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Admiral Harvey's Amphibious Operations Reading List in PDF.

What's a good-old fashioned amphibious exercise without a reading list? Small Wars Journal received an e-mail the other day that had a message attached from Admiral John C. Harvey, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. The message, "Amphibious and Expeditionary Operations Reading Program"; was addressed to all Commanders, Commanding Officers, Officers-in-Charge and Command Master Chiefs; and concerned preparation for Bold Alligator 12 (the largest amphibious exercise to be conducted by the Fleet in ten years). Galrahn at Information Dissemination has posted the message in its entirety here.

The message emphasized Admiral Harvey's concern that our Sea Services' collective knowledge of amphibious expeditionary operations has eroded over time. As such, the bulk of the message provided Admiral Harvey's personal reading program intended to stimulate the intellectual juices in preparation for BA 12. Good on Admiral Harvey!

The reading list is a personal program, voluntary in nature, but he truly believes it can form the basis of a stronger amphibious expeditionary operations professional reading program. The list contains four "core" books with additional reading focused on specific areas of amphibious operations to include doctrine and tactics.

Full disclosure: Despite my Marine Corps background I have not read all the books on this list and can remember little concerning those I did so many years ago. I've relied on "mini-reviews" and "product descriptions" for the short blurb after each listed book.

I also enjoin you to add to this list, let Small Wars Journal know what additions are required to build this into a world-class amphibious operations professional reading list.

Continue on for Admiral Harvey's list or download a PDF version...

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced today that the President has nominated Army Lieutenant General Robert W. Cone for appointment to the rank of general and assignment as commanding general, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va. Cone is currently serving as commanding general, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas.

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Book Review: The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid

by Linda Polman. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010. 229 pages.

ISBN: 978-0-8-50-9290-5. $23.99 (hardcover).

Reviewed by Bert Ventura

The Crisis Caravan by Linda Polman is a narrative that vividly illustrates how a multibillion dollar industry has grown up around the humanitarian aid business; and while NGOs and IGOs compete for their share of the billions in aid money, the warring parties and rogue governments are benefitting the most from the aid. Ms. Polman, an Amsterdam based freelance journalist, has spent the last fifteen years reporting from war ravaged locations around the world. She is an excellent storyteller who vividly brings to life the grim realities of human suffering and the too often futile efforts of aid organizations in a manner not often seen.

Polman suggests that governments and private donors have lost sight of the real tragedies and give money based solely on newspaper headlines and not the extent and urgency of human suffering. Throughout the chapters, she takes the reader on a tour through war zones and manmade humanitarian crisis' in Africa and the Middle East. She highlights the frustrations of a Liberian doctor who while working diligently to help amputee victims of the Sierra Leone genocide, has his efforts and successes played down by western politicians vying for publicity. Polman also discusses the frustrations felt by Afghan citizens who helplessly watch as their government and other corrupt entities siphon off billions of dollars from aid money intended to rebuild their country.

Polman's conclusions are sensible and clear-eyed. She proposes the question: If aid has become a strategic aspect of warfare that more often than not benefits the aggressor instead of the victim, should nothing at all be done? She answers her own question by suggesting that the option of "doing nothing," while not what she advocates, should not be taken off the table if it is the best option available. In other words, all options must be equally considered even if it means saying no to aid. She also asserts that the aid system should not be exempt from fair criticism because "too much is wrong with it."

Given the author's determination to strike a chord with the reader regarding abuses in the delivery of humanitarian aid, The Crisis Caravan is a must read by policy makers, private donors, aid workers and military professionals. It will definitely change the way one looks at humanitarian aid.

Major Humberto O. Ventura, a U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer with service in Iraq and Latin America; he is currently working towards his M.S. in the Defense Analysis Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

Spinning Senators Wasn't a 'Psyop,' Officer Admits - SWJ friend Spencer Ackerman, Danger Room, has the latest concerning the Rolling Stone story suggesting NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan utilized "psy-ops" on visiting U.S. citizens. BLUF: "...there was no inherent line crossed. Holmes feared that his training as an information operations officer disqualified him from spinning U.S. legislators, since information operations aren't supposed to target U.S. citizens. But both Holmes and Caldwell's team have told Danger Room that the training command didn't actually perform information operations..."

... says the Wall Street Journal (subscription required) in an editorial titled "The President's Generals". "...Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen's term ends September 30... Names under consideration include the current vice chairman, General James Cartwright, supreme commander in Europe Admiral James Stavridis, and General David Petraeus... By broad consensus, the most accomplished general officer of his generation is General Petraeus..."

Considerations on Libya

by Steven T. Brothers

We must prevent Qaddafi from more efficiently slaughtering his own people. This can be accomplished with intervention. Yet, we must carefully weigh the risks lest a hazy contingency plan creep into a muddling campaign.

As a military officer I know that no fly zones (NFZ) and air strikes are not easy to implement, nor are they necessarily effective. Libyan air defenses would need to be suppressed. We could lose aircraft. Combat search and rescue (C.S.A.R.) personnel deployed to save downed pilots could be killed or captured. Also, our laser-guided bombs would require soldiers -- on the ground --to direct them to their targets.

Those who say an NFZ would be "easy" point to Operation Northern Watch over Iraq as proof. Yet, much of Iraq's air defenses were destroyed in the Gulf war. Further, Iraqi air defenses were easier to find and destroy. Libya does not have such a capacity; what it has is more dangerous: scores of shoulder-fired missiles that are tougher to locate.

Complicating this is a dangerous absence of information about the opposition. Although Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. is "reaching out" to the rebels we should be skeptical of any intelligence information provided to us. We do not need a Libyan version of the Iraqi informant "Curveball" feeding us false tips in order to further a narrow agenda.

Also, much of the opposition are former government employees which have not been paid in days. Should this drag on for weeks -- and this is certainly possible -- there is a risk of the opposition fracturing. Rival leaders might then capitalize on U.S. ignorance and seek support for personal power grabs.

Also, what happens after Qaddafi is toppled? Libya does not have the civil capacity and structures that Tunisia and Egypt have. Libya is -- dangerously so- more like Yemen. It lacks the mechanisms to provide basic services, which themselves can check the kind of hopelessness and desperation that feeds violence.

We also must determine how far we are —to go. When does a no fly zone turn into a no drive zone? Qaddafi's aircraft should be grounded but he also possesses equally efficient means: tanks, artillery, and gun trucks. Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the Red Crescent, and other relief organizations, there is a humanitarian crisis developing. Qaddafi's forces are sealing off supply routes. Qaddafi is using food as a weapon. If we plan on assisting here, this will require "boots on the ground."

Reminiscent of Somalia, our soldiers would face the difficult task of discerning allies from enemies. A sizeable portion of the opposition is former military, many of whom still wear the same uniforms and use the same equipment as Qaddafi's forces. This makes a corner stone of any military intervention - the rules of engagement - extremely problematic.

We have not adequately evaluated the political risks. Most Libyans would resent the presence of foreign troops. If we overreach, we risk alienating the next generation of Libya's leaders and the young people that will chart its political future.

If the opposition's supposed leadership asks for an intervention then they may lose legitimacy. Libyans see this as their revolution and want to emulate the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with little outside help. The opposition has already appropriated dozens of tanks, attack helicopters, and the critically important anti-aircraft weapons. It may take a while but they might be able to accomplish this on their own.

Others have suggested inserting Special Forces teams to assist the rebels. An apparent rag-tag unprofessional gang, the rebels are led by a few professional soldiers. We could assist by sending teams to help train and lead them. Yet, this is also risky: A U.K. SAS team was captured by a faction of the opposition that considered them invaders. Also, the Libyan opposition is not the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. There is no Ahmad Shah Masoud -- nor the legacy of a martyred one -- to rally around. We do not have a twenty-plus year history of assisting the Libyan rebels. There may be a leader in the making but they have yet to assert themselves.

There are more workable options. While the U.N. has taken measures to prevent more weapons from getting to Qaddafi what about personnel? The U.N., the Arab league and the African Union must pressure those countries that have supplied the mercenaries in order to prevent more from arriving. Also, the E.U. --although it has frozen Qaddafi's assets -- must also freeze those of the Libyan state. Until the opposition is in control of the treasury, this is an option worth considering.

Qaddafi's ruthlessness rivals that of Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his leadership, rebel soldiers are bound, gagged, shot, and set on fire while merciless guns for hire execute civilians. He must be stopped. Yet, before we rush to rattling our sabers, our policy makers must build a multinational consensus, weigh the risks, and always respect the wishes of the Libyan people.

Major Steven T. Brothers is an Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Graduate Student at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. His comments do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army, the US Government, or Harvard University.

Editor's Note: While we will present all options for intervention, SWJ does not maintain an official position. Rather, we want to facilitate the discussion.

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The 2011 Army Posture Statement was published on 2 March. The Army Posture Statement is the written testimony of the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army to Congress for the annual posture hearings. It informs Congress on the state of the Army and outlines the Army's compelling needs for Congress to consider when reviewing the President's budget for the following fiscal year. The Army Posture Statement also informs internal and external audiences about recent Army accomplishments and current initiatives. The online version of the Army Posture Statement includes 15 addenda which explain key programs and policies, including ARFORGEN, the Network and the Army Profession of Arms. It also contains over 270 information papers which provide details on important initiatives and activities.

One key quote from page 11: "Violent extremism in various forms will continue to constitute the most likely and immediate threat around the world. A more dangerous threat will come from emergent hybrid adversaries who combine the agility and flexibility of being an irregular and decentralized enemy with the power and technology of a nation state. These security challenges, in whatever form they are manifested, constitute the threat that the Army and our Nation will face for the foreseeable future."

Peace-Building That Pays Off by General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret.), New York Times opinion. BLUF: "In voting last month to eliminate financing for the United States Institute of Peace, members of the House of Representatives did not do their research. You will find the institute's competent work behind practically every American success in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has undertaken missions from the Balkans and Sudan to the Philippines and Somalia, where I supported the institute's efforts to mediate conflicts, promote the rule of law and encourage democracy."

USIP is on the chopping block, it should not be, at all... - Small Wars Journal

Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.

--Albert Einstein

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British Reporter John Oliver attempts a key leader interview in an ungoverned space/denied area. In order to accomplish his task, he must covertly infiltrate, blend in with the local populace, gain their trust, and obtain actionable intelligence for the disposition/composition of his target.

The Daily Show With Jon StewartMon - Thurs 11p / 10cSearching for the Wisconsin 14www.thedailyshow.comDaily Show Full EpisodesPolitical Humor & Satire BlogThe Daily Show on Facebook

Imposing a No-fly Zone in Libya - WTOP radio interview with Robert Haddick, managing editor for Small Wars Journal, who wrote the "This Week at War" column at Foreign Policy concerning the 'Jawbreaker' option.

Some Advice to Evil Dictators

by Steven Eden

Things look pretty bleak for monarchs, presidents, and mullahs from Casablanca to Tehran these days. Crowds in the street, hesitant soldiers, frightened policemen, breathless commentators, shaky governments...it's enough to make any strongman cry. Revolution is in the air and sparks drifting from country to country are setting folks ablaze, which given the dry climate can't be good.

Steven Eden is a retired Armor officer and planner with a long-term interest in the Middle East and a graduate degree in European History.

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US Naval Institute: An Open Letter by Captain Victor Addison, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

(Posted at Information Dissemination - Bolded emphasis SWJ.)

For too many years, I have not paid close attention to the governance of the U.S. Naval Institute. I have taken for granted the fact that the Institute would always provide the "independent forum" that allows us to freely explore and share ideas in a public environment unencumbered by bureaucracy, rank, or politics. Since 1873, commands around the world have had spirited professional discussions that began with the phrase: "did you read the article in this month's Proceedings about...?" As an active duty Naval Officer, I always knew that I was free to enter these discussions--or even start one of my own—without fear of censorship or reprisal. Now that freedom is threatened by a proposal to change the Institute into an advocacy-based organization. As a loyal USNI Life member, I recommend the following:

1. Vote "no" on this initiative. Your vote counts and we need numbers to make sure this issue is resolved decisively.

2. Publicly support the continuing service of our USNI CEO, Tom Wilkerson. He is an extraordinarily courageous and innovative leader who has the Institute on the right course.

3. Publicly demand the creation of an independent panel to develop recommendations—subject to membership approval—that will improve USNI governance. For example, our current governance process is obviously tilted toward nominating retired flag officers, former senior defense officials, and corporate executives for election to the USNI Board of Directors. This demographic group is not representative of the diverse character of our USNI membership.

I have personally contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs by not paying close enough attention to USNI governance issues. I will not be making that mistake again. Please vote "NO" on this important initiative and let your voice be heard.

Gates in Afghanistan to Assess Troop Withdrawals by Elisabeth Bumiller New York Times. "... unannounced trip to meet with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and begin assessments to determine the number of American troops to be withdrawn from the country in July."

Bing West's "The Wrong War," on Afghanistan Strategy - Washington Post book review by Chris Bray. BLUF: "... West ends his descriptive and analytical narrative with prescription, in a chapter titled 'The Way Out.' Some of the solutions he offers here raise more questions than they answer, such as his observation that the availability of sanctuary in Pakistan makes it impossible to defeat an enemy that can leave Afghanistan to survive and regroup. This is true and widely acknowledged, but West joins the rest of us in having no particular answer to the dilemma. Most important, though, West argues for Afghans to assume the lead in securing Afghanistan. The time has surely come to take that suggestion - and the book in which it appears - seriously."

Also see Small Wars Journal editor Mike Few's The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan: An Interview with Bing West.

Undermanned, Overwhelmed by Dan Green Armed Forces Journal. BLUF: "Much of our approach to stability operations has been about doing what our bureaucracies are comfortable with rather than dealing with the problem of insurgency on its own terms. A significant portion of our approach is capital-centric, biased toward formal government institutions, focused on long-term development versus stabilization and imperfectly partnered with the U.S. military."

The Army's Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve? By Lieutenant Colonel Daniel E Moutan, Army Magazine. BLUF "The Army has come a long way in establishing a professional FAO program that supports service and joint requirements. It must refocus the program, however, and provide the guidance, assignments and resources to make the program more relevant to the ongoing operations in which our military is engaged."

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Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries by Chris Kraul, Los Angeles Times. BLUF: "We have a lot to learn from Colombia. We're now going through what they have experienced for the last 20 years," the 27-year-old Garcia said later of the drug-fueled violence plaguing Mexico. "What Colombian pilots know about night missions, flying over difficult terrain, and participating in joint task forces is invaluable to us."

Ground Truth: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Center for Naval Analyses Briefing

When: Monday, 7 March 2011, 10:30 am -- 12:00 pm

Where: Capitol Hill, Cannon House Office Building, Room 122

This briefing will feature the key findings of a recent CNA study, Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions (by Dr. Jerry Meyerle, Megan Katt, and Jim Gavrilis). The study includes 15 vignettes (from 10 provinces) about different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special Forces; the British Army and Marines; the Dutch Army and Marines; and the Canadian Army.

In these cases, it was up to small units on the ground to adapt counterinsurgency principles to the unique conditions they faced in different areas of Afghanistan. The briefing will feature two officers, a U.S. Army colonel and a U.S. Marine captain, who were involved in two of these cases. They will describe the diverse conditions their units faced, how they responded to these conditions, what worked and what did not, and the successes they achieved.

In addition, the authors will discuss recurring themes from the 15 vignettes, lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels, and what they mean for future conflicts.

Some of the book's key themes include:

Dealing with a localized insurgency

Navigating the political terrain

Searching for political solutions

Engaging the population and building popular support

Employing restraint in the use of force

Operating with little strategic guidance

The agenda can be found here. For more information regarding CNA's work on issues related to stability and development, please refer to this website.

PRC 2023: The Now or Never Moment on Taiwan by Robert Jordan Prescott at House of Marathon, BLUF: "... in the 2023-2032 time frame, the PRC leadership may conclude a now or never moment faces the country on a key priority -- reunification with Taiwan..."