Blog Posts

Much more at Abu Muqawama.

Key points from the conference:

1. Major Indian military challenges/strategies

2. Problems with Indian military modernization

3. Bottom line: Indian military modernization is a big story in Asia. India is far behind China both in capacity and its modernization effort. India needs deep political and bureaucratic reform before it will be able to adequately address the challenges and implement the strategies described in point #1.

More at The Washington Post.

James Clapper: Another Military Man for a Civilian Post - Bruce Ackerman, Washington Post opinion.

More at The Washington Post.

More at The New York Times.

Via e-mail from Sterling Yee of Human Rights Watch:

The Human Rights Watch Film Festival returns to New York, 10-24 June. This year we are proud to present two astounding documentaries that focus on the obstacles the Afghan citizens and US military face during times of war and rebuilding.

Camp Victory, Afghanistan - Drawing from nearly 300 hours of vérité footage shot between 2005 and 2008, Camp Victory, Afghanistan skillfully explores the reality of building a functioning Afghan military. We are delighted that filmmaker Carol Dysinger will be present for a discussion after the screenings. Find out more.

Restrepo - Winner of the Sundance Grand Jury Prize for Documentary, Restrepo chronicles the deployment of a platoon in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley, one of the most dangerous postings in the US military. This is war, full stop. The conclusions are up to you. We are delighted that filmmaker Tim Hetherington will be present for a discussion after the screenings. Find out more.

"We think your colleagues and readers would be interested in these films because they touch upon issues facing not only Afghan society, but also the international community. With so much global attention on US involvement in Afghanistan -- we hope that the films will teach and inspire New Yorkers to learn more about Afghanistan and become more active in their communities."

On the one hand, we are encouraged:  we put our hand out and asked for your

financial support in one little blog entry, and it has come.  Thanks very much

to those of who have responded. We've heard from site regulars who've done so much

for us we wish we were paying them, and from other folks we never knew were out

there supporting us.  We've seen amounts from $5 to $500 (wow!). And we're

inching along -- now at $3820 and counting.  Every little bit counts. 

So do those big bits.

On the other hand, we're reminded how fickle this fundraising business is. Although

it is a nice round number, we didn't pick $50,000 because of its roundness. We have

a gap to fill, and we're not on the glide path that will fill it by our goal of

the 4th of July. I guess that incessant nagging from your favorite public station

is not because they are all incessant nags by choice or nature, but rather because

they have to be. Apparently, so do we.

Our current budget is going to get us through our long-awaited upgrade, put some

good new features into the site, and keep us moving with publishing the Journal

and SWJ Blog, albeit on life support.  We've got our eyes on some early 2011

grants and are pursuing some other sources of support.  But late summer and

fall 2010 are wide open -- we really need to bring in some extra hands to help us

populate, expand, and manage the rich content that will be supported by the new

platform. It's a lot of nug work, we will do it efficiently with some interns, off-shore

data entry types, lots of volunteers, etc.  But there's just no escaping it

-- we have grown bigger than our nights and weekends. And we need some resources

to close the gap.

We will grow bigger with a more mature approach to fundraising, as well. 

We are working to approach more sponsors, advertisers, etc.  As mentioned in

the small print on the Support

page, your qualified leads in that area would be huge, although we don't need any

more windmills to tilt at if the leads aren't promising.  We're also working

on some ways to appreciate and recognize our supporters, but at this point, each

coffee cup we don't have and therefore don't mail out for your gift of $30 or more

is another article we can review and post.  We'll get get better at expressing

our appreciation and/or bribing you to support.  Thanks to those of you who

have responded without all the coddling.  And thanks to those who jump in now

to those handy contribution methods below. If we had operators, they'd be waiting

for your call. But these choices work:

Give a one-time

donation:

Set-up a monthly

donation:

$

for

months.

Mail checks payable to:

Small Wars Foundation

4938 Hampden Ln, #560

Bethesda, MD 20814

The United States faces a myriad of challenges in the 21st century including fighting and paying for two wars, building America's economic strength, rising powers that contest established orders, international and domestic terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and resource scarcity. The Obama administration's National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review lay out an ambitious agenda to protect and promote American interests in this rapidly changing environment. Yet, questions loom as to how the administration will implement its priorities, especially in a constrained budget environment and a period of deep economic uncertainty. Given the heightened need to prioritize spending, has the administration laid out a sustainable vision?

The Center for a New American Security will address these issues and more in nine reports released today ahead of its fourth annual conference, Shaping the Agenda: American Security in the 21st Century, which will take place this Thursday, June 10. All publications are available for download now at www.cnas.org and will be available in hard copy at Thursday's conference.

In addition to these reports, stay tuned for CNAS Senior Fellow Robert Kaplan's book Monsoon, CNAS Non-Resident Fellow David Kilcullen's book Counterinsurgency, CNAS Writers in Residence Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker's book Counterstrike and CNAS Senior Fellow Tom Ricks's book on the history of U.S. generals and their leadership.

Continue on for the reports...

How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq's most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY's Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Colonel Sean MacFarland's brigade arrived in Iraq's deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq's U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city's most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland's brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn't going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn't going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland's brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn't hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

What followed was one of history's unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar's growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Much more at Wired.

The Afghan logistics and security contractors (and their associates in the Taliban) did not need to read Joseph Heller's Catch-22 or study Lt. Milo Minderbinder's business methods; in Afghanistan, these arrangements are second nature. And the planned tripling in the U.S. headcount in Afghanistan since early 2009 has resulted in more and longer convoys and thus more money for all sides in the convoy protection business.

One conclusion we might be able to draw from Filkins' article is that the Taliban are not overly concerned about ISAF's strategy. Having influence with the Afghan logistics and security firms, the Taliban are opting for the moment to take the bribes and allow the convoys to pass. If the coalition's military pressure on the Taliban became painful enough, we would expect to see a different Taliban calculation, with more attacks on the convoys, perhaps enough to constrain ISAF operations. If this conclusion is true, it would reveal a broader point -- that the Taliban retain the initiative and retain the ability to regulate not only their own operations but ISAF's as well.

More importantly, Filkins' story has the potential to damage political support for the war inside the U.S. As stories such as this reinforce the impression (true or not) that the war in Afghanistan is descending into murky corruption, more of the public is likely to throw up its hands in disgust.

Murky corruption, side deals, tangled relationships, and the power of money are all integral elements of irregular warfare. After a decade of renewed experience, many U.S. soldiers are very good at the game. But what remains unknown is whether all of America is ready for the murky deals that irregular warfare requires. America's adversaries don't think so, which is why America has found itself on this playing field.

WAR, Sebastian Junger, Twelve (New York), 2010.

Review by Karaka Pend of Permissible Arms.

On May 21, 2010, I saw Sebastian Junger speak on the subject of his book War. It was standing room only, with several servicemen and women present; but the audience was mostly older folks. The parents of Private Misha Pemble-Belkin, one of the soldiers Junger writes about in his book, were present that evening, and Junger took care to welcome them. It was clear from that moment on, even before his reading or before I had the chance to read the book, that Junger had written about people who had come to mean a great deal to him. To understand that is to understand the impetus of his account.

Take a look at some recent posts over at

MountainRunner.  Matt Armstrong observes the tangled web of inadequate

terminology in

The

need for a national strategy on Communication and Engagement, and notes that

the recent National Security

Strategy punts on strategic communication and public diplomacy. 

Perhaps the White House is "in charge" in the Gulf now, by whatever

sophomoric understanding of in charge fits the sound bit media but does not

really apply to such a massive federated (not federal) approach to a response. 

But the federated approach for cohesive SC/PD is awfully optimistic, and as Matt

observes,

guidance and direction" while deferring to individual agencies, they failed.

What "guidance and direction" appears in the strategy is inadequate to serve as

a forcing mechanism to drive subsequent nested strategies, some of which have

already been written.

Matt, et al, offers a one day training event on

Now Media: engagement

based on information not platforms, coming up in DC on July 6.  I've

caught the old media / new media => Now Media convergence part of his story

before, and it is well done.  I hope to catch the rest soon.

More at The Australian.

Israel has said it will continue a naval blockade of the Gaza Strip despite growing global pressure to lift the siege after a navy raid on a Turkish ferry carrying aid killed nine activists this week.

What is the legality of the blockade and did Israel's intervention breach international law? At the link above or below you will find some questions and answers on the issue.

More at Reuters.

More at The Washington Post.

Small Wars Journal has kicked off our

first fundraising campaign.  During June 2010, or more precisely through the 4th of July, we have a goal of raising $50,000 for Small Wars Foundation,

the 501(c)(3) that operates Small Wars Journal. While we dearly appreciate the donations so far - our community of interest and practice needs to do more here to help us keep the lights on - seriously. For many this site has been a free ride, for others a serious investment in time and money that can no longer sustain itself with pats on the back.

When we reflect back on where we are now, damn, we're thankful. We are

where we are now, first and foremost, because of the quality of thought and writing

by our content contributors (all volunteers), the substantive participation of commenters

on the Journal and SWJ Blog, and the richness of discussion in the Small Wars Council. 

We have benefitted immensely from the early endorsement and continued participation

of some of the greats in the field.  We have received some individual contributions

and we have efforts underway enabled by some generous grants. We are humbled by

the way the community has embraced Small Wars Journal.

Even more humbling is the amount of work we need to do to keep up with your interest

and continue to be worthy of the value you seem to place in us.  We have a

criminal backlog of good content submissions that we need to be able to work through

faster, since timeliness in so important to our dialog. We have a lot to do to update

and expand the site's other content, particularly to exploit the potential of an

upcoming platform and usability upgrade made possible by a grant. We are doing a

lot, we can do a lot more, and we need some resources help to close the gap. Call

it capacity building.

So to better serve you, the small wars community of interest, we are in the unpleasant

but necessary position of coming to you, hat in hand, in an NPR-like scenario. We

are counting on your contributions, coupled with support from grants and foundations,

collateral income (advertising and referrals), and volunteer contributions of effort

and content, to help us do more of what you seem to value and want us to do.

Please see our Support

pages for more ways you can help.  Here are the most blunt ones:

Give a one-time

donation:

Set-up a monthly

donation:

$

for

months.

Mail checks payable to:

Small Wars Foundation

4938 Hampden Ln, #560

Bethesda, MD 20814

Track the

campaign's progress here.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has challenged the Marine Corps to define its future - and this is especially important as the Corps' Commandant, General James Conway, is nearing retirement.

Gates has been quoted as unsure just where Marines would be asked to storm a beach in the future - especially as "potential foes continue fielding more and more advanced weapons". He has also been critical of the Marine's Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) stating the need "to take a hard look" at the practicality of such expensive acquisition efforts.

But Gates said that America "will always have a Marine Corps," and "we will need some amount of amphibious capability."

What say you?

The Marine Corps answered yesterday by conducting the largest amphibious landing exercise 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Navy's 3rd Fleet have staged since before 11 September 2001.

See Cartoons by Cartoon by Joe Heller - Courtesy of Politicalcartoons.com - Email this Cartoon

More at The Weekly Standard.

More at The Boston Globe.

Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq is an absolutely fascinating read. This book from the National Defense Intelligence College takes both an historical and policy-oriented view of prisoner of war interrogations in three wars. The World War II section examines the Army's use of Japanese Americans -- Nisei -- as interrogators in the Pacific, along with incisive discussions of why Japanese soldiers seldom were taken prisoners, why a relatively high percentage of such POWs cooperated with their interrogators, and why they furnished such a significant amount of intelligence to their captors (the Japanese military hierarchy assumed that their men would not become prisoners and so did not indoctrinate them about the importance of not giving up information if they were.) This part of the book also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the Army and Navy Japanese language training both services provided during the war.

The Vietnam section focuses on profiles of the most able interrogators in World War II (the wonderfully named R.W. G. "Tin Eye" Stephens for the British and Hans Scharff for the Germans) and a number of successful American officers during the Vietnam conflict. Throughout the book, the authors make the point that linguistic ability, a deep understanding of the captives' culture and worldview, and a perception that torture or other violent methods were useless in soliciting information of value are the hallmarks of a successful interrogator of prisoners. This part of the book also describes these individuals' occasional conflicts with the military bureaucracy, such as Sedgwick Tourison's experience in reporting more information about the Tonkin Gulf incident than his superiors wanted to hear.

The final section, on Iraq, focuses on policy issues -- specifically, whether Army doctrine should permit Special Operations personnel to interrogate prisoners. Again, real-world examples from personal experience provide a study that is both gripping and insightful.

Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq is a thoughtful and provocative analysis of what any army confronts in war -- the need to gather intelligence from prisoners, the most effective way to do that, and the ineffectiveness of "harsh methods" in delivering useful information.

You can read the book here or get a copy from GPO here.

More at The Washington Post.

Pentagon Told to Save Billions for Use in War - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

More at The New York Times.

Full article at the Institute for National Security Studies.

More at The National Journal.