Blog Posts

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

Jim Garamone reports that DOD to Drop Social Security Numbers from ID Cards

"Beginning June 1, Social Security numbers on military identification cards will begin to disappear, said Air Force Maj. Monica M. Matoush, a Pentagon spokeswoman. The effort is part of a larger plan to protect service members and other DOD identification card holders from identity theft, officials said."

This change is one of the first offered towards comprehensive reform by Gregory Conti, Dominic Larkin, David Raymond, and Edward Sobiesk in SWJ's The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information and the NYT's Service Members Face New Threat: Identity Theft.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

From SWJ's good super-hero friend Doctrine Man:

Message to the Next SecDef by Colonel Joseph J. Collins, USA Ret., Armed Forces Journal. BLUF: "To get us through this budget crisis, we don't need a new strategy; we need prudence, visionary leadership and tough management."

How to Deal with Libyan Ambiguity: Define the Problem, Not the End State by Captain (Major-select) Crispin Burke at Best Defense. BLUF: "So, for the moment, let's stop babbling about mission objectives, end states, and withdrawal plans. Instead, let's focus on the more immediate: the problems in Libya, their underlying causes. Next, we need to understand how solving one problem affects other problems?"

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

U.N. Staff Killed During Afghan Protest - Voice of America

At least 12 people, including eight foreign employees of the United Nations, have been killed in northern Afghanistan, after a protest against the burning of the Quran turned violent, Afghan police said Friday.

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned as "cowardly" the attack on the U.N. mission 's compound in Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of Balkh province.

Afghan officials said demonstrators stormed the U.N. office during protests against the recent burning of the Quran by an American preacher in the southern U.S. state of Florida. Afghan President Hamid Karzai had condemned the Quran burning, and called on the United States to bring those responsible to justice.

On Friday, more than a thousand demonstrators took to the streets of Mazar-e-Sharif after Friday prayers. Afghan officials said the protest outside the U.N. mission began peacefully, but that some of the demonstrators overran the compound's security guards, killing them. Police say protesters then entered the building, setting it on fire, and beheading some of the U.N. workers inside.

Afghan officials said the dead included at least three Afghan protesters and five Nepalese U.N. guards.

The top U.N. official in Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, was said to be heading to the northern city.

Demonstrations against the Quran burning were also held Friday in the Afghan capital, Kabul, and the western city of Herat, where protesters shouted anti-American slogans. No violence was reported.

In October of 2009, militants killed six U.N. employees during an attack at a guesthouse in Kabul.

President Karzai recently selected the relatively-peaceful city of Mazar-e-Sharif as one of seven areas slated to be transferred from NATO to Afghan security forces this year as part of the security transition.

More

Afghans Angry Over Koran Burning Kill U.N. Staff - New York Times

Afghan Protests of Koran Burning Turn Deadly - Washington Post

Protests Turn Deadly at Afghan U.N. Office - Wall Street Journal

Mob Kills 8 U.N. Workers in Afghanistan - Los Angeles Times

Deadly Protests for Koran Burning Reach Kandahar - New York Times

Kabul: 5 Die in Quran Burning Protest - Voice of America

Day 2: 5 Die in Quran Burning Protest - Associated Press

Five Dead in Second Day of Koran Burning Protests - Reuters

U.N. Staff Killed During Protest in N. Afghanistan - BBC News

United Nations Mission Rocked by Mob Killings - The Guardian

Seven Killed in Worst-ever Attack on U.N. Workers - Daily Telegraph

U.N. Staff Beheaded as Afghans Rage Against Pastor - The Indpendent

Afghans Angry at Quran Burning Kill 7 at U.N. Office - Associated Press

U.N. Death Toll in Afghan Attack May Hit 20 - Reuters

U.N. Condemns Deadly Attack on Afghan Office - Associated Press

U.S. 'Deeply Shocked' by U.N. Killings in Afghanistan - Voice of America

Obama Condemns Violence in Afghanistan - USA Today

Anti-Islam Pastor Responds to Killings in Afghanistan - Wall Street Journal

Pastor Who Burned Koran Demands Retribution - New York Times

Koran Burning by Pastor Initially Went Unnoticed - Washington Post

Koran Burning Pastor Calls Afghan Mob Killings Tragic - Los Angeles Times

Koran-burning Pastor Says Not Responsible for Deaths - Agence France-Presse

Florida Pastor Is Focus of Muslim Outrage, Again - Reuters

Koran Burning Ignored in U.S., News in Af and Pak - New York Times

Should Media Have Reported Fla. Quran Burning? - USA Today

Massacre in Mazar - Foreign Policy opinion

The Mazar Killings - Registan opinion

The Consequences of Qur'an Burning - The Guardian opinion

The ragtag anti-Qaddafi forces need basic combat skills a lot more than bigger guns.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Libya's rebels need boot camp, not more weapons

2) A new bomber is cheaper than Tomahawks -- if you do enough bombing

Libya's rebels need boot camp, not more weapons

Two weeks ago, when an armored column loyal to Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi was poised to crush the rebellion in Benghazi, U.S. President Barack Obama dramatically reversed his policy and endorsed a limited air campaign against Qaddafi's forces. A week ago, the rebels were on the march toward Tripoli and seemingly on the verge of removing Qaddafi from power. Alas, it was not to be. A Qaddafi counterattack has sent the scattered rebels fleeing once again back toward Ajdabiya and Benghazi. This second setback for the rebels has resulted in a debate inside the White House over whether the coalition should arm the rebels, another escalation in the conflict.

On March 30, it was reported that CIA officers were in Libya with the rebels, making an assessment of their situation and possibly directing airstrikes in support of their fighters. We can gather from open sources much of what these intelligence officers are likely to report. As a military force, Libya's rebels are a disorganized rabble and seem incapable of preparing and holding defensive positions or maneuvering effectively against rudimentary enemy resistance. The rebels need boot camp, fundamental infantry training, and the development of some battlefield leaders, not a new stockpile of weapons.

Click below to read more ...

Robert Haddick, SWJ's Managing Editor and This Week at War author, was a guest this morning on WNYC's The Brian Lehrer Show. You can listen to "The Web of Weapons" here. Robert provided a look at supplying weapons to Libyan rebels, the US's history of arming insurgencies and where Gadhafi has gotten his weapons.

The purpose of this post is two-fold, firstly an announcement of the 2nd Irregular Warfare Summit sponsored by The Institute for Defense and Government Advancement on 23-25 May 2011 at the Key Bridge Marriott, Arlington, Virginia. You can find the agenda and administrative information at the link.

Secondly, and more importantly (at least to me), is a request for information concerning my presentation at this summit. I'm scheduled to kick off the "Small Wars Focus Day" on 23 May. The title of my pitch is "The New Media and Information Technologies: Capturing Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned, Best Practices and Emerging Concepts".

In my write up for IDGA I proposed a presentation that examines how the "new media", to include online publications, blogs and social media, and information technologies have impacted traditional roles, methods, and hierarchies in regards to lessons learned, best practices (tactics, techniques and procedures) and emerging irregular warfare associated emerging concepts. The use of the new media and information technologies in regards to strategic communications will also be addressed.

My intent is to build off an earlier RFI, Thoughts on the "New Media" - compiled by Small Wars Journal, I presented our community of interest and practice in March of 2009 and am requesting your thoughts on this issue. For starters (but not limited to) I'd appreciate feedback that addresses:

- What new media and information technologies have done in regards to IW associated issues.

- How the new media and information technologies have impacted "business as usual" within the U.S. Government and in particular the Department of Defense.

- Perspectives on the good, the bad, and the ugly in regards to strategic communications.

- Understanding the "state of new media and information technologies" and its relationship with irregular warfare.

- What has worked, what hasn't, and why -- government/military and private sector.

- Food for thought on the way ahead, or maybe, the way backwards.

Please chime in below or e-mail me at ddilegge at smallwarsjournal.com. I desire multiple perspectives on this subject and appreciate in advance your contribution!

Registration and additional administrative information.

WASHINGTON, APRIL 1, 2011 -- In a fingertip-to-the-brim nod to its American frontier history, the Army is changing hats again - returning to the tumultuous days of the horse Cavalry in the wild west and adopting a dark blue Stetson as the official headgear for the current force of 1.1 million Soldiers.

"We figure the Stetson will be popular with the troops," said Sgt. Maj. Bob S. Stone, Army Uniform Board headgear task force president. "It's been a while since we have changed the headgear, so it's time. Plus a Stetson is functional and down right American."

But reminiscent of the controversial switch from the garrison cap to the black beret, the Army faces opposition from one community deeply opposed to losing its special identity with the Stetson - the Armor branch.

"Why in the heck are they doing to us what they did to the snake-eaters?" asked one officer familiar with the board's deliberations. "If you ain't Cav, you ain't ought to be wearing a Cav hat. That just ain't right."

Effective date for Stetson wear is April Fool's Day, 2012.

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links.

The Enemies of Our Enemy

Over at Foreign Policy, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman address arming the Libyan rebels in their argument, The Enemies of Our Enemy

BLUF. A key question for the international community now is whether to arm the rebels. Doing so would offer obvious advantages, but they are outweighed by the risks -- most notably the possibility that the weapons could find their way into less-friendly hands in the future. Qaddafi's weapons caches alone pose a long-term threat not just to Libya, but to other states in North Africa, including Tunisia and Egypt. Allied forces should not contribute to the problem.

The air campaign, while unlikely to depose Qaddafi on its own, has bought time for more creative means of rebel support -- ones that do not increase the danger of unintended consequences. If improving the rebels' military capacity is necessary, the international community should provide training rather than weapons. Assisting insurgents is a classic form of unconventional warfare, and it does not necessarily mean putting Western personnel in Libya. The United States can help by facilitating rebel communications and delivering virtual instruction on such military basics as digging trenches and coordinating firepower. Training and advisory assistance to rebel leaders can be provided outside Libya's borders (in a neighboring state, ideally) with support from other countries in the region.

The enemies of our enemy in Libya may not be our friends. But the danger that they pose to U.S. interests in the future will be determined in no small part by what the United States and its allies do in Libya today. There is no doubt that the choices facing policymakers are extremely difficult -- intervention is often a lose-lose situation. But the international community better get used to that ambiguity sooner rather than later -- in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, the choices will not get any easier.

Much more over at Foreign Policy

Operation Odyssey Dawn: Background and Issues for Congress

By Jeremiah Gertler

Coordinator

Specialist in Military Aviation

Congressional Research Service

March 28, 2011

Summary:

The ongoing uprising in Libya against the government of Muammar al Qadhafi has been the subject of evolving domestic and international debate about potential international military intervention, including the proposed establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, establishing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, authorizing robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo established by Resolution 1970, and authorizing member states "to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory."

In response, the United States established Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya. Military operations under Odyssey Dawn commenced on March 19, 2011. U.S. and coalition forces quickly established command of the air over Libya's major cities, destroying portions of the Libyan air defense network and attacking pro-Qadhafi forces deemed to pose a threat to civilian populations.

From the outset of operations, the Obama administration declared its intent to transfer command of operations over Libya to a coalition entity. On March 28, 2011, the NATO Secretary General announced that NATO would take over command of all aspects of military operations within a few days.

Establishment of the initial no-fly zone over Libya went smoothly. One U.S. aircraft was lost due to mechanical malfunction, but the crew was rescued. Estimates of the cost of the initial operation range between $400 million and $1 billion.

U.S. participation in Operation Odyssey Dawn and NATO operations around Libya raises a number of questions for Congress, including the role of Congress in authorizing the use of force, the costs of the operation, the desired politico-strategic end state, the role of U.S. military forces in an operation under international command, and many others.

Operation Odyssey Dawn: Background and Issues for Congress

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

By Christopher M. Blanchard

Acting Section Research Manager

Congressional Research Service

March 29, 2011

Summary:

Over forty years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government's use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi's overthrow sparked an international outcry in February and early March 2011, and a stalemate began to break in favor of the Qadhafi government, threatening civilians in opposition-held areas. The United States and other European and Arab states are now carrying out military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17 and authorizes "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid the dismantling of his military by coalition air strikes. His supporters threatened to respond to attacks by striking civilian and military targets in the Mediterranean region.

Resolution 1973 calls for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue, declares a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, and authorizes robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo on Libya established by Resolution 1970 of February 26, "while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." As of March 28, U.S. military officials reported that U.S. and coalition strikes on Libyan air defenses, air forces, and ground forces had neutralized the ability of Muammar al Qadhafi's military to control the country's airspace and were increasingly focused on targeting pro-Qadhafi ground forces found to be continuing to violate Resolution 1973 through attacks on Libyan civilians. President Obama has said the United States will not introduce ground forces and has called for Qadhafi to step down. The no-fly zone called for in Resolution 1973 is in place and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is assuming command of coalition operations. The United States and international partners are providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons in temporary camps in Tunisia and Egypt.

Until recently, the United States government was pursuing a policy of reengagement toward Qadhafi after decades of confrontation, sanctions, and Libyan isolation. President Obama now has joined some leaders in asserting that Muammar al Qadhafi must ultimately give up power, although that outcome is not called for explicitly in Resolution 1973. Obama Administration officials highlight a number of non-military steps the U.S. government has taken to achieve that objective, while military operations to protect Libyan civilians continue. U.S. steps include new targeted sanctions established in Executive Order 13566. Some Members of Congress expressed support for U.S. military intervention prior to the adoption of Resolution 1973, while others disagreed or called for the President to seek explicit congressional authorization prior to any use of force. Some executive-legislative consultation occurred prior to the start of U.S. military operations, and, on March 21, President Obama sent a letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization.

Many observers believe that Libya's weak government institutions, potentially divisive political dynamics, and current conflict suggest that security challenges could follow the current uprising, regardless of its outcome. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council which claims to represent all areas of the country and is seeking recognition and material support. In evaluating U.S. policy options, Congress may seek to better understand the roots and nature of the conflict in Libya, the views and interests of key players, and the potential consequences of the military action under way and other policy proposals under consideration.

Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy

Via Information Dissemination: "China Releases National Defense 2010 White Paper". The White Paper full text can be found here. Galrahn's bottom line: "This is a high level paper claimed to be in the spirit of transparency, but it basically reveals nothing as one might expect."

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links. Includes the latest on Operation Odyssey Dawn.

Ending an Insurgency Violently:

The Samar and Batangas Punitive Campaigns

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Bruno, U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project

25 March 2010

Download the Full Strategy Research Project: Ending an Insurgency Violently

From 1899-1902, the United States Army waged a successful counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines. For over two years, Army strategic leaders endeavored to employ a policy of benevolent assimilation to attract the Philippine populace. Due to insurgent resistance, varying levels of attraction and chastisement policies were actually utilized. In 1901, the massacre of a U.S. infantry company at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the Army to end the waning insurgency in the two remaining un-pacified provinces. Resultantly, the Army undertook punitive operations to reduce the last major rebel strongholds in the Philippines—the Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. Several scholars assert that the Samar Expedition, commanded by BG Jacob H. Smith, was based on a harsh policy of devastation. Smith's expedition undeniably resulted in significant public outrage over charges of excessive cruelty and war crimes. In contrast, the Batangas campaign plan, under the direction of BG J. Franklin Bell, is remembered as a balanced strategy of coercion and attraction. Nevertheless, both campaigns provide an opportunity to analyze the proper balance of attraction and retribution policies necessary to carry out a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Download the Full Strategy Research Project: Ending an Insurgency Violently

USMA's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) released the March 2011 issue of CTC Sentinel. Articles include

The Unraveling of the Salih Regime in Yemen

by Christopher Boucek and Mara Revkin

Using Google Insights to Assess Egypt's Jasmine Revolution

by Joshua Goldstein and Gabriel Koehler-Derrick

Accuracy of the U.S. Drone Campaign: The Views of a Pakistani General

by Brian Glyn Williams

Haqqani Network Influence in Kurram and its Implications for Afghanistan

by Jeffrey Dressler

The Risks of Supporting Tribal Militias in Pakistan

by Daud Khattak

The Factors Behind Rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan

by Chris Zambelis

Much more over at the CTC.

In other news, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released the current issue of Inspire. Outside the calls to recruit individual's to suicide missions, Zawahiri makes claims that the revolutions in the Middle East and Northern Africa are a "Tsunami of Change" inspired by God to assist in Al-Qaeda's global strategy.

Washington in Fierce Debate on Arming Libyan Rebels by Mark Landler, Elisabeth Bumiller and Steven Lee Meyers, New York Times. BLUF: "The Obama administration is engaged in a fierce debate over whether to supply weapons to the rebels in Libya... with some fearful that providing arms would deepen American involvement in a civil war and that some fighters may have links to Al Qaeda."

Related:

Amid Rebels, 'Flickers' of al Qaeda - Wall Street Journal

Opposition Includes Small Number of al-Qaeda Fighters - Washington Post

Intelligence on Libya Rebels Shows "Flickers" of Qaeda - Reuters

NATO Chief Fears al-Qaeda Have Infiltrated Rebels - Daily Telegraph

1,000 'Freelance Jihadists' Join Libyan Rebels - Washington Times

Who Are the Rebels Fighting Libyan Govt Forces? - Voice of America

U.S. Mulls Arming Libyan Rebels - NPR

Obama Doesn't Rule Out Arming Rebels - USA Today

Arms to Libya Rebels 'Not Ruled Out' - BBC News

U.S.: No Decision to Arm Rebels - Associated Press

Britain Considers Arming Rebels - Daily Telegraph

France Ready to Talk About Arming Libyan Rebels - Reuters

Italy Says Arming Libyan Rebels Would be "Extreme" - Dawn

NATO All Over The Place on Arming Libyan Rebels - Wired

At the U.N., Discussion About the Arms Embargo - BBC News

Arming Libya Rebels Not Allowed by U.N. Resolutions - The Guardian

Update One. Jamsheed K. Choksy discusses his SWJ article Libyan Rebels and Western Assistance on Ian Masters talk radio show.

Philippines a Model for Counterinsurgency by Jim Michaels, USA Today. BLUF: "Though not widely known, the Philippines once threatened to become a hub of al-Qaeda... Since 9/11, the small U.S. contingent here has given the Philippine military the tools and know-how to decimate Abu Sayyaf on its own and have created what some military experts say is a model for how to stop Islamic insurgencies before they require an invasion force to defeat."

"Is it a future model for counterinsurgencies? Absolutely."

Related:

Treading Softly in the Philippines - The Weekly Standard

The Lesser and Greater Insurgencies of the Philippines - Long War Journal

The Role of the Philippines in the Long War - Long War Journal

Investing in People - Long War Journal

OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID - Special Warfare

Securing Peace in Mindanao through Diplomacy, Development, and Defense - U.S. Embassy, Manila

Jihadists in Paradise - The Atlantic

Continue on for today's SWJ news and opinion links. Includes the latest on Operation Odyssey Dawn.

CNN's Drew Griffin reports on calls to hold U.S. military brass responsible for a deadly 2008 battle in Afghanistan.