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Transcript

Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

Kabul, Afghanistan

July 20, 2010

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, Minister Rassoul. And I am honored to join representatives from more than 70 countries and organizations to stand in strong support of a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Afghanistan. I want to thank President Karzai and the Afghan Government for hosting us today and for the months of preparation that were needed to make this conference a reality. And before I begin, I want to join the secretary general in congratulating the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan for the successful negotiation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement earlier this week. This is the most significant achievement between these neighbors in nearly 50 years and it will go a long way towards strengthening regional economic ties, creating jobs, and promoting sustainable economic development -- all of which are critical to the people of both countries.

Today's conference represents a milestone in a long and difficult journey. Here in Kabul, we are following Afghanistan's lead. The Afghan people and government have charted a comprehensive strategy for their future. Their plans are detailed, practical, and reflect a great deal of work and consultation. And we are here as representatives of individual nations and as members of the global community to offer our support and align our resources behind Afghan goals and Afghan policies.

Now, we know the road ahead will not be easy. Citizens of many nations represented here, including my own, wonder whether success is even possible, and if so, whether we all have the commitment to achieve it. Well, we will answer these questions with our actions. Today, we join in launching what the Afghan Government has termed "the Kabul process." It is a process that reflects a commitment to accountability, including clear benchmarks and milestones. And indeed, this conference is about accountability -- accountability for the United States, for the United Nations, for members of the international community, and for the Afghan Government. We are called not only to voice support for the people of Afghanistan, but to honestly assess the progress we've made, identify the gaps between our expectations and our performance, and resolve to close those gaps together through patient, persistent efforts...

Continue on for the remainder of Secretary Clinton's speech...

The US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Major Nathan Springer, U.S. Army: from 1000 CST, (1100 EST), (1600 ZULU) on Thursday, 22 July 2010.

Major Springer Commanded in Afghanistan as he served in the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173rd ABCT in Northeast Konar and Eastern Nuristan Province during OEF 07-08. His briefing will discuss the leader and Soldier training necessary to be successful within the current ISAF population-centric COIN strategy. MAJ Springer holds a M.A. in National Security Affairs, Homeland Security and Defense, from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and has published numerous articles on the execution of population-centric COIN at the tactical level.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinweb and participate via Defense Connect Online (DCO) as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

Col. McCuen was an author, lecturer, business executive and a consultant on Irregular Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Hybrid War. He was a 1948 graduate of West point and earned a Master of International Affairs degree from Columbia University's School of International Affairs. He commanded a dual paratroop/Armored Cavalry Squadron in Germany, was Director of Internal Defense and Development Studies and Chairman of the First Current Affairs Panel at the US Army War College at Carlisle, PA. He was the author of The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War -- The Strategy of Counter- Insurgency which during the 1960's -- 1970's was on the Department of the Army's "required reading" list. After retirement from the Army, he was General Dynamics Chief of Abrams Tank Training and then later General Dynamics Manager of Field Operations, having a hundred of his men and women in Desert Storm with Abrams Tank units. Beloved husband of Gloria S. for 61 years. Dear father of John J. Jr. (Vera) and Les S. (Theresa). Grandfather of Matthew, Haley, Christopher, Vitale and Victoria. Also survived by his pet dogs Tanker, Tillie and Ruby. Family will receive friends at A.J. Desmond & Sons (Vasu, Rodgers & Connell Chapel), 32515 Woodward, (btwn 13-14 Mile), Thursday 4-8p.m. Memorial tributes to Almost Home, P.O. Box 250602, West Bloomfield, MI 48325.

Much more at Orbis.

Some have become cynical about Washington's ways. But we should consider whether there might be deeper causes that mere bureaucratic competition and empire-building behind the vast expansion in the IC. Rather than being only a self-interested grab by agencies and contractors for money and power, the great expansion of the IC also reflects the preferences of the broader American society. We could save money by making significant cuts in the IC's counter-terrorism activities. But that would mean taking risks with casualties, civil liberties, or responsibilities that many Americans would find uncomfortable. So, perhaps not yet having thought through the financial tradeoffs, the public, at least for now, is happy to "spend whatever it takes." In other words, if we are outraged by the size, expense, and waste of "Top Secret America," we all share the blame.

For example, the minimum acceptable standard for counter-terror success is presumably zero attacks within the United States homeland. An Islamist maniac shooting up a reception center at Fort Hood with two pistols or a crude attempted car bomb in Times Square are deemed to be unacceptable failures, requiring investigations and bureaucratic shakeups. An alternative and thriftier approach for the federal intelligence community would have it focus on only truly mass casualty scenarios such as nuclear, chemical, biological, maritime, and commercial aviation threats. Preventing relatively low casualty threats such as car bombs, suicide bombers, and gunmen would fall on states, cities, and the citizens themselves.

But don't expect anyone to propose cutting $100 billion over ten years from the IC's budget in exchange for a, say, 25% increase in the chance of 200 terror murders in the U.S. over the same ten years. One reason the IC may be so costly and complex is because of the urge to spend extra money in an attempt to save that extra life from a terror attack. American society seems —to make that marginal payment. In this sense, society's preferences for the IC's spending on counter-terrorism matches the society's preferences for health care spending -- every extra year of life is worth it, whatever the price. Not surprisingly, the budgets for the IC and health care are following the same exponential trajectory.

Click through to read more ...

Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, presents in-depth profiles of each of the insurgencies.

Download the full monograph at Rand.

Observations on Recent Trends in Armored Forces - David E. Johnson, John Gordon, IV; Rand Occasional Paper.

For an ongoing project entitled "An Army for Full Spectrum Operations: Lessons from Irregular Wars," RAND Arroyo Center researchers assessed recent "irregular" conflicts and their implications for U.S. Army force mix and capabilities, as well as for the elements that support or operate with ground forces. This paper provides initial research observations on how various militaries view the role of heavy forces (tanks and other armored vehicles) in irregular warfare (IW) and hybrid warfare environments. The views of the U.S. Marine Corps, the British Army, the Canadian Army, the Danish Army, and the Israeli Army are discussed. What emerges from the research to date is that each of these forces believes that there is a role in IW and hybrid warfare for heavy forces, including tanks, because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.

Download the full occasional paper at Rand.

Much more at PBS.

WASHINGTON, DC 20511

July 19, 2010

Acting Director of National Intelligence, David C. Gompert, reaction to the Washington Post series.

This morning, the Washington Post began a series of articles on the growth of the Intelligence Community following the terrorist attacks on 9/11. The reporting does not reflect the Intelligence Community we know.

We accept that we operate in an environment that limits the amount of information we can share. However, the fact is, the men and women of the Intelligence Community have improved our operations, thwarted attacks, and are achieving untold successes every day.

In recent years, we have reformed the IC in ways that have improved the quality, quantity, regularity, and speed of our support to policymakers, warfighters, and homeland defenders, and we will continue our reform efforts. We provide oversight, while also encouraging initiative. We work constantly to reduce inefficiencies and redundancies, while preserving a degree of intentional overlap among agencies to strengthen analysis, challenge conventional thinking, and eliminate single points of failure. We are mindful of the size of our contractor ranks, but greatly value the critical flexibility and specialized skills they contribute to our mission.

The challenges that lie ahead are difficult and complex. We will continue to scrutinize our own operations, seek ways to improve and adapt, and work with Congress on its crucial oversight and reform efforts. We can always do better, and we will. And the importance of our mission and our commitment to keeping America safe will remain steadfast, whether they are reflected in the day's news or not.

David C. Gompert

-----

Q&A on the IC Post-9/11

Truth about Contractors

ODNI Fact Sheet

ODNI Organizational Chart

Previewing Priest: Inside the Semi-Secret World - The Atlantic

Counterinsurgency by Dr. David Kilcullen, reviewed by Basil and Spice.

More at Basil and Spice.

More at Kings of War.

The list is vetted through the components and TSOCs to ensure that research will advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. The final recommendations for research topics are approved by the USSOCOM commander.

These topics, concepts, and processes reflect the challenges of winning the current conflicts and meeting the needs for the conflicts most likely to face us in the foreseeable future. This alone speaks to the need for more debate, research, and study. If you have any questions about this document, JSOU Press in general, or how JSOU can assist you in your academic research, contact the director of Research, [email protected].

More at The Interpreter.

You can have the best COIN doctrine in the world and the most swept up culturally aware warriors that exist, able to rain down death and destruction in 3 local languages and say sorry afterwards. But if you cannot come up with a decent plan, implement it effectively and maintain your combat power while doing so you are still going to get egg on your face! It's all about the basics.

And then Ken:

My emphasis (It's all about the basics). Because that really sums it up. We are overly concerned with displaying (word of choice) our sophistication and erudition thus we have lost sight of that inviolable truth.

Much more at Politics Daily.

Executive Order 13434, issued in direct response to lessons learned from 9/11, Katrina and other disasters that have threatened our national security, calls for the establishment of a corps of National Security Professionals (NSPs); leaders who will be called upon to work across the interagency in response to various domestic and international crises. Past responses have proven that working across departmental boundaries requires leadership capabilities derived from an interagency perspective. To effectively serve in this capacity, NSPs must be prepared - trained, educated, and experienced. They must be able to work together to respond quickly, efficiently, and effectively.

To aid in readiness, the DoD NSPD Implementation Office is conducting the first National Security Professional Development symposium, hosted by the National Defense University August 4 -- 5, 2010. The symposium, entitled, "National Security Professionals: Forming an Interagency Community," is intended to lay the foundation towards the development of a community of National Security Professionals. Enhanced awareness, expanded cultural acuity, collaboration and developed networks are critical characteristics demonstrating readiness and key outcomes of this symposium.

The DoD NSPD Implementation Office formed an interagency symposium working group responsible for developing the content. Representatives on the working group are from participating agencies including Department of State, Energy, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, National Defense University, Defense, NSPD Integration Office, and the United States Institute of Peace.

Please visit the National Security Professional Development Symposium web site for more.

by Andrew Garfield

General Petraeus, in his recent Senate Confirmation Hearing, reminded everyone that in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, "the key terrain is the human terrain." Taking and holding the human terrain is the essential prerequisite for ultimate success in Afghanistan, as it was in Iraq. This battle for control of and support from a contested population can only be won if we understand the Afghan people, whose cooperation, trust and support we are trying to secure. Armed with this understanding, we can navigate the human terrain successfully. Without it, we continue to be confused by the complexities of their culture, faith and society; oblivious to their desires, grievances and opinions; distracted by the lies and distortions of our enemies; and blind to opportunities to enhance our reputation.

In much of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan today, the Taliban hide, recruit, train, prepare and attack from safe havens provided by the local Pashtun population. They remain hidden for extended periods simply by hiding in plain sight; well known to elements of the local population who are un—or unable to challenge their presence. If we are to challenge the Taliban in Kandahar and elsewhere in Afghanistan, and enhance the influence and effectiveness of the Afghan Government, our soldiers and diplomats must understand fully the society and culture in which they operate.

Continue on for more...

Tribal engagement in Afghanistan is an increasingly hot topic among U.S. Government,

academia, the think tank community and the blogosphere.  Articles, blog posts

and papers on tribal engagement written by authors with recent experience in Afghanistan

collectively ignited a heated debate on the efficacy of pursuing this kind of sub-national

strategy -- a debate that many in the national security community are watching closely. 

With this in mind, Small Wars Foundation hosted a two-day

Tribal Engagement Workshop

(TEW) focused on Afghanistan from March 24-25, 2010 in Fredericksburg, VA. 

The TEW was cosponsored by Small Wars Foundation,

the U.S. Joint Forces Command

Joint Irregular Warfare Center, the U.S. Marine Corps

Center for Irregular Warfare, the

U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Center, and

Noetic. The workshop was

designed to address conceptual issues associated with tribal engagement and explore

the considerations that operators and planners would have to address in order to

implement a tribal or local engagement program.

The

TEW Summary Report is available now.  We are working to organize and present

additional material via the TEW

Event Page. In the interim, there is a good amount of background information

there now.

The workshop was made possible in the first place through the vision, support

and engagement of Noetic.  Small Wars Foundation extends its sincere thanks

to Ben Fitzgerald and team.  The co-sponsors (Noetic, JIWC, CIW, and COIN Center)

all brought interest, expertise, and a variety of critical capabilities and support

to the table; their decisive engagement along with a diverse and expert group of

participants made the event a success.  We would especially like to express

our gratitude to our speakers, facilitators, and analysis team:  (list

of bios)

Caerus Associates

Noetic Group

Institute for National Security Studies

RAND

Marine Corps University

US Army and USMC COIN

Center

Caerus Associates

Analysis

Analysis

Noetic Group

As more outputs from the event become available, they will be posted on the

TEW Event Page.

By Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, July 14, 2010 -- Afghan President Hamid Karzai has approved a program that will set up local police forces in towns and villages where the Taliban are attempting to infiltrate and intimidate the population.

The local police forces will bridge the gap until fully trained government forces can step in, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell said at a news conference today.

"While we are simultaneously operating at a far higher tempo and degrading the Taliban so they are less of a threat to these local communities, we can utilize a willing, local, armed population to do community policing," Morrell said.

The local police forces are not militias, Morrell explained. Karzai approved a plan to put up to 10,000 community police in place, to be paid by the government and to operate under the control of the Afghanistan's interior ministry.

"This is about putting locals to work, so that they can be on watch in their communities for people who shouldn't be there, and then work with the established security organizations -- the [Afghan] army, the police, the coalition -- to make sure they don't menace their communities," Morrell said.

Though the preferred solution in the country is a fully trained police force, a Defense Department official speaking on background said, "the recent discussion and decision is an encouraging sign of Afghan officials taking serious, detailed interest in both their short-term security needs and the long-term sustainability of security programs."

Officials said examples of Afghan villagers banding together to deny the Taliban access to their towns have been encouraging.

"We clearly have seen examples of local communities repelling attempts by the Taliban to infiltrate and intimidate their communities," Morrell said. "We have also, though, seen examples where there are communities that may not have stepped up in that demonstrable a way, but clearly want to and are looking for help in doing so."

Since June 1, the Taliban have killed 89 percent of the civilians killed in Afghanistan. Morrell pointed out that if the coalition and Afghan government forces kill civilians, it is inadvertent. "By contrast, we know that the Taliban [are] deliberately targeting civilians," he said. "And they are doing so at an increasingly high rate."

Related Sites:

Transcript - U.S. Department of Defense

Tribal Engagement Workshop - Small Wars Journal

More:

Pentagon Defends Afghan Local Police Plan - Voice of America

President Karzai Approves Plan for Local Defense Forces - Washington Post

Afghans to Form Local Forces to Fight Taliban - New York Times

Afghan Gov't Says OK to Local Defense Forces - Associated Press

Local Afghan Security Forces 'Temporary Solution' - Agence France-Presse

"General David Petraeus is settling in as President Obama's top man in Afghanistan. Petraeus and his commanders are pushing a plan to help Afghan villagers fight the Taliban on their own but Afghan President Karzai is said not to like the idea much. David Kilcullen talks to Mary Louise Kelly about adapting counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Kilcullen was a senior advisor to Petraeus during the Iraq surge in 2007."

Download the full Forum Paper at the NATO Defense College.

DNI had a ten year run, closing its doors at http://d-n-i.net last November. There's a site of loosely the same title there now, but it's not the same site.

The Project on Government Oversight was involved with the start up of DNI, and is behind its Lazarus reincarnation. No new content is being posted, but the archives are alive again now for those who want to explore them. The new site is http://dnipogo.orghttp://dnipogo.org.

(nothing follows)

Hamkari Baraye Kandahar aka Deepwater Horizon

Containing both will be slow, but doable

by Jonathan Pan

The upcoming Kandahar operation "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar" reminds me of the Deepwater

Horizon oil spill. Concerning all the efforts that BP is exerting at containing

the oil spill, Chris Gidez, a former oil company public relations man,

has the following to say,

"At the end of the day, the best public relations and advertising in the world cannot

compete with that live video stream of that oil coming out of the bottom of the

sea." The similarity to Hamkari is that the combined political, economic, and military

might of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not been able to

stop the Taliban's influence (the oil) from spreading to the population (the sea).

The reason for this failure begins with "strategic communications." ISAF should

worry about stopping the oil rather than talking about it; it needs to immediately

follow a "underpromise and overachieve" strategy rather than worrying about "strategic

communications."

For starters, "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar" means "Cooperation for Kandahar" in Dari.

Rahimullah Yusufzai writes,

"It is not the first time that a non-Pashto term is being used in the Pashtun-populated

southern Afghanistan." The previous major operation in Helmand was called Operation

"Moshtarak," or Together or Joint in Dari. What was also not learned from Moshtarak,

or the Marjah offensive, goes beyond semantics. While the Marjah offensive was touted

as a military success, it is viewed by many to be a governance failure. Of the 400

men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah, and Kandahar City that were

interviewed

by the International Council on Security and Development, "61% of those interviewed

feel more negative about NATO forces than before the military offensive." Even Major

General Nick Carter, the commander of the volatile Regional Command South, conceded

that the three-month old Moshtarak

was

about three to four months away from success. By hyping up Moshtarak, the Afghan

people felt promised to a certain level of security and governance. While the security

aspect has mainly been achieved, the governance aspect has not been able to keep

up with the pace. Make no mistake- capacity building takes time in a country torn

by war for over 30 years while the best and brightest study and work abroad or work

for international organizations. However, the idea of successful and quick governance

did not just enter the minds of Marjah residents- there was a failure in the message.

in Afghanistan

The Afghan environment is like no other. Being able to address problems in multi-dimensional terms has never been more important. Do your homework. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) elements vary from location to location, unit to unit, and person to person. Levels of discipline, training, leadership, capacity and capability range the full spectrum. The following information is to provide you and your unit with recommendations that may or may not work in your area of responsibility (AOR). So, use what is appropriate at your location and develop the ANSF to support the success of the mission.

A Time for Sergeants: COIN Success at the Company and Platoon Level

in Afghanistan.

Read the entire monograph.