Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by Youssef Aboul-Enein | Tue, 06/29/2010 - 12:30pm | 1 comment

The Red Flag: A History of Communism by David Priestland. Published by Grove

Press, New York.  655 pages, 2009. 

Reviewed by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

 America's military leaders and counter-insurgency practitioners must not

only orient themselves to the tactics of adversaries, but the mindset that motivates

and even creates divides among insurgents.  Delving into the ideological rationale

of such enemies as al-Qaida requires patient study, reflection, debate and analysis. 

It requires the training of one's own mind to eliminate biases, and immerse oneself

in empathizing (not sympathizing) with the adversary.  Why is it important

to empathize with the enemy?  By developing such analytic rigor into the psychology,

and ideology that motivates and justifies violence one can begin to anticipate,

interrogate, and understand the landscape as well as decision-cycles of those that

challenge the United States and its allies.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/29/2010 - 11:57am | 0 comments
Opening Statement of General David H. Petraeus, Confirmation Hearing as Commander, ISAF/US Forces--Afghanistan on 29 June 2010.

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. And thank you for the rapid scheduling of this hearing.

I am, needless to say, humbled and honored to have been nominated by the President to command the International Security Assistance Force and US Forces in Afghanistan, and to have the opportunity, if confirmed, to continue to serve our nation, the NATO Alliance, our non-NATO Coalition partners, and Afghanistan in these new capacities.

At the outset, I want to echo your salute to the extraordinary service of Senator Robert Byrd. With his death, America clearly has lost a great patriot.

I would like to begin this morning by saying a few words about General Stan McChrystal, someone I've known and admired for nearly 30 years. General McChrystal has devoted his entire professional life to the defense of this nation, and he and his family have made enormous personal sacrifices during his lengthy deployments over the past nine years in particular. His contributions during that time were very significant. I can attest, for example, that the success of the surge in Iraq would not have been possible without General McChrystal's exceptional leadership of our special mission unit forces there. Similarly, the development of the Joint Special Operations Command during his unprecedented tenure commanding JSOC was extraordinary as well.

Most importantly, of course, he made enormous contributions in leading the coalition endeavor in Afghanistan over the past year. During that time, he brought impressive vision, energy, and expertise to the effort there. He made a huge contribution to the reorientation of our strategy and was a central figure in our efforts to get the inputs right in Afghanistan -- to build the organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, to get the right leaders in charge of those organizations, to develop appropriate plans and concepts, and to deploy the resources necessary to enable the implementation of those plans and concepts. We now see some areas of progress amidst the tough fight ongoing in Afghanistan. Considerable credit for that must go to Stan McChrystal...

Read the entire opening statement of General David H. Petraeus.

by Robert Haddick | Tue, 06/29/2010 - 10:59am | 5 comments
At a recent meeting with students at the Army's Command and General Staff College, Defense Secretary Robert Gates wondered out loud, "And the question is, since the Marines have essentially, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, played the role of second land Army, what differentiates them from the Army? And what is their mission going forward that makes them unique? ... We will always have a Marine Corps. But the question is, how do you define the mission post Iraq, post Afghanistan?" The new Marine Corps Operating Concepts attempts to answer those questions.

For over two hundred years, the U.S. Marine Corps has fought a two-front war, one against enemies like the Barbary pirates, the Japanese army, and al Qaeda and the second against the real mortal threat, those brigands inside the Washington Beltway who see the Marine Corps as a wasteful appendage ripe for snipping off. No one doubts the Marine Corps has done great service in Iraq and Afghanistan. But similar acclaim after World War II did not prevent calls for reducing the Marine Corps to a near-ceremonial guard. Steep budget cuts loom once again over the Pentagon. What makes the Marine Corps unique and worth spending money on?

According to the new Marine Corps Operating Concepts paper, the Marine Corps will have competitive advantages in two crucial areas: assuring littoral access and fighting "small wars." The Operating Concepts asserts that the Marine Corps's naval character endows it with unique traits and capabilities not found elsewhere in the U.S. military. These traits and capabilities make the Marine Corps the obvious tool to use when undertaking littoral access operations. Second, the Operating Concepts believes that these traits and capabilities result in a distinct advantage when fighting "small wars." These are the answers the Operating Concepts gives to Gates's questions.

The Operating Concepts paper envisions three forms of littoral access operations: engagement, such as security force assistance and "Phase Zero" operations; crisis response, such as humanitarian relief and evacuations; and power projection involving either major or irregular combat operations. With much of the world's population living near the sea and sea lines of communication and nautical chokepoints critical key terrain, the Operating Concepts asserts that littoral combat will remain an essential capability. The document explains that the Navy/Marine Corps's flexibility, global mobility, and ability to transport large combat power and logistical support remain relevant and essential capabilities.

The Marine Corps's naval character should provide the Marine Corps with unique advantages regarding "small wars" operations. The United States' maritime strategy is based on broad cooperation with allied and partner navy, coast guard and marine forces. This maritime strategy puts the Marine Corps in regular contact with cultures around the world. This familiarity and experience with foreign cultures and military forces should give the Marine Corps an important advantage when waging irregular conflicts.

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/28/2010 - 9:10pm | 3 comments
General Hal Moore - Steven Pressfield interview with the General.

I met General Hal Moore a few years ago, at a dinner in his honor in Los Angeles, around the time the movie We Were Soldiers was released. Both Joe Galloway and General Moore signed a copy of their book We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young for me. General Moore added a note, citing a quote from my book, Gates of Fire, which he said reminded him of LZ X-Ray and his warriors in that fight. It was the quote about "Any army can win when it still has its legs under it; what counts is what they do when all strength has fled and they must produce victory on will alone." That note means a great deal. Decades earlier, he and the 1st battalion, 7th U.S. Cavalry kept their legs under them during the battle of Ia Drang, and produced victory. And General Moore has continued standing strong since. A special thank you to Joe Galloway for providing the pictures accompanying this post...

Read the entire interview.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/28/2010 - 6:00pm | 1 comment
Spencer Ackerman has left the Washington Independent and, drum roll please, joined Noah and crew at Wired's Danger Room. Check out his first DR post concerning after 9 years of war in Afghanistan the U.S. is finally trying to get a grip on warzone contractors.

More good news from Afghanistan: the U.S. military has no idea where the billions it's spending on warzone contractors is actually ending up. And nine years into the war, the Pentagon has barely started the long, laborious process of figuring it out.

Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault just arrived in Kabul about a week and a half ago as the commander of Task Force 2010, a new unit established to ensure that the military's dependence on contractors for everything from laundry to armed security doesn't end up undermining Afghanistan's stability in the process. That's no hypothetical concern: a congressional report last week found that Afghan, U.S. and Mideastern trucking companies who have a piece of a $2.16 billion logistics contract with the military pay about $4 million every week in protection money to warlords and Taliban insurgents.

Enter Dussault, one of the military's few flag officers to specialize in contracting and the former commander of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan. Her priority for Task Force 2010's joint military/civilian team of auditors and investigators, Dussault tells Danger Room in a phone interview from Afghanistan, "is to put a laser-like focus on the flow of money, and to understand exactly how money is flowing from the contracting authorities to the prime contractor and the subcontractors they work with." It's imperative, she adds, to get contractors to "understand they have to be more specific about who their network is and what their subcontractors are." ...

More at Danger Room and also check out the recent Center for a New American Security report Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform, which calls on the U.S. government to embark on a path of ambitious reform that will increase federal oversight and better protect U.S. taxpayer dollars from potential waste, fraud and abuse. CNAS' Senior Fellow Richard Fontaine (coauthor with John Nagl on the report) will testify tomorrow at a congressional hearing on the role of contractors in warzones.

And last, but not least, visit one the best blogs covering contractors in a warzone - Matt's Feral Jundi.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/28/2010 - 1:45pm | 5 comments
5 Questions for General Petraeus - Jed Babbin, Real Clear Politics.

In a hastily-assembled hearing tomorrow, Gen. David H. Petraeus will appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee as a prelude to his confirmation as the new top commander in Afghanistan. Petraeus -- author of the military's manual on counterinsurgency warfare, who commanded the counterinsurgency in Iraq -- should, and likely will, receive the unanimous support from the committee. But the hearing should nevertheless be a forum for a penetrating analysis of President Obama's policy in pursuing the war.

Announcing Gen. McChrystal's relief and Petraeus's nomination, the president was emphatic in saying that his action was a change in people, not policy. But the nation-building policy begun by President Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan and continued by Obama, is -- by objective criteria -- failing. It deserves to be dissected publicly, and Petraeus is the best person to explain how it could work. Here are some of the questions that committee members should pose...

Read the five questions at Real Clear Politics.

Update: For ease of commenting here are the five questions as extracted from Jed Babbin's fine article.

1. How can the counterinsurgency succeed unless these sources of funding are cut off?

2. What is the competing cause offered by the Afghan Government, and how can it be made more attractive than the Islamic fundamentalism that has existed in Afghanistan for decades or even centuries?

3. What are the major advantages and disadvantages you foresee in Afghanistan and how do they compare with those you faced in Iraq?

4. Can the counterinsurgency succeed without first terminating Iran's lethal assistance to the Taliban?

5. The next major Afghanistan policy review will occur in December. What measures of success or failure do you believe should be applied in December to decide the way forward?

Please see the original article for commentary and insights that accompany the questions.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/28/2010 - 12:35pm | 0 comments
The July/August 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs is now online and will be on newsstands June 29. Two items are of particular interest to our community of interest and practice. Please note that only portions of the articles are available to non-subscribers.

Defining Success in Afghanistan - Stephen Biddle, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Fotini Christia, assistant professor at MIT, and J Alexander Their, director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, urge the Obama administration to pursue decentralized democracy in Afghanistan.

The New Cocaine Cowboys - Robert C. Bonner, senior principal of the Sentinel HS Group, describes the tactics Mexico should use to fight its battle against drug cartels.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/28/2010 - 5:44am | 1 comment
A Look at Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Afghanistan - Charlie Rose interview.

"The story of a President, 2 Generals, the future of a war and magazine story. The implications on the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal. We talk to David Kilcullen, former counter insurgency advisor to David Petraeus, Eric Bates, Executive Editor of Rolling Stone, Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University, Rajiv Chandrasekaran from the Washington Post and Michael Gordon of the New York Times. Also via phone from Afghanistan with Dexter Filkins of The New York Times. We close with excerpts from past interviews with General McChrystal and General Petraeus."

A Look at Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Afghanistan - Charlie Rose interview.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/27/2010 - 6:33am | 0 comments
Will There be an Afghanistan Syndrome? - Eliot A. Cohen, Washington Post opinion.

... The rise and fall of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal -- whom President Obama dismissed Wednesday as commander of the faltering U.S.-led war in Afghanistan after an explosive magazine article featured the general and his top aides deriding the president, vice president and other civilian leaders as well as foreign allies -- will no doubt play a major role in the stories we ultimately tell ourselves about the Afghan conflict. These war stories are not just morality tales to be retold in high school history books or television documentaries. They can shape the way the United States fights its enemies in the future, and the way it settles disputes over war at home. The McChrystal saga, with its echoes of the Vietnam era's bitter civilian-military recriminations, threatens to do the same.

In Vietnam, as in the Gulf War, the old stories are, to say the least, radically incomplete. The civilians did not, in fact, micromanage most of the Vietnam War. President Lyndon B. Johnson restricted bombing targets in North Vietnam for the sensible reason that he did not want to bring China and Russia into a larger conflict. The campaign in the South -- including massive bombardment and search-and-destroy missions -- was the product of a conventional military that understood the war chiefly in terms of killing the enemy, not fighting an insurgency. Similarly, a truer tale of the Gulf War would emphasize the U.S. failure to shatter Saddam Hussein's power, which paved the way for years of blockade and sporadic bombardment, leading to a second and conclusive showdown more than a decade later...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/27/2010 - 6:27am | 4 comments
Mullen Says the Military Still Needs the Media - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

For the military, it's like a grisly death in the family: How did Gen. Stanley McChrystal, one of the most respected soldiers of his generation, blow himself up in a magazine profile? It's a puzzle to McChrystal's colleagues here, and understandably, there's a new wariness in dealing with the media.

The relationship between the military and the press could probably use a little adjustment. The Rolling Stone article was a wake-up call for both sides that the coziness that has evolved over the past decade, as "embedding" of reporters became more widespread, can cause problems. Now there's likely to be a tilt back toward more traditional ground rules and a little more distance. We'll see whether that leads to better reporting or just a chillier relationship...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/27/2010 - 5:59am | 21 comments
Endless War, a Recipe for Four-star Arrogance - Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Post opinion.

Long wars are antithetical to democracy. Protracted conflict introduces toxins that inexorably corrode the values of popular government. Not least among those values is a code of military conduct that honors the principle of civilian control while keeping the officer corps free from the taint of politics. Events of the past week - notably the Rolling Stone profile that led to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's dismissal - hint at the toll that nearly a decade of continuous conflict has exacted on the U.S. armed forces. The fate of any one general qualifies as small beer: Wearing four stars does not signify indispensability. But indications that the military's professional ethic is eroding, evident in the disrespect for senior civilians expressed by McChrystal and his inner circle, should set off alarms.

Earlier generations of American leaders, military as well as civilian, instinctively understood the danger posed by long wars. "A democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War," Gen. George C. Marshall once remarked. The people who provided the lifeblood of the citizen army raised to wage World War II had plenty of determination but limited patience. They wanted victory won and normalcy restored.

The wisdom of Marshall's axiom soon became clear. In Vietnam, Lyndon B. Johnson plunged the United States into what became its Seven Years War. The citizen army that was sent to Southeast Asia fought valiantly for a time and then fell to pieces. As the conflict dragged on, Americans in large numbers turned against the war -- and also against the troops who fought it...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/27/2010 - 5:47am | 0 comments
Military Disturbed by Rapid Turnover at Top in Afghan, Iraq Wars - Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

Since 2001, a dozen commanders have cycled through the top jobs in Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S. Central Command, which oversees both wars. Three of those commanders - including the recently dismissed Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal - have been fired or resigned under pressure. History has judged many others harshly, and only two, Gen. David H. Petraeus and Gen. Ray Odierno, are widely praised as having mastered the complex mixture of skills that running America's wars demands.

For the military, this record of mediocrity raises a vexing question: What is wrong with the system that produces top generals? Much of what top commanders do in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq bears little relation to the military skills that helped them rise through the ranks, military officials said. Today's wars demand that top commanders act like modern viceroys, overseeing military operations and major economic development efforts. They play dominant roles in the internal politics of the countries where their troops fight...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/26/2010 - 9:02pm | 6 comments
Afghan Overture to Taliban Aggravates Ethnic Tensions - Dexter Filkens, New York Times.

The drive by President Hamid Karzai to strike a deal with Taliban leaders and their Pakistani backers is causing deep unease in Afghanistan's minority communities, who fought the Taliban the longest and suffered the most during their rule. The leaders of the country's Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities, which make up close to half of Afghanistan's population, are vowing to resist - and if necessary, fight - any deal that involves bringing members of the Taliban insurgency into a power-sharing arrangement with the government.

Alienated by discussions between President Karzai and the Pakistani military and intelligence officials, minority leaders are taking their first steps toward organizing against what they fear is Mr. Karzai's long-held desire to restore the dominance of ethnic Pashtuns, who ruled the country for generations. The dispute is breaking along lines nearly identical to those that formed during the final years of the Afghan civil war, which began after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 and ended only with the American invasion following the Sept. 11 attacks. More than 100,000 Afghans died, mostly civilians; the Taliban, during their five-year reign in the capital, Kabul, carried out several large-scale massacres of Hazara civilians...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/26/2010 - 9:50am | 6 comments
Can Counterinsurgency Work in Afghanistan?

Wednesday, June 30, 2010, 12:00 - 1:30 PM, at the Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.

The U.S. military in Afghanistan has been trying to follow best practice counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine since spring 2007. The theory is that if counterinsurgents deliver security and connect Afghans to their government, the population will deny support to the insurgents. The assumption is that the population's perception of the government and insurgency determines success, not body counts or capturing terrain. Our soldiers have been living in small combat outposts, patrolling on foot and at night, meeting with Afghan elders to learn their concerns and needs, and delivering public works projects in many areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan, yet security continues to deteriorate. Stepping back from Afghanistan, it is not clear COIN has worked in any conflict where the population did not support their government. Can it work in Afghanistan?

Please join Hudson Institute for a discussion featuring Visiting Fellow Ann Marlowe, who travels frequently to Afghanistan, reporting on the American counterinsurgency there as well as Afghanistan's economy, culture, and archeology. She completed her second embed in Zabul Province and her sixth overall in late April. Marlowe will discuss the merits and failures of a COIN strategy in Afghanistan on both practical and theoretic grounds.

Joining Marlowe will be Conrad Crane, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute of the Army War College. He was the lead author for the 2006 Army and Marine Corps Field Manual that embodies current American COIN doctrine. The discussion will be moderated by Hudson Institute Senior Vice President S. Enders Wimbush, and will be streamed live on Hudson's website.

Lunch will be served.

To RSVP, please email [email protected] with "Afghanistan" in the subject line.

Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center

Hudson Institute

1015 15th St, NW

6th Floor

Washington, DC 20005

www.hudson.org

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 06/26/2010 - 8:19am | 0 comments
Afghanistan War: Top Three Challenges Facing General Petraeus - Dan Murphy, Christian Science Monitor.

Gen. David Petraeus, the commander viewed by some in Washington as the man who single-handedly turned around the Iraq war, will be taking on a bigger challenge than the one he confronted at the dawn of the Iraq surge in 2007. He'll be in charge of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan that's just getting under way, much as he was in Iraq. But he's starting almost nine years into this current war, rather than three years in as he did in Iraq. That means he faces more entrenched power players. Historically, the longer an army takes to shift to counterinsurgency strategy, the lower the odds are of success, as a study found last year. And sustaining the Afghanistan war -- now costing over $70 billion a year -- is taking its toll on American and Afghan public support...

General McChrystal boasted of success ahead of an operation in the town of Marjah, but afterward struggled to deliver the kind of governance needed to prevent the Taliban from coming back. Before McChrystal's ouster, war-planners indefinitely postponed a major offensive due to start this month in the southern province of Kandahar in order to rethink their approach. Meanwhile, the country remains as violent as ever. With six days left in the month, June 2010 is already officially the deadliest for foreign troops in Afghanistan since the war began, with 79 casualties. With Petraeus expected to sail through congressional confirmation hearings early next week, what are some of the key challenges he will face when he takes charge in Kabul? ...

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 10:17pm | 7 comments

Jules Crittenden remembers when:

... Rolling Stone thought counterinsurgency was cool, as opposed to something that needed to be patronized and blown up? Set the wayback to May 2009, when Rolling Stone deemed Small Wars and Lady Gaga both HOT...

Jules continues:

Unsurprising, mildly interesting, and irrelevant. Trusting Rolling Stone in the first place was a bad idea. The kind of unguarded comments and behavior as depicted in front of a Rolling Stone writer were a bad idea. What did they think he was going to do with it?

And adds an adversaries take to boot:

"We are enjoying every minute of it on TV and the radio," says a senior Afghan Taliban official and former cabinet minister in Mullah Mohammed Omar's defunct government, who spoke on the condition that he not be quoted by name. "All the talk about this being America's longest, most expensive, and most unpopular war - and about the tension between McChrystal and Obama - is music to our ears."

And as for Hastings and his editors in regards to their "fact-checking" questions - "whoa Nelly" - from The Washington Post:

Rolling Stone magazine sent an aide to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal a list of 30 questions to check facts in a profile of the commander. The questions contained no hint of what became the controversial portions of the story.

The magazine's executive editor, Eric Bates, denied that Michael Hastings, the author of the story, violated any ground rules in writing about the four weeks he spent with McChrystal and his team.

Damn, just damn at The Washington Post.

Update: But wait, there is more at The Washington Post:

"There's a Rolling Stone article out," the aide told McChrystal. "It's very, very bad."

Forty hours later, McChrystal had been relieved of his command, his 34-year military career in tatters. Apart from a terse apology, McChrystal has not discussed publicly the disparaging remarks that he and his aides made about administration officials and that appeared in the article.

On Friday, however, officials close to McChrystal began trying to salvage his reputation by asserting that the author, Michael Hastings, quoted the general and his staff in conversations that he was allowed to witness but not report. The officials also challenged a statement by Rolling Stone's executive editor that the magazine had thoroughly reviewed the story with McChrystal's staff ahead of publication...

More here.

Last note from Jules:

... Yeah, well, that was then. Gotcha on a Small Warrior, turning a Small War on its ear, getting the president to dance to your tune, being the talk of the Taliban. That's HOT in 2010.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 9:32pm | 2 comments
Army's New Fear: Media's Friendly Fire - Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal.

According to U.S. military doctrine, in order to defeat an insurgency like the one in Afghanistan, commanders must engage with the news media to win the hearts and minds of both the local population and the American public. But in the wake of the firing of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as Afghan commander over intemperate remarks to Rolling Stone magazine, Pentagon officials are concerned the military may recoil in fear and anger from the press.

The chill couldn't come at a more inopportune time for the Pentagon's leadership, with skepticism about the war's progress growing among U.S. politicians and officials in Afghanistan ahead of what is likely to be the war's most important operation, the imminent move by thousands of U.S. forces into Kandahar, the spiritual heartland of the Taliban. "If we recoil, if we go underground, if we get defensive, it's self-defeating," said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary. "We need to remain as engaged as ever, if not more so because we are at a crucial point in this war."

Even before Gen. McChrystal's ouster, senior defense officials had been contemplating an overhaul of their communications strategy to get top officers in the war zone to brief reporters more frequently, a strategy regularly employed during the Iraq surge three years ago. Defense officials described the effort as an attempt to keep Washington-based reporters regularly informed of operations in Afghanistan amid concerns that news coverage was increasingly providing narrowly focused snapshots of insurgent violence in southern Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 9:03pm | 0 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Petraeus's burden

2) Expecting the unexpected

Petraeus's burden

Gen. David Petraeus now has the unenviable task of salvaging the campaign in Afghanistan. In his announcement of Petraeus's transfer, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that there will be no change in the campaign's strategy. With the president reaffirming his administration's analysis of the situation and its strategy for solving the problem, the implication is that success will come with continuity in management, better cooperation among the players, and more resources.

Afghanistan is becoming a deepening vortex for both the United States military and for the country's national security policies. In addition to the financial and human toll (80 ISAF soldiers have died so far this month), Afghanistan is imposing other costs on the U.S. military, on U.S. defense planning, and on America's diplomatic leverage around the world. When assessing the benefits to be achieved by the Afghan campaign, these costs also merit consideration.

The administration and its military advisers have chosen a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and a long list of officials have expressed their concerns about the implications of repeated deployments for the all-volunteer force. Afghanistan also seems to chew up generals. Gen. David McKiernan was replaced out of frustration with a lack of progress. The same frustration, expressing itself in behind-the-scenes contempt and bickering, brought down Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Now Petraeus has been recalled from a depleted bench. This move has its price. After jumping into the Afghan vortex, Petraeus will leave behind his critical duties at Central Command, which include diplomacy across the Middle East and Central Asia, the containment of Iran, and supervising the endgame in Iraq. The administration has yet to announce who, if anyone, will replace Petraeus at Centcom.

The Afghan vortex has implications for defense planning elsewhere in the world. In a speech he delivered to the Navy League in May, Gates said that the costs of rehabilitating the Army and Marine Corps, combined with the ground force's long term manpower and family support costs, will mean that the Navy will see no increases in its budget. The secretary general of Japan's ruling party recently argued that U.S. naval power is in decline and that Japan needs to adjust its maritime security policy accordingly. When that view spreads throughout Asia, an arms race will be inevitable.

The deepening commitment has forced the U.S. government into the position of pleading for favors from Pakistan and Russia in order to open new supply lines to the growing army in Afghanistan. The price has been to forfeit diplomatic leverage with implications for U.S. relations in Europe, India, and China.

Are the campaign objectives in Afghanistan worth all of these costs?

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 10:56am | 1 comment

Well,

we'll certainly be

celebrating this 4th of July. But it doesn't look like we'll be high-fiving

and declaring success on our June fundraising campaign.  We didn't naively expect

that a slap-dash "send money" blog post would solve all our ills.  But we were

briefly teased by a strong start, a few $500 contributions, and a $1000 day early

on.  Reality sets in - we've had a few $10 average/day doldrums, and we are plodding inexorably

toward coming in at <20% of goal. Thanks very much to those of you have supported us at any level. Are there more of you?

If you value Small Wars Journal and are in a position to help us out financially,

please do so now via all those convenient 21st century ways to throw money at us.

Also see our Support page

for other ways to help.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 10:14am | 10 comments
Gen. David Petraeus' Strategy for Afghanistan: It Works - David Wood, Politics Daily.

Lost in the furor over the disgraced Gen. Stanley McChrystal is this simple truth: The counterinsurgency strategy championed by his successor, Gen. David Petraeus, works.

Awaiting his confirmation by the Senate early next week as the new commander in Afghanistan, Petraeus is assembling his war staff and planning how to tackle his biggest and most immediate problems: the stalled offensive in Kandahar, the lackluster performance of the Afghan army and police, and the ragged relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

As chief architect of the counterinsurgency strategy he implemented in Iraq and which McChrystal adapted to Afghanistan a year ago, Petraeus knows that aggressively combining security with appropriate political and economic action - with a good dollop of humility that puts the Afghans in charge - is a long-term but sure road to success. In short, as many soldiers in Afghanistan have shown me, the strategy works. But it takes time and patience...

More at Politics Daily.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 06/25/2010 - 9:36am | 0 comments
Petraeus's Opportunity - Mark Moyar, Wall Street Journal opinion.

The firing of Gen. Stanley McChrystal has ended the career of an outstanding military leader and the only American to forge a close relationship in recent years with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. It has disrupted the war when the U.S. executive branch and Congress crave signs of immediate progress.

It has also brought in a new commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who has a great record and the public-relations savvy his predecessor lacked. Those assets, together with the urgency this crisis has given to longstanding problems, afford the new commander hitherto unavailable opportunities.

For one thing, the change may facilitate the appointment of an American ambassador who shares the strategic views of the military commander. Karl Eikenberry's differences with Gen. McChrystal—and with Gen. Petraeus, who was on the same page as Gen. McChrystal—undermined efforts to organize militias and co-opt insurgents. Mr. Eikenberry's contempt for Mr. Karzai has prevented him from accomplishing his most important mission—influencing the chief of state...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/24/2010 - 3:36pm | 3 comments
In Afghanistan, Petraeus Will Have Difficulty Replicating His Iraq Success - Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post opinion.

... This is not a vote of no-confidence in Gen. David H. Petraeus, whom the president has selected to lead the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, replacing the disgraced Gen. Stanley A McChrystal. It is a simple recognition that the conditions Petraeus enjoyed in Iraq are far from present in Afghanistan, and that the key skills he brought to bear in the first war won't help him as much in the second.

What allowed Petraeus to succeed in Iraq was not the troop surge itself; after all, a city as big and sprawling as Baghdad, with 5 million people living in two- and three-story homes, can swallow 30,000 troops without a burp. Nor was it his development of a counterinsurgency doctrine for the Army. The key tenets -- such as focusing on protecting the population, while still going after the diehard insurgents, and splitting rather than uniting the enemy -- were familiar stuff to anyone who had read the books. It seemed novel only in the context of Iraq, where for many years the American commanders had terrified families by knocking down doors in the middle of the night, treating locals not as the prize to be won but as the playing field on which they confronted the insurgents.

Rather, Petraeus's critical contribution in Iraq was one of leadership: He got everyone on the same page. Until he arrived, there often seemed to be dozens of wars going on, with every brigade commander trying to figure out the strategic goals of a campaign. Before Petraeus arrived, the top priority for U.S. forces was getting out. After he took over, the No. 1 task for U.S. troops, explicitly listed in the mission statement he issued, was to protect the Iraqi people...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/24/2010 - 2:40pm | 3 comments
Odierno to Use Combat Lessons to Develop Joint Doctrine

By Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 24, 2010 -- President Barack Obama's nominee for the top U.S. Joint Forces Command post said today he will utilize the lessons he has learned during three combat command tours in Iraq if he is confirmed to lead the nation's joint force provider.

During his confirmation hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno explained the approach he would take at the Norfolk, Va.-based command.

Odierno, commander of U.S. Forces Iraq, also has served as commander Multinational Corps Iraq and was the commander of the 4th Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

"My first priority will be to support all of our combatant commanders and prepare our U.S. joint interagency team to meet the needs of this evolutionary and complex environment in which we must continue to operate, and not only operate, but succeed," the general said. "I will never forget my responsibilities to ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, as well as our dedicated families, are prepared and ready to take on all of the challenges ahead."

Continue on for the rest of the story...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/24/2010 - 11:47am | 14 comments
by Jason Thomas

While participating in a Commander's briefing in March this year at the Tactical Operations Centres (TOC) on a US military Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Afghanistan, the XO prepared the military staff before they gave their presentations by saying "be brief, be bold and be gone." So given five minutes with General Petraeus it would certainly be bold of a little Australian to give this highly intelligent, supreme commander of Coalition forces in the Middle East any advice at all. In 1991 Petraeus was accidently shot in the chest at Fort Campbell while observing a training exercise. The M16 bullet pierced his lung and artery. A week after the operation Petraeus proved to the doctor he was fit to be dismissed by doing 50 push-ups in his hospital room. He is one tough soldier as well.

We know that General Petraeus is not averse to taking advice from Australians, so here are some ideas from one who has been on the ground in Afghanistan for the last eight months. The advice is from raw and at times life-threatening situations at a level that many of the coalition soldiers don't get to experience. As the Regional Manager for a USAID implementing partner responsible for overseeing a key plank of counterinsurgency strategy I witnessed many facets of military operations, the impact on Afghan people, the attitude of the Taliban, the intricate web of tribal relationships and deep ethnic divisions, poverty and of course the omnipresence of Islam.

My brief advice would be to suggest five changes that may help turn the tide in Afghanistan -- but they require a paradigm shift in how our political leaders decide troops should engage and how aid organisations and civilian policy makers place moral judgements on development.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/24/2010 - 11:05am | 0 comments
This important item, speculated on in various forums, deserves to be bumped up and out of all the noise surrounding recent events. Concerning General Petraeus' new duties, The Army Times is reporting that White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said "He'll give up CENTCOM". Earlier in the day, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said defense officials had not identified a nominee to take over as the Commander of U.S. Central Command.