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Discuss at the Council.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Michael Mullen speak to reporters at the Pentagon.Also see the transcript of the press conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on leadership changes in Afghanistan.
Also, more by:
Ex at Abu Muqawama
Ex (again) at The Argument
Fred at Slate
Tom at The Weekly Standard Blog
Richard at Belmont Club
James at Outside the Beltway
Jules at Forward Movment
Herschel at The Captian's Journal
Noah at Danger Room
Robert at Westhawk
Judah at World Politics Review
Joshua at Registan
Laura at The Cable
Tom R. at Best Defense
Tom B. at Thomas P.M. Barnett
How does one execute a population-centric approach to COIN in an area where you cannot go except by a three day hike? About six weeks ago, the PRT and both US and Afghan supporting forces pushed north along a mountainous dirt track in order to reach Doab, one of the bigger villages about 30km north of FOB Kala Gush. The idea was to conduct an extended engagement with village leaders to discuss reconstruction projects, establish some rapport, and to contest any anti-Afghan forces in the area. There was dispute among US officers about whether MRAPs or Humvees could navigate these rough mountain tracks. The drive was slow and precarious, the US vehicles clinging to the edge of dirt mountain but they did reach Doab and engage the elders. So far so good. Not long after they began the drive home, an estimated 100-150 insurgents attacked the US convoy, engaging in an extended 8 hour firefight along the entire route back to FOB Kala Gush. If one can imagine walking a balance beam while getting shot at for 8 hours, one can get a feel for the engagement. To the credit of US forces, they returned to base largely intact, have suffered two non-critical wounds and losing one HUMVEE. However, one wonders the secondary effects of pushing into the Doab valley and the ensuing violence.
In the words of Paul Newman's harried and hunted Butch Cassidy, "who are those guys?" Is the Taliban and al Queda actually using the dirt tracks of Nuristan as meaningful transit routes? Or are these tribal warriors defending their valley from foreigners as they have any other force that ventured into their mountains? The answer to that question informs how important Nuristan is to the COIN fight in northeast Afghanistan. Mountains with xenophobic locals should be left alone. Significant Taliban transit routes may need interdiction. It is hard for to believe that the Taliban can move significant men and supplies across the mountains of Nuristan -- or why the independent minded Nuristanis would help them. But mountain men of Afghanistan can hike for days and days and perhaps the Taliban have found some acceptance among the Nuristans.
Meanwhile the PRT and maneuver forces at FOB Kala Gush will try to remain positively engaged with the locals at Doab and others in the Afghan frontier -- with aid if not military force. Yet this quandary underscores one of the weaknesses of the current US reconstruction approach -- the very military nature of PRTs. When military presence is in itself an incitement to resistance and anti-US/anti-government sentiment, would a more traditional civilian/NGO assistance approach make more sense in many areas? A team of Afghan locals working on behalf of a USAID-funded NGO could likely have gotten in and out of Doab without violence and more positive effect.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.
More at The Wall Street Journal.
Gates Recommends Replacement for Top Command in Afghanistan - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today asked for the resignation of the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, saying the U.S. military "must do better" in executing the administration's new strategy there.Gates recommended that President Obama nominate veteran Special Operations commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to replace McKiernan, who would depart as soon as a successor is confirmed. Gates also recommended that Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the former head of U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan who is currently serving as Gates's military assistant, be nominated to serve in a new position as McChrystal's deputy...More at The Washington Post.
U.S. Replaces Commander in Afghanistan in War Overhaul - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.
The Pentagon is replacing the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, less than a year after he took over, marking a major overhaul in military leadership of a war that has presented President Obama with a worsening national security challenge.Defense officials said that General McKiernan was removed because of what they described as a conventional approach to what has become one of the most complicated military challenges in American history. He is to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command who recently ran all special operations in Iraq.The decision reflects a belief that the war in Afghanistan has grown so complex that it needs a commander drawn from the military's unconventional warfare branch...More at The New York Times.
More at The Philadelphia Inquirer.
More at The Wall Street Journal.
This year's convention theme, Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners", addresses the issue of trying to bridge the gap between theory and practice and between academics and practitioners. This has always been the core mission of CAMOS in relation to the broad field of strategic and security studies. Thus, CAMOS seeks paper proposals that address the following topics:
• the sources of military effectiveness and force employment in war;• the causes and effectiveness of intervention policy;
• the origins and effectiveness of terrorism, as well as the sources of terrorist recruitment;
• non-traditional conflict triggers, including refugee flows, environmental scarcity, and NGO involvement in conflict settings; and
• the relationship between coercive and non-coercive strategies in a counterinsurgency or reconstruction environment.
We especially welcome panel or paper proposals that draw on both scholars and practitioners and that have clear policy relevance.
Paper proposals should include the paper titles, a short abstract (500 words max), and contact information for the author(s). Panel proposals should include the same for each paper, along with a title and abstract for the panel as a whole, and contact information for panel chair and discussant, if included.
Please submit proposals by Friday 29 May 2009 to:
Dr. Sergio Catignani
Assistant Professor in International Security
University of Leiden
Phone: +31615166911
Email: sergiocatignani @ gmail.com (If you send your proposal as an attached document, please include your surname and paper title as the document title.)
More at The Wall Street Journal.
The concept of the "Long War" is attributed to former CENTCOM Commander Gen. John Abizaid, speaking in 2004. Leading counterinsurgency theorist John Nagl, an Iraq combat veteran and now the head of the Center for a New American Security, writes that "there is a growing realization that the most likely conflicts of the next fifty years will be irregular warfare in an 'Arc of Instability' that encompasses much of the greater Middle East and parts of Africa and Central and South Asia." The Pentagon's official Quadrennial Defense Review (2005) commits the United States to a greater emphasis on fighting terrorism and insurgencies in this "arc of instability." The Center for American Progress repeats the formulation in arguing for a troop escalation and ten-year commitment in Afghanistan, saying that the "infrastructure of jihad" must be destroyed in "the center of an 'arc of instability' through South and Central Asia and the greater Middle East."
The implications of this doctrine are staggering. The very notion of a fifty-year war assumes the consent of the American people, who have yet to hear of the plan, for the next six national elections. The weight of a fifty-year burden will surprise and dismay many in the antiwar movement. Most Americans living today will die before the fifty-year war ends, if it does. Youngsters born and raised today will reach middle age. Unborn generations will bear the tax burden or fight and die in this "irregular warfare."
There is a chance, of course, that the Long War can be prevented. It may be unsustainable, a product of imperial hubris. Public opinion may tire of the quagmires and costs--but only if there is a commitment to a fifty-year peace movement...
More at The Nation.
More at the Strategic Studies Institute.
There is no denying the opportunity in Kunar. Along the Kunar river valley and where there are roads, the 3-1 is effectively applying security operations capacity building, and reconstruction projects with strong results. This is indicative of the 3-1 leadership's strong emphasis on non-lethal operations and effects. One example is the Kunar construction corps, a program which offers young military age men throughout the East a small stipend and the opportunity to learn a range of construction skills. Every graduate is immediately hired by one of the plentiful construction companies building infrastructure in Kunar.
The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) works well with moderate and reform minded Governor Wahidi and various district governors and ministry officials. Wahidi is slowly building legitimacy by delivering (thanks to the PRT) strong flows of projects to the province while also carrying a strong anti-corruption banner.
But central Kunar's development is untenable if the northern valleys can continue to harbor a strong Taliban sanctuary.
In small wars, we talk of human terrain as well as geographical terrain. In both senses, Kunar has some of the roughest, most inaccessible terrain in the world. Deeply isolated, xenophobic, independent tribes occupy steep northern valleys of Gaziabad, Pech, and Korengal with no roads in or out. Tribal conflict and smuggling interests incite violence and well-established collaboration with the Taliban. Attacks on ISAF forces are a daily threat, including major coordinated operations.
Sometimes in COIN, circumstances favor a paradoxical approach. Such may be the case in Korengal, where the short, tough, bearded Korengalis on these steep ridges conjure up the image of Pashtun Gimlis defending Helms Deep. By all accounts, the Korengalis hold no ambitions for global terrorism or an Islamic caliphate. They largely seek to be left alone, sell their timber, and resist control by any foreigner -- foreigner meaning someone from outside their Valley. The Korengal provide Taliban limited sanctuary and transit of their territory as a matter of practical resistance and collaboration against Afghan and ISAF forces attempts to extend control into the Korengal and enforce anti-logging laws. The Korengalis offer fierce resistance and are difficult to engage on projects. One wonders if a better approach would be to look the other way -- in several respects. Pull back US and Afghan forces and seek to de-emphasize ANP and ANBP timber smuggling enforcement in the area. Heck, the US could even offer to buy the timber at a good price if the Korengalis promise to keep the Taliban out of their valley and/or agree to a dialog with the Afghan government on key issues (e.g. when will the trees run out, balancing autonomy with government services, etc). At a minimum, shifting emphasis from the Korengal would enable the Army to apply more resources in Gaziabad and Pech, areas where population security and clear-hold-build strategies may have a better chance. As always, this issue is more complicated than I present so I don't know what is the best strategy -- only US and ANA forces on the ground are in a position to make that determination. But we do know that adaptive, non-linear strategy tied to conflict assessment is essential to COIN and, likely, to success in Afghanistan's East.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.
More at Antiwar.com.
More at The Journal of International Security Affairs.
Many attribute Nang's success to its legendary and controversial warlord governor, Gul Agha Sherzai. Sherzai is practically a caricature of the Afghan warlord: a former Muj against the Russians, he combines ruthlessness with Machiavellian political skills and a convenient comfort with corruption or worse. He would be easy to dislike if not for the fact that he keeps Nangarhar safe and increasingly prosperous while staunchly pro-American. The visible focused police presence I saw in downtown Jalalabad is indicative of how Sherzai has tamed the province and increased capacity along many dimensions. Fertile lands and an increasing role as a regional economic hub have spurred ideas of what reliable power, further irrigation, and an airport could yield in turning Jalalabad's agricultural wealth into a valuable export.
My hosts in Jalabad were the fine soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry division at FOB Fenty. I am indebted to these guys for their invitation and taking the time to talk with me about our handbooks and training projects. Long gone, however, is the cushy life of the Burz Al Arab or Kabul Serena. My Fenty quarters were a plywood prison cell right next to a busy helo pad. The 3-1 has really faced some extraordinary challenges -- reforming as an entirely new unit only months before deployment to RC East -- a treacherous and challenging counterinsurgency mission. It is a great credit to COL John Spiszer and his team that they have sustained modest progress in the Northeast even as the situation in the South has deteriorated. The 3-1 has an extraordinary, if perhaps overly stovepiped, group of support units for the engagement and reconstruction of Nangarhar. You have a PRT, HTT, ADT, MTT, not to mention vairous partners in a collection of NGOs and IOs. WTF! Leaving aside (for now) the organizational wisdom of this alphabet soup, Nangarhar is potentially a worthy example of success in the East. Or is it?
Is Sherzai's strongman approach one we would want to duplicate elsewhere? Does the Provincial government have a self-sustaining income stream to function? There is little taxation collected in the province except for the tariff at Torkham Gate -- the primary trade route with Pakistan. The Afghan Torkham profits go directly to a fund controlled by Sherzai, allegedly used for "reconstruction" in an account he controls. Real development is almost entirely funded by outsiders such as the US PRT and various USAID programs. A small budgetary allotment from Kabul just about pays for existing salaries, with none for development, construction, or even much maintenance. Thus, much of the governance and economic growth may be unsustainable servicing of the US grant-making and logistics appetite.
One can think of stabilization as a sequence from engagement to ceasefire to managed peace to self-sustaining peace to long term development and (perhaps) democratization. Nangarhar is ready for a stronger emphasis on sustainable development and governance capacity building that can withstand the inevitable departures of Sherzai and most US assistance. This is not to dismiss the contribution made by Sherzai. He is a good example that working with nasty characters can be a necessary and effective part of small wars.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.
This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)—an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.
It's important to note that Security Force Assistance occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and with what organizations we use to accomplish the mission.
We have military cooperation agreements with more than 125 nations around the world and often provide security force assistance in response to host nation requests. This assistance is generally delivered by Offices of Security Cooperation, always under the control of the US Embassy Country Team, and is accomplished by a mixture of assigned military and civilian personnel, contractors, and mobile training teams. These mobile training teams come from either the General Purpose Forces --- perhaps more appropriately described as Multi-Purpose Forces --- or from the Special Forces depending on the type of training requested.
Under conditions of active conflict where we have direct responsibility for security -- as in Iraq and Afghanistan -- tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces. This mission is accomplished using the resources of the modular brigade augmented as necessary based, again, on conditions. The conditions include the state" of security -- described in doctrine as Initial Stage, Transforming Stage, and Sustaining Phase -- as well as the capacity and capability of the host nation security forces. Security Force Assistance at the Institutional Level will be accomplished by a Security Transition Headquarters organized under the Joint Task Force. This Security Transition Headquarters partners with the US Embassy Country Team and evolves over time into an Office of Security Cooperation as described above.
Finally, we have security relationships with some nations facing significant internal security challenges but which, for many reasons, may not accept a large, visible US military presence within their borders. If they request Security Force Assistance under these conditions, the mission is generally assigned to US Special Operations Forces, potentially augmented by regionally-oriented General-Purpose Forces.
Clearly, the future operational environment will require us to demonstrate as much versatility in Stability Operations as we have in Offense and Defense Operations. Understanding the variety of conditions under which Security Force Assistance occurs is an important first step.
General Martin E. Dempsey is Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, May 4, 2009 -- The type of hybrid warfare" that defense experts predict the United States is increasingly likely to face will pull the military in two directions, the Defense Department's top policy official said today.
Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, said America's conventional dominance gives incentive to its enemies to use asymmetric means to undermine U.S. strengths and exploit its weaknesses.
Preparing for this operating environment will pull the Army, and the military writ large, in two very different directions," she told the roughly 200-person audience at the Army Leader Forum at the Pentagon.
On the one hand, the United States must be ready for irregular warfare, in which combatants blend in with civilian populations and conduct roadside-bomb attacks, suicide bombings and similar tactics, she said.
Those of you who served in Iraq and Afghanistan know firsthand how challenging it is to operate effectively in such an environment," she said.
Meanwhile, she said, the United States must remain prepared to deal with high-end threats, though these are much more likely to be asymmetric in character. Illustrating this concept, Flournoy described a scenario in which rising regional powers and rogue states use highly sophisticated technologies to deny U.S. access to critical regions and to thwart its operations.
These tactics range from anti-satellite capabilities, anti-air capabilities and anti-ship weapons to weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks.
Further complicating the battle landscape is the prospect of sophisticated nonstate actors using high-end capabilities such as weapons of mass destruction or guided rockets or munitions, as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon during its 2006 war with Israel.
We can expect to see more hybrid conflicts in which the enemy combines regular warfare tactics with irregular and asymmetric forms of warfare," she said.
The concept of hybrid warfare garnered attention last month when Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced his budget recommendations at a Pentagon news conference.
Gates proposed distributing allocated funds in accordance with what he characterized as the type of complex hybrid" warfare he expects will be increasingly common. He placed roughly half of his proposed budget for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, about 40 percent in dual-purpose capabilities and the remaining 10 percent in irregular warfare.
Gates also said recently that the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review -- a congressionally mandated Defense Department strategy review completed every four years -- would be unique in its consideration of this blended type of warfare.
This will be the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons learned on the battlefield these last few years; lessons about what mix of hybrid tactics future adversaries, both state and nonstate actors, are likely to pursue," he said at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa.
Flournoy provided a glimpse of the 2010 QDR, which the department will submit to Congress early next year.
In addition to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, key security challenges include violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons and increasing encroachment across the so-called global commons, which include air, sea, space and cyberspace, she said.
Kabul is smaller than I thought it would be. It seems like more of a frontier town feel than a big crowded third world city. The streets reminded me initially of the National Urban Warfare Training Center out at Ft. Irwin... the dusty brown mud buildings... the crooked little shops with old men dressed in the classic Pashtun clothing.. goods piled in windows and on tables....... the hanging meats. That Kabul reminds me of NTC is a credit to former NTC CGs Dana Pittard and Bob Cone and their restless dedication to the training mission. The only thing NTC needs to really capture Kabul is about 5,000 Toyota Corollas... seemingly the only vehicle on the road. Kabul's streets also illustrate that this is a town used to conquest and war. Every street is lined with walls topped with razor wire, every building a miniature fortress.
We had hoped to move straight to RC East on our first day but milair availability being somewhat sketchy and weather dependent, we were delayed and forced to overnight in Kabul. This was not a hardship. We stayed at the beautiful and luxurious Kabul Serena Hotel and dined with journalists and NGO workers at a classic Kabul hang out, the Gandamack Lodge. For the interagency crowd discussion starts at social hour, with civilians sharing perspectives and hassles over beers while the military remains tightly behind the wire. We need a whole-of-government drinking hole.
The Serena also happened to be hosting a conference with twelve Provincial Governors. In our discussions with several of the Governors, two topics were on their mind:
1) giving the Provinces more governing authority by moving away from the Kabul-centric strategy adopted in 20022) the fall elections and, in particular, the implications should President Karzai loseThese two questions will drive many of our discussions over the next two weeks.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.
--SWJ comment posted 10 March 2009.
Future conflicts will introduce an array of threats that defy simple categorization. We have at times tried to categorize threats in discrete operational themes such as conventional or unconventional, regular or irregular, high intensity or low intensity, traditional, terrorist, or criminal. However, the world is just not that accommodating. The security challenges we face are complex, and we have every reason to believe—based on our own experiences and on other conflicts we have recently observed—that our enemies will seek to employ a variety of threats in confronting us. Our model of the spectrum of conflict in FM 3-0 can be somewhat misleading in that it implies gaps among the different operational themes. What our model does not portray is the affect that time has on conflict and the likelihood that our enemies will seek to migrate among these themes. We cannot expect that we will have the option of selecting a category of conflict and then implementing a strategy confined to that category—the enemy gets a vote."
Hybrid, networked threats further blur the space among operational themes adding even greater complexity to the current and future operating environment. In response, our units and leaders in theater adapt from one theme to another frequently, sometimes day by day, often mission by mission and location by location. This occurs at all levels from the tactical to the strategic.
The hybrid threats we face are also increasingly decentralized in execution. Their objective is to exploit us by decentralizing operations and employing information operations as a weapon. In the book The Starfish and the Spider by Rod Beckstrom and Ori Brafman, the authors examine business models that provide insights into how open and decentralized systems operate: when attacked, a decentralized organization becomes even more open and decentralized....open systems can easily mutate."
The point is that the threat doesn't confine itself to a single operational theme. The enemy adapts to leverage their strengths and to exploit our vulnerabilities. I believe LTG Stan McChrystal—one of our truly innovative senior leaders—had it right when he said, to defeat a network, you have to be a network." So our challenge is to adapt our institutions and develop our leaders to confront the complexity and decentralization inherent in the future operational environment.
We must avoid either-or constructs about conflict and how we organize, train, and equip ourselves in anticipation of conflict. When we commit our campaign-quality" Army to a sustained operation in the future operating environment, it will need to be versatile enough to respond to all forms of contact. Even more important, it will need to be led by leaders agile enough to deal with complexity and anticipate the changes inherent in an extended campaign.
General Martin E. Dempsey is Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.
The Al Muntaha restaurant and bar sits majestically atop the legendary Burj Al Arab hotel in Dubai, mirroring the mast-top spars of the sailboat shape of the iconic hotel. Originally touted as the world's only seven-star hotel (now since more realistically categorized by Jumeirah Group as five-star premier), and uber luxe hotel bar is an ironic place to contemplate my upcoming two-week expedition into the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush and to try to better understand Coalition efforts to stabilize Eastern Afghanistan.
What brings us to Afghanistan? My company trains and supports DoD and State in the non-lethal and interagency dimensions of war. In both training programs and our handbooks, we help military and civilian staffs to better understand the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of their mission and we teach them how to form an effective team with other parts of the interagency and NGO space. You will be relieved to know I don't do this training. Rather we have a team of about sixty veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan PRTs and similar reconstruction or advisory roles in these wars. My role is to manage this extraordinary collection of interagency talent and lend my perspective of working stability operations at the policy level for more than 16 years. Quite simply, we are the experts in small war soft power."
As I sip my $32 blueberry martini (delicious but, crikey, not THAT delicious), I ponder several questions :
(1) What are the political, economic, and human dimensions of conflict and instability in Eastern Afghanistan (and Western Pakistan for that matter)? Do our military units, PRTs, and NGOS understand and agree on the local sources of conflict and is there an integrated strategy to promote stability at the provincial and local level?(2) Is the capacity building mission of extending legitimate governance from Kabul still the right development strategy? Or should we put greater emphasis on addressing needs and capacity at the local and tribal level as a means to build political support among the people?
(3) Is the military-PRT structure in Afghanistan working effectively? How can we enable more effective civil-military teams focused and capable of provincial and local level engagement and assistance?
(4) Perhaps a shorter summary of these questions: what the hell is going on with governance, economics and reconstruction in Afghanistan and what needs to be fixed?
I hope to report back to SWJ on what we (myself and two of my Afghanistan trainers) find on our travels. We will be meeting and traveling with a wide range of folks at many levels, including the military, PRTs, journalists, and the Afghans themselves. But first, can someone wire me some cash to cover my Al Muntaha bar bill?
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.
More at The Los Angeles Times.