SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
Same, same for the Combined Arms Center blog.
Both are great examples of what Frontier 6 (aka LTG William Caldwell) had in mind when he posted here at SWJ on changing the organizational culture.
More at The Washington Times.
Trends across the security, political and economic landscape of Iraq continue to improve, but the fundamental character of the conflict remains unchanged, according to a Defense Department report submitted to Congress yesterday.
The improved security in Iraq has opened the doors for dialogue between the leading parties in the country's government and communities and has made room for other institutional developments. But results are still tenuous and long-term stability will only be realized if the Iraqi government continues to build its legitimacy and take on existing challenges, the report says.
The quarterly report is required by the 2008 DoD Appropriations Act and measures the stability and security in Iraq.
The report states that security in the country has continued to improve, even as coalition forces have drawn down, with security incidents at levels last seen in 2004. Civilian deaths across Iraq have declined by 77 percent compared to the same reporting period last year. Major contributions include the surge of coalition forces, the growth of the Iraqi security forces and the efforts of the "Sons of Iraq" citizen security groups, according to the report.
High-profile suicide attacks have taken fewer lives, and they have not been as successful at inciting subsequent violent acts, the report says.
At the same time, coalition forces have drawn down significantly. All five U.S. surge brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions and other coalition forces have left Iraq. The transfers to provincial Iraqi control of Qadisiyah province in July and of Anbar province this month highlight the report's assessment of security achievements during the drawdown of coalition forces.
The Iraqi security forces also are making progress and earning the respect of the Iraqi people, and with coalition forces, they have had many successes in the past several months against local and Iranian-supported militias, the report says. This has led to a shift in the people's attitude toward the militias, and has led to more Iraqis choosing to address their differences politically rather than through violence, according to the report.
The security successes have also led to the degradation of al-Qaida in Iraq's capabilities, the report says, and have led to broader political support for the Iraqi government.
But the report also states that while trends continue to remain positive, "they remain fragile, reversible, and uneven."
"While security has improved dramatically, the fundamental character of the conflict in Iraq remains unchanged—a communal struggle for power and resources," the report reads.
The report calls on the Iraqi government to continue building legitimacy by serving its people while taking on challenges that remain.
Some of those challenges facing the government include expanding its ministries of Defense and Interior to properly man, train and sustain their field forces. It needs to improve its defense budget and distribution of resources, the report says, and it calls on the defense ministry to successfully integrate former militia members into the Iraqi security forces.
Iranian influence in illegal militias known as "special groups" continues to plague Iraqi security efforts, the report says.
"Malign Iranian influence continues to pose the most significant threat to long-term stability in Iraq," the report reads. "Despite continued Iranian promises to the contrary, it appears clear that Iran continues to fund, train, arm, and direct [special groups] intent on destabilizing the situation in Iraq."
The nearly 100,000 Sons of Iraq helping with local security are slowly transitioning into the traditional Iraqi security forces, but the process needs to be faster and more efficient, according to the report.
Iraqi leaders continue to make incremental but steady political progress, the report says, thanks largely to the security gains.
"The current security environment is more hospitable to compromise across sectarian and ethnic divides, while expanding oil revenues have generated the funds needed to support development and reconciliation programs," the report reads.
Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - Full Report
Now that he has left Iraq in better shape than he found it, can Gen. David Petraeus save Afghanistan and the rest of the region? He'll need to apply some tough lessons from Baghdad to his new challenge- just not the ones you think.
General David Petraeus left Iraq last week with proper fanfare for his success in dramatically reducing the violence that had steadily engulfed the country until late last summer. At the end of October, he'll take the helm of the four-star Central Command that oversees US military affairs in all of the Middle East and South Asia. His new to-do list will be long and complex. The general will no doubt be applying a number of important lessons from Iraq in his new command. They aren't necessarily the lessons most people think, but they just might be the lessons that America - struggling to contain a growing two-country war in Pakistan and Afghanistan and locked in a tense regional showdown with Iran - urgently needs to learn... When Petraeus takes the reins at CENTCOM, he'll need to take a similar long, hard look at Pakistan's border region and Afghanistan to arrive at the same fundamental diagnosis of the problem. As in Iraq, he is likely to conclude that the solution lays not in merely pumping more troops into the region but rather in how those troops are used. Nor, with apologies to Bob Woodward, will there be some silver-bullet technical solution to kill or capture the al Qaeda leadership. Troop numbers and technology were not the key factors that turned the tide in Iraq...The lesson of Iraq is that there is no magic formula for any of the complex foreign policy challenges facing the United States. The right expertise must be brought to bear on all these problems - whether it's South Asia, finishing the job in Iraq, or containing Iran. A dangerous fantasy has taken hold in Washington that the Iraq war is "over" and that the United States can now turn its hammer on another problem. Yes, the remaining tasks in the Middle East are less combat than conflict termination - a primarily political and diplomatic job that requires military leverage to accomplish - but they are what the mission is all about. When will America learn that hasty exits do not make for stable endgames? The next president, whoever he is, would be wise to keep Petraeus at CENTCOM for long enough to bring some of these needed efforts to fruition.Much more at Foreign Policy.
Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson
After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.Secretary Gates at National Defense University (Full Transcript). Highlight excerpts follow.
Balance
The defining principle driving our strategy is balance. I note at the outset that balance is not the same as treating all challenges as having equal priority. We cannot expect to eliminate risk through higher defense budgets, to, in effect "do everything, buy everything."
The War We Are In
As we think about the security challenges on the horizon, it is important to establish upfront that America's ability to deal with threats for years to come will depend importantly on our performance in the conflicts of today... In the past I have expressed frustration over the defense bureaucracy's priorities and lack of urgency when it came to the current conflicts - that for too many in the Pentagon it has been business as usual, as opposed to a wartime footing and a wartime mentality. When referring to "Next-War-itis," I was not expressing opposition to thinking about and preparing for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so - and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that.
COIN and Stability Operations
... the recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing adequately to address the dangers posed by insurgencies or failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos, and criminality. Let's be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland - for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack - are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.
The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. We do not have the luxury of opting out because they do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.
Strategic Communications
The Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the importance of strategic communications as a vital capability, and good work has been done since. However, we can't lapse into using communications as a crutch for shortcomings in policy or execution. As Admiral Mullen has noted, in the broader battle for hearts and minds abroad, we have to be as good at listening to others as we are at telling our story to them. And when it comes to perceptions at home, when all is said and done, the best way to convince the American people we're winning a war is through credible and demonstrable results, as we have been able to do in Iraq.
China
Other nations may be un—to challenge the United States fighter to fighter, ship to ship, tank to tank. But they are developing other disruptive means to blunt the impact of American power, narrow our military options, and deny freedom of movement and action. In the case of China, investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary means to project power and help allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. This will put a premium on America's ability to strike from over the horizon, employ missile defenses, and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems such as the Next Generation Bomber.
Conventional Dominance
...although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. It is true that the United States would be hard pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I've said before, where on Earth would we seriously do that? We have ample, untapped striking power in our air and sea forces should the need arise to deter or punish aggression - whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait. So while we are knowingly assuming some additional risk in this area, that risk is, I believe, a prudent and manageable one.
Procurement
As we can expect a blended, high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so too should America seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities we have - the types of units we field, the weapons we buy, the training we do.
When it comes to procurement, for the better part of five decades, the trend has gone towards lower numbers as technology gains made each system more capable. In recent years these platforms have grown ever more baroque, ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is reaching a point of diminishing returns. A given ship or aircraft -- no matter how capable, or well-equipped - can only be in one place at one time - and, to state the obvious, when one is sunk or shot down, there is one less of them.
In addition, the prevailing view for decades was that weapons and units designed for the so-called high-end could also be used for the low...The need for the state of the art systems - particularly longer range capabilities - will never go away, as we strive to offset the countermeasures being developed by other nations. But at a certain point, given the types of situations we are likely to face - and given, for example, the struggles to field up-armored HUMVEES, MRAPs, and ISR in Iraq - it begs the question whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed.
The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drives the procurement, rather than the other way around.
Institutions
In Iraq, we've seen how an army that was basically a smaller version of the Cold War force can over time become an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. Your task, particularly for those going back to your services, is to support the institutional changes necessary so the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.
Constituencies and Institutions
...the reality is that conventional and strategic force modernization programs are strongly supported in the services, in the Congress, and by the defense industry. For reasons laid out today, I also support them. For example, this year's base budget request contains more than $180 billion in procurement, research and development, the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems. However, apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabilities to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict - and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts...
In the end, the military capabilities we need cannot be separated from the cultural traits and reward structure of the institutions we have: the signals sent by what gets funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in the academies and staff colleges, and how we train.
Limits and Modesty
First, limits about what the United States - still the strongest and greatest nation on earth - can do. The power of our military's global reach has been an indispensable contributor to world peace - and must remain so. But not every outrage, every act of aggression, every crisis can or should elicit an American military response, and we should acknowledge such.
Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. The Taliban dispatched within three months, Saddam's regime toppled in three weeks. Where a button is pushed in Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul. Where a bomb destroys the targeted house on the right, leaving intact the one on the left.
But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to upend the immutable principles of war: where the enemy is killed, but our troops and innocent civilians are spared. Where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or awed into submission, instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.
More:
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speaks to students at the National Defense University on 29 September 2008.Gates Criticizes Conventional Focus At Start of Iraq War - Washington Post
Defense Chief Criticizes Bureaucracy at the Pentagon - New York Times
Gates: Military Force, Technology Have Limits - Los Angeles Times
Balance at Heart of National Defense Strategy, Gates Says - AFPS
US Defense Chief Calls for a Balanced US Military Strategy - Voice of America
Iran Remains Unyielding, Gates Says - AFPS
Balance at Heart of National Defense Strategy, Gates Says - AFPS
US Defense Chief Calls for a Balanced US Military Strategy - Voice of America
Gates Calls for a Balanced Military - Associated Press
Gates Predicts No Sharp Cuts in US Defense Budgets - Reuters
Gates Warns of the Limits of US Military Power - Agence France-Presse
Gates: US Troops Likely to Stay in Iraq - United Press International
Technology is No Cure-all, Gates Tells Military - Reuters
More at Red Team Journal.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies is hosting a rollout event on Tuesday, October 7 from 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM featuring:
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, USA, Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth
Ambassador John Herbst
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State
Ambassador Dick Solomon
President, United States Institute for Peace
Ambassador Michael Hess
Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development
Samuel A. Worthington
CEO and President, InterAction
Please see this invitation if you are interested in attending.
Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor
This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.The Strongest Tribe - Bing West
From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around--and the choice now facing America.Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson
After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.The War Within - Bob Woodward
Woodward interviewed key players, obtained dozens of never-before-published documents, and had nearly three hours of exclusive interviews with President Bush. The result is a stunning, firsthand history of the years from mid-2006, when the White House realizes the Iraq strategy is not working, through the decision to surge another 30,000 U.S. troops in 2007, and into mid-2008, when the war becomes a fault line in the presidential election.We Are Soldiers Still - Joe Galloway
In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.In a Time of War - Bill Murphy
The West Point cadets Murphy follows through their baptism by fire are an admirable sample of young American men and women: intelligent, ambitious and intensely patriotic.To be released soon:
Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy - Steven Metz
Today the US military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post--Cold War era. But the preoccupation with Iraq also mired the United States in the Middle East and led to a bloody occupation. What will American strategy look like after US troops leave Iraq?Wednesday, October 1, 2008, 10:30 a.m.--1:30 p.m.
Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
The October 1st operational launch of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), on the eve of new American Presidential Administration, provides an unprecedented opportunity to reconceive and reshape U.S. strategy toward Africa. However, while significant attention has been devoted to the structure and functions of AFRICOM—and to its "strategic communications" challenges—less thought has been given to identifying the core security interests that should guide U.S. strategy on the continent, and the new forms of partnership with a more self-assured Africa that are most likely to advance those interests.
With its capacity for political as well as military engagement, for conflict prevention as well as kinetic operations, AFRICOM has the potential to serve as a model for future interagency security cooperation efforts in the Long War. But what AFRICOM does is more important than how the command is structured. What is the strategic rationale for increased U.S. security engagement with African countries, in light of America's core global challenges? What are the emerging threats and challenges in Africa, and how should the United States best organize itself to address them? On October 1st, AEI scholars Mauro De Lorenzo and Thomas Donnelly will host a public panel to address these and other questions.
Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq - Peter R. Mansoor, Yale University Press, 2008, 376 pgs, $28.00.
It is hard to objectively evaluate a book that is "blurbed" on the back by the likes of General David Petraeus (now Commander, U.S. Central Command), Dr. Conrad Crane (chief editor of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency), H.R. McMaster, Tom Ricks and Wick Murray. They have all endorsed the book as a masterful memoir of the post-conflict period in Iraq's capital from a commander's viewpoint. What can anyone else find to say that this suite of insightful soldiers and scholars have not?
Even worse, the book includes a brief foreword from Donald and Fred Kagan, about as powerful a father-son pairing as one will ever find among historians and public intellectuals today. The former is a highly respected historian of classics who teaches at Yale, from which the latter also graduated. Fred Kagan, after a decade at West Point, is now a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. They supervise a series for that school's university press which is intended to "present the keenest analyses of war in its different aspects, the sharpest evaluations of political and military decision making, and descriptive accounts of military activity that illuminate its human elements."
They certainly scored a home run with Baghdad at Sunrise. It offers a compassionate, candid and comprehensive account of a brigade commander's tour in Iraq. The author served as the Commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division known as the Ready First Combat Team" during that confusing period after the toppling of the Bathist regime and the all too quick transfer of responsibility to an interim Iraqi governing group. The author provides a keen depiction of events on the ground, and his understanding of the decision making that was guiding his unit's activities in the grim and grimy streets of Rusafa and Adhamiya in central and northeast Baghdad. This sector is sandwiched between the Tigris and the slums of Sadr City. Mansoor's "Ready First" struggled to bring order out of chaos, neutralized the national insurgents, and fought the increasing influx of Islamic militants from late May of 2003 until relieved in July 2004. In an area of some 75 square miles that was once home to over 2 million Iraqis, his brigade struggled to overcome the poor planning and lack of follow through that occurred back in Washington's policy making circles.
Mansoor's lens is often focused on the human dimension of this conflict, especially his own soldiers. The book is dedicated to his entire brigade, but especially those that made the ultimate sacrifice. The circumstances around the loss of each soldier, including his Command Sergeant Major Eric Cooke, is carefully detailed. These soldiers "made their stand in the cradle of civilization in an effort to ensure that the progress of mankind continues, and that it will be an evolution worthy of the twenty-first century, not the seventh."
The author is very well equipped and well positioned to evaluate the historical underpinning and decisions about the war. He is one of those unique soldier-scholars, able to apply perceptive insights from history with a rigorously trained and analytical mind, with the skills of a senior combat commander. Colonel Mansoor earned a PhD from Ohio State University in military history, and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy. He is now the Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University. After command in Iraq, he served as the founding director of the U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Center at Leavenworth, and was detailed to the Chairman, JCS study group of colonels that evaluated U.S. military strategy in Iraq (the dust jacket inaccurately states that this group proposed the surge strategy). From 2007-2008, he was General Petraeus's executive officer at Multi-National Force-Iraq where he got to see the evolutionary progress he and his brigade has so relentless worked towards. The return to civilization in Mesopotamia is now within grasp, but only if the Iraqis want it.
The author concludes with a chapter titled "Reflections" that alone is worth the price of the book. This chapter synthesizes his year of command and provides battle-hardened lessons learned about insurgency. Underscoring points made by now retired LtCol John Nagl, Mansoor forcefully presents a need for greater adaptation by the U.S. Army. Its culture "must change, or the organization will be unprepared to fight and win the wars of the twenty-first century. While retaining the ability to conduct major combat operations, the Army must change its culture to embrace missions other than conventional land force combat"
Echoing concerns raised by Bing West in his highly regarded The Strongest Tribe, Mansoor worries about the relationship between the American people and its professional army. "American cannot long remain a superpower if we think that our wars can be fought solely by the small sliver of society that populates our professional military forces," he observes. However, the author provides no recommendations on how we can best attain this closer relationship. This reviewer is of the opinion that the fault does not lie with the American people, but with our senior elected officials.
This is an exceptional memoir that decades from now will still be ranked as an insightful but especially candid history of the war. Mansoor is the rarest of commanders, —to point out where his own decisions or judgments were flawed. It will appeal to general readers looking for intimate details and honest assessments on a daily basis from a commander's lens. It is highly recommended for prospective military leaders as part of their preparation for higher command. Simply stated, it is an impressive account that all prospective brigade, regimental and battalion commanders should read.
Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine infantryman who serves as a research fellow at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila, PA.
By Captain Timothy Hsia
Iraq today is at a critical juncture which could mark the beginning of further stabilization or increased internecine struggle. The surge of troops has created additional breathing room for the Nouri Al-Maliki government and General Petraeus' leadership has greatly assisted in ensuring a more peaceful and secure Iraq. For the past two years, Iraq has been the scene of multiple sectarian battles between Sunnis and Shia, and internally within the two sects. The Sunni insurgency has died down as the Sons of Iraq (or Concerned Local Citizens) have turned against foreign jihadists and extremist Sunni groups. Similarly the Shia internal struggle has been won by Maliki and the Government of Iraq over Moktada Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
The next phase of the Iraq war could become less of a sectarian struggle and more of an ethnic conflict. The inability of Iraq's parliament to resolve the situation in Kirkuk and the threat of violence in Khanaqin has highlighted the unresolved pressing issue of the Kurdish people and its Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).
The current Iraq war has strengthened the Kurdish people as it has demographically consolidated the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq. Kurdish peoples displaced to Northern Iraq because they were now free to return to their ancestral homes after being evicted previously by Saddam and also because they were seeking refuge from regions besieged by sectarian violence. Simultaneously, the KRG has lured Kurdish people back to the Kurdish heartland in Northern Iraq with promises of land, wages, and security. Estimates today of the total population of Kurdish people living in the Middle East ranges around 30 million people. Based off these numbers, the Kurdish people are often described as the largest ethnic minority without a country. Hitherto, the Kurdish region has been comparatively stabile due to its homogenous demographics. And currently the Kurdish provinces in Northern Iraq enjoy a level of economic prosperity and political autonomy unmatched by any other region within Iraq...
Panel:
John Matthew Barlow (History, Concordia University)
David Betz (War Studies, King's College London)
Christian Bleuer (Political Science, Australian National University)
Craig Hayden (Int'l Communications, American University)
Kevin Jon Heller (Law, University of Auckland/University of Melbourne)
John Horgan (Psychology, Pennsylvania State University)
Thomas Johnson (Cultural Studies, Naval Postgraduate School)
Jason Ralph (Politics & International Studies, University of Leeds)
William Snyder (Law, University of Syracuse/Maxwell School)
Marc Tyrrell (Anthropology, Carleton University)
Tony Waters (Sociology, California State University, Chico)
L.L. Wynn (Anthropology, Macquarie University)
More at CTLab.
Much more at The New York Times.
More at The International Herald Tribune
More at The Washington Post.
Green Warriors
Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations from Planning Through Post-Conflict
By David E. Mosher, Beth E. Lachman, Michael D. Greenberg, Tiffany Nichols, Brian Rosen and Henry H. Willis of Rand
Rand says:
Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans have highlighted the importance of environmental considerations. These range from protecting soldier health and disposing of hazardous waste to building water supply systems and other activities that help achieve national goals in the post-conflict phase of contingency operations. The Army has become increasingly involved with environmental issues in every contingency operation and must be better prepared to deal with them. This study assesses whether existing policy, doctrine, and guidance adequately address environmental activities in post-conflict military operations and reconstruction. Findings are based on reviews of top-level policy and doctrine, analysis of operational experience, extensive interviews with diverse Army personnel, and a review of operational documentation and literature. From these sources, a database of 111 case studies was created. The research showed that environmental concerns can have far-reaching and significant impacts on the Army, both direct and indirect, especially in terms of cost, current operations, soldier health, diplomatic relations, reconstruction activities, and the ultimate success of the operation or the broader mission. Some evidence suggests that environmental problems may have even contributed to insurgency in Iraq. Recommendations include updating current policy and doctrine to fully address environmental considerations in contingency operations; ensuring that contractors are carefully selected and managed; and transmitting proactive field environmental practices and lessons throughout the Army.
What say you?
Discuss at Small Wars Council
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(H/T Mark Vinson)
Michí¨le Flournoy, President and Co-Founder of CNAS, will moderate the discussion on the nature of duty, sacrifice, and officership in a time of war, to take place on October 1, 2008, from 4:00pm to 7:00pm, in the Willard's Crystal Room. Join these Iraq war veterans and the author of an important new book on the sacrifices of young American Army officers for a discussion about country, service, and officership in a time of war.
Date/Time:
October 1, 2008
Panel Discussion: 4:00 pm to 5:45 pm
Cocktails and hors d'oeuvres: 5:45 pm to 7:00 pm
Location:
Willard InterContinental Hotel's Crystal Room
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C., 20004
RSVP:
Online Registration, Click Here
Or, RSVP by phone: (202) 457-9427
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is an independent and nonpartisan research institution that develops strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values. CNAS leads efforts to help inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.
Much more at The Atlantic.
Background
In this work, Patrick Kelley interprets the intelligence environment of political, military and information empires. His contribution sheds light on the cause of enduring intelligence collection deficits that afflict the center of such empires, and that can coincide with their ebb and flow. Alert intelligence practitioners, present and future, can note here just how useful a fresh interpretation of the intelligence enterprise can be to a coherent understanding of the global stream of worrisome issues. The long-term value of this work will be realized as readers entertain the implications of Churchill's comment that "The empires of the future are the empires of the mind."
The manuscript for this book was reviewed by scholars and intelligence practitioners, and was approved for public release by the Department of Defense's Office of Security Review.
Selected Review Commentary Excerpts
Good intelligence, in both senses of the word, has been notably missing in U.S. foreign policy over the past several years. Skillfully moving from the Roman to the Ottoman to the British empires, adeptly applying ideas from a wide range of Eastern and Western philosophies, Patrick Kelley has produced a remarkable set of lessons-yet-to-be-learned for the United States. Full of trans-historical and cross-cultural insights, this is the perfect supplement and essential sequel to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Field Manual. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power: Kelley makes it so.
Patrick Kelley is that rare scholar-soldier who has dared to be self-reflexive. His monograph on "Imperial Intelligence" is carefully researched and lucidly written. Considering how crucial the question of intelligence gathering is, an understanding of its history should be of great interest to scholars, to statesmen, to intelligence gathering departments, and to interested non-specialist readers as well.
As Patrick Kelley observes near the close of this book, "all intelligence is fundamentally historicized." One of the main reasons we study history is to escape the insularity of the present, to overcome the unwarranted exceptionalism that so oft en afflicts our sense of ourselves, to remind us that the problems we face can be found to echo those of our predecessors. Kelley brings an historical perspective brilliantly to bear on contemporary America's intelligence capabilities and limitations, identifying its "way of knowing" as a distinctively imperial one and demonstrating that it shares much in common with the intelligence challenges of the Roman, the Ottoman, and the British empires.
Imperial Secrets: Remapping the Mind of Empire
Nathaniel Fick is a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to joining CNAS, he served as a Marine Corps infantry and reconnaissance officer, including operational assignments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. In 2007, Fick was a civilian instructor at the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy in Kabul. He is the author of the New York Times bestseller One Bullet Away (Houghton Mifflin, 2005). His writing has appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today, among other publications, and he is a frequent contributor to CNN, NPR, and the BBC.
Vikram Singh is a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He works on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Asia Initiative '09, and a range of CNAS defense strategy and planning projects. Prior to joining CNAS Mr. Singh worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, where he was responsible for strategic initiatives to improve the US military's work with partner nations including the policy oversight and management of a joint Department of Defense and Department of State program to train and equip foreign military forces around the world.
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