Blog Posts

The Military Interventions We Don't Plan For - Those to Protect Civilians by Sarah Sewall and Anthony Zinni, Washington Post. BLUF: "No intervention is simple. Yet part of the reason political leaders face such difficult choices is that our armed forces - and those of our allies - resist thinking about or planning for these kinds of contingencies."

How the U.S. military fell in love with 'Three Cups of Tea' by Greg Jaffe, Washington Post. BLUF: "... the scandal's most far-reaching impact could be on the U.S. military, which was quick to embrace Mortenson's message that one American could help change the lives of Afghans and bring light and learning to a troubled part of the world."

Mullen launches diatribe against ISI by Baqir Sajjad Syed, Dawn. BLUF: "Though the Haqqani network's presence in the tribal areas and the army's reluctance to go after them has been a sore point in Islamabad-Washington relations for some time now, Admiral Mullen's words indicate a hardening of the American stance. Rarely in the past have American officials been this open and categorical about links between the ISI and the network."

No Exit, No Problem

by Jason Whiteley

"♫Nowhere to run to baby, ♪nowhere to hide. ♫" Those quintessential Vietnam -era lyrics from Martha and the Vandellas in 1965 describe well the passion with which the baby boomers assiduously avoid becoming stuck in political situations with "nowhere to run." Being associated with a political quagmire akin to the Vietnam War is the kiss of death for political support for any contemporary military action. Accordingly, when the first U.S.-fired ordinance hit the ground in Libya, the question, "What is the exit strategy?" immediately exploded across the U.S. airwaves. The public wants to know, "Where can we run, baby?"

The term 'exit strategy' implies a potential military failure can be avoided with a clear delineation of goals and objectives. The genesis of the term is credited to military reviews of strategic failures in Vietnam. The conceptual primacy of an exit strategy was later popularized by journalists who credited such a strategy for the United States' success in the First Gulf War. Although there is much to suggest that the victory was largely symbolic, public demands for an exit strategy have prevailed. Recent experience, however, suggests that reckless pursuit of an exit strategy more often engenders strategic failure than success.

Jason Whiteley is a West Point graduate and an Iraq veteran. He has been widely quoted on building governance capacity in post-war countries. He is author of the forthcoming book Father of Money: Buying Peace in Baghdad (Potomac Books, 2011)

Let's make something clear, the civil war in Libya will not end in a stalemate. The French will likely intervene with ground forces and topple the Gaddafi regime, and they will probably do it within a month. It is quite possible that they will do so with Italian help. President Obama has fervently wished for America to be just one of the boys; in the end, this may be a case of wishing for something so much that you get it. America has abrogated the role of global marshal that it assumed after World War II. Every posse needs a Marshal to lead it. The French will likely pick up the tin star they found lying in the street of the global village.

Click through for the rest of "Why France Will Finish Off Gaddafi".

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

'Restrepo' Director Is Killed in Libya - C. J. Chivers, New York Times. BLUF: "Tim Hetherington, the conflict photographer who was a director and producer of the film "Restrepo," was killed in the besieged city of Misurata on Wednesday, and three photographers working beside him were wounded."

Update: The NYT article has been updated. "Chris Hondros of the Getty photo agency died within a few hours of devastating brain trauma."

A National Strategic Narrative

by Mr. Y

This Strategic Narrative is intended to frame our National policy decisions regarding investment, security, economic development, the environment, and engagement well into this century. It is built upon the premise that we must sustain our enduring national interests -- prosperity and security -- within a "strategic ecosystem," at home and abroad; that in complexity and uncertainty, there are opportunities and hope, as well as challenges, risk, and threat. The primary approach this Strategic Narrative advocates to achieve sustainable prosperity and security, is through the application of credible influence and strength, the pursuit of fair competition, acknowledgement of interdependencies and converging interests, and adaptation to complex, dynamic systems -- all bounded by our national values.

The Full Article is available at the Woodrow Wilson Center

Book Review: The Ayatollah's Democracy: An Iranian Challenge

by Hooman Majd.

Published by W. W. Norton, New York. 2010, 282 pages.

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Hooman Majd offers a deep analytic look at the politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the varying interpretations of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in the 21st century. His previous book "The Ayatollah Begs to Differ," was well received and widely read by those watching the nuances of the Iran's Islamic polity.

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," (Naval Institute Press, 2010). He is Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and is a Senior Defense Department counter-terrorism advisor.

Book Review: The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition

by Alison Pargeter.

Published by Saqi Books, London. 300 pages, 2010.

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Alison Pargeter is a researcher on Islamist radicalism at the University of Cambridge. Her first book is a refreshingly complex and nuanced examination of the Muslim Brotherhood. The book starts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, by a schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna, and its evolution from social organization to a political organization based on an interpretation of Islamic ideals.Alison Pargeter is a researcher on Islamist radicalism at the University of Cambridge. Her first book is a refreshingly complex and nuanced examination of the Muslim Brotherhood. The book starts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, by a schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna, and its evolution from social organization to a political organization based on an interpretation of Islamic ideals.

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," (Naval Institute Press, 2010). He is Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and is a Senior Defense Department counter-terrorism advisor.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

According to the BBC, British Foreign Secretary William Hague just announced that Britain will send 10 soldiers to Benghazi to assist Libya's rebels with logistics, intelligence, and training. This announcement followed a plea from the chairman of France's foreign affairs committee to send French commandos to Libya to direct NATO air strikes against Qaddafi's forces.

In another surprising, if odd, development, Reuters is reporting that the European Union has developed a provisional plan to deploy a European military expeditionary force to Misrata, if requested by the United Nations. The mission of the expedition would be to protect aid deliveries to the city, which is currently under siege by pro-Qaddafi forces. What is odd is that according to Reuters, all 27 EU states endorsed this potential mission. Germany, which abstained during the UN vote authorizing military action in Libya and has refused to participate in the current NATO operation, might now be volunteering the Bundeswehr for a trip to the frontline in Misrata.

Each time a setback has occurred in Libya, the West has responded with military escalation. The arrival of Western journalists in Misrata is undoubtedly creating pressure on NATO's political leaders to take additional steps against Qaddafi's forces.

President Obama and his team are trying to simultaneously be good allies while also strictly limiting the U.S. military commitment. The Obama team must he stunned that NATO is struggling to achieve military effects against the rump of Libya controlled by Qaddafi. Britain and France are rumored to be running out of precision bomb guidance kits.

Libya's rebels have counted on a bailout from NATO. Europe may similarly be counting on a military bailout from the United States. Is NATO's operation in Libya too big to fail?

Nothing follows.

U.S. Still in Denial About 21st Century Threats, Says Former Obama National Security Adviser by Sandra Erwin, National Defense. BLUF: "... defense leaders should avoid becoming consumed by 'tactical' issues such as inter-service rivalries and, instead, focus on the bigger picture, said former Obama national security adviser, retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones. The U.S. military still has not come to grips with the 'security environment of the 21st century,'... ... Jones envisions the U.S. military playing a greater diplomatic role as preventer of wars and protector of democratic ideals."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Update 6:

Questions Over Greg Mortenson's Stories: CBS 60 Minutes, 17 April 2011

Hat tip to Galrahn at Information Dissemination via Twitter. Carolyn Kellogg at the Los Angeles Times (Investigation throws 'Three Cups of Tea' author Greg Mortenson's charity work into doubt) reports that:

An investigation by "60 Minutes" to be broadcast this weekend will cite multiple sources that contend some of the most inspiring stories in Greg Mortenson's books "Three Cups of Tea" and "Stones into Schools" are not true.

Much more at the LAT and "60 Minutes".

Update

Greg Mortenson's response so far, via the Central Asia Institute web page:

An Important Message from Greg Mortenson

Afghanistan and Pakistan are fascinating, inspiring countries full of wonderful people. They are also complex places torn by conflicting loyalties, and some who do not want our mission of educating girls to succeed. I stand by the information conveyed in my book, and by the value of CAl's work in empowering local communities to build and operate schools that have educated more than 60,000 students. I continue to be heartened by the many messages of support I receive from our local partners in cities and villages across Afghanistan and Pakistan, who are determined not to let unjustified attacks stop the important work being done to create a better future for their children. For further questions, concerns and inquires, please email [email protected].

Update 2

Mortenson Under Fire from '60 Minutes', Bozeman Philanthropist Denies Allegations by Gail Schontzler, Bozeman Daily Chronicle. BLUF: "He denied several "60 Minutes" allegations, and defended his financial dealings, but appeared to concede that one key story in his book was not literally true."

Update 3

Board of Directors, Central Asia Institute: Responses to 60 Minutes Questions. "Following (at the link) are questions that were asked by producers of the program 60 Minutes, exactly as they were asked of us, and the answers that we are providing to 60 Minutes."

Three-cup Monte by Carl Prine at Line of Departure. BLUF: "Like the best swindles, Dr Greg keeps his rap simple: The sexy svengali who tickles, teases and touches your soul while his mitt wiggles into your purse; the Ponzi peddler paying a fortunate few to fleece the rapacious many; the book cooker who dangles dubious data and dividends to draw Dow dollars; the quack selling pharmaceutical enhancements to the same guy who never gets the chance to try them out at the clip joint."

Update 4

60 Minutes: Questions over Greg Mortenson's Stories - CBS transcript

Update 5

Does It Matter If The Military's Fave Scholar Sells Three Cups of Snake Oil? - Spencer Ackerman, Danger Room. BLUF: "... Danger Room pal Niel Smith argues that the Army has institutionalized counterinsurgency so poorly that officers can fool themselves into embracing caricatures of it. And that's how Mortenson's tea can taste a lot like snake oil."

Update 7

Via the Central Asia Institute website:

Greg Mortenson's Message to Supporters - CAI

CAI Board of Directors Statement 04/16/11 - CAI

CAI Board of Directors Response to "60 Minutes" Questions - CAI

Greg Mortenson's response to "60 Minutes" Questions - CAI

Update 8

Stranger than Fiction: What We're Really Losing with Greg Mortenson's Fall by Joshua Foust, PBS. BLUF: "Just because you can't help everyone doesn't mean you should help no one. Sadly, Mortenson's good work is going to be overshadowed - possibly destroyed - by this scandal (albeit one that looks like it was largely of his own making). And the losers, besides wide-eyed Americans who've lost an unassailable hero, will ultimately be the people his schools were helping."

Greg Mortenson Speaks interview by Alex Heard, Outside. "The embattled director of the Central Asia Institute responds to allegations of financial mismanagement and that he fabricated stories in his bestselling book Three Cups of Tea."

Pentagon Inquiry Into Article Clears McChrystal and Aides by Thom Shanker, New York Times. BLUF: "An inquiry by the Defense Department inspector general into a magazine profile that resulted in the abrupt, forced retirement of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has cleared the general, his military aides and civilian advisers of all wrongdoing."

The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision

International Security, issue 4, volume 35

by Peter D. Feaver, Duke University

Abstract. President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interest­ing case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensur­ing the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence—both in published ac­counts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players—shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had fol­lowed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.

Full article is available here.

Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents:

Assessing the Value of a Divisive Concept

by David Ucko

Abstract. Popularised as a result of the so-called surge in Iraq, the concept of counterinsurgency has since experienced a marked decline, mostly due to the difficulties of implementing its core principles in Afghanistan. Across the United States and Europe, counterinsurgency now seems to be on its way out, as a concept to be studied and as a priority to inform policy.

This article examines the value of retaining counterinsurgency as a concept, along with its associated principles and theory. Much depends on what is expected from this term, which lacks both definition and clear substance. Counterinsurgency provides neither a strategy for military intervention nor a campaign plan for deployed soldiers and will fail if mistaken for more than what it is. Counterinsurgency does offer a collection of insights, which, if used in a manner sensitive to local context, can help in the design and execution of expeditionary campaigns. These insights are often largely commonsensical but have nonetheless played an important role in challenging previously dominant misconceptions about the nature of war and peace, both in Europe and the United States.

The one good reason to abandon the term would be because of its divisive and distorting connotations; the aim then would be to talk more plainly about the nature of war-to-peace transitions. Even so, expunging counterinsurgency from the lexicon will not remove or in any way alleviate the operational challenges most closely associated with it. Thus, whatever happens to this concept, the lessons and associated theory that it has advanced must not be forgotten. Instead, these must be retained to prepare expeditionary actors for future military interventions and, at the same time, to prompt far greater caution whenever such endeavours are planned.

The KoW description and prior discussion can be found here.

The Abstract can be found here.

Full article published by the Berlin-based SWP can be found here.

The U.S. Army COIN Center will be hosting Mr. Haider Mullick, a fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University and the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. He will present a webcast presentation entitled "Counterinsurgency Challenges in Pakistan and Effects on ISAF-Afghanistan."

Mr. Mullick advises and consults with U.S. government organizations on security, diplomacy, governance and development issues in South Asia. From 2009-2010, he conducted research for General David H. Petraeuson Pakistan's national security policy. Mullick is also the President and Chief Executive Officer of Red Teaming Associates. He is the author of Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies.

His brief will be 0900-1100 CDT (1000-1200 EDT, 1500 ZULU), Friday, 22 April 2011.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting online at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

The VOA Is Losing Its Voice by L. Gordon Crovitz, Wall Street Journal. BLUF via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: "We are in an information war, and we are losing."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

We were just sent the screen capture below and guess it begs two questions. Firstly, did RC (SW) block access to Small Wars Journal or is this some type of temporary glitch? Secondly, if SWJ has been intentionally blocked, WTF?

We've also heard reports that other elements of ISAF can no longer access SWJ. Anyone have any intel on this? Thanks.

Update: While we are on the subject (also see jcustis comment below), we have also gotten reports that the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) has, at least at times and at certain locations, blocked Small Wars Journal and the Small Wars Council discussion board. This includes CONUS and OCONUS locations. Intel on this would also be appreciated.

Update 2: When it rains it pours. From the comment section below from Andy: "My Air Force Network blocks SWJ as well. They use, IIRC, Blue coat. Like jcustis, no joy getting the site removed from the blacklist. It looks like what they do is categorize websites and then block specific categories. So if the category includes "blog" or "forum" then it gets blocked." Anyone else out there?

Why Failed States Shouldn't Be Our Biggest National Security Fear by Stewart Patrick, Washington Post. BLUF: "... preoccupations reflect more hype than analysis. U.S. national security officials would be better served - and would serve all of us better - if they turned their strategic lens toward stronger developing countries, from which transnational threats are more likely to emanate."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

In Afghanistan's South, Signs of Progress in Three Districts Signal a Shift - Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post. BLUF: "For the first time since the war began nearly a decade ago, the Taliban is commencing a summer fighting season with less control and influence of territory in the south than it had the previous year."