Mortenson's name, they do know the name of his charity, the Central Asia Institute (CAI)." RFE/RL is posting updates on Facebook and Twitter.

A RFE/RL correspondent visits the Immit and Majaweer schools.

Institutionalizing Wisdom:

The Journey of Introspection, Learning, Problem Solving, Teaching, and Training

Perhaps you are coming home from your fourth tour to either Iraq or Afghanistan. Or maybe you are a Green Beret who has spent the last decade in the quiet wars of the Philippines and Colombia? In either case, you might be spending a significant amount of time processing your experiences. What have you learned? What did you do right? What did you do wrong? If you have found your way to Small Wars Journal, then you have found a venue where you can share your experiences and learn from what others have done in the past in other environments.

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Errors in Man-hunting: The Long Road to Finding Bin Laden

by Will Chalmers

I wrote this short article with the intention to spark debate on the topic of why the conventional opinion on Osama bin Laden's whereabouts over the last decade turned out to be incorrect. Discussing and analysing the factors that led to this discrepancy between western observers and bin Laden's own assessment of his security needs is to me a worthwhile debate. This paper it not intended to be a criticism of any one individual's past comments but rather a vehicle for potentially improving future analysis.

Will Chalmers is a research assistant at the Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society (CSAFS) located at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC). He is a graduate of the War Studies MA program at RMCC.

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A Time For Unity and A Premature Celebration

by Butch Bracknell

A Time For Unity

Osama Bin Laden is no more. The latest Afghan war assessment notes frangible, delicate progress, but progress nonetheless. Commanders returning from Afghanistan cite real and substantial advances in the areas for which they were responsible, and even the newspapers give the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan some chance for success. The President names a new national security team well-suited for the responsibilities they are about to undertake, the CIA managed an intelligence operation that constitutes a robust success in the usual sea of anti-Agency criticism, the Congress seems to be —to compromise in the way that the founders envisioned to produce responsible policy and budget choices. American credibility abroad is surging, however slightly, and the President, in a time of crisis, acted presidential by signing a risky covert action finding authorizing the bin Laden raid. A time of tempered American triumph and unbridled unity? Hardly.

Continue on for the full article...

CBS News: Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) about his decision to speak out against government torture of terrorists.

Senator John McCain on the Use of Torture - Full text of remarks on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 12 May 2011. Introduction follows:

"Mr. President, the successful end of the ten-year manhunt to bring Osama bin Laden to justice has appropriately heightened the nation's appreciation for the diligence, patriotism and courage of our armed forces and our intelligence community. They are a great credit and inspiration to the country that has asked so much of them, and like all Americans, I am in their debt."

"But their success has also reignited debate over whether the so-called, 'enhanced interrogation techniques' of enemy prisoners, including waterboarding, were instrumental in locating bin Laden, and whether they are necessary and justifiable means for securing valuable information that might help prevent future terrorist attacks against us and our allies and lead to the capture or killing of those who would perpetrate them. Or are they, and should they be, prohibited by our conscience and laws as torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."

"I believe some of these practices -- especially waterboarding, which is a mock execution, and thus to me, indisputably torture -- are and should be prohibited in a nation that is exceptional in its defense and advocacy of human rights. I believe they are a violation of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, all of which forbid cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of all captured combatants, whether they wear the uniform of a country or are essentially stateless."

"I opposed waterboarding and similar so-called 'enhanced interrogation techniques' before Osama bin Laden was brought to justice. And I oppose them now. I do not believe they are necessary to our success in our war against terrorists, as the advocates of these techniques claim they are."

"Even more importantly, I believe that if America uses torture, it could someday result in the torture of American combatants. Yes, I know that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations do not share our scruples about the treatment of enemy combatants, and have and will continue to subject American soldiers and anyone they capture to the cruelest mistreatment imaginable. But we must bear in mind the likelihood that some day we will be involved in a more conventional war against a state and not a terrorist movement or insurgency, and be careful that we do not set a standard that another country could use to justify their mistreatment of our prisoners."

"And, lastly, it is difficult to overstate the damage that any practice of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by Americans does to our national character and historical reputation -- to our standing as an exceptional nation among the countries of the world. It is too grave to justify the use of these interrogation techniques. America has made its progress in the world not only by avidly pursuing our geopolitical interests, but by persuading and inspiring other nations to embrace the political values that distinguish us. As I've said many times before, and still maintain, this is not about the terrorists. It's about us."

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Why the president's legal advisors are in no hurry to justify the bin Laden raid.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The SEALs did their job. Will the lawyers now do theirs?

2) Security partnerships are frustrating, but necessary

The SEALs did their job. Will the lawyers now do theirs?

Osama bin Laden's fourth son Omar along with some of his brothers have called for an international investigation into the killing of their father. A statement written by the sons and published in the New York Times calls for President Barack Obama to cooperate with their demand for a U.N. inquiry into the question of "why our father was not arrested and tried but summarily executed without a court of law." Should there be no response within 30 days, the sons have pledged to assemble a "panel of eminent British and international lawyers" to pursue legal action against the U.S. government and its officials.

U.S. government officials have been brief in their legal defense of the raid. Attorney General Eric Holder laconically stated that the raid by Navy SEALs against bin Laden was "conducted in a way that was consistent with our law, with our values ... It's lawful to target an enemy commander in the field."

Bin Laden's sons as well as other analysts outside the United States view the raid in the context of the procedures of criminal law. By contrast, Holder and most observers inside the United States view the raid as a military mission with bin Laden just another combatant. Enemy military personnel are not subject to the rights due a suspect under criminal procedure but rather are at risk of ambush and sudden lethal attack without warning. In the military context, it doesn't matter if the combatant is not holding a weapon, is not in a military uniform, or is in an "unthreatening" posture (such as asleep). The only circumstances under which military forces are required to "give quarter" is after an enemy combatant has completed a surrender or is too wounded to resist, something very unlikely to have occurred in the bin Laden compound given the aggressive rules of engagement issued to the assault team. Bin Laden's sons reject this interpretation, viewing bin Laden as a criminal suspect deserving the rights of legal process.

Having won the kinetic battle at bin Laden's Abbottabad compound, will the United States now lose in the court of world public opinion? Some legal scholars are wondering why U.S. officials have not offered up a thorough legal defense of the bin Laden raid. In March 2010, Harold Koh, legal adviser to the State Department and previously dean of the Yale Law School, delivered such a defense for the U.S. policy of using drones to kill enemy combatants without warning or legal process. But Koh has been silent so far on the bin Laden raid.

Click below to read more ...

Where We're Good:

Why violent extremist organizations don't really operate with impunity

by Greg Grimes

A great deal of ink has been spilled on highlighting the difficulties in fighting global extremist movements, organizations that seem frustratingly amorphous and intractable. We know who the bad guys are; why are we having such trouble eliminating them? The recent extermination of Osama bin Laden makes it a good time to point out how much we do have working in our favor.

COL Greg Grimes is assigned to the Joint Irregular Warfare Center of USJFCOM.

PB Outcast: Thoughts on Operating a Successful Squad-Sized Patrol Base in Afghanistan

by Capt Luis R. Perez

Marine Corps Gazette

The location of your patrol base (PB) is arguably the single most important factor in determining how effective your position will be when conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in southern Afghanistan. In conventional terms, to seize and hold an objective you need to physically occupy it. If, as in the case of COIN in Afghanistan, you define your primary objective as the people rather than a piece of physical terrain, then you need to be collocated with the people to seize and hold the objective. This being said, just as you do with physical terrain in conventional operations, you will need to determine what the key human terrain is. This may not be readily apparent to you, especially if you receive a turnover from a unit with limited experience in the area or if you are assuming responsibility for a battlespace that does not offer a unit with which to conduct a turnover. In fact, it took me over 4 months to determine exactly where a squad-sized PB would be most effective within my platoon's area of operations (AO). What follows are the main highlights and lessons learned associated with the steps that led to the establishment of PB Outcast, how operations were conducted within and outside the PB, the role the PB played in building our unit's intelligence picture, and the command and control concept from within and outside the PB.

Much more over at the MCG

Getting It Right:10 Problems with the Afghan Campaign

by Dan Green

Armed Forces Journal

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander Gen. David H. Petraeus often talks about getting the "inputs" right in Afghanistan, which means having the right mix of military forces, civilian assets and Afghan government participation to conduct a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. In many respects, the process of getting the inputs right only really began in 2009, but with the beginning of the U.S. drawdown later this year, it is useful to investigate whether we have the inputs right as well as whether the "outputs" are correct. The following 10 problems with the Afghan campaign reflect the challenges of resourcing the conflict correctly but also have to do with implementation strategy in general, as well as how civilian interagency and Afghan partners are doing in support of the COIN strategy. These observations are gleaned from my service in Afghanistan with the State Department in 2005-2006 when I worked as the political officer at the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team, military service with the Navy in 2009-2010 where I worked as the liaison officer between ISAF Joint Command and the U.S. Embassy's Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs, as well as a trip last fall for the U.S. government where I participated in an independent study of the conflict. I also served with the Navy in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2007, which provided a useful contrasting experience.

Much more over at AFJ

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West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has released a Special Issue of the CTC Sentinel on the death of Usama bin Ladin. The new issue can be found here.

The Special Issue contains the following articles:

- Bin Ladin's Killing and its Effect on Al-Qa`ida: What Comes Next? By Bruce Hoffman

- Special Operations Forces and the Raid Against Bin Ladin: Policymaker Considerations in Combating Terrorism by Michele L. Malvesti and Frances Fragos Townsend

- How Bin Ladin's Death Will Affect Al-Qa`ida's Regional Franchises by Camille Tawil

- The Impact of Bin Ladin's Death on AQAP in Yemen by Gregory D. Johnsen

- The Impact of Bin Ladin's Death on AQIM in North Africa by Geoff D. Porter

- Bin Ladin's Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa`ida's Confidential Secretary by Nelly Lahoud

- Bin Ladin's Location Reveals Limits of Liaison Intelligence Relationships by Charles Faddis

- What the Experts Say... With Juan C. Zarate, Mark Kimmitt, Elliott Abrams, Michael F. Walker, Frank Taylor, Rohan Gunaratna, Dell L. Dailey and Thomas W. O'Connell

The Navy Seal Who Killed Osama Bin Laden from Rob Riggle

Don't Kill Gaddafi

by Patrick McKinney

In the early hours of April 15, 1986, American and allied aircraft launched raids against Libyan military targets and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's compound. In the early hours of April 25, 2011, American and allied aircraft launched raids against Libyan military targets and the Gaddafi compound. Air strikes followed again on April 30, and appear to have killed Colonel Gaddafi's son. President Ronald Reagan ordered the first strikes as punitive action in retaliation to the terrorist bombing of American servicemen in Germany, and to prevent future attacks. The Obama administration authorized strikes as an escalation of force to resolve an emerging political and military stalemate. Once a decisive military act, targeted killings are descending the slippery slope of acceptance for conflict resolution.

Patrick McKinney served as a United States Army officer and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He now resides in Alexandria, VA. The opinions and views expressed in this piece are his own.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Transitioning to Afghan-Led Counterinsurgency - Prepared statement by Dr. Seth Jones, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

The death of Osama bin Laden and the upcoming tenth anniversary of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan have triggered several important policy issues. This testimony poses several questions. What should the U.S. objectives be in Afghanistan? Based on these objectives, what are America's military options (and what would the implications be for transition)? Finally, what are the political options, including the possibility of a peace settlement?

I argue that U.S. objectives in Afghanistan should be tied to narrow U.S. national security interests, and the U.S. military strategy should transition to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy would involve decreasing the U.S. military footprint and relying on an increasingly prominent role of U.S. Special Operations Forces to help Afghans conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. It would require assisting Afghan national and local forces degrade the insurgency and target terrorist leaders. Implementing this strategy would require decreasing the U.S. military footprint to perhaps 30,000 or fewer forces by 2014 and surging Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan Local Police. It would also include leveraging U.S. Special Operations Forces, CIA, and some conventional forces to conduct several tasks: train, equip, and advise Afghan National Security Forces; assist local communities improve security and governance from the bottom up (especially the Afghan Local Police and Village Stability Operations programs); conduct direct action operations against high value targets; provide a range of "enablers," such as intelligence, civil affairs, and military information support operations.

There are several ways for the United States to achieve its limited objectives in Afghanistan. The first is if al Qa'ida is destroyed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and no longer poses a serious threat to the U.S. homeland. The second is if the Taliban breaks ties with al Qa'ida. The third is if Afghan National Security Forces and local allies (such as Afghan Local Police) can sufficiently degrade the insurgency and prevent the return of the Taliban with minimal outside assistance. At the moment, the United States should pursue all three means simultaneously -- targeting al Qa'ida and its allies, political negotiations, and Afghan-led counterinsurgency -- until one of them, alone or in combination with the others, adequately achieves core U.S. objectives.

Transitioning to Afghan-Led Counterinsurgency - Prepared statement by Dr. Seth Jones.

The Lawfulness of Killing Bin Laden

by Butch Bracknell

Much has been made of the recent revelations that Osama bin Laden was unarmed at the moment he was killed by U.S. special operations forces in close quarters battle. Let us put this issue to rest with dispatch, once and for all: Killing bin Laden was not an extrajudicial execution, a murder, or a war crime. It was a combat engagement lawful under U.S. and international legal authority -- full stop.

Two rationales undergird the lawful killing an enemy combatant, including an unlawful combatant such as the transnational terrorist bin Laden: self-defense and jus in bello.

- The self-defense justification usually permits a "friendly" combatant to engage an opponent with deadly force when the combatant believes his or her life, or the life of other members of his or her unit or other authorized protected persons (for example, certain noncombatants present in the area, such as ordinary citizens, children, aid workers, or missionaries), is endangered by the hostile acts or intent of an opponent. Whether the opponent is armed is relevant to the self-defense analysis, but does not solely settle the issue. The key factor is whether a combatant reasonably believes his or her life (or the life of a protected person) to be in danger; for example, an enemy combatant may appear to have a weapon, even though he is unarmed. If the friendly combatant reasonably fears for his life or that of a protected person, deadly force is permitted and the defensive killing is not unlawful.

Even so, discussion of the location of bin Laden's weapon and whether he might have been wearing a suicide vest are utterly irrelevant: engaging bin Laden with deadly force is most appropriately viewed as grounded on the second rationale: jus in bello.

- The law pertaining to the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello), which has developed since antiquity and includes certain provisions of the modern Geneva and Hague conventions, permits the sanctioned killing of an opponent in an armed conflict, regardless of whether he is armed at the moment he is engaged. So long as the opponent meets the minimum criteria to be regarded as a combatant (even an unlawful combatant), he may be engaged with deadly force, even if he is separated from his weapon. He may be killed while sleeping, eating, taking a shower, cleaning his weapon, meditating, or standing on his head. It is his status as an enemy combatant, not his activity at the moment of engagement, which is dispositive.

Osama bin Laden was an enemy combatant -- again, full stop. His status as a virtual enemy of the United States is grounded on several factors: his declaration of war (fatwa) by Al Qaeda, of which he was the nominal chief, against the United States; the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40); and, most likely, declaration of a state of hostilities (essentially, a state of "war") by the President against an opposing belligerent: Al Qaeda, its footsoldiers, and its leaders. The qualifier "most likely" indicates that if the President has, in fact, declared Al Qaeda to be a hostile, belligerent force, the designation probably would be classified and non-public. It is also superfluous, as Congress supplied the necessary authority in the AUMF to make combat actions against Al Qaeda lawful. They described a category of combatants who may be targeted by U.S. forces, and Osama bin Laden fell squarely into that category more precisely than any other person in the world. Targeting bin Laden was based on bin Laden simply being bin Laden: his conduct as he stared down the wrong end of an MP-5 was immaterial.

Once designated a hostile enemy combatant, there are only two ways a combatant can be exempted from lawful targeting: by manifesting a clear and unequivocal intent to surrender, and by becoming wounded or otherwise incapacitated and incapable of resistance (hors d'combat). There is no evidence bin Laden was wounded prior to administration of the lethal force which ended his life. Moreover, U.S. forces engaged in armed conflict are under no obligation to give an enemy combatant a chance to surrender; the enemy combatant must practically force his surrender on the U.S. force by manifesting it clearly, timely, and in a manner which enables U.S. forces to discontinue the use of lethal force. At this instant, a shield of legal protection descends around him, and U.S. forces are obligated to treat him humanely and consistent with the laws of armed conflict pertaining to detainees. Until the shield is present, triggered by manifest surrender, it is absent. Without the shield that only he could initiate through his surrenderous conduct, bin Laden remained a legitimate target and was treated so by the assaulting U.S. force.

Bin Laden's death was a triumph for the American intelligence community and the armed forces and provides, at long last, some solace to the victims of 9/11 and Al Qaeda's other terroristic acts. His death will likely prove to be a strategic gain, and it eliminates a continuing threat to Americans at home and her citizens and forces abroad. It also was completely sanctioned under U.S. and international law. The intellectual energy spent obsessing and hand-wringing over bin Laden's death would be better spent on less clear-cut law of armed conflict issues facing the nation and the international community.

Butch Bracknell is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps. A career military lawyer with tours in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, he is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, DC.

Transition in Afghanistan - Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen, President and CEO of Caerus Associates, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

I would like to focus narrowly on the question of what, specifically, needs to happen on the ground in Afghanistan in order to enable a transition in 2014. The answer to this question depends on whether you believe the insurgency in Afghanistan is the problem, or is a symptom of a wider set of problems. My work in and on Afghanistan over the past seven years suggests the latter - that is, the insurgency arises from a wider set of causes, and just dealing with active fighters will be insufficient for effective transition.

In particular, I see the war as arising from a four-part cycle of instability:

- Corruption and criminality, arising in part from the drug economy and in part from the international presence and the contracting bonanza associated with it, creates a flood of illicit cash into the hands of elites, power brokers, local warlords and certain corrupt officials;

- This corruption enables and incentivizes abuse, in the form of expropriation of resources, denial of justice, physical abuse and violence, against ordinary members of the Afghan population;

- These abuses create popular rage, cynicism and disillusionment with the Afghan government, but also with the international community, whom many Afghans hold responsible for the behavior of abusive officials and elites;

- This empowers and enables the insurgents, who are able to pose as clean, just, incorruptible, and the defenders of the people, and can exploit popular rage to build support; and the insurgency in turn creates the conditions of instability, violence and lack of accountability that drive the cycle onward.

As I have previously testified, we have seen this cycle deepen and worsen over the past decade of the war, and our focus (at various times) solely on destroying the main forces of the enemy has been ineffective in addressing the wider drivers of the conflict, or has even made things worse.

To address this overall instability dynamic, we need four things: an anti-corruption campaign, a governance reform campaign, a process of political reconciliation at the district and local level, and a robust security campaign to suppress the insurgency while these other elements have time to take effect.

Transition in Afghanistan - Prepared statement by Dr. David Kilcullen.

Long Term Goals for Afghanistan and Their Near Term Implications - Prepared statement by Dr. Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Steps Needed for a Successful 2014 Transition in Afghanistan, 10 May 2011. Excerpt follows:

The Afghanistan debate often focuses, understandably, on near-term concerns. Sound policies in the near term, however, require a longer term vision to guide them. And for now, several key components of a long term vision for Afghanistan are absent or underdeveloped. What would success look like? What does the United States require to secure our central interests there? What relationship do we want with Afghanistan or its region after 2014, and what role will that require us to play then -- or now?

I argue below that core American interests in Afghanistan are real but narrow, and center on the security requirements of denying Afghan territory to terrorists as a base for attacking us or destabilizing Afghanistan's neighbors. These limited interests can be realized via a range of possible Afghan end states -- we need not hold out for the highly ambitious political and economic development aims that the United States adopted in 2001. While desirable, these are not strictly necessary to meet our core requirements. But we cannot settle for just anything. There are limits on the acceptable that exclude outcomes such as partition or anarchy, and this limits the viability of approaches such as a counter-terrorism (CT) strategy that would leave us unable to prevent a collapse of the current government. And it is hard to see any feasible, acceptable, Afghan political outcome that could function without sustained American and other international engagement. In the longer term, that engagement need not be primarily military (though some U.S. military presence ought not to be excluded as a possible means to the end of Afghan stability). But financial and technical assistance is likely to be needed on a sustained basis if Afghanistan is not again to suffer the fate that befell it the last time the West disengaged. To realize U.S. interests will require a long term relationship with Afghanistan that accepts the need for continued assistance, albeit at levels far below today's, in the service not just of a better life for Afghans, but of a safer future for Americans.

This longer term vision implies a number of near-term requirements. Among the more important of these is a clear strategy for governance reform; meaningful, measurable progress before 2014 in restraining government predation; and a negotiated agreement with the GIRoA that provides concrete reassurance that our allies will not be abandoned to their fate even as the United States draws down.

To develop this argument I first identify and prioritize America's underlying interests in Afghanistan. I then discuss what these imply for acceptable end states there, and what this in turn implies for the required American role to sustain a stable Afghanistan that can meet our interests in the longer term. I then turn to some consequences of this long-term analysis for several near-term policy issues -- especially the utility of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan as a part of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the GIRoA, the attractiveness of substituting a counter-terrorism (CT) strategy for today's counterinsurgency (COIN) approach in light of bin Laden's death, the attractiveness of negotiated settlement as a means of achieving an acceptable end state, and the appropriate sequencing and prioritization of security improvement and governance reform.

Long Term Goals for Afghanistan and Their Near Term Implications - Prepared statement by Stephen Biddle.