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Over the last month, as the situation is questioned in Afghanistan and small wars perculate throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, the discussion has returned towards asking what is the nature of war in modern conflict and what is the utility of our Counterinsurgency Doctrine.

In early February, I interviewed Bing West to ask his opinion prior to the release of his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. Bing contended,

The new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare. The new COIN, however, remains an unproven theory, with a distinct downside.

Over at Foreign Policy, Dr. Stephen Walt asks Hearts, minds, and gunships: What are we really doing in Afghanistan? He comments that

It goes without saying that the accidental killing of nine Afghan boys by an American helicopter gunship was yet another public relations setback for the U.S. war effort. But more than that, I think it may also tell us a lot about how we are really waging that war, which is somewhat at odds with the rhetorical emphasis that it tends to get back home. The incident also underscores the inherent contradictions in U.S. strategy and does not augur well for our long-term prospects.

Walt links to BCSIA fellow Jacqueline L. Hazelton's Compellence in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Uses of Force in Dhofar, Oman, and El Salvador

This paper analyzes the uses of force in two successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns to delineate under what conditions the use of military force serves the state's strategic ends, and under what conditions it hinders them. The conventional wisdom prescribes the strictly limited use of force in COIN. Historically, however, successful states have used considerable force, including massive force and including the targeting of civilians. I argue that successful counterinsurgency requires using force selectively: to punish and deter, for denial, and to show resolve. Further, I sketch the conditions under which each type of force is likely to achieve state political ends, and under what conditions it is not. The cases are the British-led campaign in Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976, and the U.S.-backed campaign in El Salvador, 1979-1992.

In my opinion, enemy versus population counterinsurgency disputes are as useless to the study of war and warfare as east verse west coast disputes were to rap and music. While both provide great publicity, they lack rigor and end in senseless tragedy.

In the end, regardless of scope, breadth, or duration, war is still war. Please continue to weigh in on the discussion and send us your experience for possible publication.

Forget no-fly zones; if Obama really wants to be rid of Qaddafi, it means changing the balance of power on the ground.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) For Libya, think 'Jawbreaker,' not 'Southern Watch'

2) Is asking the Army for a quick ending asking too much?

For Libya, think 'Jawbreaker,' not 'Southern Watch'

The current struggle in Washington and European capitals over what to do about Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi sounds very much like a case of déjí  vu. A ruler of an oil-exporting Arab country -- a veteran of military confrontations with the West -- faces an armed uprising from citizens in rebellious provinces. He responds by counterattacking with regime loyalists who are supported by air power. Western military forces stationed near the fighting watch as the bombardment and street fighting proceeds. The U.N. Security Council issues a condemnation and the ruler's overseas bank accounts are seized. Western leaders discuss imposing a no-fly zone while a few openly hope that a palace coup will remove the ruler from power.

Two decades ago, this was the situation with Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein, just after the remnants of his destroyed army limped back from Kuwait. President George H.W. Bush and his advisors felt certain at the time that Saddam would not last more than a week or two against Kurdish and Shiite revolts that sprang up after his defeat in Kuwait. Little did they know how much irritation he would cause two succeeding U.S. presidents. Although U.S. policy toward Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War resulted in open-ended frustration and then another war, some policymakers apparently seem —to follow the same path today with Libya.

Just as with Saddam in March 1991, last week Qaddafi seemed certain to go down. One week later, it seems very possible that he could hold on.

Click below to read more ...

CNAS Report: U.S. and Mexico Should Embrace Regional Cooperation to Combat Drug Cartels

As Presidents Obama and Calderón continue to discuss the United States and Mexico's efforts to combat growing drug-related violence, the leaders should look to embrace regional cooperation to combat the cartels, according to a recent report authored by Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Non-Resident Senior Fellow Bob Killebrew.

In Crime Wars: Gangs, Drugs, and U.S. National Security, Killebrew surveys organized crime throughout the Western Hemisphere and analyzes the challenges it poses to individual countries and regional security. He argues that Mexico will remain a key state in the struggle against violent organized crime in the region, and that the United States should continue to support Mexico's efforts while examining its own role in the ongoing conflict. In addition, the report notes, the United States and Mexico should:

* Increase U.S.-Mexico law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

* Increase bilateral training and assistance.

* Embrace regional cooperation to attack cartels.

* Attack the cartels' financial networks and money-laundering capabilities.

"Whether Calderón and his successors can or will sustain a long-term, bloody fight to root out corruption in the Mexican state and reassert the rule of law is a matter of grave concern for the United States," said Killebrew.

Download Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security.

This report is also available for download in Spanish: Guerras del Crimen: Pandillas, Cárteles y la Seguridad Nacional Estadounidense.

Several of us at Small Wars Journal are card carrying members of the U.S. Naval Institute. For those of you who might ask why the current bru-ha-ha concerning the proposed changes in USNI's mission statement I'll quote the following e-mail that just arrived in my in-box:

I am not sure how aware you are of the USNI battle over its fundamental mission, its soul if you will, but it may not seem like something of much concern to the SWJ audience. Nothing could be further from the truth. The numbers of insurgency and COIN related article published in both Proceedings and Naval History Magazine are rather phenomenal and the entire public forum is diminished when we lose another independent public entity, especially one as well regarded at the USNI. One might even forecast that the means used to conduct the coup d'etat from within by these folks at USNI could conceivably be similar to actions that might be taken to undermine the independence of any other public service publication or electronic journal - including yours. "It could never happen here" was probably on the lips of many at USNI and among the membership just short years ago, I am sure.

Here is the current USNI mission statement:

"The Mission of the Institute is to provide an independent forum for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical to national defense."

Here is the proposed change:

"THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE IS AN INDEPENDENT FORUM ADVOCATING THE NECESSITY OF GLOBAL SEA POWER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY."

Even this simple minded Marine understands the difference between independence and advocacy. Once you become an advocate for a particular service don't knock at my door expecting sympathy. USNI is heads and tails above similar institutions associated with the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. Why? USNI does not mouth the party line -- and for that reason alone - the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard have benefited greatly over the years by USNI's INDEPENDENCE.

On the 2011 annual ballot the Board of Directors has recommended "an historic change to the Mission of the Naval Institute to 'advocating the necessity of global seapower.'" I am voting no to the proposed change and I encourage other USNI members to do the same. I'll not regurgitate what those much smarter than me have said about this issue - here are several links - and from there - you'll find more.

Information Dissemination -- Almost real-time coverage of the debate and issues by Raymond Pritchard and crew.

The Crazy Plan to Change the Longtime Mission of the U.S. Naval Institute - CAPT John Byron (USN, Ret.) at Foreign Policy's Best Defense.

Open Letter to the Board of the United States Naval Institute by John Byron - At Information Dissemination.

CDR Salamander - More near-real-time coverage of the issue.

The United States Naval Institute and the Junior Officer - By SWJ friend and author LCDR Benjamin "BJ" Armstrong at CDR Salamander.

Add additional links in the comment section below - thanks much - Dave D.

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Via USNI:

U.S. Naval Institute 2011 Member Ballot Announcement

For all Members of the Naval Institute,

In the 2011 annual ballot the Board of Directors has recommended an historic change to the Mission of the Naval Institute to "advocating the necessity of global seapower." The Board believes that the United States must support and maintain a strong, global naval capability and that a proper role for the Institute is to be a proactive advocate for that goal.

This is an important initiative from our Board of Directors; one that deserves your full attention as a member.

The full ballot will appear in the March Proceedings, and is now online here , together with a more comprehensive justification for the new Mission Statement.

In keeping faith with the 137 year tradition of our professional association as the "Independent Forum of the Sea Services" I encourage members to engage on this important initiative.

Share your views, and cast your ballot NLT April 11, 2011.

Major General Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.)

Chief Executive Officer

U. S. Naval Institute

Forty-Five Years of Frustration

America's Enduring Dilemma of Fighting Insurgents with Airpower

by Dr. Mark Clodfelter, Air and Space Power Journal

BLUF: "The problem for American air chiefs-and political leaders-is that their default position for applying airpower is often its kinetic aspect. American air commanders today cannot be expected to forgo the bombing option when insurgents attack US troops or when intelligence pinpoints "high-value" targets. Yet, those commanders-and their political leaders-must have a complete appreciation for the potential costs of such bombing and for whether the potential long-term price is worth the desired short-term gain. In certain cases, the costs may appear justified. For most, though, restraint is probably the prudent course of action. The emphasis on kinetic airpower helped doom America's pursuit of broad-based political goals against an insurgent enemy in Vietnam and may well to do the same as America follows those footsteps in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Forty-Five Years of Frustration

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The March-April 2011 Edition of Military Review has been published. Here is the lineup with links to individual articles:

Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0: The Way the Army Fights Today by Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., U.S. Army. Change 1 to FM 3-0 advances the concept of mission command beyond mere philosophy to make it a catalyst for change in the Army.

Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxis by Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D., and Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired. We must have a relevant theory and comprehensive strategy that goes beyond the military dimension.

Fighting to Understand: A Practical Example of Design at the Battalion Level by Lieutenant Colonel Pat Proctor, U.S. Army. The 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery Regiment's combat operations in Iraq from 2009 to 2010 offer a case study in the application of design to a real world problem.

A Practical Guide to Design: A Way to Think About It, and a Way to Do It by Lieutenant Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr., Ph.D., U.S. Army. The Army's approach to design offers commanders a new way to lead forces in a world of irregularities, surprises, and fleeting opportunities.

How Emotional Intelligence Can Make a Difference by Gerald F. Sewell. The Army's comprehensive fitness programs must include awareness and training in emotional intelligence.

Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Security Forces: Fighting Asymmetry with Symmetry by Major Juan P. Nava, U.S. Army. Mexico will not fail despite serious economic challenges, increasing voter apathy, and an ongoing struggle with transnational criminal organizations.

The Way Out of Afghanistan by Bing West. America's warrior ethos is being diluted by employing counterinsurgency theory in Afghanistan; it is time to transition fully to an advisor role that can invigorate Afghan security forces.

Beyond Reconciliation: Developing Faith, Hope, Trust, and Unity in Iraq by Major Nathan Minami, U.S. Army, Colonel David Miller, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Davey, U.S. Army, and Mr. Anthony Swalhah. Creating local and regional unity movements in multiple areas across Iraq will help foster democracy.

The Coming Test of U.S. Credibility by Amitai Etzioni. How the United States responds to challenges by Iran and North Korea has strong implications for its credibility.

Report Urges Rethink of U.S. Aid in Afghanistan (Canadian Press) and Ex-Pentagon Adviser Says U.S. Should Cut Afghan Aid (Associated Press) both point here: Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency by Dr. Mark Moyar at Small Wars Journal.

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Dr. Mark Moyar's Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide, (c) 2011 Orbis Operations, LLC, is posted here with permission of the author.

Continue on for the link and the Executive Summary...

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Information Operations doesn't do IO

by MisoMan

Mr. Michael Hastings of Rolling Stone Magazine, coupled with information provided by LTC Michael Holmes (an Information Operations Officer assigned to the 71st Theater Information Operations Group) created a maelstrom of confusion and misinformed discussion regarding two related -- and yet distinct functions within the United States Army.

Information Operations and Psychological Operations are not the same. They are often incorrectly labeled as synonymous, but this due to a fatal flaw in the Army Staff Structure - not because of doctrinal misrepresentation. This article will serve to demonstrate the misunderstanding and attempt to clarify some roles and responsibilities.

It is necessary to highlight that currently the within the "Information Realm", the United States Department of Defense is undergoing a period of transformation, restructuring, and redefining its doctrine. As such, much is open to interpretation until doctrine is updated and disseminated throughout the Army and the Joint Force.

MisoMan is a trained Soldier in the Art of Influence, known as Military Information Support Operation (MISO). He has experience at the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic levels of influence, including support to Joint and Interagency elements. MisoMan is not a representative of the Department of Defense or the United States Army; rather -- he is voice of clarity, interpretation, and truth. The opinions located within this paper are solely his.

Mind Games: Why Rolling Stone's Article on the Military's Domestic PSYOP Scandal Gets it So Wrong by Matt Armstrong at Foreign Policy. BLUF: "... The original purpose of the Smith-Mundt Act was to give America a voice in the building war of information around the world. Introduced in Congress in October 1945, the prohibition on domestic dissemination of material intended for foreign audiences by the State Department was to protect the government and the American public from the "drones," "loafers," and "men of strong Soviet leaning" within the department. In other words, it not an anti-propaganda law, but a protective measure against a department of questionable loyalty. If it had been, or currently is, a broad brush law, we would not have had the campy "perils of communism" films or administration officials appearing on Sunday talk shows. It is ironic that a law intended to counter disinformation is subject itself to so much misinformation. This is ultimately another cautionary tale about people doing something they are not trained for and the media commenting on something they know little to nothing about. Both of which must be fixed for the sake of U.S. national security."

Spring Fighting Season Looms In Afghanistan - NPR roundtable with C.J. Chivers, New York Times, John Nagl, Center for a New American Security, and Bing West, author of The Wrong War.

Lead-in: "Fighting typically picks up from its winter lull as the snow melts in Afghanistan. Some analysts say the U.S.-led counterinsurgency is going as planned, but others argue that civilian causalities are undermining those efforts, and may stall the planned drawdown of U.S. troops."

My (belated) analysis of Defense Secretary Robert Gates's speech last Friday at West Point. BLUF: "Gates's speech was a warning that the Army is about to get smaller, more intellectually challenging, and with promotions harder to come by. The result, Gates hopes, will be an Army that can make security force assistance into a highly effective and widely used tool. It is an unproven theory. But it's a plan that has to work."

Click below to read more ...

Gates On COIN: What Was Really Said? by David Ucko at Kings of War. BLUF: "The problem with the coverage of this speech is that it combines hedges and qualifying preambles from disparate parts of the address and paints a picture of a Secretary of Defense disenchanted with counterinsurgency, and repentant about ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Too much attention is given to the shaping of the arguments rather than their intended thrust. A closer read of the address reveals a very different, and very important message, one that is unfortunately struggling to get out."

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Military Officials Dispute Claim Army Unit Was Directed to Manipulate Senators - Jennifer Griffin and Justin Fishel, FOX News.

"... Holmes was disgruntled because his original assignment to influence Afghans was no longer needed when Caldwell took up the training command. Holmes apparently thought he was supposed to use "psychological operations" to find the Taliban and "turn them," according to the officer. But that wasn't what Caldwell's command wanted of him..."

"Holmes reportedly spent much of his time on Facebook setting up a strategic communications firm called SyzygyLogos with the woman with whom he was accused of having an improper relationship in Afghanistan, Maj. Laural Levine. Holmes denies that charge..."

Army: Gen. Caldwell's Accuser Had No Psy-Ops Training - Julian Barnes, Wall Street Journal.

An Army officer who accused a top general in Afghanistan of using "psychological operations" against visiting lawmakers in an article in Rolling Stone magazine was not trained in the military specialty, Defense Department officials said.

The U.S. Army's Special Operations Command announced Friday that their special warfare center has no record of training Lt. Col. Michael Holmes in "psychological operations." ...

.. a military officer who served with Lt. Col. Holmes and under Gen. Caldwell said the accusation is baseless, and that the officer was specifically told not to use information operations techniques...

Rolling Stone's War on Our Troops - Washington Times editorial.

... Mr. Hastings primary source is Lt. Col. Michael Holmes, the head of the information operations (IO) unit who is portrayed in the cliched role of the selfless whistleblower bucking the system. But according to information obtained by The Washington Times, Lt. Col. Holmes is better characterized as a disgruntled soldier who had been caught engaging in alleged improprieties and is using the liberal anti-war press to strike back...

A humdrum staff-support job apparently was not what Lt. Col. Holmes had in mind when he deployed. Our second source said, "[Holmes and Levine] weren't happy about it because they wanted to float around Kabul on their own." When Lt. Col. Holmes was ordered by his superiors to do work he considered beneath him, such as looking up the biography of a visiting dignitary, he "used the 'I am an IO trained person I cannot do that' [argument]." Apparently, that's how some think "an Army of one" is supposed to work...

U.S. Army May Have Used PSYOP Against Senators. How is That Different from PR? - Anna Mulrine, Christian Science Monitor.

According to Rolling Stone, a general asked a psychological operations specialist to help him get inside the heads of visiting senators. The military asks, was he trying to manipulate the Congressional delegation or just be a good host?

... The problem, say some senior military officials, is the often-complex distinctions between PSYOP specialists and public affairs officers, who routinely prepare background dossiers on visiting officials. The distinctions are further blurred, they add, by an increasingly media-savvy American military eager to influence "hearts and minds" both abroad and at home...

Not the Stuff of Bud Light Lime - Galrahn, Information Dissemination.

... Are you kidding me? A disgruntled Lt. Col. who normally does information operations in the Facebook fan club of Caldwell's social software shop gets assigned staff work for VIP visits, and the article frames that assignment to Holmes - leveraging his opinion of being assigned what he considers work beneath his keyboard skill set - as a crime? Yep, and that context is reinforced by the author...

Sorry folks, but I don't see this as the stuff of Bud Light Lime. The only allegation being made is that Caldwell dared to ask this Holmes and his internet nerds to research and plan for a visit by VIPs for the purposes of briefing and prepping Caldwell for the visit, and the intent was so that Caldwell would be prepared to communicate more effectively his needs for more money and more people. Those are the specific allegations made by Holmes in the story, everything else in the story was the narrative that implied illegal activity added by Michael Hastings...

What I see here is a disgruntled staff officer with an axe to grind against his boss, and a reporter —to play along.

Officer Denies Efforts to Sway Lawmakers - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

"... Lt. Col. Shawn Stroud, communications director for NATO's training mission in Afghanistan, sent out a personal e-mail to friends and colleagues to "categorically deny the assertion" that the commander, Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, or his officers "used an Information Operations cell to influence distinguished visitors."..."

"... The military has no record of Colonel Holmes being listed as a qualified psychological operations officer, according to Pentagon officials. Colonel Holmes acknowledged that on Saturday..."

Military Denies Use of Intelligence Tactics on Senators - Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post.

"... officers, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the investigation, said Holmes never was asked to use psychological operations, deception or other tactics that would be illegal when applied to fellow Americans. He simply was being asked to conduct research using publicly available material, they said. They also said Holmes never attended any of the meetings with visiting members of Congress..."

"... independent specialists in military law said Holmes's position as an information operations officer, regardless of whether he was formally reassigned, does not mean he cannot be asked to perform other legal tasks. If you're being asked to chip in and help someone else, that's a lawful order..."

Hastings, Caldwell and PSYOP Kerfuffle - Benjamin Domenech, The Compass.

"... So why would this article even be written? Why would Holmes and Hastings spin what is at most a benign misallocation of personnel into a grand conspiracy? Well, the answer is included in the same piece: an AR 15-6 inquiry and a disciplinary report filed against Holmes. Hastings depicts the investigation as being retribution for Holmes' claiming he was being assigned inappropriate duties, and compares the memo afterward to the Starr report - but the investigation found Holmes was drinking too much, "going off base in civilian clothes without permission," "improperly using his position to start a private business," and most significantly, "having an 'inappropriate' relationship with one of his subordinates." ..."

"While Holmes and the subordinate in question, Maj. Laural Levine, deny that anything inappropriate was going on (they claim they're merely working on starting that private business together), if the two had been busted for an inappropriate relationship, that is not an insignificant thing. In fact, it's grounds enough to boot them both out of the military if one of the participants is married..."

Psy-ops Against Congress -- Count Me as Skeptical - Jack Goldsmith, Lawfare.

"... as far as I can tell, the factual charges against General Caldwell come from a single source, Colonel Michael Holmes, the leader of one of Caldwell's information operations units. Hastings states that Caldwell and his subordinates asked Holmes to "conduct an IO campaign against" visiting officials. But the facts offered in support of this supposed operation are thin. Holmes was (by his account) ordered to research and provide background assessments on the visitors, and prep the General for his meetings. When Holmes complained about the order, it was clarified to specify that he should "only use publicly available records to create profiles of U.S. visitors." Holmes colors this seemingly innocent tasking in dark shades..."

"... Hastings has not charged that Caldwell acted imprudently by selecting the wrong person to prepare him to brief members of Congress. He has charged that Caldwell was running an illegal psychological operation against Congress in order to advance his career at the expense of his mission. That charge is unsupported and highly dubious. The whole story seems like a one-sided hatchet job to me."

Sen. John McCain Responds To Psy-Ops Claims: 'Put Me Down As Skeptical' (Video) - Amanda Terkel, Huffington Post.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) responded on Sunday to a report that he was the target of "psychological operations" by the U.S. military to pressure him on Afghanistan, defending the general at the center of the controversy and saying he was "skeptical" of the accusations.

Hastings Battles Generals on the Pages of Rolling Stone - Editor, War on Terror News.

"When Michael Yon attacked Generals Menard and McChrystal, his readership soared. When Michael Hastings of Rolling Stone magazine published disparaging remarks by General McChrystal's staff, their hits peaked at 943,000 the day after, 600% of their norm. Their American readership soared from 100k to 753k that day. There's no telling how many copies of that issue were sold. The General was fired within hours for daring to note that the POTUS had hardly given him the time of day. Hastings got a Polk Award from for taking down the General. Their online revenue likely hit 6x the norm as well."

"So, it's little surprise, that Hastings and Rolling Stone have decided to try to replicate those numbers. This time, they're going after LTG Caldwell IV, and relying on hearsay and "he said, she said," with a zeal reminiscent of the Inquisition. He's aligned himself with an officer with a bone to pick: LTC Holmes (a married man) was investigated for inappropriate relations with a subordinate and evidently took issue with orders given him by the General, his boss. Hastings decided to get the hackles of Senators up, by implying they had been played."

"But there are some things that don't add up in the LTC's story. He claims that his role is "PsyOps," but one insider has called him out on it. Evidently, the officer was assigned in an "Information Operations" (IO) role, and does not appear to be involved in a "psychological operations" position at all..."

The Men Who Stare At Senators - Blackfive.

"... This whole article is a piece of garbage and Michael Hastings is this century's muck raker extraordinaire. If anyone has access to the 15-6 investigation, I would love to read it. I wonder why Michael Hastings hasn't posted it along with his article? I'm probably going to drop a FOIA on it soon."

"A proper investigation is in order, certainly. I would bet a lot of money that it will reveal that the man with intergrity and honor through all of this is LTG Caldwell and not LTC Holmes..."

"Unfortunately, this creates a significant distraction for a man who's job is relentless in pace with no acceptable outcome other than victory. We wish C3 the best!"

On the Cover of the Rolling Stone: Hastings Aims at Another General, the Military Fires Back - The Brat, Assoluta Tranquillita.

"Michael Hastings of Rolling Stone is at it again. Little punk Mikey, whose most recent claim to fame was writing a story on General Stanley McChrystal, decided to milk his 15 minutes of infamy, and has set his sights on yet another General, in this case LTG William Caldwell IV."

"I really did try to read Mikey's latest breathless prose, but honestly? I just couldn't get past the first few paragraphs to know that, once again, this 'award-winning "journalist" is so intent on claiming another scalp, and yet more notoriety, he doesn't do his homework..."

Rolling Stone Targets Another General - CJ, A Soldier's Perspective.

"Like Blackfive, I wouldn't be surprised if this LTC is out for vengeance and swinging wildly trying to pass the buck. I have worked and do work very closely with Psy-ops units for years and they all know the rules. Being in the military, I see exactly what is happening from this article, but the uninformed that have never served a day in uniform will assume the worst..."

"... I can only surmise that LTC Holmes truly had no grasp of the differences between PAO and IO. I'm confident that LTC Caldwell will come out of this unscathed as I know him to be a honorable, competent, and engaging leader. Believe me, I have no problem saying when I think an officer or any other Soldier is wrong..."

Dissecting the Runaway Journalist - Joe Harlan, Registan.

"Michael Hastings' latest revelation on general officers in Afghanistan reveals more about his sources and how he pastes together his information than anything about how operations in Afghanistan are run. Setting aside the possible motives of LTC Michael Holmes, who at the very least acted improperly by taking what amount to command grievances to the public press, there are some clues as to how Hastings constructs his critiques that need addressing - namely, that he takes a mix of publicly available information, gets a few salacious details from insiders, and writes a piece meant to challenge the powerful. Isn't that what journalists are supposed to do? Not when they get them so fantastically wrong..."

Lawyer Told General His Spin Wasn't Illegal Psyop - Noah Shachtman and Spencer Ackerman, Danger Room.

"The accusation was explosive and unambiguous: A top general in Afghanistan used illegal "information operations" to influence visiting U.S. Senators. But military documents obtained by Danger Room show that at least one Army lawyer deemed the work legal. What's more, the alleged information operator's bosses repeatedly told him that he was just another communications staffer, not some bender of minds..."

Sens. McCain, Lieberman Say Report on 'Psyops' was 'Weird' - Raw Story (CNN Video at the Link).

"Two top US Senators who were reportedly targeted by military "psyop" units said Sunday they don't believe the report was accurate, calling it "weird." Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) was particularly hesitant to trust the media over the military given his background as an airman, even though the reporter's last major story forced one of America's top generals out of his job."

Mind Control is Just Not That Easy - Megan McArdle, The Atlantic.

"... I mean, sure, there probably are advanced psychological techniques that could induce senators to appropriate more money for the Afghanistan operations. But those techniques, perfected by Asian communists, are not executed in two hour meetings with a powerpoint deck and an urn full of stewed coffee..."

"... basically the entire story comes from a single guy who seems to have gotten himself into hot water, somewhat coincidentally, not long before he decided to become a whistle-blower. Holmes (and Hastings) argue that this was retaliation for complaining about his inappropriate orders to provide his general reports on visiting legislators. But of course, there's also the possibility that he was the one who was looking for payback..."

Reference Documentation:

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CoS Memorandum for Staff Directors, NTM-A/CSTC-A. Subject: Information Engagement Activities. COL Joseph P. Buche, dated 15 June 2010.

Investigation timeline, undated, authored by COL Joseph Buche, former Chief of Staff at NTM-A, based on a series of e-mails covering the 15-6 investigation concerning LTC Michael Holmes.

26 February 2011 e-mail to Small Wars Journal, from a friend of ours, highlighting the personal thoughts of Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud. LTC Shroud is the Communications Director of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.

More to follow, stay tuned.

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Expanding Your Knowledge of Modern Arab Military Culture:

Books on Arab Military Development and Experiences

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

An understanding of the military roots of various Arab countries is vital as the United States undertakes further engagement in the region. Morocco is an old and valued partner of the United States. Morocco was the first country to recognize the United States as a sovereign nation (20 December 1777), its relationship with America include such trials as weathering the storms of World War Two and today being designated a major non-NATO Ally who has suffered from terrorism with the recent bombings in Casablanca. The Moroccan military has seen service in Bosnia, Somalia and in multiple peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Sierra Leone. Douglas Porch, who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate school, is an expert on French military affairs. He has written a book that discusses the French difficulties in subduing Morocco and brining it under colonial control in his 1986 book, The Conquest of Morocco: A Savage Colonial War (London: PaperMac Books, ISBN 0-333-44461-2). French colonial expansion in the early twentieth century was dominated by a small circle of French politicians and military senior officers who saw that French ideals could be better mastered in its colonial possessions, free from the taint of liberal political and social intrigue, these were the same ultra-conservatives who would be implicated in the infamous Dreyfus Affair, that sent an innocent artillery captain to Devil's Island on charges of espionage because, above all, he was Jewish.

CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is author of "Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," (Naval Institute Press, 2010).