Blog Posts

100 Years of COIN: What New Have We Learned? - David Betz, Kings of War.

... Having said all that, 2006 may represent something of a watershed; it's probably too soon to tell but my hunch is that the stuff which John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen are writing about global insurgency is significant. Kilcullen's Accidental Guerrilla has garnered a ton of deserved praise. And having seen several chapters of Mackinlay's book The Insurgent Archipelago which is about to be published, I think he pushes the envelope further still. He reckons that there has been a sea change from Maoist to 'Post-Maoist' insurgency: Maoist insurgent objectives were national whereas Post-Maoist objectives are global; the population involved in Maoist insurgency was manageable (albeit with difficulty) whereas the populations (note the plural) involved in Post-Maoist insurgency are dispersed and unmanageable; the centre of gravity in Maoist insurgency was local or national whereas in Post-Maoist insurgency it is multiple and possibly irrelevant; the all important subversion process in Maoist insurgency was top-down whereas in Post-Maoist insurgency it is bottom-up; Maoist insurgent organization was vertical and structured whereas in Post-Maoism it is an unstructured network; and whereas Maoist insurgency took place in a real and territorial context the Post-Maoist variant's vital operational environment is virtual. My question is whether this is still insurgency or has it evolved into something else sufficiently different as to be actually something else?

Mor at Kings of War.

Thin Red Line of Heroes - Stuart Koehl, Weekly Standard.

... the British role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is slowly being consigned to the memory hole. To listen to most American commentators on the wars, you would not even know the British are there. Indeed, we only hear about them when one is accidentally killed by US fire, or when they are reducing their troop commitments (which makes it look like they are running away). Even conservative American commentators have had a somewhat condescending attitude towards the British forces, blaming them for the policies of the British government that, e.g., had them passively watch while Iranian Guards took a Zodiac full of British sailors hostage, or when it had them stand by while Shiite militias occupied their former base camp. But soldiers only follow the orders they are given by their civilian masters, and would we really want it any other way?

It is fortunate, therefore, that British veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan are finally putting their stories down on paper, and that these books are beginning to make their way into the American market. Two recent releases document with perception, wit, and humanity the unique experiences of two extraordinary British soldiers, which should put to rest any idea that the British army is becoming effete or less capable than it has been since Marlborough's day...

More at The Weekly Standard.

David Kilcullen at the Pritzker Military Library - Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Pritzker Military Library

610 North Fairbanks Court, 2nd Floor

Chicago, IL 60611

Phone: 312.587.0234

RSVP: [email protected]

Member Reception - 5:00pm cst

Presentation & Live Webcast - 6:00pm cst

It's not that we haven't fought the war in Iraq before, argues David Kilcullen. We have - the U.S. and its allies have dealt with similar conflicts in post-war Germany, in Vietnam, in the Balkans, and even against the IRA. The difference is that, back then, we weren't fighting all of those wars at the same time, on top of each other, tied together at the wrists and kicking.

Kilcullen has worked as an officer and military advisor on the ground in hotspots ranging from East Africa to the jungles of the Philippines. In 2007, he served as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to Gen. David Petraeus during the planning and implementation of the Iraq troop "surge". The Accidental Guerilla describes the situation in Iraq as Kilcullen sees it: a hybrid war that combines the insurgency of the Viet Cong, the challenge of nation-building after years of dictatorship in post-war Germany, the sectarian strife in the Balkans, and the domestic terrorism of the IRA.

The "accidental guerillas" of the title are people who fight not because they hate the West or have any desire to see it overthrown, but because their space has been invaded by a large outside force as it tries to deal with a small, extremist element like al Qaeda - which then manipulates and exploits the backlash against the larger force, thereby creating the "accidental guerillas" and turning them into a loosely cooperative group.

Drawing from his experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and lesser-known conflicts in West Java, East Timor, Pakistan, and southern Thailand, Kilcullen describes a maddening state of affairs where solutions to some problems only deepen others, and the military prowess of the U.S. in high-tech conventional warfare is virtually no help at all. In his final estimation, there are no across-the-board answers to counter-insurgency - only to adapt to the unique challenges of each one, and devote focus to securing the population along with defeating the enemy.

Kilcullen is a contributor to Small Wars Journal and Military Review. He retired from the Australian Army as a lieutenant colonel after twenty years of service. He is currently a counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency advisor to NATO and several governments, including the United States, and a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute.

Training the Top Guns of Drone Aircraft - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

The Pentagon is preparing to graduate its first pilots of unmanned drones from the elite US Air Force Weapons School - a version of the Navy's Top Gun program - in a bid to elevate the skills and status of the officers who fly Predators, one of the military's fastest growing aircraft programs.

The elite flight schools of the Air Force and Navy are most closely associated with smart, tough fighter jocks. But over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MQ-1 Predator and more heavily armed MQ-9 Reaper craft have become, to many in the Pentagon, the most important aircraft the US has deployed.

In 2006, the Air Force was able to fly only 12 drones at a time. Today, the service flies 34 regular combat air patrols. As the program has expanded, the job of keeping the best pilots flying drones has proved to be a challenge.

Until recently, pilots would work on the Predators and Reapers, then return to their assigned aircraft. But the Air Force would like officers to make a career out of flying unmanned craft and become experts at operating the drones...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

The 'It' Think Tank - Carlos Lozada, Washington Post.

It was no accident that former vice president Dick Cheney chose the American Enterprise Institute as the venue for his full-throated defense last month of the Bush administration's national security policies. In the Bush years, AEI wielded significant influence and helped develop major initiatives on national security, including the surge in Iraq.

In the era of Obama, however, the Center for a New American Security may emerge as Washington's go-to think tank on military affairs. Founded in 2007, CNAS has already filled key posts in the new administration (such as former CNAS president Michele Flournoy, who is now undersecretary of defense for policy), and its top people include John Nagl, who helped draft the Army's counterinsurgency manual, and David Kilcullen, a former adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus. Now CNAS has completed a 31-page report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, advising Team Obama on how to best meet its goal to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in its safe haven in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

More at The Washington Post.

These are the young Americans who went thousands of miles and defeated the mightiest military empires ever unleashed against us.

Sacrifice and the Greatest Generation - Tom Brokaw, Wall Street Journal.

When asked how I came to write The Greatest Generation, I recount a trip to Normandy in 1984. I went there to produce a documentary on the 40th anniversary of D-Day. I had looked forward to a week of stirring stories, evenings of oysters and Calvados, and long runs through the countryside.

Instead, from the moment I stepped onto Omaha Beach with two veterans of the First Division I had an out-of-body experience. Geno Merli, who earned the Medal of Honor, and Harry Garton, who lost both legs in combat, landed in the first wave at Omaha. Working-class products from Pennsylvania, they were soft-spoken and matter-of-fact as they described for me the horrors of that day and all the fighting that was yet to come.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

A nice - short - and to the point perspective by Simon Shercliff, the First Secretary Foreign Security and Policy at the British Embassy in DC - We Promise to Stay, and We Promise to Go:

One small part of President Obama's much-heralded speech in Cairo this week hit squarely the two key planks of both the US and the UK's Afghanistan/Pakistan policy: 1) a promise to bring troops out as soon as we are confident that there is no threat emanating from" violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans [or Brits] as they possibly can"; and 2) a promise to continue building and strengthening our respective relationships with the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments and people, not least through long-term, non-military assistance programmes.

Obama said: "make no mistake: we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We seek no military bases there". To the extent that we can work out accurately the motivations of the various parts of the insurgency in Afghanistan, we continually find that straightforward nationalism plays a part (just one part). The stationing of one country's troops on another country's soil has always, and almost universally, generated this characteristic, anywhere in the world. The people of Afghanistan, of whichever ethnic group, are no exception. We need to continue to make clear that we have no designs on any form of long-term, military occupation of these proud people.

But in the same breath, this policy needs to be balanced by another clear message - again President Obama brought it out in his speech. While the US and UK, and all our other allies, want to bring our combat troops home as soon as we can, we also want to emphasize that our governments are setting up a long-term commitment to support Afghanistan and Pakistan, politically and through our respective overseas aid departments. Obama said: "we also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we plan to invest $1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who have been displaced". The UK has committed $811 million to Afghanistan over the next four years - this is one our biggest overseas aid commitments. We need to reinforce the message at every turn that we are not going to cut and run. We will not leave both coutries to whatever fate befalls them, once we decide that the threat to us has subsided.

A tip of the hat - or tam - some SWJ types are of Scots heritage - to the British Embassy for sharing this with our community. Cheers.

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick is now posted. Topics include - When Organized Crime Meets Terrorism and Does it Take a Network to Beat a Network?

Key take-aways:

Mattis discussed how today's adversaries have adapted to U.S. conventional military superiority by forming disaggregated networks of small irregular teams that hide among indigenous populations. United States military forces, by contrast, have only come under greater central control. According to Mattis, this shift is due to evolutions in intelligence-gathering and communications technologies. Call it the new iron law of military bureaucracies: when commanders gain the technical ability to micromanage, they will micromanage...

Perhaps the most interesting question raised by Mattis's speeech is not whether the youngest soldiers can rise to the new demands that would be placed on them, but whether the colonels and generals -- and their civilian masters above -- will be able to relinquish the tight control technology has given them and to which they have become so accustomed. Will they ever acquire the courage necessary to trust a decentralized and distributed force of independent small units to find its own way of achieving the goals of a campaign? Mattis believes that this is the only path to success against tomorrow's enemies. What general or politician will have the nerve to take it?

As promised previously here's the link to the full document - CNAS has now posted Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Andrew Exum, Nathaniel Fick, Ahmed Humayun and David Kilcullen.

Eight years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the situation is as perilous as ever and continuing to worsen. The campaign has been further complicated by a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, where the center of gravity of the insurgency has now shifted. In counterinsurgency campaigns, momentum matters. Over the next 12 months, the United States and its allies must demonstrate they have seized back the initiative from the Taliban and other hostile actors.

Also new at CNAS is Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism by Kristin Lord, John Nagl and Seth Rosen.

The paper establishes a clear analysis of the threat, a realistic vision of success, and strategic principles to guide U.S. actions. The authors also offer specific ways and means" in order to accomplish the objectives they lay out, including developing the intelligence networks and human capital necessary to counter violent extremism, creating expeditionary" civilian specialists who can embed with military units and provide much-needed assistance in political, economic, and governance missions; optimizing strategic public engagement abroad; investing in the capacities of both U.S. and foreign militaries to counter violent extremism; prioritizing job creation in areas where young people are economically marginalized and susceptible to radicalization; and defending the homeland against terrorist attacks.

And one last note - Ex has moved Abu Muqawama over to the CNAS site. Corporate boy;-)

Continue on for news and opinion related to President Obama's Cairo Speech. We will be updating this page as additional items are published...

President Obama Speaks to the Muslim World from Cairo on 4 June 2009.

Full Text of Barack Obama's Speech to the Muslim World - The Australian.

Earlier today I participated in a U.S. Joint Forces Command media teleconference and roundtable with Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward, Deputy Commander for USJFCOM and Rear Admiral Dan W. Davenport, Director of the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E) Directorate. This roundtable concerned USJFCOM's new Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and an ongoing associated war game (29 May -- 5 June) intended to assess the ideas of the CCJO and inform future force development as well as the new Joint Concept Development Vision released to the public yesterday.

Up front -- full disclosure -- I consult for USJFCOM. That said, I think it useful that our community of interest understand the intent of the CCJO and more importantly -- what is different about this new version and its relationship with other concepts that address issues discussed in the CCJO such as combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction. So, my question was to be - What's new about this version of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and what is the relationship between the CCJO (beyond simply being the Capstone" or higher order") and the family of operating and integrating concepts that address many of the issues contained in the CCJO? Maryann Lawlor of SIGNAL Magazine, who was two ahead of me in the reverse alphabetical pecking order, beat me to the punch...

Here's the answer in a nut shell - The CCJO is a combination of existing constructs that address the challenges we face in a way that offers fresh insights into the conduct of military operations.

The bolded emphasis is mine. As you read the CCJO and tick off the national security challenges, basic categories of military activity and common operating precepts you might find yourself thinking - I've seen this all before - and you probably have - in this or that concept, a doctrinal publication, in a white paper or one of countless studies and monographs - each looking at a particular issue or two as a separate problem set. The CCJO acknowledges all that and as such takes a holistic approach to some very complex issues - read or reread the CCJO with that in mind. This is not a document that should get the once over and shelved - it is to be revisited and pondered upon as we search for solutions.

For a quick summary of other issues addressed at the Q&A today see Gerry Gilmore's piece at American Force Press Service.

And as posted here previously - especially if the current state of concept development and the usefulness of these documents baffles you - please read the Joint Concept Development Vision released yesterday by USJFCOM. It cannot be emphasized enough how important the following three guidance principles are:

1) Concept development will be based on a thorough understanding of current doctrine. 2) Concepts will provide a clear and testable alternative to that doctrine. 3) Concepts will be validated through experimentation, practical experience, analysis, and professional debate will be transitioned systematically and expeditiously into doctrine.

For discussion on the JCDE Vision see what the Council has to say.

SWJ has received an advance copy of a new Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report entitled Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan by Andrew Exum, Nathaniel Fick, Ahmed Humayun and David Kilcullen. As soon as CNAS posts the full report we will provide a link. Until then here is an excerpt from the introduction which serves more as an executive summary:

The United States and its allies are in the eighth year of a war in Afghanistan that has no end in sight. Making matters worse, the security situation in Pakistan—always a safe haven for the insurgents against whom the United States and its allies have fought—has also declined precipitously.

The strategic consequences of the extremist advance are severe... Failure in Afghanistan would mean not only a possible return of pre-9/11 safe havens, but also a sharp blow to the prestige of the United States and its allies... An al Qaeda victory in Pakistan would galvanize global support for the radical Islamist movement, provide a safe haven for al Qaeda, and substantially increase the threat of nuclear terrorism...

The president and his advisers have elected to pursue a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan while encouraging the government in Islamabad to do the same in Pakistan.

To implement this strategy effectively, the United States must rapidly triage in both countries. For the United States, NATO, and the governments involved, winning control over all of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the coming year is not a realistic objective; setting priorities is paramount. But because populations in civil wars tend to side with whichever group exercises control, protecting the population must take precedence over all other considerations. What counts, for now, is controlling what we can with the resources we have. Thus, this paper recommends that the United States and its allies pursue an ink blot" strategy over the course of the next 12 months on both sides of the Durand Line, securing carefully chosen areas and then building from positions of strength.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first section outlines the current situations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with particular focus on Pakistan since the situation there is both graver and less well understood. These situation assessments highlight two trends that threaten the administration's stated objectives of promot¬ing a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan and enhancing a stable, civilian-led, constitutional government in Pakistan: decreasing government control and increasing civilian casualties. In Afghanistan, Taliban influence has displaced government control in large sections of the country, while the government and the coalition have been unable or un—to guarantee security for the people. In Pakistan, extremist control in the northwest has spread with alarming rapidity and now threatens traditionally stable areas in Pakistan's Punjabi heartland. In both countries, civilian casualties resulting from military opera¬tions have been increasing.

The second section provides two operational recommendations for Afghanistan and two for Pakistan. These four recommendations seek to address the most pressing dangers identified in the situation assessments, and to further progress toward meeting the benchmarks that matter.

In Afghanistan:

Adopt a truly population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes protecting the population rather than controlling physical terrain or killing the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Use the civilian surge" to improve governance and decrease corruption in Afghanistan. Place civilian expertise and advisers in the Afghan ministries and—to a lesser degree—the provincial reconstruction teams, rather than in the embassies.

In Pakistan:

Strictly curtail the counterproductive drone strikes on non-al Qaeda targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The expansion of the approved target list for U.S. drone attacks to include non-al Qaeda individuals should be reversed.

Strengthen the Pakistani police, with an emphasis on areas—such as Punjab and Sindh—where the Taliban has not yet exerted control.

The third and final section examines the question of metrics. Since momentum is crucial in counterinsurgencies, accurate metrics are necessary to reinforce what works and to change what does not. Measurement of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan has focused excessively on inputs, rather than outcomes; when measurement has focused on outcomes, they have often been the wrong ones. We suggest different metrics for tracking, and adjusting, the implementation of the administra¬tion's new strategy, with particular emphasis on measuring the peoples' perception of their own security and the government's ability to exercise legitimate control.

For more see Spencer Ackerman's commentary on Triage at The Washington Independent.

Continue on for news related to LTG Stanley McChrystal 's Senate confirmation testimony today. We will be updating this page with additional items in the morning...

Pakistan an Enormous Risk to Global Stability: Kilcullen - Australian Broadcasting Corporation intereview with transcript and extended interview video.

One of the world's top counter-insurgency experts, former Australian soldier David Kilcullen has recently warned in a blistering submission to the United States congress, that Pakistan now represents an enormous risk to global stability. He is urging for a fresh approach from America its dealings with Pakistan.

I think the good thing about it is that we've finally started to see some serious concern within Pakistan itself about the threat of Taliban militancy. If you were looking two or three months ago I don't think people took it as seriously as they do now, and I think the difference is that Pakistan settled areas, around Brunei and Swat which are not really part of tribal areas, have now been threatened by the Taliban and people are starting to take it seriously. That's the good side.

The bad side is I think there's a long way to go in terms of the non-military aspects of this. The military part of it is like a sharp wedge being pushed into the Swat Valley, and essentially that's driving the militants elsewhere and we're going to start to see a spill over of violence, I think, into the rest of Pakistan as that continues...

Much more at ABC.

US-Philippines Partnership May be Model for Fighting Terrorism Elsewhere - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

The small US military mission in the Philippines attracts little attention, but Defense Department officials say it has been surprisingly effective at reducing the havens once used by militants here - and that could make the effort a model for other US partnerships with other nations, including Pakistan.

Pakistan has been reluctant to allow more than 70 American trainers into the country, worried about public reaction to a substantive US troop presence. But the low profile and public acceptance of the US military program in the Philippines suggest there could be lessons for American officers eager to step up their efforts with the Pakistan military...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Sam Roggeveen at Lowy Institute's The Interpreter:

Not only has the milblog Small Wars Journal made Rolling Stone's annual hot list, but UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband, writing on his blog, has described SWJ alumnus David Kilcullen as his 'favourite Australian analyst'. Fine. FINE. Milliband and Rolling Stone probably just haven't heard of The Interpreter yet.

Sam's right though, excellent stuff at The Interpreter - well worth a regular visit.

Greyhawk over at Mudville Gazette asks: Now that Rolling Stone has included Small Wars Journal on the 2009 Hot List, how long until we see these at the local PX (or grocery store): Link to mag covers;-)

Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq comments: It's better than the initial joke that I had, where the cover of Rolling Stone Magazine would be a boy band consisting of Nagl, Exum, Dave Dilegge, Zenpundit and David Kilcullen called the "Small Wars Boys".

The Kilcullen Doctrine - Mark Safranski, ZenPundit.

While relatively short and designed, naturally, to help promote a book by a friend and CNAS colleague, Dr. Nagl has also taken a significant step toward influencing policy by distilling and reframing Dr. Klicullen's lengthy and detailed observations into a reified and crystallized COIN doctrine". A digestible set of memes sized exactly right for the journalistic and governmental elite whose eyes glaze over at the mention of military jargon and who approach national security from a distinctly civilian and political perspective.

New Doctrines Without Strategic Foundations - Raymond Pritchett, Information Dissemination.

I am not an expert on counterinsurgency, but ever since the surge and getting turned onto the topic by reading the Small Wars Journal, I have studied it enough to understand when COIN is and is not effective. I don't believe that COIN is a subject anyone will truly master without a great deal of regional centric training, education, and experience, although I really appreciate how many concepts of COIN scale in warfare, in particular the complicated discussions of how to operate military forces in populated environments (like the littoral).

Legal Advice From the Taliban - Patrick Devenny, FP's The Argument.

So far, NATO has responded to Taliban expansion by reinforcing its units in the area, boosting its firepower, and combating the poppy economy through interdiction and crop substitution. That's the easy part. The real challenge will come after territory is regained and NATO begins its fight for the population -- not just the land. To get this next phase right, NATO and its Afghan allies would do well to take a lesson from the force that has been managing much of the south for the last two years: the Taliban. Yes, time to take advice from the enemy. What methods of "guerrilla governance" are attracting the support of local populations? And how could NATO and Afghan forces use them to "clear, hold, and build?"

Pakistan on the Brink - Ahmed Rashid, The New York Review of Books (Hat tip to Tom Ricks).

Pakistan is close to the brink, perhaps not to a meltdown of the government, but to a permanent state of anarchy, as the Islamist revolutionaries led by the Taliban and their many allies take more territory, and state power shrinks. There will be no mass revolutionary uprising like in Iran in 1979 or storming of the citadels of power as in Vietnam and Cambodia; rather we can expect a slow, insidious, long-burning fuse of fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have lit and that the state is unable, and partly unwilling, to douse.

Petraeus: Video Shows Strike Aimed At Taliban - Steve Inskeep, NPR interview.

Gen. David Petraeus: I have. In fact, I was in Kabul the other night briefed by the brigadier general who I appointed to carry out an investigation of this particular incident, and there is indeed video from a B-1 Bomber that very clearly shows bombs hitting individuals who are the Taliban who are reacting to the movements of the Afghan and coalition forces on the ground.

What's Up With that "Global Engagement Directive"? - Marc Lynch, FP's Abu Aardvark.

The White House announced the other day that there would be a new desk at the National Security Council called the "Global Engagement Directive" which would take the lead in public diplomacy, international communications, foreign aid and other areas of engagement. This is a good move, which could potentially overcome a number of persistent problems in American public diplomacy and strategic communications.

5 Reasons Why this North Korean Crisis is No Groundhog's Day - Dan Twining, FP's Shadow Government.

North Korea's missile and nuclear tests, new threats of war against its declared enemies, and the predictable results of these developments -- expressions of concern at the UN Security Council, U.S. offers of more unconditional talks, China's ambivalent response - suggest that we remain in the Groundhog Day" cycle of crisis and response that has characterized U.S. policy towards Pyongyang since 1994. In fact, new dynamics on the peninsula and in the region, and the fresh opportunity provided by what can now clearly be judged to be years of failed policy on denuclearization and disarmament, present an opportunity for a creative rethink about U.S. policy options. To clarify a way forward, it's worth considering how the playing field has shifted (I see five ways that it has), and how this may create a different set of possibilities for the United States and our allies vis-í -vis the North Korean regime -- one that breaks decisively from the past and offers real hope for change.

Anything at Abu Muqawama.

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick is now posted. Topics include - Can Counterinsurgency Ever be Used Again? - Social Scientists in the Trenches.

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Coglianese believes this article still has some utility for SWJ readership. We agree and appreciate him sending it along.

Creating a Supercharged Battalion

By Lieutenant Colonel William David

Creating a Supercharged Battalion (Full PDF Article)

From the Preface:

In late July 1993, the 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry Task Force, 10th Mountain Division, departed Fort Drum for Mogadishu. They were to become the ground element of the 10th Mountain Division Brigade serving as the Quick Reaction Force for the United Nations command in Somalia.

They were the only U.S. maneuver element in country. Over a seventeen hour period on 3 and 4 October, TF 2-14 Infantry--fighting its way from the Mogadishu airfield to downtown--extracted ground elements of Task Force Ranger following the downing of two Task Force Ranger helicopters during an operation that had begun midday on Sunday the 3rd. This battle was marked by fierce fighting.

The 2-14 Infantry accomplished their challenging and dangerous mission. I am one of those who believe that only a really extraordinary infantry battalion could have gotten the Rangers out that night. TF 2-14 Infantry was clearly outstanding. Several of us, therefore, encouraged LTC Bill David to write this story.

Bill's story is simple and complex at the same time. The insights and lessons are, for the most part, timeless and broadly applicable. Bill presents a clear picture of what is required to make an outfit truly first rate.

This is the story of a battalion commander leading his soldiers in combat. LTC David describes how he built on the basic Army training and doctrine formula and added particular emphasis in core areas to develop a winning team.

This is a personal account. It is not history.

Luck was not a factor in 2-14's success. As will become apparent, 2-14's performance was the result of mission/combat-focused training, careful planning, aggressive execution, and an unwavering commitment to the welfare of soldiers....

Creating a Supercharged Battalion (Full PDF Article)

What do Lady Gaga and Small Wars Journal have in common? One is on the cover of the Rolling Stone and one isn't -- but sure enough both made the Rolling Stone 2009 Hot List" -- go figure.

Stocks may tumble and fortunes may fall, but hotness, it seems, is eternal.

There was some concern about compiling our latest Rolling Stone Hot List during an ice-cold era. But it seems that in these uncertain, gray days, we need what our Managing Editor Will Dana called "the sparkly and the sexy, the perfectly shaped diversions America leads the world in creating."

... Since we launched the Hot List in 1986, we've had our share of hits and misses (check our cover gallery to revisit all out past Hot Issues, from Angelina to Giselle to Britney). In 1988, we profiled "Hot Character Actor" Kevin Spacey, and we're particularly proud that in 1990, we introduced readers to a 23-year-old screenwriter named Jeffrey Abrams (you might know him now as Lost and Star Trek visionary J.J. Abrams). Of course, we've also missed the mark — in 1990, we thought Renny Harlin's hot streak would last, and the same issue that featured Abrams also declared Tevin Campbell "Hot Prodigy."

This time, we're banking on an assortment of movers, shakers and muckrakers that runs the gamut from the warfare digest "Small Wars Journal" to Hot Issue cover girl Lady Gaga...

Rolling Stone's 2009 Hot List - as soon as we grab a hard copy of RS we'll post the SWJ entry - anyone seen it yet and care to share in comments below? This issue has not hit the news stands as yet.

Update:

Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement:

Yeah, well, anyone with a Y chromosome can see the chick with the Phyllis Diller fright wig and the bubble bikini is hot. Glad to see RS is getting hip to how hot Small Wars can be. Now breathlessly awaiting the print version with the actual RS SWJ review. Hate to get political about it, but seeing as SWJ was the go-to place for understanding the Iraq surge and RS is only just catching up two years later, forgive me for suspecting that the Odoption of the Bush embrace of counterinsurgency tactics has something to do with the new Small Wars fashion craze.

Greyhawk at Mudville Gazette:

Dave Dilegge asks "What do Lady Gaga and Small Wars Journal have in common? One is on the cover of the Rolling Stone and one isn't - but sure enough both made the Rolling Stone 2009 "Hot List" - go figure."

"This time," an anonymous Rolling Stone editor says of the list, "we're banking on an assortment of movers, shakers and muckrakers that runs the gamut from the warfare digest "Small Wars Journal" to Hot Issue cover girl Lady Gaga."

The kewl kidz know where to go for the show.

Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama:

So are we bitter that our boss John Nagl nominated Small Wars Journal to Rolling Stone's "Hot List" instead of us? Naw. I'm pretty sure no one under 40 years of age reads Rolling Stone anymore, so it makes sense that my pleated pants-wearing boss would turn down Frampton Comes Alive! long enough to speak to some geriatric Rolling Stone journalist about the latest "hot" thing.

No, no, in all seriousness, congrats to Dave and the gang at SWJ. We'll be out behind the cafeteria dumpster smoking with the cool kids if anyone needs us.

Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq:

Small Wars Journal is a great site. But you normally wouldn't associate it with Rolling Stone Magazine's "Hot List". Until now.

It looks as if I'm going to have to acquire a copy of Rolling Stone when it gets shipped over here.

Joshua Keating at FP Passport:

Congratulations to everyone at SWJ! The recognition is well deserved. Since FP has teamed up with them to publish Robert Haddick's excellent weekly column "This Week at War," we can't help but feel a little hotter ourselves today.

Rumors that Ricks and Rothkopf are appearing together on the next Tiger Beat cover have yet to be confirmed.

Okay here's the scoop (RS page 85):

Hot Intelligence: 'Small Wars Journal'

The Military's New Must Read

Want to know how Obama is going to fight the war in Afghanistan? Then check out Small Wars Journal, an online magazine that provides a crash course on asymmetric warfare. Get schooled in fighting Somali pirates. Find out what Malcolm Nance, a former Navy interrogation instructor, thinks about waterboarding ("a torture technique, Period"). When David Kilcullen, special adviser to Gen. Petraeus, live-blogged the Iraq surge, he did it for SWJ.

Contributions include who's who of the sharpest minds in uniform, regardless of rank. "You're judged purely on the strength of your intellectual argument," says John Nagl, a retired lieutenant colonel who helped write the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Run by two former Marines, the site is a must-read for military insiders. "We must be doing something right," says co-founder Dave Dilegge, "because we get people calling us Attila the Hun warmongers one day and counterinsurgency-loving tree-huggers the next."

Hat tip to JMG1093 at the Council.

Hopefully this won't happen but Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq reports on a recent e-mail he received:

I just received this e-mail from someone involved in an Army-based web forum called "CompanyCommand.com" (whose sister site is "PlatoonLeader.com"). Seems that, with projected budget "cuts", the first thing to go isn't bloated programs like the F-22 Raptor or the Army's Future Combat System, but rather, inexpensive projects which have actually yielded impressive results by spurring innovation from the field...

Again, I don't know how serious the recommendation was to shut down CompanyCommand.com, but should anyone question the power of "The New Media" on combat operations, I merely direct them to this article in Small Wars Journal. (Includes interviews from Zenpundit, David Kilcullen, Thomas Ricks, Abu Muqawama, and, of course, from me).

Starbuck goes on to recommend that if you have an account at CompanyCommand or PlatoonLeader, log in and tell the admins not to shut the site down.

Social Science for Counterterrorism

Putting the Pieces Together

Edited by Paul K. Davis, Kim Cragin.

Contributors: Darcy Noricks, Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, Claude Berrebi, Brian A. Jackson, Gaga Gvineria, Michael Egner, and Benjamin Bahney - Rand.

Social Science for Counterterrorism (Full Monograph)

The authors report on an aggressively interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social-science literature relevant to counterterrorism. They draw on literature from numerous disciplines, both qualitative and quantitative, and then use high-level conceptual models to pull the pieces together. In their monograph, they identify points of agreement and disagreement and point out instances in which disagreements merely reflect difference of research context or perspective. Priorities for further research are suggested and improved ways to frame questions for research and analysis are identified. The questions addressed relate to how terrorism arises, why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, how terrorism declines, why individuals disengage, and how strategic communications can be more or less effective.

Social Science for Counterterrorism (Full Monograph)

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,

Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,

Adjutant General

Official:

WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

Commander-in-Chief Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military

Old Army Buddies - Michael Auslin, Washington Post

Those Who Make Us Say 'Oh!' - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal

They Died for You - Rick Atkinson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

Remembering Bataan - Washington Times

Roots of Memorial Day - Hayley Peterson, Washington Examiner

What are the Origins of Memorial Day? - Seattle Post Intelligencer

Observing Memorial Day - Larry Abeldt, Abilene Recorder Chronicle

What Does Memorial Day Mean? - Tabatha Hunter, Benton County Daily Record

What Patriotism Means to an American Citizen - Johnnie Godwin, The Tennessean

Let Us Honor the Best and Noblest of Us All - Spartanburg Herald Journal

Honor Their Sacrifice - Doug Chapin, Washington Times

The Dead We Honor - New York Post

Legacies of War Dead Endure - Rick Hampson, USA Today

Memorial Day Roll Call Salutes 148,000 Veterans - Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press

Obama Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute - Kent Klein, Voice of America

Grief and Honor at Arlington Cemetery - James Key, USA Today

Rolling Thunder - Michael Ruane, Washington Post

Memorial Day 2009 - Washington Post

This Memorial Day - New York Times

Being True to Our Values - Philadelphia Inquirer

Sterling Memorial - Bob McManus, New York Post

Memorial Day 2009 - McQ, Blackfive

A Word of Caution - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

How Not to Celebrate Memorial Day - Uncle Jimbo, Blackfive

Tibor Rubin - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Memorial Day 2009

Taps

Taps

Band of Brothers