Jeremy Gwinn focuses on the "transition" phase of security force assistance in Afghanistan.
Journal
Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
Clausewitz's conception of fog and friction in warfare remains as relevant in ever. Are you prepared to operate in an environment of uncertainty?
To defend her position, 21st Century America and western powers must seek out and create opportunities for advancement. To do this, we must change the way we think.
The insurgents have adapted in their ability to deny space to the adversary; rather than settling to eat soup with a knife they attempt to recast the knife as a spoon.
These powerful criminal organizations leverage their competitive advantage to further corrupt the Afghan government possibly creating an endless cycle of dependency.
Chavez undertook a classical Maoist political campaign on Venezuelan society using the military as his modus operandi
It is essential to understand that everything of importance in Afghanistan happens in the village, not in Kabul, or even at the Provincial headquarters. Historically, Afghanistan has always been driven from the village up, from at least the time of Alexander the Great to the present time.
In today’s environment, the United States conducts security cooperation efforts to build partnerships and partner capacity in an attempt to “further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order.” To prove successful in this strategy, the US Air Force must demonstrate to partner nations how developing a strong aviation enterprise lays the foundation for the economic and security benefits that airpower can provide.
A Neorealist Perspective of Iraq after the American Exit
Limiting the definition of insurgency, can limit the military response
Self-organized civilians' activities against the military in war are neither a theoretical assumption nor NEW in history. Today and tomorrow, armies will have to contend with the phenomena.
How do you ensure you have the right amount of junior leaders (rank of sergeant to major) where you need them, when you need them?
As the withdrawal of US and allied forces continues, the post-2014 allied manning and assistance levels in Afghanistan have yet to be defined. The absence of a plan, inadequate media coverage, and our upcoming presidential election have created ambiguity, confusion, and drift, harming the war effort and giving comfort to our adversaries.
A Case Study of the American Experience in Iraq in the Pillar of Justice
Policy analysts question conceptual failure (ends), intellectuals want to know why, and the analysis of organizational and operational lessons learned (ways and means), will shape outcomes for years.
Kaplan builds a case for the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and its perimeter states as the new geopolitical center of the developing world
Uribe COIN model: Interview with Dr. Thomas A. Marks
Leading thinking about counterinsurgency misses the relevance of religious freedom.
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan – What is Being Done Wrong and What Could be Done Better
Non-Commissioned Officer's masters thesis
I place the Libyan Civil War of Liberation within the ambit of 2011 Arab Spring; broadly as a refurbished sprig of Arab people’s movement against their respective autocratic state regimes.
Leveraging technology, the US could create networks allowing for unprecedented intelligence collection as well as widespread and immediate distribution of information
The civil war is in full swing and Iran is driving it—it all goes back to the “Green Cresent” and the old “Silk Road”
The Gentile-Nagl Debate is nothing new in military history
The Troops Need Napalm and Flamethrowers
A response to Shane Bilsborough's Counterlawfare in Counterinsurgency
In times of austerity, the military's best investment is in its people: education, selection, and promotion of talent.
Regardless of what the current US administration and Senior Military Officers claim, we lost the peace in Iraq.
Many areas of interest to the United States today were former Ottoman dominions like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, even Libya. Understanding the mechanics of this former empire is crucial to comprehending the nuances of the region.
A counterinsurgency strategy based on the now-famous Field Manual 3-24, written under the auspices of then-LTGs David Petraeus and James Mattis in 2006, is inappropriate for Mexico.
Opinion polls in Afghanistan cover issues as diverse as the legitimacy of the Karzai regime, the use of suicide attacks, the appropriateness of female education, and the adequacy of the health systems.
The lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem
Recent budget debates have featured emotional discussions about reforming the military retirement system. This is not a new phenomenon; there have been more than a dozen official studies on reforming military retirement since 1948.
Drones and special forces get the headlines, but pundits have missed a more fundamental shift in the nature and direction of American national security policy.
Bing West, John Nagl, Mark Moyar, Thomas Mockaitis, Christopher Paul, Douglas Ollivant, Gian Gentile, and David Anderson share their views
For Whom will the American Military Fight if our Governmental System is Challenged?
Dust off the plans from 2009, Here is a "Way" to Organize for the Transition Mission
International legal institutions, media outlets, human rights NGO’s should be leveraged to the US advantage as part of a focused and coherent counterlawfare strategy.
The book is not doctrine. It invites those interested in influencing the outcome of ‘internal’ armed conflicts to weave together ideology, politics, methodology, intelligence practices, operations, and strategy as seamlessly as possible
Should we continue to embrace the status quo, we will jeopardize our ability to achieve the aims of our current National Security Strategy
Retired Indian General and Small Wars Council extraordinaire Ray visits to talk all things India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
Targeting Maoist-affected areas with increased funding and attention is probably good policy, but it is likely not an overstatement to say anti-Maoist success will correlate significantly with India’s progress in caring for its poorest peoples.
The government of India has proclaimed this Naxalite – Maoist movement to be the greatest threat to national security. This may become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
Spanish translation of Urban Land Use by Illegal Armed Groups in Medellin
We collect lessons learned, but do we learn from the lessons collected?
A review of Sylvia Longmire's work on Cartels
We are woefully under-trained. The troops can absorb and do far more than we tend to credit them. Our training is mostly designed to be easy on the trainers and to produce metrics