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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

"Obsession: Radical Islam's War Against The West"
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/25/2008 - 12:58am | 3 comments

Obsession: Radical Islam's War Against the West, also called Obsession, is a 2006 documentary movie about Islamist teachings and goals which uses extensive Arab and Iranian television footage.

Obsession compares the threat of radical Islamism with that of Nazism before World War II, and draws parallels between radical Islamists and the Nazi Party during the War, specifically Adolf Hitler's relationship with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem as an inspiration for radical Islamic movements in the Middle East today.

The film features analysis by counter-terrorism figures such as Nonie Darwish (the daughter of a Fedayeen soldier), Alan M. Dershowitz, Steven Emerson, Brigitte Gabriel, Martin Gilbert, Caroline Glick, Alfons Heck, Glen Jenvey, John Loftus, Salim Mansur, Itamar Marcus, Khaleel Mohammed, Daniel Pipes, Tashbih Sayyed, Walid Shoebat, Khaled Abu Toameh, Robert Wistrich and interviews with Israeli officials and a former PLO operative.

Recently (September 2008) the Clarion Fund distributed DVDs of the film by mail, and in newspaper advertising supplements, predominantly in swing states for the upcoming presidential election.

The Huffington Post on the Clarion Fund: A shadowy organization is financing the delivery this month of millions of DVDs of the controversial video Obsession: Radical Islam's War Against the West. The video, which has been widely criticized as hostile to Muslims, has been inserted in numerous national and major-city newspapers.

Newspapers reported to have carried the DVD included the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Charlotte Observer, Miami Herald, and Raleigh News and Observer

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) calls Obsession "a well-planned con."

The video above is a 12-minute abridged version. Trailers and clips can be viewed here and the full 77-minute version on DVD can be purchased here.

Sources for the above include Wikipedia, CAIR, and the official Obsession web page. This posting was prompted by various news services citing outrage over recent distribution of Obsession, bringing this 2006 video to our attention, once again.

Ditto...
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/24/2008 - 6:56am | 0 comments
... what Erin said.
CMC on the Maritime Strategy
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/23/2008 - 1:55pm | 0 comments

Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway talks about the US Maritime Strategy, part of the Conversations with the Country gathering in North Carolina on 18 September 2008.
Wired's 2008 Smart list
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/23/2008 - 8:06am | 0 comments
Wired Magazine's latest issue lists the 15 people their staff believes the next President should listen to. Of particular interest to SWJ is the inclusion of Dr. Montgomery McFate. McFate a cultural anthropologist who works on defense and national security issues and is currently serving as the Senior Social Science Adviser for the US Army's Human Terrain System Program in her capacity as a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analysis.

From Use Anthropology in Military Planning by Wired's Noah Shachtman:

... Traditionally, the military has relied almost solely on so-called hard sciences like nuclear physics and electronics. But as a simple regime-change operation in Iraq descended into a baffling counterinsurgency, it became clear that you can have the most advanced sensors, the toughest armor, the most precise GPS-guided munitions, but without any insight into the civilian population - or at least some sense of how they'll react to your moves - your war effort is sunk.

By 2004, McFate had made her way into the national security establishment as a researcher at Rand. (This despite an unusual background — she grew up on a barge in the San Francisco Bay and had hung out with well-known beat poets.) McFate's ideas (shared by a growing number in the military) caught the attention of the science adviser to the joint chiefs of staff. She then codified them in a pair of landmark articles in Military Review outlining a rationale and strategy for integrating the social sciences into national defense. Today she is the senior social science adviser for the Human Terrain System, a $130 million Army program that embeds political science, anthropology, and economics specialists with combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq. "What you're trying to do is understand the people's interests," she says. "Because whoever is more effective at meeting the interests of the population will be able to influence it."...

More at Wired and at Shachtman's post on Wired's Danger Room blog.

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

COIN Civil-Military Cooperation
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/22/2008 - 7:14pm | 0 comments
Fawzia Sheikh, Inside the Navy (subscription required at Inside Defense), reports that US Joint Forces Command is planning on publishing a commander's handbook and related assessments with the intent to improve US civil-military cooperation in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This effort is part of the results garnered from a Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) of JFCOM's Unified Action '08 program. The LOE, with US State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the lead, was conducted in June and included seminars and table-top "experimentation".

... The objective was to assess whether the planning framework was "able to incorporate and account for" civilian and military relationships, roles, responsibilities and authorities, and that the framework can support the execution of the "strategic interagency planning process"...

The LOE replicated a joint staff tasked with developing policy and an operations plan for responding to an insurgency. This included using a country reconstruction stabilization group to conduct interagency planning.

JFCOM also created an integration planning cell that looks at a strategic plan that has been developed or as it's being developed... and "actually deploys down to the combatant-command level to help harmonize the civilian and military plans."

JFCOM concluded that the planning framework used during the LOE provides the necessary guidance but further work has to be done to hammer out the details on how the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff will participate as each has its own unique strategic planning process.

While DOD has its own strategic planning systems, until now it lacked one that spanned across numerous government agencies...

ITN also reported on the three documents JFCOM plans to produce dealing with the issues raised by the LOE.

One is a companion "practitioner's guide . . . kind of a how-to book" that will be released in the October or November time frame...

The second document will be a joint force commanders' handbook outlining "their role in the system," he said, adding it will be ready in January or February.

The third document will be a LOE report on the experiment's findings. The last officially released Unified Action related document by JFCOM was the US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation dated December 2005.

Pakistan Bombing Update
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/21/2008 - 9:08pm | 0 comments
Sunday night news update on the Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad...
Urban Warfare Analysis Center
by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 09/20/2008 - 8:18pm | 0 comments

The Urban Warfare Analysis Center produces interdisciplinary research regarding irregular warfare in urban environments.

For those with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access check out the completed research on the Research and Analysis page of the Urban Warfare Analysis Center (UWAC). A relatively new organization, UWAC prides itself on its "fusion" approach to research and analysis:

The UWAC Analysis Team utilizes a fusion cell approach to foster innovation and collaboration. In contrast to the old "stovepipe" approach in which information and expertise is rarely shared across teams, the fusion cell model brings together people with diverse experiences and skill sets. Thus, the two main ingredients for the creation of innovative ideas -- collaboration and multidisciplinary expertise -- are both captured.

The UWAC team is comprised of three disciplines -- military specialists, technology experts, and social science analysts -- to produce research and analysis across multiple functional areas.

UWAC participated in a USJFCOM / USMC project I worked on earlier this year in my "day job" and provided top-notch support. Here is a listing of their current urban operations related products:

• Implications of Iranian Media in Iraq

• Using Ocean Waves to Power Port Cities during Stability Operations

• Islamification of the Chechen Wars

• Virtual Worlds and Terrorist Attack Planning

• How a Boy Becomes a Martyr - The Dangers of Web 2.0 Technology

• Weapons Review: SCAR

• Aquaponic Technology in Urban Operations

• Virtual Worlds and Money Laundering

• Web 2.0 and Enemy Recruitment

• Impact of Off-the-Shelf Global Telecommunications Technology

• Urban Jihad: Militant Exploitation of the Koran

• Lessons Learned From the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006

• How the Iranian Media Help Build Support for Hezbollah

• Virtual Worlds and their Implications for Urban Warfare

• Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support

• Iran's Evolving Urban Warfare Doctrine

• Cell Phone Use by Insurgents in Iraq

• Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq: Assessment and Outlook

• Sistani's Future Role in Iraq

• Suicide Bombings in Urban Warfare: Trends in Motives and Targets

• Attacking Urban Insurgents: Choking Off the Money Supply

• Influence Operations in Iraq: Discussion Paper for JUW08 War Game

• Information Operations: Lessons from Private Marketing Companies on Cultural Awareness

• Text Messaging by Insurgents and Terrorists: A Potent Force Multiplier

• Tamil Tigers: Trendsetters of Urban Suicide Bombings Pursuing Airborne Capabilities

• Virtual Worlds and Enemy Attack Planning

• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Piezoelectric Devices

• Influence Operations: Print-on-Demand Printing

• Case Study of Urban Warfare: Compilation of Lessons Learned from the Chechen Wars

• Nanotechnology in Urban Operations: Overview of Capabilities and the Way Forward

• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Shear Thickening Fluids

• Contract Airborne Surveillance Support to Balkan Urban Operations

• Case Study: U.S. Marines in Beirut (1982-1984)

• Urban Warfare: Learning Best Practices on Biometrics from Casino Operations

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Radio Frequency Identification -- Tracking the Possibilities

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: New Carbon Fibers to Produce Stronger, Lighter Body Armor

• Urban IED Threat in Somalia

• Sun Tzu and Modern Urban Warfare

• West Africa: Drug Trade and Communication Schemes

• Colombia's Counterdrug Operations

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Nanotechnology and Battlefield Medical Care

Not bad for a young organization.

A Conversation with Journalist Bob Woodward
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/20/2008 - 9:40am | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - Part one of a conversation with Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Bob Woodward about his book The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008.

Charlie Rose Show - Part two of a conversation with Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Bob Woodward about his book The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008.
Joint Strategic Assessment Team II
by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 09/20/2008 - 8:16am | 0 comments
Sean Naylor of Army Times reports that General David Petraeus is planning to form a team of under 100 experts to conduct a top-to-bottom strategic assessment of US Central Command's area of responsibility.

Petraeus tapped Col. (P) H.R. McMaster to lead the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, or JSAT, according to multiple sources.

McMaster is widely regarded as one of the Army's most capable officers. He is the author of Dereliction of Duty, an examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's performance during the Vietnam War, and he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in western Iraq, a deployment that came to be seen as a model of how to conduct counterinsurgency at the local level.

The team will include people from government, the military and academia.

Petraeus takes charge at CentCom on Oct. 31 and the JSAT will begin its work immediately thereafter.

Sources said the work would likely be completed in February.

General Petraeus, along with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, utilized a JSAT in 2007 that contributed much to the creation of the classified Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. Among other recommendations the JSAT provided the framework for a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy intended to provide a bridge for the Iraqi government and security forces to eventual handover of day to day political and security functions.

Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Ann Scott Tyson of the Washington Post reported on JSAT efforts in US Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least '09 and New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics, respectively.

The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level. In essence, it is as much about the political deals needed to defuse a civil war as about the military operations aimed at quelling a complex insurgency, said officials with knowledge of the plan.

The groundwork for the campaign plan was laid out in an assessment formulated by Petraeus's senior counterinsurgency adviser, David J. Kilcullen, with about 20 military officers, State Department officials and other experts in Baghdad known as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Their report, finished last month, was approved by Petraeus and Crocker as the basis of a formal campaign plan that will assign specific tasks for military commands and civilian agencies in Iraq.

The plan anticipates keeping US troop levels elevated into next year but also intends to significantly increase the size of the 144,000-strong Iraqi army, considered one of the more reliable institutions in the country and without which a US withdrawal would spell chaos. "You will have to do something about the sucking noise when we leave," said a US officer familiar with the plan.

The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously -- in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of "clear, hold and build." One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces -- the primary focus under the former top US commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. -- toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.

"The revised counterinsurgency approach we're taking now really focuses on protecting those people 24/7 . . . and that competent non-sectarian institutions take the baton from us," said Kilcullen, offering an overview of the campaign plan.

With mounting pressure to "get Afghanistan under control" - and many pundits and politicians advocating an Iraq-like "surge" of US and NATO troops into that country - the formation of a Central Command JSAT is very good news. A critical counterinsurgency lesson learned (and at times unlearned) is one size does not fit all and while a new strategy may include a substantial increase in ground combat forces circumstances warrant a comprehensive approach based on factors peculiar to Afghanistan.

Moreover, JSAT recommendations for Afghanistan must be an integral part of a regional strategy that includes Pakistan and India - as Dr. T.X. Hammes rightly argues in his recent Small Wars Journal blog post - The Good War?

Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. Nor has there been a discussion whether dedicating more resources to Afghanistan is more effective than dedicating different but equivalent resources to support Pakistan. This is despite the fact that 80% of the supplies for the forces we have in Afghanistan come by road directly through one of the least stable parts of Pakistan. In short, if Pakistan destabilizes we probably lose in Afghanistan -- the converse is not true.

Yet, our position in Afghanistan appears to be largely shaping our policy toward Pakistan. And our actions in Pakistan inevitably have a major impact on our relationship with India -- a rising nation destined to be the most important of the three.

We entered Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda's operating forces and eliminate its training bases. We successfully eliminated the bases and hurt Al Qaeda badly. One reason often given for our presence in Afghanistan is that we must stabilize it as a nation so that Al Qaeda can never use it as a terrorist base again. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan. The subsequent conflict inside Pakistan is contributing to increasing instability in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has greatly increased the strain on the Pakistani government.

Before we rush more troops into Afghanistan, we must answer basic questions about our strategy for the region and how our efforts in Afghanistan support that strategy. Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy -- and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy.

While not mentioned by T.X., Iran shares a border and long history with Afghanistan and if recent reporting holds true is increasingly taking an active role in supporting the Taliban.

For additional background on the Iraq JSAT and the issues facing decision-makers in 2007 see The New Yorker's The General's Dilemma by Steve Coll, Newsweek Magazine's Brainiac Brigade by Babak Dehghanpisheh and John Barry, and Dave Kilcullen's posts here at Small Wars Journal (scroll down to 2007 entries).

Philippines Treaty in Question
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/19/2008 - 7:03pm | 0 comments
Philippines Treaty in Question - United States Institute of Peace interview with Eugene Martin.

In the Philippines, the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo recently reached an agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to end decades of conflict by granting self-determination and self-governance to the Moro minority in Moro dominated parts of the southern island of Mindanao. Non-Moro opponents of the concessions challenged the agreement in the Supreme Court. Violence erupted, as some MILF units rampaged and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) struck back. Negotiations to settle the ethnic conflict have ceased.

From 2003 to 2007, Eugene Martin was executive director of USIP's Philippine Facilitation Project, which aimed to further the peace process between the government and the MILF. A retired senior Foreign Service officer, Martin served twice in the Philippines, as deputy chief of mission in 1996--99 and as a political military officer in 1987--90. He now is the director of the Washington Office of Johns Hopkins University's Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies.

Martin's work on the Philippine reconciliation project was summarized in a USIP Special Report (February 2008) and highlighted in a recent National Journal article about USIP.

USIP interview with Eugene Martin on developments in the Philippines.

Losing Afghanistan?
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/19/2008 - 5:36pm | 0 comments
Commentary: Losing Afghanistan? - Arnaud de Borchgrave, United Press International

Is NATO losing the Afghan war, as the Soviet Union did in the 1980s and the British Empire in the 19th century? Notwithstanding NATO and US denials, the answer is affirmative. And abundant evidence is provided in a detailed 113-page report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The author is Anthony Cordesman, CSIS' senior strategic thinker.

The situation in Afghanistan, Cordesman writes, has been deteriorating for the past five years "and is now reaching a crisis level." Both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen have acknowledged that it is now an Afghan-Pakistani conflict "and one lacking in both military and civilian resources. It is also becoming increasingly more deadly for civilians, aid workers, and US and NATO forces."

Titled "Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat," the CSIS report documents "changes in the character of the threat and the rise in Afghan and allied casualties." UN and declassified US intelligence maps detail the steady expansion of threat influence and the regions that are unsafe for aid workers. Other data show how Afghan drug growing has steadily moved south "and become a major source of financing for the Taliban."

The CSIS report shows that the next US president will "face a critical challenge with a war that is probably being lost at the political and strategic level, and is not being won at the tactical level." It is clear why the senior US and NATO commanders in Afghanistan are calling for substantially more troops than Bush decided to deploy this September, and the problems in this briefing are compounded by critical problems in Afghan and Pakistani governance and economic development.

More at United Press International.

Losing The Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat - Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

The situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating for nearly half a decade, and is now reaching a crisis level. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have acknowledged that it is now an Afghan-Pakistan conflict, and one lacking in both military and civilian resources. It is also a war that is becoming increasingly more deadly for civilians, aid workers, and US and NATO forces.

Resurgent Taliban, Haqqani, and HIG forces have turned much of Afghanistan into "no-go" zones for aid workers and civilians. These forces, benefiting from a rise in poppy cultivation and safe havens in the FATA regions of Pakistan, are steadily expanding their capabilities and geographic reach.

This report includes a graphic and map analysis of the fighting in Pakistan, changes in the character of the threat, and the rise in Afghan and allied casualties. UN and declassified US intelligence maps detail the steady expansion of threat influence and the regions that are unsafe for aid workers. Other data show how Afghan drug growing has steadily moved south and become a major source of financing for the Taliban.

It shows that the next President will face a critical challenge in dealing with a war that is probably being lost at the political and strategic level, and is not being won at the tactical level. It is clear why the senior US and NATO/ISAF commanders in Afghanistan are calling for substantially more troops than President Bush decided to deploy this September, and the problems in this briefing are compounded by critical problems in Afghan and Pakistani governance and economic development.

More at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/19/2008 - 1:54pm | 4 comments
Via e-mail (not yet posted to National Defense University's Institute for National Security Studies website) -- Strategic Forum Number 234 - Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations by Patrick M. Cronin.

Key Points:

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience.

Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an "unequal dialogue" between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into "military" affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort.

One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results.

A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier's Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one's superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks.

A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations (Full PDF Article)

Westhawk Review: The Strongest Tribe
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/18/2008 - 1:44pm | 3 comments

Book Review: 'The Strongest Tribe'

By Westhawk - Cross Posted at Westhawk

The Strongest Tribe is Bing West's third book on the Iraq War. It is a capstone volume, covering the conflict from 2003 until the summer of 2008. The book also covers the war from bottom to top, from foot patrols in Iraq's slums to meetings with President Bush and his top advisors at the White House. Although rushed into print (there is no index yet plenty of grammatical errors), I predict that a decade from now, The Strongest Tribe will hold up very well as a history of America's intervention in Iraq.

The Strongest Tribe will hold up well because Bing West may be the single most qualified person on the planet to tell this story. As a young Marine Corps officer in Vietnam, Mr. West personally implemented counterinsurgency doctrine. He later wrote about his experiences at RAND and in his book about Vietnam, The Village. As for the dilemmas faced by the generals and those in the top echelons of the government, Mr. West brings his experience as an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration.

Although the U.S. looks set to achieve its goals in Iraq, it goes without saying that the campaign was a mismanaged, costly, and ultimately Pyrrhic victory. Mr. West spares almost no one from blame: President Bush for abruptly adopting grandiose goals for Iraq in May 2003, but failing to choose the proper leaders and military strategy to achieve those lofty ambitions; Secretary Rumsfeld for tacitly undermining his President by seeking to get out of Iraq as quickly as possible; General George Casey for failing to admit that the Iraqis were unable to assume significant responsibilities as quickly as he had asserted to his superiors; and Prime Minister al-Maliki and virtually all other senior Iraqi officials for either being sectarian zealots, or for being outright thieves...

Iraq's Counterinsurgency College
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/18/2008 - 8:19am | 0 comments
Iraq's Counterinsurgency College - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The US focus in Iraq is fast shifting from fighting a war to preparing for its aftermath.

The cornerstone of the transition is an effort to rehabilitate and release thousands of Iraqi detainees, including many former insurgents. According to the military, there are more than 19,000 Iraqi detainees in American custody, down from 26,000 in November 2007.

The effort, centered in Baghdad and Basra, includes courses in literacy, mathematics and moderate Islamic thought. The military hopes the courses will temper the detainees' religious beliefs and give them the skills to find and hold a steady job.

"The idea is to move from punishment to rehabilitation," said Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, one of the officers leading the push. "It's not enough to simply lock these guys up and hope they somehow turn into productive members of Iraqi society."

Few in the military question the need for the rehabilitation effort, but some wonder whether troops should be leading it. Some officers privately complain the program is turning them into social workers who coddle violent extremists. But few are —to voice those criticisms because the effort is a favored project of Gen. David Petraeus, the former commander of US forces in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus believes the country's stability will be shaped by how well former insurgents are integrated back into Iraqi society. He sees the rehabilitation push as a powerful weapon in that fight...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Conversation with the Country: Maritime Strategy
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/18/2008 - 7:33am | 0 comments
The audio webcast of today's Conversation with the Country will be live on BlogTalkRadio beginning at 0900. Here is some additional information:

Senior Officers from the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard will present the new Maritime Strategy -- "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" - 18 September, from 0900 to 1430. You can follow the discussion live on BlogTalk Radio.

Counterinsurgency Leaders' Workshop
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/17/2008 - 8:12pm | 0 comments

3-7 November 2008 - Counterinsurgency Leaders' Workshop (COIN Workshop). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sponsored by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. This event is a five-day program focused on understanding the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is a version of the same extremely popular workshop offered to hundreds of military and civilian attendees over the past two years. The COIN Center has expanded the number of slots available to compensate for the high demand of previous sessions. The proceedings are UNCLASSIFED and registration is open to all interested US government and allied personnel.

Odierno Succeeds Petraeus (Updated)
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/17/2008 - 1:51pm | 2 comments

Odierno Succeeds Petraeus in Iraq - Thom Shanker and Stephen Farrell, New York Times

In an ornate palace built by Saddam Hussein, the United States military command in Iraq changed hands on Tuesday from Gen. David H. Petraeus, who created the strategy known as the surge, to Gen. Ray Odierno, who oversaw its day-to-day operations across a country in which violence has dropped significantly.

Attending the hourlong transfer ceremony were Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates; Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, acting commander of the Central Command; and senior Iraqi government and military officials. Mr. Gates later traveled on to Kabul, Afghanistan.

In his first, brief comments as commander of the multinational forces in Iraq, General Odierno said, "We must realize that these gains are fragile and reversible, and our work here is far from done."

Formerly the No. 2 commander, he faces the challenge of improving on the hard-earned security gains in Iraq with fewer troops, as the United States begins preparations to withdraw 8,000 troops by early next year. The overall American military presence in Iraq - 15 combat brigades and support and logistics personnel - would then number about 138,000 people.

General Petraeus will soon take over as commander of the American military's Central Command, responsible for military issues across the strategically important crescent that stretches from Pakistan, across Central Asia and the Middle East, and throughout the Persian Gulf, and includes operations in Iraq and also, most notably, the troubled mission in Afghanistan.

More at the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, Voice of America, American Forces Press Service, BBC News and Associated Press.

20 Months in Baghdad - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion

The night before Gen. David Petraeus turned over command here, a group of senior officers gathered at Camp Victory to say goodbye. It was like a football team's testimonial dinner at the end of a winning season: There were steaks and baked potatoes and a highlight film of the general's 20-month command, scored with rock music, called "Surge of Hope."

The signature line of the video was a statement Petraeus made to Congress when he began what seemed to many people like mission impossible: "Hard is not hopeless." That was his closing comment, too, as he relinquished command in an elaborate ceremony yesterday at the gilded Al Faw Palace. But now, he said, Iraq was "still hard but hopeful."

Petraeus did something astonishing here. It wasn't simply managing the "surge" of U.S. troops, whose precise effects military historians will be debating for years. It was that he restored confidence and purpose for a military that had begun to think, deep down, that this war was unwinnable and unsustainable.

By force of will, Petraeus and his president, George W. Bush, turned that around. They didn't win in Iraq, but they created the possibility of an honorable exit.

More at The Washington Post.

A General for Our Times - The Times editorial

Five years ago a youthful US army general, with a PhD in international relations and a name that seemed plucked from Herodotus, led the 101st Airborne Division into Mosul in northern Iraq. He had taken part in a stunning military victory, but failed conspicuously to celebrate. "This is a race to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people," he said. "And there are other people in this race. In some cases, they want to kill us."

General David Petraeus is still not celebrating. But he is leaving Iraq in a state no sober observer would have forecast when he took command of US forces there early last year. He has pacified large parts of a country that had descended into a solar-heated hell of suicide bombings and sectarian carnage. He has salvaged some pride for the US military after Abu Ghraib, and seen himself hailed as America's most trusted and talented commander of the past four decades.

More at The Times.

Update: Multi-National Force - Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance signed by General Odierno dated 16 September 2008. Contains Introduction and sections "How We Think", "How We Operate" and "Who We Are".

The Crossover of Urban Gang Warfare and Terrorism
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/17/2008 - 2:07am | 0 comments
The National Strategy Forum Review has been kind enough to permit SWJ to post an excellent essay by Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA Ret, that will appear in their Fall 2008 edition. A New Threat: The Crossover of Urban Gang Warfare and Terrorism examines a new and - as yet - unnamed national security challenge.

On the 22nd of June of this year, residents of a Phoenix, Arizona, neighborhood saw an eight-man Police SWAT team apparently serving a warrant. Team members were equipped as usual -- black boots, black Kevlar vests and helmets, Phoenix Police Department shirts and low-light laser aiming devices. But the "SWAT" team was actually a Mexican hit squad carrying out a targeted, and successful, assassination of a troublesome drug dealer -- in the United States. When the real cops arrived, one part of the hit team attempted a tactically-proficient ambush of pursuing police, who counter-ambushed and captured three. The others escaped, most likely back into the drug-fueled insurgency now underway in Mexico, where targeted assassination of officials and intimidation of public institutions -- for example, hospitals treating wounded officers -- is increasingly widespread. The Mexican drug war -- and much else besides -- is spilling over our borders, part of a growing nexus of criminal gang activity and terrorism sponsored by Islamist radicals.

A growing body of evidence shows that criminal gang activities in the United States are taking on the characteristics of a domestic insurgency similar, in some ways, to the war going on in Mexico against drug gangs. There is also growing circumstantial evidence of mutual support between the more serious international gangs and state-sponsored terrorism that will soon pose a clear danger to American national security -- if it hasn't already. This isn't just the local punk "gangstas" that are preoccupying our police, educators and parents across America. Nor is it solely an attack by 9/11-style terrorists, either from outside the U.S. or from sleeper cells inside America. Rather it is a new thing -- a potentially murderous combination that is spreading rapidly northward from South and Central America into densely packed American urban centers into suburbia and rural areas. Unless it is checked, and defeated, the United States will be increasingly vulnerable to civil violence and catastrophic attack from within...

A New Threat: The Crossover of Urban Gang Warfare and Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

Clear, Hold, and Hope
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/16/2008 - 5:08am | 0 comments
Progress in Afghanistan Gets Rockier - James Kitfield, National Journal

Lt. Col. Kent Hayes knows all about the blood, sweat, and excruciating effort needed to lay the initial security piece of the counterinsurgency puzzle. The rangy executive officer for the 24th MEU explains that the Marines' original plan to act as a roaming strike force in Helmand had to be torn up after the first battle with the Taliban. The enemy unexpectedly stayed and fought fiercely for more than a week rather than relinquish Garmsir. An estimated 400 insurgents died. Marine commanders immediately realized that the town was a critical resupply and logistics hub for insurgent operations throughout the province.

"Our original mission was to act as a quick-reaction force for the ISAF commander in Kabul so he could throw us at any escalating crisis in this area," Hayes says. But Gen. David McKiernan, the commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, understood the strategic importance of Garmsir and instead ordered the Marines to stay in the town and implement a classic counterinsurgency operation of "clear, hold, and build." Hayes says that his troops are "not normally in the business of owning ground, but I guess you could say we've rented Garmsir for a while."

After clearing the town of insurgents, the marines held it by establishing routine neighborhood patrols to keep the Taliban at bay. The MEU's civil-affairs unit reached out to the district governor, tribal sheiks, and local imams in Garmsir and the surrounding region, organizing the first shura -- or traditional governance council -- that the area had seen in three years. Local leaders were empowered to pick and prioritize development projects.

With improved security, the Red Crescent humanitarian organization moved in with aid for 1,400 displaced families. The marines, using their own money from the Commander's Emergency Response Program, launched small reconstruction projects: digging wells and repairing irrigation canals; delivering medical services; rebuilding damaged homes; even buying a new speaker system for the local mosque.

The Afghan Civilian Assistance Program, which the United Nations and the US Agency for International Development support, started longer-term projects.

Within weeks, an abandoned bazaar reopened and was swarmed with shoppers. By late summer, nearly eight weeks had passed without the 24th MEU having a single contact with Taliban insurgents, whom the locals were increasingly —to identify for the Marines.

Hayes is unequivocal in naming the key to the 24th MEU's success in Helmand province: "It's a real simple concept -- we learned during this mission that the best way to combat this type of enemy is to mass forces and stay. We actually replaced a small British force that was spread thin trying to cover too much ground with too few troops. Instead, we flooded a town that was strategically important to the enemy with overwhelming forces. That's the way you can win this kind of fight -- with boots on the ground."

Much more at The National Journal.

The Good War?
by TX Hammes | Mon, 09/15/2008 - 7:15pm | 3 comments
The Good War?

By TX Hammes

In the last month, both presidential candidates have stated they wish to send more troops to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, neither candidate has stated what he sees as the United States' strategic interests in Afghanistan. Even more dangerous, neither candidate has expressed a strategic framework for the region. Despite increased violence in Pakistan, Musharraf's recent resignation and the collapse of the coalition government, neither candidate has even commented on how our actions may be feeding Pakistan's instability. Their determination to send more troops seems to be based on the idea that Afghanistan is the "good war" than on any thoughtful evaluation of the situation.

This sudden willingness to increase our support for Afghanistan is particularly peculiar since it has largely been our forgotten war. Despite almost seven years of fighting, the administration has still not clearly articulated a strategy and has starved the effort of resources.

In October of 2001, with 9/11 burned into the nation's consciousness, the Bush Administration committed the United States to rooting Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. The nation clearly supported that goal and focused intensely on Afghanistan during the fall and early winter of 2001. However, our attention quickly waned as the active fighting seemed to end. Without ever expressing a change in our strategic goals, the effort in Afghanistan slipped from destroying Al Qaeda to establishing a unified Afghan state. The administration asked the United Nations to help establish a government. Yet, even as that government was being established, the Bush Administration shifted its focus to Iraq. Afghanistan became an under funded, forgotten backwater. Given our much larger investment in Iraq, it is natural the nation's attention remained focused on Iraq from 2003 until today. Despite a near collapse of our position in Afghanistan during late 2003, and its subsequent rebuilding by the team of Ambassador Khalizaid and Lieutenant General Barno, Americans paid little or no attention to events in Afghanistan. In fact, after their departure, most Americans didn't notice a slow but steady degradation of the security situation in Afghanistan...

Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen's Critique of Maneuver Warfare
by Eric Walters | Mon, 09/15/2008 - 3:46pm | 3 comments
See William Owen, "The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," in Small Wars Journal. Also published in August 2008, Vol 153, Vol 4. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal.

As a very minor contributor to a couple of the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication "White Books" outlining Maneuver Warfare and having once been a professor teaching Maneuver Warfare for American Military University, my attention was caught by William F. Owen's piece, "The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," if nothing else than for its catchy title. One might expect it to get a fair amount of visibility due to its controversial thesis. Owen is rightly frustrated with the maneuver warfare concept, especially since he appears to rely on the U.S. Marine Corps publications FMFM-1 and its successor, MCDP-1 Warfighting as the best contemporary articulation. But to characterize the concept as a fraud? A perversion of the truth perpetrated on the U.S. military in order to deceive it? There are indeed difficulties with the maneuver warfare concept, but to label it a fraud seems a bit much. Owen argues that the "the community it was intended to serve" embraced maneuver warfare uncritically. So who is to blame—the advocates who maliciously perpetrated the concept or the U.S. Marine Corps that accepted it so naively and so readily? ...

Petraeus Moves to Even More Complex Challenge
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/15/2008 - 8:14am | 2 comments

Petraeus Moves to Even More Complex Challenge - Al Pessin, Voice of America

The top US commander in Iraq will leave his post Tuesday after a momentous year-and-a-half, during which he is widely credited with reversing a spiral of violence that seemed destined to plunge the country into civil war.

In February of last year, when General Petraeus arrived in Iraq, 81 US troops were killed here. The number rose to a high of 126 last May, as more troops poured in, and the general ordered them out into Iraqi villages and neighborhoods to engage a variety of insurgent groups. These days, the US monthly casualty toll here averages about 20. And there has been a parallel reduction in Iraqi deaths, along with an 85 percent drop in overall violence.

"He took a war that was clearly being lost and turned it around," said retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl. "If I were writing a book on General Petraeus' service over the last 18 months, I would call it "Turnaround."

Nagl, who served in Iraq earlier in the war, and is now an analyst at the Center for a New American Security in Washington.

"His own role, his own vision, his own drive, his own understanding of counterinsurgency led him to implement a new strategy," Nagl added. "He understood that the key to success in any counterinsurgency campaign is protecting the population. That comes first."

It was General Petraeus' first two tours of duty in Iraq that led him to believe a new strategy was needed. In 2006, while running the Army's main analytical unit, he ordered the writing of a new counterinsurgency doctrine. In early 2007, with violence in Iraq seemingly spinning out of control, President Bush ordered General Petraeus to take his new doctrine and put it to work...

Fair Winds and Following Seas - Job Well Done
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 09/14/2008 - 1:06pm | 0 comments
SWJ was very fortunate to have worked with Colonel Steve Boylan, officially and off-line, during his tour as the chief spokesman for General Dave Petraeus at Multi-National Force -- Iraq. Short and sweet -- Steve is the consummate professional and it has been our pleasure, both professionally and personally. Paul Bedard has a short piece up at US News and World Report's Washington Whispers blog on what's next for COL Boylan:

Colonel Steven Boylan, who has been the chief spokesman for Army General David Petraeus since 2006, has declined to travel with the four-star general when he moves from Baghdad to Tampa, Fla., in October to take over the helm of the US Central Command. "The family had a vote, and they voted to stay in Kansas," Boylan tells Whispers. He'll return to Fort Leavenworth, where he first hooked up with Petraeus when the general ran the US Army Combined Arms Center and wrote the new doctrine for defeating an insurgency. Boylan traveled with Petraeus to Baghdad, leaving the family in Kansas.

From SWJ -- thanks Steve and wishing you and yours the best in your next assignment as well as fair winds and following seas wherever your travels may take you.

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A Conversation with Thomas Friedman
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/14/2008 - 12:46pm | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - A conversation with Thomas Friedman about his book Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution--and How It Can Renew America.
By the Numbers
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 09/14/2008 - 11:52am | 0 comments
Sometimes I just have to shake my head and wonder out loud (in this case blog) what the hell are they thinking? In this case the "they" is the readership of Phil Carter's Intel Dump over at The Washington Post.

Intel Dump has always offered up first-rate discussion and analysis on foreign policy and national security issues -- even when you disagree with a particular point of view expressed by Phil or a guest blogger you come away smarter for having read the postings.

Phil is on sabbatical (working on the Obama campaign) but he did manage to reel in an all star lineup of guest bloggers to fill the void -- and that's just what they have been doing -- in spades -- great posts on Iraq and Afghanistan (where we are, how we got there and what we need to do), Bacevich's The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, seapower and power projection, supporting our deployed civilians as well as the military and more. Posts that make you think.

What has me wondering out loud this Sunday morning is these 16 posts garnered a total of 157 comments from Intel Dump readership - and not all of those are exactly on-topic. A 17th posting by Bob Bateman concerning Chuck Norris' appearance on Larry King Live has racked up 189 comments (at 1045).

Have we descended that far into partisan politics and celebrity infatuation? Is public discussion on serious and important issues in these times of dynamic political, foreign policy and national security flux impossible? Judging by these comments maybe it is.

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