Blog Posts

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Do troop surges really work?

2) NATO looks for a new strategy in Libya

Do troop surges really work?

As springtime arrives in Afghanistan, the coalition's soldiers and commanders are bracing for the annual acceleration of combat against the Taliban. The "surge" of over 33,000 additional U.S. soldiers, ordered by President Barack Obama in December 2009, has been in place since last fall. Everyone expects another violent summer, just as occurred after "surge" reinforcements arrived in Iraq in 2007. But the Iraq surge appeared to work; in 2008 and thereafter, violence declined dramatically. The Iraqi government and its security forces are now fully in charge, and the last U.S. troops should be gone by the end of the year. Advised by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen, and Gen. David Petraeus, Obama is hoping that the success these surge proponents brought to Iraq will occur similarly in Afghanistan.

But did the U.S. troop surge in Iraq really win the war? Maj. Joshua Thiel, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, thinks not. In a study written for Small Wars Journal, Thiel performs a statistical analysis that correlates the arrival of the surge reinforcements into Iraq in 2006 and 2007 with subsequent levels of combat incidents in 2007 and 2008. Using data gathered from each of Iraq's 18 provinces and incorporating lags to account for the time required for new combat units to become effective in the field, Thiel concluded that there was no significant correlation between the arrival of U.S. reinforcements and subsequent changes in the level of violence in Iraq's provinces. Some provinces received reinforcements; others did not. Combat incidents went up in some provinces and down in others. But the connection between surge troops and the change in the level of incidents seems entirely random.

Overall violence in Iraq declined steeply in 2008. But Thiel attributes this to other factors besides the arrival of U.S. combat reinforcements.

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Towards a Comprehensive Approach presents a wide range of ideas regarding the elements of strategy, its purpose, and how it should be developed. It is not intended to be a primer on strategy nor a comprehensive review of the topic. There is an extensive literature on military strategy and planning that is not duplicated or reviewed here. Instead, this volume highlights the differences and similarities between the approaches typically used by civilian organizations and the doctrinal methods of NATO and the militaries of its member states and partners, while presenting some ideas on how to bridge the gaps.

There is no single "best" way to address the complex security problems that NATO faces in the contemporary operational environment. Instead, developing mutual understanding to recognize where approaches overlap and where actors simply need to "agree to disagree" is the route most likely to produce practical improvements in the integration of civilian and military efforts. Appreciating the range of views and methods is the first step towards achieving a workable synthesis of them.

The Persistent Problem of Civil Military Integration in War by Nadia Schadlow

The Illusions and Delusions of Smart Power by Christopher M. Schnaubelt

NATO's New Strategic Concept: An Integration of Civil and Military Approaches by Karl-Heinz Kamp

Strategy, Segmentation and Incrementalism: A Corporate Approach by Allen Burch

All for One and One for All?: Forging Development, Diplomatic and Defense Partnerships Under NATO's New Strategic Concept by Christopher A. Jennings

Interagency Challenges in Strategic Assessments by Kirk A. Johnson

Joint Strategic Planning in Iraq: Optimism is Not a Plan: Needed Changes for a Long War by Bradford R. Higgins

Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy.

Can We Measure Progress or Failure in War?

U.S. Army Major Josh Thiel's recent article The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality challenges the contemporary notion that you can "add more (forces) and then you win" in a protracted insurgency. Josh, an Army Special Forces officer assigned to 1st SFG, studied economics at USMA and defense analysis at NPS. His concise work illustrates what is known in econometrics as a red flag. A simple linear regression of two variables showing substantial deviation is enough to suggest that the problem is much more complicated than simply adhering to the tested independent variable.

by T.J. Buonomo

On 15 March 2011, General Petraeus testified at length on the situation in Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee. While the majority of the four-hour hearing can be summarized as the general's cautious but optimistic assessment of progress on the security and political fronts, two of his comments in particular are deserving of serious scrutiny.

T.J. Buonomo is a former Military Intelligence Officer and graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy with a degree in Political Science and Middle East Studies.

National Library for the Study of George Washington Groundbreaking Ceremony

Click through for the full transcript.

The AfPak border areas of Kunar and Nuristan Provinces continue to remain significant challenges to the ISAF effort in Afghanistan providing both safehavens for Taliban training areas and gateways into Pakistan's tribal areas for resupply, shelter, and lifeline support to al Qaeda. SWJ contributors Jim Gant and Nathan Springer have written extensively on their experiences in the region. Additionally, this area was documented in the film Restrepo and the devastating Battle of Wanat.

When the President of the United States announces a major cut in defense spending and "a fundamental review ... of our role in a changing world" in consecutive sentences, other heads of government around the world will certainly take notice. They will then make adjustments to their own security strategies, adjustments which are bound to produce cascading consequences.

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Al Pessin

Voice of America

The Pentagon says President Barack Obama's desire to find $400 billion over the next 12 years in additional defense spending cuts will result in reductions in U.S. military capabilities. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is launching a comprehensive review to develop options for the president to consider.

In his budget speech Wednesday, President Obama praised Secretary Gates for finding $400 billion in cuts based mainly on improved efficiency. Then he said he wants the same amount of cuts again.

"We need to not only eliminate waste and improve efficiency and effectiveness, but conduct a fundamental review of America's missions, capabilities, and our role in a changing world. I intend to work with Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs on this review, and I will make specific decisions about spending after it's complete." Obama said.

In a fact sheet, the White House specified that the president wants to hold defense spending increases below the inflation level, and save $400 billion between now and 2023. Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell says the cuts would affect the defense department's base budget, currently $553 billion per year. At the current spending rate that would be a cut of about 6 1/2 per cent per year. The cuts would not affect funding for the current wars.

Continue on for more and related news links.

EC11, an annual joint and coalition ISR interoperability demonstration, will run May 23 - June 3 at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and at distributed locations worldwide. Continue on for an EC11 update.

Sub-hunting is not the only task for which DARPA has turned to crowd-sourcing. In February, DARPA crowd-sourced the design of a new tactical vehicle that would perform either reconnaissance or battlefield delivery and evacuation missions. DARPA hoped to attract the interest of service members, auto enthusiasts, designers, and engineers and offered a $10,000 reward for the top design.

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We don't need no education

We don't need no thought control

No dark sarcasm in the classroom

Teachers leave them kids alone

Hey! Teacher! Leave them kids alone!

All in all it's just another brick in the wall.

All in all you're just another brick in the wall.

Need budget cuts? We probably can start by shutting the Air War College by Tom Ricks at Foreign Policy's Best Defense. BLUF: "... it costs at least $300,000 a year to send an officer to the AWC. So this looks like a good place to begin budget cuts, Secretary Gates. Close the place and send the students out into the world of civilian academia, where they will be challenged intellectually and might learn something."

Update

Gen. Kane's Response: Assessing the Air War College is a Matter of Perspective at Best Defense. BLUF:"At the end of the day, we've got perception and reality here, and as we all know sometimes the perception becomes the reality even if it is only in the mind of the individual observer. You can form your perception of our institution through Dan's chapter or my thoughts."

An Evaluation of Counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War