Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/03/2010 - 9:12am | 3 comments

Gene Simmons Military Tribute

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/03/2010 - 8:06am | 2 comments
Inside the Ring - Bill Gertz, Washington Times.

U.S. intelligence agencies have obtained a Chinese military book that will provide new insights into the Chinese military's information-warfare plans. The book is being translated, but Inside the Ring obtained its table of contents, which reveals Beijing's priorities for high-technology warfare using computers and electronic-warfare weapons. The 322-page book, "Information Warfare Theory," was published in May 2007 and written by Wang Zhengde, president of the People's Liberation Army Information Engineering University.

Like other military and Communist Party writings, such books are not often made public, and when they are, they provide U.S. intelligence and military specialist with valuable clues to the military thinking and plans of China's secretive military. The book states that information warfare is the "core" of China's high-tech military-reform efforts, which are referred to as "informationized" warfare - what the U.S. military has called the "revolution in military affairs." It involves integrating various weapons and intelligence with advanced command-and-control systems and mobile, combined-arms forces...

More at The Washington Times.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 06/02/2010 - 2:35pm | 9 comments
Some wonderful Real Politik analysis by Tony Cordesman over at CSIS in Israel as a Strategic Liability? that we received in their Web Flash mailing.

Israel should be sensitive to the fact that its actions directly affect U.S. strategic interests in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and it must be as sensitive to U.S. strategic concerns as the United States is to those of Israel.

and

...Israel should show enough discretion to reflect the fact that it is a tertiary U.S. strategic interest in a complex and demanding world.

A quick read here and well worth it. I am confident we have folks deeply entrenched in both extreme camps. Does this reflect the pragmatic middle ground?

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 06/02/2010 - 1:35pm | 4 comments
Two must reads that we have neglected to visit (and link to) as often as we should; Kings of War (King's College) and The Interpreter (Lowy Institute).
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 06/02/2010 - 7:44am | 7 comments
America's Strategic Poker Face - Michael Gerson, Washington Post opinion.

... It is commonplace to assert that there are economic foundations of national power. It is shameless to use a national security document to advance a debatable domestic agenda that shows scant understanding of how economies actually grow stronger. And it is doubly shameless - naked-on-a-downtown-bus shameless - for this administration to assert "responsible management of our federal budget" as a national security priority.

In most areas, the 2010 NSS expresses unobjectionable continuity. America frowns on nuclear proliferation. America likes democracy. America will act along with its allies -- except when it needs to act alone. Portions of the document are admirable, especially its emphasis on the promotion of development and global health as instruments of national influence. But it is not surprising that nearly everyone can find something to like in the NSS, since it reads like a State of the Union without space constraints. "The United States is an Arctic nation," we are informed, "with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region."

Much that is old in the NSS is obvious. Much that is new is not actually new. The contention that health entitlements, infrastructure construction and education spending are really national security priorities is a repolished version of an argument made for decades on the isolationist left. "How many schools could we build for the price of an aircraft carrier?" has become the claim that domestic spending is the national security equivalent of building an aircraft carrier...

More at The Washington Post.

National Security Strategy - White House Web Page

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 06/02/2010 - 4:23am | 0 comments
Counterinsurgency 3.0 - Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis, Parameters.

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wounded, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was "deteriorating" badly, according to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an August 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban's reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban's austerity over the Karzai government's corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fanaticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international development assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international development aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

The conflict in Iraq taught the US military many valuable lessons about how to gain the trust and cooperation of the local populace in the fight against radical Islamic insurgents, demonstrated in the new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented during the 2007 "surge." First, the Anbar Awakening established a successful precedent of the US military partnering with local tribes against insurgents, a tactical approach that could be consid¬ered "COIN 1.0." Next, COIN theorists led by General David Petraeus described the Clear-Hold-Build strategy to transition and expand tribal security alliances into long-term governance arrangements, a strategic advance that can be termed "COIN 2.0." General McChrystal and ISAF forces are applying many of these lessons in their current COIN operations in Afghanistan. There remains, however, a substantial doctrinal need to move from tactical methods that cultivate and develop tribal alliances to the strategic use of international aid to defeat insurgencies broadly and decisively. The authors term this new strategic approach to providing development aid in conflict areas "COIN 3.0." ...

Much more at Parameters.

Also in the latest issue of Parameters:

Integrating Civilian and Military Activities - Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

Combating a Combat Legacy - Chad Serena

The Issue of Attrition - J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda - Thomas R. Mccabe

Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict - Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny Mcpherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn

Clausewitz and the "New Wars" Scholars - Bart Schuurman

Our Visual Persuasion Gap - Martin Gurri, Craig Denny, and Aaron Harms

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/01/2010 - 4:29pm | 0 comments
Michael Yon's War - D.B. Grady, The Atlantic.

It began with a bridge. On the morning of March 1, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated on Tarnak River Bridge near Kandahar, Afghanistan, killing multiple civilians and one American soldier. While the destruction of a single bridge might ordinarily pose a mere inconvenience to the U.S. war machine, in the oppressive terrain of Afghanistan it became a logistical chokepoint, halting ground-based operations for days.

War correspondent Michael Yon sought the answer to an uncomfortable question: who was responsible for the security of that bridge?

Yon is no ordinary reporter. A former Green Beret with U.S. Army Special Forces, he has spent more time embedded in Iraq and Afghanistan than any other journalist. His dispatches have produced some of the most memorable combat narratives of the war, and a large share of its most iconic images. Make no mistake; Michael Yon is not a dispassionate observer of the Columbia J-School variety. When writing about U.S. forces, he says "we." When writing about insurgents, he calls them terrorists or Taliban. And when reporting failures in the war effort, he names names. This has earned him both the respect and ire of senior military staff. In the case of the Tarnak River Bridge, the name most repeatedly mentioned as responsible for its security was Daniel Menard, the Canadian brigadier general in charge of Task Force Kandahar. Yon went public with this information...

More at The Atlantic.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/01/2010 - 8:36am | 4 comments
To go beyond MSM reporting on the IDF's boarding of Gaza flotilla vessels see Information Dissemination, CDR Salamander, FP Passport, Politico, The Interpreter, Schmedlap, Abu Muqawama, Zenpundit, and Fabius Maximus.

Add others we missed to comments below.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/01/2010 - 8:19am | 0 comments
Shoot at American Patrol. Get Shot. Ditch Rifle. Ask Patrol for Bandage. Repeat? - C.J. Chivers, New York Times.

... This is the bizarre world of Afghan war, where both sides know the rules and fight according to them. For one side, the rules can resemble constraints. For the other, they can mean opportunity.

NATO's rules of engagement govern when, where and how force can be used, and in what forms, from a pistol shot to an airstrike. They also guide decisions on when and how Afghan homes can be entered. Rules of eligibility help shape when an Afghan can be given access to the military's medical system. Other rules determine when an Afghan can be detained, and by whom, and for how long, and where, and under what conditions. Over the years, the rules have shifted repeatedly. No doubt they will continue to change. And whenever a change is made, soldiers and Marines often joke that it seems that the Afghans they fight know the new rules as surely as American troops do, and adjust to them immediately.

This seemed to be the case on May 29 - when, if the soldiers had it right, two Afghans fighting the Americans took a break when they got shot, tossed aside their rifles or machine guns, and chose the wounded civilian option to hitch a ride from their enemy to their enemy's top-shelf gunshot-trauma care...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/01/2010 - 8:17am | 0 comments
America is Still the Best Guarantor of Freedom and Prosperity - Max Boot, Los Angeles Times opinion.

The U.S. still possesses unprecedented power projection capabilities, and just as important, it is armed with the goodwill of countless countries that know the U.S. offers protection from bullies.

Much nonsense has been written in recent years about the prospects of American decline and the inevitable rise of China. But it was not a declining power that I saw in recent weeks as I jetted from the Middle East to the Far East through two of America's pivotal geographic commands - Central Command and Pacific Command.

The very fact that the entire world is divided up into American military commands is significant. There is no French, Indian or Brazilian equivalent - not yet even a Chinese counterpart. It is simply assumed without much comment that American soldiers will be central players in the affairs of the entire world. It is also taken for granted that a vast network of American bases will stretch from Germany to Japan - more than 700 in all, depending on how you count...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/31/2010 - 4:00pm | 0 comments

It's Memorial Day -- time to look back and reflect on what so many have given

to get us to where we are.  In practice, it's also the unofficial start of

summer and the time to look forward to all that brings. With no disrespect intended

to this solemn day, it is also time for us to kick off our first fundraising campaign. 

During June 2010, or more precisely through the 4th of July, we have

a goal of raising $50,000 for Small Wars Foundation, the 501(c)(3) that operates

Small Wars Journal.

When we reflect back on where we are now, damn, we're thankful. We are

where we are now, first and foremost, because of the quality of thought and writing

by our content contributors (all volunteers), the substantive participation of commenters

on the Journal and SWJ Blog, and the richness of discussion in

the Small Wars Council.  We have benefitted immensely from the early endorsement

and continued participation of some of the greats in the field.  We have received

some individual contributions and we have efforts underway enabled by some generous

grants. We are humbled by the way the community has embraced Small Wars Journal.

Even more humbling is the amount of work we need to do to keep up with your interest

and continue to be worthy of the value you seem to place in us.  We have a

criminal backlog of good content submissions that we need to be able to work through

faster, since timeliness in so important to our dialog. We have a lot to do to update

and expand the site's other content, particularly to exploit the potential of an

upcoming platform and usability upgrade made possible by a grant. We are doing a

lot, we can do a lot more, and we need some resources help to close the gap. Call

it capacity building.

So to better serve you, the small wars community of interest, we are in the unpleasant

but necessary position of coming to you, hat in hand, in an NPR-like scenario. We

are counting on your contributions, coupled with support from grants and foundations,

collateral income (advertising and referrals), and volunteer contributions of effort

and content, to help us do more of what you seem to value and want us to do.

Please see our Support

pages for more ways you can help.  Here are the most blunt ones:

Give a one-time

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Mail checks payable to:

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Track the

campaign's progress here.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/31/2010 - 8:09am | 1 comment
Memorial Day, for a Father Whose Son was Killed in Iraq - Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times.

Where I grew up in the Midwest during the 1950s and early '60s, Memorial Day was no more about remembering the nation's war dead than Labor Day was about honoring working stiffs. It was a "free day." Falling on a Monday, Memorial Day made possible that great innovation, "the long weekend." As a family, we gathered in backyards for barbecues and to celebrate the informal beginning of summer. We did not gather in cemeteries to pay homage.

During my years as a serving soldier, Memorial Day connoted something quite different: It meant no scheduled training. It no longer implied a "free day," however. In the outfits where I served, holidays were the days we officers wore civvies to work, trying to catch up on everything left undone (usually paperwork) during the duty week. In retrospect it seems odd and more than a little embarrassing: Girding ourselves to fight the Red hordes, we Cold Warriors could spare no time to contemplate the sacrifices made by the real warriors who had preceded us.

Three years ago this month, my son was killed while serving in Iraq. His death changed many things, among them my own hitherto casual attitude toward Memorial Day.

Here in New England, where we now make our home, deejays and local news anchors still proclaim Memorial Day weekend the unofficial start of summer, as if unearthing some fresh discovery. Folks with cottages to open up take to the highways, pushing through traffic toward seashore or mountains. Our trek will be considerably shorter and simpler: We will make the five-minute drive to our son's gravesite...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/30/2010 - 6:08pm | 0 comments

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,

Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,

Adjutant General

Official:

WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

-----

On the morning of August 16, 2005, as my wife Retta and I sat with Wes and Abbey just after breaking the news to them of Mikes death earler that morning, then 13 year old Abbey buried her head into my shoulder, sobbing these words: "he was supposed to chase away my first boyfriend, he was supposed to cheer at my graduation from high school, he was supposed to be an uncle to my children..." These words seared my heart, broken as it was. I shall never forget them. She lost her oldest brother that day, her "Bubs" which she called him short for his nickname, Bubba.

-- Mudville Gazette

General Orders No. 11 - Washington Times

20,000 Flags - Forward Movement

Remembering Mark - Kerplunk

Graduation Night: Moon Over Yusufiyah - Mudville Gazette

Four-Day Weekend - Wings Over Iraq

Coming Home - Mudville Gazette

A Way To Honor A Fallen Hero Today - Blackfive

Memorial Day - Prairie Pundit

Memorial Day: Fitting Memorials and Passing of Torches - Blackfive

National Memorial Day Parade - Blackfive

What We Remember on Memorial Day - Los Angeles Times

Remember Who? - Paragould Daily Press

Take a Moment to Reflect on Memorial Day - Chillicothe Gazette

Memorial Day Has Relevance - Odessa American

Remember Vets; Celebrate Freedoms - Bluefield Daily Telegraph

Is the Traditional Memorial Day Celebration Still Relevant? - Delmarva Daily Times

A Special Monday - Battle Creek Enquirer

Memorial Day's First Blossoms - Louisville Courier-Journal

Memorial Day About More Than Barbecues, Sales - Rio Rancho Observer

A Day to Honor, Not Celebrate - Duluth News Tribune

Don't Forget the 'Memory' in Memorial Day - New Haven Register

Memorial Day - Southeast Missourian

Honoring the Fallen - Covington News

Remember the Reason for Memorial Day - Mount Airy News

We Wish We Didn't Need Tomorrow But, Sadly, We Do - Leader Vindicator

Memorial Day Used to be May 30, Still Should Be - Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

'Yes, We Thank You. Yes, We Remember You.' - Fort Wayne Journal Gazette

Honoring the Fallen - Catskill Daily Mail

Memorial Day is Time to Reflect Upon Sacrifices - Daily Republic

A Time to Remember Their Sacrifices - Hillsboro Times Gazette

Giving Their Last Full Measure - McCook Daily Gazette

They Gave Their Lives - Casper Star-Tribune

Memorial Day is Foremost a Day of Honor - Lexington Dispatch

Every Day is Memorial Day - Washington Times

Seeing a Fallen Soldier Home - Washington Times

Maintain Peace by Staying Strong - Washington Times

The Glory of War - Washington Times

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/30/2010 - 7:58am | 0 comments
Continue on for Small Wars Journal's Afghanistan and Pakistan update...
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/30/2010 - 6:26am | 0 comments
To Join the Army's Old Guard, Iraq War Veteran Learns to Sweat the Small Stuff - Christian Davenport, Washington Post.

That ceremonial, iconic role makes it essential for Old Guard leaders to choose their soldiers carefully. Members of the unit must be at least 5-foot-10, physically fit and able to stand for hours at a time without so much as flinching. They have to master choreographed steps and marches and put together a flawless uniform, all of which they learn during an intensive three-week Regimental Indoctrination Program, which, as Pata is discovering, is unlike anything else in the Army.

Here, a ruler is almost as important as a rifle. Everything must be in its place - medals half an inch above the breast pocket, U.S. insignia one inch from the lapel edge, buckle two inches from the belt loop. Nothing in the constellation of the many decorations on Pata's uniform may be outside a one-sixteenth-of-an-inch margin of error - two tiny tick marks on the inspector's ruler, about the width of this o. Anything more and Pata gets what the Old Guard calls a gig. Three gigs and you fail.

Inspection time looms. A fellow soldier helps Pata fix his belt tight, clips one last derelict thread, and then, like a designer prepping a model for the runway, checks the soldier's shoes, soles, hair, hat, rifle, belt, gloves, cuffs, medals...

More at The Washington Post.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 05/28/2010 - 6:19pm | 0 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Can't we already write the December Afghanistan strategy review?

2) The new War Plan Orange.

Can't we already write the December Afghanistan strategy review?

The "battle" for Kandahar is now underway. But don't call it a battle, says Gen. Stanley McChrystal, think of it as a "process." According to a recent gloomy assessment by the Washington Post's Karen DeYoung, administration officials view the Kandahar operation as the "go for broke" culminating effort of the war. McChrystal will commit 10,000 U.S. soldiers and 80 percent of USAID's budget for Afghanistan to the Kandahar offensive. In DeYoung's words, "The bet is that the Kandahar operation, backed by thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars, will break the mystique and morale of the insurgents, turn the tide of the war and validate the administration's Afghanistan strategy. There is no Plan B."

Are Barack Obama and McChrystal really gambling on achieving a clear and convincing victory in Kandahar? The battle against the Taliban insurgents is a battle for perceptions. And there are numerous audiences whose perceptions the administration and McChrystal must alter. These audiences include Kandahar's leaders and population, the U.S. public, and the rest of the world, which will render its judgment about U.S. strength and effectiveness.

How do U.S. officials define success in Kandahar? According to DeYoung, the definition is vague, relying on "atmospherics reporting," public opinion polling, and levels of street commerce. When defining success, U.S. officials are in a logical trap; they must keep their definitions secret in order to prevent the Taliban from targeting the measurements. But without stating their goals in advance, they will have a difficult time convincing the various audiences that they are achieving them.

According to DeYoung's article, the Kandahar operation will be the centerpiece of the Obama administration's December strategy review. That review will presumably result in a decision confirming the plan to begin a withdrawal the following summer.

Given that the administration is hiding the definition of success, Obama has repeated the July 2011 withdrawal pledge, and the U.S. 2012 electoral calendar will by then be in motion, couldn't the White House staff just write the December strategy review now?

The one factor that actually remains unknown is how the Taliban will respond to the Kandahar offensive.

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/27/2010 - 6:06pm | 0 comments
COIN Spring Symposium, Interim Report - US Army / US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center.

The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center hosted its 2010 Counterinsurgency (COIN) Symposium with special emphasis on COIN in Afghanistan from May 11-13, 2010. Twelve featured speakers and 120-plus attendees discussed COIN theory and best practices coming from the field in Afghanistan. The purpose was to identify common themes for inclusion in pre-deployment training and professional military and interagency education curricula.

The report contains common themes and more detailed summaries of each speaker's presentation.

More at the COIN Center.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/27/2010 - 5:09pm | 3 comments
The Center for a New American Security's national security experts released statements today regarding the Obama Administration's National Security Strategy:

Continue on for the statements...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/27/2010 - 2:29pm | 0 comments
Today the Administration is released the National Security Strategy that "lays out a strategic approach for advancing American interests, including the security of the American people, a growing U.S. economy, support for our values, and an international order that can address 21st century challenges."

Read the full National Security Strategy

by Robert Haddick | Thu, 05/27/2010 - 10:49am | 0 comments
Today the Obama administration rolls out its National Security Strategy (my Foreign Policy colleague Josh Rogin got the pre-release document).

The new National Security Strategy (NSS) has the skeleton of a true strategy. It properly begins with ends, describing America's enduring national interests (security, prosperity, values, international order). It then moves on to ways, the approaches and actions the United States government will employ to achieve those ends (for example, non-proliferation strategies, encouraging science research, promoting human rights, and strengthening alliances). It even discusses means, the resources the government and the country will mobilize to implement the ways. So far, so good.

But what is missing is an honest analysis of the obstacles, challenges, and adversaries that stand in the way of execution, and how the government intends overcome these. The strategic world is almost always competitive; smart and experienced adversaries are attempting to thwart success. The strategic competition is a match-up of strengths and weaknesses; the NSS has virtually no discussion of these match-ups. The NSS in long (very long) on ideals and aspirations. It does very little to recognize the competitive global environment, the strengths and weakness the United States brings to the competition, and how these compare to the advantages and vulnerabilities of adversaries (who largely remain unnamed in the document).

It is also the case that the ends -- the enduring national interests (security, prosperity, values, international order) -- will frequently come into conflict with each other. For example, pursuing security in a certain case may inflict stress on the international order. Some policies designed to promote prosperity may require taking risks with security or with values. The NSS does not reveal its priorities in this regard or the framework for how policymakers will resolve such conflicts.

We should not be too surprised by these shortcomings in the document. It may be asking too much of the United States government's top officials to reveal their analysis of America's strengths and weaknesses and how those match up against those of adversaries. Nor should we expect that when interests and goals come into conflict, policymakers will tell us which ones are expendable.

The resulting document thus seems more like a windy political campaign speech than frank strategic analysis (the Bush administration's 2006 NSS measures up no better by these standards). So what is the Obama administration's real national security strategy? How does the administration really view the competitive environment, honestly size up America's capabilities, evaluate the vulnerabilities of adversaries, and really rank the priority of its goals? We won't know until some archives are opened far in the future.

It is understandable that the administration's real strategic appraisal must remain classified, otherwise adversaries would have crucial information to develop even more effective strategies. It would be refreshing - and fortifying - if a more revealing NSS caused the American public to have an open debate on ends, way, and means; America's competitive strengths and weaknesses; and on what the country's strategic priorities should be. A version of that debate occurs (sometimes) every four years. From the perspective of administrations currently responsible for day-to-day governing, that is often enough.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/27/2010 - 5:39am | 0 comments
President Obama's National Security Strategy Looks Beyond Military Might - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

Military superiority is not enough to maintain U.S. strength and influence in the world, and the United States must build global institutions and expand international partnerships beyond its traditional allies, according to a new national security strategy prepared by the Obama administration. Maintaining U.S. global leadership will also depend on a strong domestic economy and a commitment to "education, clean energy, science and technology, and a reduced federal deficit," the White House said in talking points summarizing the strategy document, which is scheduled for formal release Thursday.

The new doctrine represents a clear break with the unilateral military approach advocated by the Bush administration after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Bush tempered that doctrine toward the end of his presidency, but the Obama doctrine offers a far broader definition of national security. While military advantage will remain "a cornerstone of our national defense and an anchor of global security," the strategy calls for "new partnerships with emerging centers of influence" and a "push for institutions that are more capable of responding to the challenges of our times," the summary said. At home, the strategy recognizes "American innovation . . . as a leading source of American power." ...

More at The Washington Post.

Strategy Focuses on Terrorists at Home - Eli Lake, Washington Times.

President Obama's new national security strategy will include a new focus on the threat posed by Americans who can be recruited and radicalized by al Qaeda through the Internet, the president's senior counterterrorism adviser said Wednesday. "The president's national security strategy explicitly recognizes the threat to the United States posed by individuals radicalized here at home," said John Brennan, the National Security Council's counterterrorism and homeland security adviser, in a speech.

Mr. Brennan told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that "we have seen individuals, including U.S. citizens, armed with their U.S. passports, travel easily to extremist safe havens and return to America, their deadly plans disrupted by coordinated intelligence and law enforcement." Mr. Brennan spoke on the eve of the release by the Obama administration of a new National Security Strategy report...

More at The Washington Times.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 05/26/2010 - 2:49pm | 36 comments
Olson: Counterinsurgency Ops Should 'Involve Countering the Insurgents' - John T. Bennett, Defense News.

The U.S. military's counterinsurgency tactics increasingly place too much emphasis on protecting local peoples and not enough on fighting enemy forces, said U.S. Special Operations Command chief Adm. Eric Olson. While the U.S. military has adopted a population-focused strategy in Afghanistan, Olson said May 26 he "fears counterinsurgency has become a euphemism for nonkinetic activities." The term is now to often used to describe efforts aimed at "protecting populations," Olson said during a conference in Arlington, Va.

The military's top special operator, in a shot across the bow of modern-day counterinsurgency doctrine proponents, then added: "Counterinsurgency should involve countering the insurgents." Olson also made clear he thinks U.S. laws give him the authority to craft and implement doctrine for America's special operators. Olson said doctrine is important for fighting wars, and "should be carefully written - but we should not fall in love with it."

In a blunt statement, Olson called "COIN doctrine an oxymoron." ...

More at Defense News.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 05/26/2010 - 10:25am | 6 comments
Gates Orders Services To Adopt McChrystal's COIN Standards - John T. Bennett, Defense News.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has directed the U.S. military services to adopt a set of counterinsurgency tools modeled after ones instituted in Afghanistan by Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, said a senior Pentagon official. Gates on May 24 signed a directive ordering the services to "take McChrystal's COIN training and proficiency standards ... and adapt those for the whole force," Garry Reid, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combat terrorism, told Defense News May 25.

The idea is to take the kinds of COIN training and "proficiency" standards that McChrystal, the top American general in Afghanistan, implemented there with his "AfPak Hands" program...

More at Defense News.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 11:09pm | 1 comment
From Navy Office of Information

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Similar to the collaborative signing of the Maritime Strategy, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard released the Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf, which guides implementation of the strategy and describes how, when and where U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war.

NOC 10 describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in the Maritime Strategy, signed in October 2007.

"The Naval Operations Concept charts more precisely how our naval forces can and do put into motion our Maritime Strategy," said Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations. "Free from territorial boundaries, naval forces can responsively maneuver to meet global needs and challenges when and where they happen."

NOC 10 states who the naval forces are, what they believe, where they operate, what they provide the nation, and what capabilities they employ to meet the demands of a complex, evolving security environment. NOC also describes how naval forces use the sea as maneuver space and are employed across the range of military operations.

NOC 10 recognizes that naval forces continuously operate forward-and surge additional forces when necessary-to influence adversaries and project power.

For more information on the Maritime Strategy go to: www.navy.mil/maritime. For more information on NOC 10 go to: www.navy.mil/maritime/noc.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 10:57pm | 30 comments
U.S. Is Said to Order Further Clandestine Military Action - Mark Mazzetti, New York Times.

The top American commander in the Middle East has ordered a broad expansion of clandestine military activity in an effort to disrupt militant groups or counter threats in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and other countries in the region, according to defense officials and military documents. The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate.

While the Bush administration had approved some clandestine military activities far from designated war zones, the new order is intended to make such efforts more systematic and long term, officials said. Its goals are to build networks that could "penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy" Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to "prepare the environment" for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. The order, however, does not appear to authorize offensive strikes in any specific countries...

More at The New York Times.