Journal

Naiveté clouded the lens through which they viewed military power.

A Maoist approach may have produced a more politically meaningful victory with less brutality in the First Congo Civil War.

How the Pentagon resisted change and needed disruption to enact life-saving programs in the face of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

How "Design" was used in shaping a the way ahead in Afghanistan.

To understand and address the tensions between “winning the present and winning the future” a joint force capable of “deep thinking” is required.

A look back at al Qaeda after 10 years of war.

Key bureaucratic and analytical challenges for the deployed threat finance analyst and the larger community of deployed all-source intelligence analysts

Will Mexico’s admittance into the Trans-Pacific Partnership create an even more empowered global criminal network?

Without a more unified and coercive strategy from the international community, Assad will likely remain in power for the immediate future. 

Stemming from his must-read book, an important discussion about Helmand, Kandahar, and America's flawed attempt to save Afghanistan.

A Foucauldian approach to military history exposes 4GW as a crock.

An interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Schaefer, the author of  “The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad.”

When it comes to their old strategy of “zero problems with neighbors,” Turkey’s worst foreign policy headache might not be Syria...

Holding and building in pop-centric COIN.

The doctrine for wargaming during COA analysis falls short for small wars.

To implement mission command successfully, a shared understanding of the environment, problem, and strategic intent must exist with echelons above and below.

Harnessing the Disruptive Mind of the entrepreneur and investor with
the System Mind of the military and government at the tactical and
strategic level of special operations.

Using visual media to disrupt insurgent formation.

China's struggle with the Uyghur minority.

COIN, organizational culture, and leadership - how they have interplayed in Afghanistan over the past several decades.

The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensible partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (

We have no more real control over conflict (or the universe) than anyone else, in fact, sometimes we now have less.  If we cannot control, we must adapt.

R2P, its historical roots, applications, and its confrontation with the "wicked" problems in Libya and Syria.

Mexico’s war against their drug cartels is a war they cannot win by themselves. Must we take some responsibility?

As sanctions bite and pressure mounts on Assad, Iran steps up its involvement in Iraqi affairs. But how extensive is their influence?

The Army is a learning organization, but it must avoid learning mumbo-jumbo.

The inside story of 9/11 and the war against al Qaida.

Afghans generally haven't seen the latest episode of How I Met Your Mother, but they would love to talk to you about the great things their male relatives are doing, their crops, how their goats are doing, the weather, and their favorite decorations on their jingle truck.

Population-centric counterinsurgency?

How operational planners applied military design to a wicked problem set in Afghanistan.

A worthwhile read on Pakistan from the Washington Post's Pamela Constable.

The Lebanese Armed Forces are the strongest institution for national unity.  We should assist them to grow stronger in this mission.

A direct action case study from World War II.

Pop-centric COIN - where from and where to?

In the first of several installments, we take a look at Iranian and Hizballah activities in Latin America.

On Memorial Day, read a tale of significant sacrifice.

Haste makes waste - or how not to push Yemen over the cliff.

Wells?!  No its all ball bearings and aquifer storage and recovery systems now!

Dan Ward asserts that acquisitions take too long.  But no one knows if he is right.

The first part in a series of interviews of leading lights on Iraq and its environs.

Back to the basics of deterrence, diplomacy, and defense to address potential nation-state employment of unconventional weapons?

CDR Aboul-Enein reviews Martin Evans' book.

Should we focus more on creating ink spots and less on defeating the Taliban?

The perhaps-unsurprising second- and third-order effects of VSO and ALP.

A look at the issues behind the use of private security contractors.

Andrew Attar adds to his March article on the operational approach to stability operations.

Criminalization is as much or more of a concern than radicalization in the Syrian conflict.

Clausewitz and non-state actors - a combination that surely won't produce any disagreements, will it?

Capturing the investor's mindset in special operations.

An interview with Daniel R. Green, who served at the PRT in Uruzgan in 2005-2006 and in Kabul from 2009-2010.