Small Wars Journal

Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 9:55pm | 19 comments
Americans Outgunned by Taleban's AK47s - Michael Evans, The Times.

The future of the standard issue infantry rifle used by American troops in Afghanistan is under review amid concerns that it is the wrong weapon for the job. With its light bullets the M4 rifle lacks sufficient velocity and killing power in long-range firefights, leaving U.S. troops outgunned by the Taleban and their AK47 Kalashnikovs and the old Russian SVD sniper rifle.

British Forces face the same dilemma but the Ministry of Defence said yesterday that there was no plan to review the SA80A2 rifle, which fires the same NATO 5.56mm calibre rounds as its U.S. counterpart. "We constantly review all of our capabilities," a spokesman said. However, Britain has followed the U.S. in investing in 400 new larger-calibre Sharpshooter rifles, which use a heavier 7.62mm round, and are effective at longer ranges. The weapon is expected to be deployed in Afghanistan, alongside the standard rifle, by the end of the month...

More at The Times.

by Michael Yon | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 4:36pm | 0 comments
We all are aware that war leads to difficult situations. In regard to detainees, we've seen terrorists released only to strike again. Yet in the interest of justice we are concerned about detaining potentially innocent people. Difficult times, difficult answers. In summary, some detainees at Bagram are trying to use American courts to chisel their way out.

Last year, a group of people were asked to join in offering an opinion to the court. Those were: Special Forces Association, U.S. Army Ranger Association, Senator Lindsey Graham, Col. (ret) Abraham German, Wade Ishimoto, Prof. Andrew Nichols Pratt, Dr. Dennis Walters, Rear Admiral (ret) George Worthington, Michael Yon and Senator Ryan Zinke.

The good attorneys who are trying to keep us from getting blown up by repeat offenders emailed today.

Continue on for more...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 4:26pm | 4 comments
President Nominates New USJFCOM Commander - U.S. Joint Forces Command PAO

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced today that President Barack Obama has nominated U. S. Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

Located in Norfolk, Va., USJFCOM oversees a force of more than 1.16 million dedicated men and women, spanning USJFCOM's service component commands and subordinate activities. The command includes active and reserve personnel from each branch of the armed forces and civilian and contract employees.

Pending confirmation by the U.S. Senate, Odierno will oversee UFJFCOM's roles in joint concept development and experimentation, joint capability development, joint training, and force provision and management as outlined in the Department of Defense's Unified Command Plan.

If confirmed, Odierno will replace Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis later this year; currently, Odierno commands U.S. Forces - Iraq, a post he has held since September 2008.

Continue on for more...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/24/2010 - 8:22am | 0 comments
General James Mattis Q&A - Vago Muradian, Defense News.

Q. What are the real lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars?

A. War is a human endeavor, a social problem, and we have modest expectations that technology is going to solve a problem as complex as warfare.

Second, no war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote, as we're often saying in the military.

A third point is that what we cannot do is look towards war today as something that we are going to fight on our own. We are going to be fighting alongside allies of some stripe, and we are going to have to create a military that can easily adapt to other allies fighting alongside it as part of our formations, and perhaps us fighting as part of their formations.

But you can't simply transport the lessons from one theater, even one as recent as Iraq, directly to Afghanistan. It's its own country, the enemy is its own enemy, the terrain is different. Most importantly, the human terrain - the complexity of the human connections, the tribal relationships - is different.

Q. You're changing JFCom's name?

A. I've asked for that change: to Joint and Coalition Forces Command. That decision is not yet made.

Read the entire Q&A at Defense News.

by Crispin Burke | Sun, 05/23/2010 - 5:52pm | 1 comment
This week, two instructors at the US Naval Academy discussed some of the challenges, strengths, and shortcomings of America's service academies. The first is Dr. Bruce Fleming, a professor of English who is set to release his book Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide in August. Dr. Fleming penned an op-ed in Thursday's New York Times entitled, The Academies' March Toward Mediocrity.

Instead of better officers, the academies produce burned-out midshipmen and cadets. They come to us thinking they've entered a military Camelot, and find a maze of petty rules with no visible future application. These rules are applied inconsistently by the administration, and tend to change when a new superintendent is appointed every few years. The students quickly see through assurances that "people die if you do X" (like, "leave mold on your shower curtain," a favorite claim of one recent administrator). We're a military Disneyland, beloved by tourists but disillusioning to the young people who came hoping to make a difference.

In my experience, the students who find this most demoralizing are those who have already served as Marines and sailors (usually more than 5 percent of each incoming class), who know how the fleet works and realize that what we do on the military-training side of things is largely make-work. Academics, too, are compromised by the huge time commitment these exercises require. Yes, we still produce some Rhodes, Marshall and Truman Scholars. But mediocrity is the norm.

Meanwhile, the academy's former pursuit of excellence seems to have been pushed aside by the all-consuming desire to beat Notre Dame at football (as Navy did last year). To keep our teams in the top divisions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, we fill officer-candidate slots with students who have been recruited primarily for their skills at big-time sports. That means we reject candidates with much higher predictors of military success (and, yes, athletic skills that are more pertinent to military service) in favor of players who, according to many midshipmen who speak candidly to me, often have little commitment to the military itself.

Dr. Shaun Baker, a professor of philosophy, provides an excellent counterpoint to Dr. Fleming in an entry on his blog at Themistocles' Shade. Dr. Baker received his PhD from Wayne State University, and is the Assistant Director of the James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy. He teaches philosophy, coaches the Academy's Ethics Bowl team, and is the Stockdale Center's webmaster.

In the Naval Academy, there is a very strong tradition of exhortation to moral excellence, honesty, integrity, ideals taken very seriously, and as more than one mid on more than one occasion has put it, "pounded" into their heads from day one Plebe Summer. Yes, this exhortation may heighten the sort of sensitivity to inconsistency that gives rise to cynicism, but I believe it also has a pronounced effect on the day-to-day thinking of a majority of the mids.

They do take these values seriously, even as they recognize their own shortcomings, those of other midshipmen and the faculty and staff. In general, I would say that this does not diminish the fact that they do take these values seriously, and think about them, have them in the forefront of their minds much more so than would people that did not go through four years of such rigorous exhortation to ethical thinking and exemplary character.

Not only do all midshipmen go through a rigorous 4 year cycle of classes intended to drive home the importance of ethical thought, and ethical leadership, classes that explicitly take up and rationally discuss cynicism, among other germane topics (just war theory, international law, military justice, principles of servant leadership, followership, constitutional principles, and etc..) but the very nature of the institution they live in for four years puts them in a good position to understand the position of the enlisted people they will eventually work with. In many ways the academy does two things at the same time. It prepares for leadership at various ranks, in various ways intellectual, moral and emotional, but it also drives home how it is to be a lower level "cog" in a big quite hierarchical command-structured institution, and teaches one how to deal with that reality, and the cynicism that naturally results.

Discuss the articles further at the Small Wars Council...

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 05/22/2010 - 10:06pm | 0 comments
At West Point, Obama Offers New Security Strategy - Michael D. Shear, Washington Post.

President Obama on Saturday offered a glimpse of a new national security doctrine that distances his administration from George W. Bush's policy of preemptive war, emphasizing global institutions and America's role in promoting democratic values. In a commencement speech to the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president outlined his departure from what Bush had called a "distinctly American internationalism." Instead, Obama pledged to shape a new "international order" based on diplomacy and engagement.

Obama has spoken frequently about creating new alliances, and of attempts to repair the U.S. image abroad after nearly a decade in which Bush's approach was viewed with suspicion in many quarters. Unlike Bush, who traveled to West Point in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to announce his American-centered approach to security, Obama on Saturday emphasized his beliefs in the power of those alliances...

More at The Washington Post.

Obama Offers Strategy Based in Diplomacy - Peter Baker, New York Times.

President Obama previewed a new national security strategy rooted in diplomatic engagement and international alliances on Saturday as he essentially repudiated his predecessor's emphasis on unilateral American power and the right to wage pre-emptive war. Eight years after President George W. Bush came to the United States Military Academy to set a new security doctrine after the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Obama used the same setting to offer a revised vision vowing no retreat against enemies while seeking "national renewal and global leadership."

"Yes, we are clear-eyed about the shortfalls of our international system," the president told graduating cadets. "But America has not succeeded by stepping out of the currents of cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice, so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities and face consequences when they don't." Mr. Obama said the United States would "be steadfast in strengthening those old alliances that have served us so well," while also trying to "build new partnerships and shape stronger international standards and institutions." He added: "This engagement is not an end in itself. The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times." ...

More at The New York Tmes.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 05/22/2010 - 7:52am | 1 comment
Blair's Resignation May Reflect Inherent Conflicts - Greg Miller and Walter Pincus, Washington Post.

As the intelligence community was rebuilt after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, two additions were seen as crucial to addressing systemic breakdowns: a new director to force often-squabbling agencies to work together, and a counterterrorism center to connect threat data dots. But developments this week underscored the extent to which those two institutions have struggled to carry out their missions, and are increasingly seen as hobbled by their own structural flaws.

The resignation of Dennis C. Blair as director of national intelligence Friday means the position will soon be turned over to a fourth occupant in little more than five years. Current and former U.S. intelligence officials said the job has come to be viewed as a thankless assignment - lacking in authority, yet held to account for each undetected terrorist plot...

More at The Washington Post.

Dispute Over France a Factor in Intelligence Rift - New York Times.

An already strained relationship between the White House and the departing spymaster Dennis C. Blair erupted earlier this year over Mr. Blair's efforts to cement close intelligence ties to France and broker a pledge between the nations not to spy on each other, American government officials said Friday. The White House scuttled the plan, officials said, but not before President Nicolas Sarkozy of France had come to believe that a deal was in place. Officials said that Mr. Sarkozy was angered about the miscommunication, and that the episode had hurt ties between the United States and France at a time when the two nations are trying to present a united front to dismantle Iran's nuclear program.

Officials said the dust-up was not the proximate cause of President Obama's decision to remove Mr. Blair, who announced his resignation on Thursday, from the job as director of national intelligence, but was a contributing factor in the mutual distrust between the White House and members of Mr. Blair's staff. The episode also illuminates the extent to which communications between the president's aides and Mr. Blair had deteriorated during a period of particular alarm about terrorist threats to the United States...

More at The New York Times.

Ousted U.S. Spy Chief 'Faced Rebellion' - Daniel Dombey, Financial Times.

High-profile intelligence reforms since September 11 2001 have not done enough to protect the U.S. against future attacks, analysts and experts said on Friday, following President Barack Obama's decision to remove the country's spy chief. Mr Obama obtained the resignation on Thursday of Dennis Blair, director of national intelligence, the most high-level departure from his administration yet. Mr Obama's move threw the spotlight on often warring U.S. intelligence agencies, which have a $50bn (€40bn, £35bn) budget and are at the forefront of the battle against al-Qaeda - not least through CIA drone strikes in Pakistan.

The effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence effort has been under public scrutiny after two recent failed bombing attempts, in an aircraft above Detroit last Christmas day and in Times Square this month. While many White House officials faulted Mr Blair on alleged personal failings, the administration also ack­nowledges that his role was still not adequately defined...

More at The Financial Times.

Clapper Leading Candidate for National Intelligence Post - Ellen Nakashima and Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

... Clapper, who has spent more than 45 years in intelligence work, is the leading candidate to become the next DNI. The extent of the authorities the next occupant of the post will wield is a significant issue for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will hold the confirmation hearing. "The committee has generally taken the position that the DNI needs to be a strong position, filled with a strong person," a congressional aide said.

Some question whether Clapper would want a job that is widely regarded as lacking sufficient authority to coordinate 16 intelligence agencies, ranging from the CIA and NSA to the FBI and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Clapper's former agency. DNI Dennis C. Blair, who announced Thursday that he was resigning, struggled to fully assume the role of the president's chief intelligence adviser. Hayden said that if Clapper, 69, were the nominee, he would urge him to secure President Obama's commitment that he is the go-to guy on intelligence. "He has got to believe that the president believes he is senior intelligence adviser," Hayden said...

More at The Washington Post.

Former DIA Analysts Rip Clapper's Leadership - Jeff Stein, Washington Post.

Two former top Defense Intelligence Agency officials say retired Air Force Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., a leading candidate to be the next Director of National Intelligence, nearly wrecked the agency's analysis wing when he ran the organization in the mid-1990s. Clapper, currently Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, ran the DIA for three years before retiring in 1995 after 32 years in the Air Force.

According to the two former top DIA officials, Clapper's major initiative - to reorganize intelligence analysis by specialists in enemy weapons, rather than specialists in countries and regions - wreaked havoc at the agency and significantly downgraded its understanding of foreign events. One of the analysts, Jeffrey White, who was chief of Middle East/Africa military assessments, among other top jobs during a 34-year career at the DIA, said Clapper eventually realized the mistake he made and reversed course...

More at The Washington Post.

Mr. Blair's Departure - New York Times editorial.

It is unsettling to watch yet another shake-up in the intelligence community. As the aborted Times Square and Christmas Day bombings proved, militant groups are determined to strike here again. A well-functioning spy network is truly a matter of life and death. Dennis Blair, who was forced out on Thursday by President Obama, is the third man to have served as director of national intelligence since the job was created in 2004 in the flurry of post-9/11 reforms.

The brainy, retired four-star admiral (and former chief of the United States Pacific Command) seemed well suited to ride herd over 16 competing spy agencies. He quickly clashed with Leon Panetta, the C.I.A. director (and true Washington insider), bristled at what he saw as White House micromanagement, struggled to figure out how to work the nonmilitary bureaucracy and never developed a relationship with Mr. Obama...

More at The New York Times.

Blair's Replacement Has Problems to Solve - Washington Post editorial.

The resignation of Dennis C. Blair as director of national intelligence was the product of personal as well as institutional failings. A retired admiral with a distinguished record of service, Mr. Blair's political judgment looked questionable from the beginning of his DNI tenure, when he nominated a former ambassador with close ties to China and Saudi Arabia - and crackpot views about the Israel "lobby" - to chair the National Intelligence Council. After the failed Christmas Day airplane bombing, Mr. Blair told Congress that the Nigerian suspect should have been questioned by the interagency interrogation group created by the administration for terrorism cases - only to acknowledge later that the team had not yet been launched.

But Mr. Blair's biggest problem was his poor management of the problem he inherited from his three, also short-lived, predecessors: the lack of clear authorities and responsibilities for his office, which was created by Congress in 2004 in an ill-considered attempt to respond to the intelligence failures before Sept. 11, 2001. Though it has mushroomed into a quasi-agency with 1,500 employees, the office of the DNI has never exercised authority over the nation's other intelligence agencies or solved the problem of their failure to share and synthesize information about key threats...

More at The Washington Post.

Dennis Blair Departs - Wall Street Journal editorial.

Intelligence disputes are usually murky, though the sacking of Dennis Blair isn't among them. Explanations for the Director of National Intelligence's exit this week range from Mr. Blair's turf wars with the CIA and at the White House to the failure to pre-empt three domestic terror attacks, two of which failed out of blind luck. But Mr. Blair is really a casualty of the failed "intelligence reform" of the last decade.

Mr. Blair's successor will be the fourth DNI in the five years since the office was stood up in 2005, and this unfortunate man or woman will also supposedly integrate and manage the 16 intelligence satraps. As we and other critics predicted at the time, however, the DNI has merely become another bureaucracy layered on top of the other bureaucracies, with some 1,500 employees often doing what others elsewhere also do. In a bureaucratic classic, Mr. Blair and CIA chief Leon Panetta clashed last year over naming intelligence chiefs abroad. Mr. Panetta won...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 05/21/2010 - 8:00pm | 1 comment
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Experts' advice to NATO: Slim down, scale back, and pass the ball,

2) Will China end up liable for the actions of its "rogues"?

Experts' advice to NATO: Slim down, scale back, and pass the ball

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright chaired a commission charged with reviewing NATO's "strategic concept." Last revised in 1999, the strategic concept is "an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks." On May 17, Albright's "Group of Experts" released its report, which forecasts the security environment through 2020 and lists recommendations for how NATO should respond. The group's conclusion? NATO should slim down, scale back, and pass the ball.

Albright's panel called on NATO to adjust to the modern threat environment. According to the group, NATO needs better preparations against cyberattacks, ballistic missiles, and unconventional threats. The report noted that many member states -- their defense budgets weighed down with excessive personnel costs -- are spending too little on new military hardware. And NATO headquarters, with a bloated staff and far too many generals walking its halls, is itself due for slimming down.

But looming over the panel's effort is NATO's inheritance from Afghanistan. Following a review of lessons learned in Afghanistan, the report calls for guidelines on when and where the alliance will again operate outside its borders. The authors remind readers that "NATO is a regional, not a global organisation; its financial resources are limited and subject to other priorities; and it has no desire to take on missions that other institutions and countries can be counted upon to handle."

Although the report left open the hypothetical possibility that NATO could engage in another out-of-area mission, it also plainly discussed the political limitations that member states will put on the organization's ambitions. Those member states with detachments in Afghanistan will no doubt be eager to join the U.S. caravan that will begin departing in 2011. After that, crushing fiscal retrenchment and sour memories of Afghanistan will likely leave most member states in Europe incapable of any significant military expeditions.

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/20/2010 - 9:10pm | 5 comments
The Secret Pentagon Spy Ring - Marc Ambinder, The Atlantic.

Michael Furlong, the long-time Defense Department official who set up and ran network of private intelligence collectors for the military, is being hung out to dry by the very forces that precipitated the network's formation in the first place. Here's the skinny: form follows function in the military, and the U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, has been aggressively moving into territory traditionally occupied by other military elements and the Central Intelligence Agency. They're doing it under the cover of something called IO -- Information Operations -- which they've adapted as one of their core missions. (The others: cybersecurity, which overlaps with IO, nuclear weapons, and space defense.)

Around 2004 or 2005, STRATCOM set up what it calls the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas. IO ops are run from here. Most everyone involved in this controversy, from Furlong to his superiors to the contractor intelligence gatherers, went through the JIOWC at some point in their careers. The CIA doesn't think STRATCOM should play in this lane. But neither does Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, or the State Department, or the National Security Staff. Information Operations involves five fields: deception, psychological operations, computer network operations, electronic warfare and operations security...

More at The Atlantic.

What If COIN Just Doesn't Work? - Ann Marlowe, World Affairs.

I don't mean, What if counterinsurgency is too trendy? or What if we shouldn't neglect preparing for conventional wars in our enthusiasm for COIN? I mean, what if counterinsurgency has never, ever, anywhere actually worked? What if our military has been chasing a chimera for almost four years — or more? These thoughts are prompted by my last couple of trips to Afghanistan where, truth to tell, there doesn't seem to be any increase in security when our troops do the right stuff (getting out among the people, lots of presence, lots of talking). We've got it down to a science now: the shuras, the projects, the provincial development plans, the embedded partners (is it my imagination or does the current military jargon for police mentors sound like a euphemism for a gay relationship?).

COIN makes sense intellectually, especially in the pellucid prose of David Galula, who wrote better in English than Roger Trinquier in French. Part of the reason it makes sense is that COIN is congruent with our culture's bias toward a perspectival view of reality. As General McChrystal keeps saying, counterinsurgency is a matter of perception. If you feel that the government provides security, that's reality. If you feel insecure, that's reality. We think lots of stuff is a matter of perspective, from modern art and music to ethics. But when COIN succeeded, it may well have had nothing to do with the living among the people bit — or the talking bit...

More at World Affairs.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/20/2010 - 4:49am | 11 comments
NATO: Illiteracy, Corruption Hamper Afghan Police - Reuters via The New York Times.

An 80 percent illiteracy rate, corruption and a lack of trained personnel are hampering Afghan police, the NATO commander overseeing the training of Afghan security forces said on Wednesday. NATO has stepped up training of Afghan police in an effort to reform a force that inspires little confidence among locals, struggles with high dropout rates and is frequently accused of incompetence and drug use.

But only 45 percent of Afghan police have had any formal preparation, said U.S. Lieutenant-General William Caldwell, who heads the training mission as the alliance prepares to boost the size of the Afghan army and police to over 300,000 by 2011. The training is also central to NATO's strategy to eventually transfer control of security to Afghan forces so that Western troops can start withdrawing next year. Professionalizing the police force will not happen overnight, Caldwell said...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 05/19/2010 - 7:28pm | 1 comment

Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderland

David Isby

ISBN 978-1-60598-9 Cloth $28.95 6 x9 xxii, 440 pages

Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires, published by Pegasus Books in New York, is an in-depth analysis of the conflicts currently taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author sees Afghanistan as defined by distinct but interconnected conflicts that are currently shaping its future. The book concentrates on the realities of these conflicts in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, internal instability threatens the future of its neighbours as well. The book also makes recommendations for effective future policies.

An illuminating history of modern Afghanistan: the story of a country caught in a vortex of terror. Veteran defense analyst and Afghanistan expert David Isby provides an insightful and meticulously researched look at the current situation in Afghanistan, her history, and what he believes must be done so that the US and NATO coalition can succeed in what has historically been known as "the graveyard of empires."

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world with one of the lowest literacy rates. It is rife with divisions between ethnic groups that dwarf current schisms in Iraq, and all the groups are lead by warlords who fight over control of the drug trade as much as they do over religion. The region is still racked with these confrontations along with conflicts between rouge factions from Pakistan, with whom relations are increasingly strained. After seven years and billions of dollars in aid, efforts at nation-building in Afghanistan has produced only a puppet regime that is dependent on foreign aid for survival and has no control over a corrupt police force nor the increasingly militant criminal organizations and the deepening social and economic crisis.

The task of implementing an effective US policy and cementing Afghani rule is hampered by what Isby sees as separate but overlapping conflicts between terrorism, narcotics, and regional rivalries, each requiring different strategies to resolve. Pulling these various threads together will be the challenge for the Obama administration, yet it is a challenge that can be met by continuing to foster local involvement and Afghani investment in the region.

David Isby, the author, has published three previous books on Afghanistan, written extensively in journals such as USA Today, Jane's Intelligence Review, Jane's Defense Weekly and other publications, testified before House and Senate committees as an independent expert, and has appeared discussing Afghanistan on CNN, PBS News Hour, the McLaughlin Group, C-SPAN, the BBC, the Voice of America and many other broadcasts. The author has spent much time on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, starting in the 1980s. Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires is available at bookstores nationwide and on-line from Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Powell's and others.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 05/19/2010 - 4:53am | 0 comments
Continue on for MDA's response to The New York Times article "Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program".
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 05/18/2010 - 4:25pm | 1 comment
Coalition Ship Aids Iranian Mariners - US Central Command (H/T Starbuck, and here.)

The San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship, USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) assisted six stranded Iranian mariners early Friday morning May 14th while conducting routine Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Arabian Gulf. Mesa Verde is currently assigned to Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, part of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).

The ship received a faint mayday call over the radio just before 4 am and shortly after, the lookout spotted a signal fire coming from a dhow in the direction of the received distress call.

Mesa Verde sent an Approach and Visit (AAV) team to assess the needs of the vessel and to provide assistance if required. Once on scene, the AAV team discovered that the dhow's propulsion, electrical and steering systems had failed and that the crew had been adrift for four days at sea and dangerously low on food and water.

The Mesa Verde provided these necessities for the distressed mariners as well as medical attention for two of the crew members with burn injuries. Furthermore, engineers from the ship replaced the battery and fixed the steering so the crew of the dhow could continue their journey safely.

"It's well trained boat crews and Mesa Verde's skilled engineers that made this difficult task look easy," said Cmdr. Larry LeGree, Commanding Officer, USS Mesa Verde. "While conducting maritime security operations, it was rewarding to be able to assist mariners in trouble."

CTF 152 was established in March 2004 and operates in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf. The task force coordinates Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with regional partners and conducts Maritime Security Operations, as well as being prepared to respond to any crisis inside the Arabian Gulf...

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 05/18/2010 - 9:56am | 3 comments
Jules Crittenden has a nice piece up on Forward Movement, Forever War, about Dexter Filkens of The New York Times.

Straightforward piece of work suggests someone who knows what he's doing, doesn't mess around, keeps his head and lets it tell itself. Could stand as a great tutorial for Journalism 101, or Advanced War Reporting, the graduate seminar. You still have to be a reporter, and do the basic job. I don't want to think about how you get that good at that and what you walk away with. It's too early in the morning.

Much more at Forward Movement.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 05/18/2010 - 8:33am | 1 comment
Connecting with Kabul: The Importance of the Wolesi Jirga Election and Local Political Networks in Afghanistan - Noah Coburn, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

There is a renewal of interest in the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament, known as the Wolesi Jirga, taking place in both Afghan domestic politics and international discussion about governance in Afghanistan. This is particularly in the wake of the house's rejection of a significant number of ministerial nominees, its opposition to President Hamid Karzai's recent election decree and its initial refusal to ratify the national budget. With an evolving relationship with the executive branch, and elections currently scheduled for 18 September 2010, there are many questions about the role of the Wolesi Jirga in national and local politics that have not been considered carefully enough. And despite widespread concern about fraud and corruption during the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections, there is little consensus on what lessons were learned from those elections or what parliamentary elections mean for politics in Afghanistan.

While the international community focuses on procedural aspects of the upcoming elections, this preliminary study suggests that, on a local level, many Afghans are concerned about how parliamentary elections will play out for very different reasons. In fact, interviewees have tended to de-emphasise the role of corruption and questions of government legitimacy and procedure, which dominate much of the current discussion of the election in the international press. Instead, those questioned tended to focus on the role of parliamentarians as important members of local patronage networks who provide some of the few real opportunities for communities to connect with the funding opportunities available in Kabul.

This paper argues in particular that the international community needs to pay more attention to the upcoming parliamentary election—not only for the precedents it will set in attempts to promote representational governance in Afghanistan, but, more pressingly, because of the ability of parliamentary elections to stimulate local political debate and reshape local political networks across Afghanistan in a meaningful manner. It suggest several broad measures that the Afghan government and the international community should take to better concentrate their efforts to support more active, local and democratic political debates...

Read the entire paper the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 05/18/2010 - 8:25am | 8 comments
A General Covers an Army War Game - Lt. Gen. David Barno, U.S. Army (ret.), Foreign Policy's The Best Defense.

The annual "Unified Quest" futures war game held recently at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was pretty impressive -- and also a refreshing change from my many previous forays.

Led by the human energizer Brigadier "HR" McMaster, this forum kicked off as a Very-Different-from-the-Big-Army event by enforcing a "NO POWERPOINT" rule. (OK, they showed about five slides over four-plus days.) Army insiders recognize how fundamentally heart-stopping this notion is among any audience of generals. A four-day conversation -- scary for some, I know!

Although labeled a "war game" (and based on some scarily realistic scenarios), this week was more of a graduate seminar for a fistful of Army generals and senior civilians, as well as a smattering of U.S. allies and partners. 4-star TRADOC Commander Marty Dempsey chaired all four days 00 a huge commitment that I've never seen made by his predecessors in earlier years...

More at The Best Defense.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/17/2010 - 10:38am | 9 comments
The latest Economist Debate is on Afghanistan; with opening statements by John Nagl, President of the Center for a New American Security, and Peter W. Galbraith, Former Deputy UN Envoy to Afghanistan.

Nagl:

The war in Afghanistan is winnable because for the first time the coalition fighting there has the right strategy and the resources to begin to implement it.

Galbraith:

The war in Afghanistan is not winnable because America does not have a credible Afghan partner and there is no prospect that one will emerge.

Join the debate and vote at The Economist.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/16/2010 - 12:39am | 0 comments
British Diplomat Takes Key Afghan Role - Mark Landler and Thom Shanker, New York Times.

When military officers and diplomats gathered in a secure room in the Pentagon on a recent Friday to get a video briefing from the Afghan battlefield, they were startled to see a youthful British diplomat in an open-neck shirt, rather than the familiar face and camouflage fatigues of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the American commander.

The diplomat's name is Mark Sedwill, the new senior civilian representative of NATO in Afghanistan, and on that day, he was acting as General McChrystal's proxy. It is a role Mr. Sedwill, 45, has taken on with increasing regularity in recent weeks, forging a tight relationship with the general that associates say carries echoes of the one in Iraq between Gen. David H. Petraeus and the American ambassador in Baghdad, Ryan C. Crocker.

Their mission also bears striking similarities to the "surge" those men carried out in Iraq: forging a combined military-civilian offensive to drive out a stubborn insurgency and allow a competent local government to take root. As the protracted struggle to bring order to the southern Afghan town of Marja demonstrates, it has been an uphill battle so far...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 05/15/2010 - 11:47pm | 1 comment
U.S. Is Still Using Private Spy Ring, Despite Doubts - Mark Mazzetti, New York Times.

Top military officials have continued to rely on a secret network of private spies who have produced hundreds of reports from deep inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to American officials and businessmen, despite concerns among some in the military about the legality of the operation.

Earlier this year, government officials admitted that the military had sent a group of former Central Intelligence Agency officers and retired Special Operations troops into the region to collect information - some of which was used to track and kill people suspected of being militants. Many portrayed it as a rogue operation that had been hastily shut down once an investigation began.

But interviews with more than a dozen current and former government officials and businessmen, and an examination of government documents, tell a different a story. Not only are the networks still operating, their detailed reports on subjects like the workings of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan and the movements of enemy fighters in southern Afghanistan are also submitted almost daily to top commanders and have become an important source of intelligence...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 05/15/2010 - 8:47am | 6 comments
Afghan Reconciliation Strategy Should Reflect Pashtun Culture - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

How do wars end in the tribal society of Afghanistan? That's one of the interesting questions that was highlighted by President Hamid Karzai's visit to Washington last week. During their well-scripted news conference at the White House, both Karzai and President Obama said they favored a process of outreach to the Taliban. And both presidents endorsed, as a start, the "peace jirga" that Karzai will host in Kabul in several weeks.

Obama described a framework for this peace process. He said it must be "Afghan-led" and that it should "open the door to the Taliban who cut their ties to al-Qaeda, abandon violence, and accept the Afghan constitution, including respect for human rights." But these public comments skirted the hard questions about reconciliation. Of the 1,400 Afghans who will be invited to the jirga, will there be any senior Taliban leaders who could actually explore a deal? What role will Pakistan play in bringing to the table a Taliban leadership it helped create and sustain? How soon do Karzai and Obama see this process moving toward real negotiations? ...

More at The Washington Post.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 05/14/2010 - 5:01pm | 6 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Obama hopes that good Afghan policy will mean good U.S. politics,

2) Is the Marine Corps just another army?

Obama hopes that good Afghan policy will mean good U.S. politics

A month ago, the Obama administration's relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai were broken, with the insulted Afghan president threatening to join the Taliban. Today, early April seems like a lifetime ago. In a White House meeting this week that was almost canceled in April, U.S. President Barack Obama decisively allied himself with Karzai.

During his news conference with Karzai, Obama reaffirmed his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in July 2011. Obama undoubtedly wants to run for re-election in 2012 with the message that he wound down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He may be using Richard Nixon's first term as a model. Nixon reduced the U.S. head count in Vietnam from more than 500,000 to just a few thousand by election day in 1972. That wind down of the war, combined with an economic rebound and a weak opponent, resulted in a landslide re-election.

The dangers of Obama's July 2011 withdrawal declaration are well known. The Taliban, with ample sanctuaries, can easily conserve their resources and adjust the tempo of their operations to extract maximum political effect. Once a U.S. withdrawal begins, it will become irreversible. Political events might even lead to its acceleration. The United States' remaining coalition partners surely won't dither on the tarmac. Another risk is that Afghanistan's security forces will not be ready to accept heavy responsibility in 14 months.

Obama undoubtedly understands this. Doesn't his policy of a quick U.S. withdrawal risk creating an even bigger mess, a debacle of his making that he would have to fix in his second term?

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 05/14/2010 - 9:52am | 0 comments
Getting the Next War Right: Beyond Population-centric Warfare - Thomas A. Marks, Sebastian L.v. Gorka, and Robert Sharp; Prism, National Defense University.

... With the end of the Cold War - and especially since 9/11 - we have been faced with a still more complex world. From Afghanistan to Mexico, irregular threats have replaced the classic nation-on-nation or bloc-on-bloc confrontations we had grown comfortable with. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia catapulted the United States and its allies back to irregular efforts spanning the gamut from the high tempo operations inherent to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the seemingly more sedate but often no less intense commitments required for whole-of-government stability operations and nationbuilding. Ironically, despite efforts to push forward in our "full spectrum" capabilities, we remain hampered by legacy attitudes of compartmentalization and linear thinking. Even more problematic and disturbing is our willingness to engage in operations and deploy forces without fully grappling with the implications of the shift to population-centric warfare as prominently assessed by General Sir Rupert Smith in The Utility of Force. As a result, our leaders can place the military in harm's way without knowing what it is they should achieve and whether it is in fact achievable through military means. This constitutes a denial of strategic thought and results in a subsequent disjunction between the operational level of force employment and the national interests of the country...

More at Prism.

Do Three Ds Make an F? The Limits of "Defense, Diplomacy, and Development" - Ethan B. Kapstein; Prism, National Defense University.

... On its surface, the notion of joining the 3Ds into a more comprehensive whole-of-government strategy toward the world's trouble spots is more than enticing; it seems downright obvious. After all, did the United States not match the Soviet threat in postwar Europe through the purposeful employment of all three tools, as exemplified by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Why, we may ask, are we not executing a similarly holistic approach toward the challenges we face in such places as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen?

Unfortunately, the idea that the arrows of defense, diplomacy, and development can be joined into one missile, much less hit a single target, may be misleading. To the extent that this concept seeks to replicate the contours of American foreign policy in the late 1940s, it suggests the limits of historical knowledge in the U.S. Government, for it is solely with the benefit of hindsight that a narrative of a seamless and coherent U.S. approach to the bipolar world can be constructed...

More at Prism.

Mindanao: A Community-based Approach to Counterinsurgency - William A. Stuebner and Richard Hirsch; Prism, National Defense University.

... Since the U.S. incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, scholars, strategists, and policymakers seem interested in discovering how to fight smarter or, preferably, how to win without fighting. Americans have been rediscovering writers such as David Galula, author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, whose experiences in the Algerian civil war helped guide counterinsurgency thinking during the Vietnam War. They have also unearthed long-forgotten publications such as the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual and issued a plethora of new doctrines, manuals, joint publications, and directives. More recently, David Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One offered an indirect approach to counterinsurgency that emphasizes local relationships and capacity-building in light of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach, he asserts, is most effective in complex environments that include accidental guerrillas - individuals who enter into conflict not as an existential threat to another nation-state but as defenders of their own space...

More at Prism.

Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations - William J. Gregor; Prism, National Defense University.

On September 21, 2009, the Washington Post published an article entitled "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure.'" The basis for the piece was a leaked copy of General Stanley McChrystal's "Commander's Initial Assessment," dated August 30, 2009. In asking for additional forces for Afghanistan, General McChrystal stated that his conclusions were supported by a rigorous multidisciplinary assessment by a team of civilian and military personnel and by his personal experience and core beliefs. A week before the Washington Post article appeared, Senators Lindsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman, and John McCain made a similar call for more forces in the Wall Street Journal. In an editorial labeled "Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan," the senators argued that General McChrystal was an exceptional commander and that he, the new Ambassador, and a new deputy commander composed a team that could win the war...

More at Prism.

... and many more thought provoking articles in the current issue of Prism.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 05/14/2010 - 8:35am | 23 comments
Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of "Unity of Effort" in American Counterinsurgency - Henry Nuzum, Strategic Studies Institute, Letort Paper.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This Paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The Paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of "unity of effort" expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future.

Read the entire Letort Paper at SSI.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/13/2010 - 10:12pm | 11 comments
Mattis: Military Should Rely Less on Technology - Christopher P. Cavas, Marine Corps Times.

The military relies too much on technology, and soldiers need to practice more "with the radios turned off," a key general said.

"We must be able to operate when systems go down," Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, head of Joint Forces Command, told a luncheon audience Thursday at a joint war-fighting conference. "It is much more important for officers to get comfortable operating with uncertainty rather than to keep grasping for more certainty." ...

"I don't think we have turned off our radios in the last eight years. What kind of systems are we creating where we depend on this connection to headquarters? While we want the most robust communications, we also want to make sure we can operate with none of it." ...

"Mission-type orders rather than bandwidth are the key to the future," he said. "We need officers who can operate off a commander's intent, understand what the boss several levels above wants, and carry them out to suffocate the enemy's hopes." ...

More at Marine Corps Times.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/13/2010 - 9:16pm | 45 comments
A CIA COINdinista's Misgivings on Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent.

The leak I got yesterday from Kandahar expressing skepticism that counterinsurgency can bring the nine-year war in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion has inspired another one. This time, a former CIA counterterrorism operative who has served on the ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq agreed to pass along a memo he has briefed to top military leaders since the fall debate over Afghanistan strategy. It's crossed desks at the White House, the Pentagon, U.S. Central Command and even Gen. Stanley McChrystal's command in Afghanistan.

While I can't go into the sourcing of this memo, it's penned by someone who began embracing population-centric counterinsurgency to mitigate the deterioration of the Iraq war as far back as 2005 — something that not a lot of CIA operatives bought into, then or today. Despite that pedigree, the CIA operative contends that attempts to protect the population from the insurgency and facilitate the delivery of Afghan government services are fatally undermined by the persistent corruption and ineffectiveness of the Afghan government and its institutions.

His counterproposal, similar to a controversial approach advocated by an Army Special Forces major named Jim Gant, is to use Afghanistan's various tribes as a proxy for both political legitimacy against the Taliban and a more effective and relevant structure for the provision of governance and economic development. He's taken to calling it "Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense." ...

More at The Washington Independent.