Journal

by CPT Nils French, Small Wars Journal

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Insurgency has historically presented a significant security challenge and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Insurgents typically choose to operate from within a population and for this reason it is the human element that has had and will continue to have the most considerable impact on their operations and the operations that counter them. In The Tipping Point, bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell combines research from several disciplines to give incredible insight into the unusual and counterintuitive principles of the human element. He does this by exploring social epidemics; occasions where ideas, messages, and behaviors spread like viruses. The principles of social epidemics can be applied to business growth, crime rates, fashion trends, and other social phenomena. Because of the common human element, the concepts are equally applicable in an insurgency setting. It is universally acknowledged that insurgents work to spread their ideas and messages and promote certain behaviors within a population. Those wishing to counter them must do the same. Three principles can be employed in concert to ensure such efforts see results. First, the proper environment must be established and maintained. Second, the manner in which information is presented must be very carefully tuned to the population. And third, the right people must be carefully selected to spread the information. Precise requirements that address the peculiarities of human behavior, none of them obvious or intuitive, are given for each method and explained. This paper will show how these principles relate to counterinsurgency. Each principle will be placed in the context of insurgency and ideas and recommendations will be presented that are immediately relevant to contemporary security challenges.

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by MAJ Aaron Bazin, Small Wars Journal

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If strategy is difficult, it is only because those who ponder and execute strategy have made it that way. In an attempt to kill enemies in unclear ways, the strategic use of force has become muddled. Today, the lexicon of American strategic thought has become a mix of technologically enabled micromanagement, restrictions that ensure a healthy dose of gridlock, and constant political "blame-storming". With a Nostradamus-like mix of art, science, and conjecture, modern strategy is lukewarm at best. To the soldier, the use of force is simple, kill, if you have to, so you can come back home alive in 15 months. Why is the use of force so complicated to strategic thinkers?

Strategy must be translated through the levels of theater-strategic, operational, and countless other bureaucratic filters to be understood by American Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. Strategy must be one thing; simple. It must be so, not only to communicate to the military what to do, but tell the American people what the military is doing (that ever-important part of Clausewitz's secondary trinity) and finally, to make the enemy understand that until they capitulate all they will experience is death, political failure, and economic ruin. Strategy should be a situationally applied tool that uses violence and the other elements of national power to adjust an international actor's behavior so that it falls into concert with international norms.

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By CPT Justin Gorkowski, Small Wars Journal

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In the battle for the support of the population, it is not the capture of the Zarqawis or the Bin Ladens that will defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Nor is it the cordon and search of the villages that have had their doors kicked in by every coalition force rotation over the past four years. The solutions are much more complex and much further out of the conventional mindset. The current threat is extremely unique, making it impossible to use a stenciled approach in applying large scale solutions developed in other insurgencies throughout history. What we can do is take the knowledge, experience and tools we possess, and immerse ourselves in the current situation, developing new methods and tools that are effective in defeating a known threat. One staple in an insurgency is the role of the population, and counterinsurgents must apply that knowledge to all actions and inactions. A method that effectively gains popular support in one geographic area may actually be counter-productive in another due to fundamental differences in the ways of life. Many factors contribute to the way people think and feel. Counterinsurgents cannot fully develop techniques that will affect thought and emotion unless they are immersed in the situation. Counterinsurgents need small unit leaders with the mental capacity and agility to think on their own to develop solutions not found in field manuals. They must be adaptive and continually reexamine the insurgent and population to be most successful in developing methods that are effective in defeat.

This article does not attempt to provide a solution to fight the insurgency in Iraq. It does provide insight on successful methods that can be applied to the current situation. An insurgency's success is fundamentally based on its level of popular support. The counterinsurgent's success is therefore intertwined with the limitation of the insurgent support base. Critical to the attainment of popular support for counterinsurgents is the presence of non-lethal effects. Non-lethal effects can simply be defined as the results of all actions that are not designed to kill. Primary contributors are civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations. Efforts must focus on effecting how people think and how counterinsurgent actions or inactions affect those thoughts.

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Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman's Terms

by Captain Craig Coppock, Small Wars Journal

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There are many books, manuals, and articles that define strategies and principles for counterinsurgency (COIN) success. No one author is completely right and no one is completely wrong; they all have great information and tools to add to your arsenal. This document is not a complete lesson on counterinsurgency theory and strategy, but is rather a collection of counter-insurgent and counter-guerrilla techniques that the author believes are relevant to the current fight in Iraq. This paper is written with an intended primary audience of Rifleman through Platoon Leader, though the information is applicable to company-level leadership as well. Remember that these are only techniques learned by one Infantry platoon in a specific place (central Iraq) at a specific time (June '06 to Sept '07). The decision to adopt and implement these techniques is entirely yours. However, using techniques specifically aimed at counter-insurgency and counter-guerilla warfare is critical to supporting your Commander's greater strategy. While it is true that every AO is different, the overarching COIN principles will apply anywhere. You just have to figure out the finer tactical means of employing them; and that is where this paper will help you out.

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by Paul Smyth

Small Wars Journal Magazine

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The recent Iraqi military operation in Basra has generated much speculation in media and commentary circles, but without access to classified sources it is extremely difficult to accurately judge what has been happening in Basra and why. Even attempts to draw on Iraqi sources or anonymous quotes from within the Coalition do not eradicate confused or contradictory reporting. Hence, some commentators will claim that the targets of the Iraqi security clampdown in Basra are the criminal and Iranian sponsored 'Special Groups' that plague the city, while others will equally assert that it is the militia followers of Moqtada Al Sadr which are being attacked in order to weaken his power base ahead of provincial elections.

Whether the subject in view is the motive behind the operation, its timing and conduct, the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias, the role of Iran or the relative effect the operation is having on the standing of the various protagonists, there is no consensus of opinion which reigns supreme.

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by Stephen Phillips

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In the summer of 2003, IED attacks in Iraq increased dramatically with the emerging insurgency. A group of intelligence, law enforcement, and explosive experts responded, forming the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell -- CEXC.

After removal of the Hussein regime an IED insurgency began led by al--Zarqawi and the remnants of the Al Ghafiqi Project, IED assassins from Iraq's former intelligence body -- the Mukbarat. This marked a dramatic increase in IED incidents in the summer of 2003. As one of JSOC's EOD assets, DiGuardo was sent into the fray to respond. He arrived in Baghdad with the intention of developing counter-IED CONOPS and TTPs. Shortly after arriving, DiGuardo found a group already working to address the IED problem. It was a conglomeration of British and American, civilian and military, EOD technicians and intelligence analysts. Though from different backgrounds, each member possessed the imagination and foresight to realize that a counter-IED effort would take the fight to the terrorists. Beyond realizing the need, these men each had the initiative to address it. They formed a cell, not unlike that of their nemeses.

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An Ongoing Case Study in Militia Based Insurgency

by CPT Michael Comstock

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Shi'a militias fought for, and in many cases, won significant territory in Baghdad's southwestern districts of West Rasheed by seizing neighborhoods of mixed sectarian composition, cleansing them of "undesirables," consolidating their gains to fund future expansion, and utilizing explosively formed penetrators (EFP) to target US forces. Being able to effectively identify this type of activity before it has progressed too far is essential. In these contested areas, the primary militia in question is the notorious Jaesh al'Mahdi (JAM), a Shi'a paramilitary organization affiliated with the junior cleric Moqtada al'Sadr. There are, however, several other militias operating in Baghdad; two noteworthy examples are the Shi'a Badr Corps and the Sunni dominated Al'Qaeda in Iraq. Over the course of Iraq's regime change transformation since 2003, Shi'a militias have been continuously working to capture the prize of Iraq: control of Baghdad.

This paper seeks to focus on a handful of West Rasheed's districts creating a microcosm case study that emphasizes how a militia operates in an insurgency. Through the benefit of hindsight, extensive open source reporting and a variety of personal experiences, these militia activities will be highlighted and examined.

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The Break Point: AQIZ Establishes the ISI in Zaganiyah

by CPT James Few

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Upon my arrival in Iraq in August 2006, Zaganiyah appeared to be a potentially shining example of democratization; a relatively peaceful, heterogeneous mixture of Sunnis and Shias, a robust security force consisting of both local police and Iraqi Army (ISF), and an adequate government representation in both the local Nahiya (County) and Diyala Provisional Councils (GOI). Furthermore, population samples indicated thriving economic metrics, moderate religious leaders, and marginal but improving essential services (A/5-73 Recon Operational Summary, August 2006).

Yet, in the shadows of this overtly optimistic US perspective, a storm of epic proportions brewed as tribal and sectarian differences clashed outside of the Coalition Forces' (CF) purview. By March 2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ), through a series of tactical political and military moves, consolidated control of Zaganiyah governing under the auspices of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a shadow government created as an alternative solution to the US-backed Shia government of Prime Minister Maliki.

AQIZ established its zone of control, effectively killing or displacing 5,000 Shia residents, dissolving the Iraqi Government presence, instituting an Islamic government, and implementing Shar'iah law.

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What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism

by Clinton Watts

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Recent information on foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan provides an updated picture of future terrorist threats to Western interests. Based on newly-released detainee data from Guantanamo and foreign fighter records captured in Iraq, we can now more precisely identify trends in al-Qa'ida recruiting. Although the data tells us little about fighting inside Iraq and Afghanistan, it reveals a great deal about the modern Sunni mujahid who fights as a volunteer in Middle East conflicts.

In addition to informing the profile of al-Qa'ida's foot soldiers, the data suggests alternative techniques for countering the organization and its foreign fighter recruits in North Africa and the Middle East. This study, which will be released serially, examines the asymmetric nature of foreign fighter recruitment, the utility of smuggling networks for counterterrorism, varying motivations for martyrdom, and trends for future terrorism analysis with the drawdown of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Nothing follows.

By LTC Craig Collier

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From September 2005 to September 2006 my brigade deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. Most of our time was spent in Salah-ad-Din Province, part of the "Sunni Triangle" north of Baghdad. The brigade's mission was to defeat the insurgency and create the conditions for a successful Iraqi democracy. The latter part of the mission involved working along all of our lines of operation to assist and train the Iraqi Security Forces, establish a working government and improve the local economy.

We can still achieve victory in Iraq in spite of the dramatic rise in violence and public dissatisfaction with our progress. However, we need an honest assessment of why 2006 was such a disappointing year and apply those lessons. From my perspective, we had too much faith in economic incentives and too little confidence in combat operations as a means to lower the level of violence. We didn't fully recognize the powerful influence of money on Iraqi behavior and hence did not do enough to address the corruption which fueled the insurgency. Finally, we had too many Soldiers and contractors whose presence in Iraq was more burdensome than helpful.

The Army's new Field Manual (FM) 3-24, "Counterinsurgency" accurately states that an insurgency "...is a shifting 'mosaic war' that is difficult for counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent whole." 1 My observations may be significantly different from what others experienced in other parts of Iraq at different times, but I believe that they are at least common to what leaders in my brigade experienced in our area of operations during our year in Iraq.

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(Understanding the Role of Ideology in Insurgency)

by Colonel Robert Jones

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To date far too much focus has been placed on the nature of the specific (though ever changing) ideology espoused by Bin Laden, and also on the aggrandized, almost mystical, value assessed to the role of ideology in insurgency in general, and for the Global War on Terrorism in particular. To take the position that ideology is the strategic center of gravity (source of all strength and power) of this, or any, insurgency shows a lack of understanding of both the concept of centers of gravity and the nature of insurgency. This is a topic for an entire book in of itself, so this paper will merely address a few key points on the narrower topic of the role of ideology in insurgency.

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by Lazar Berman

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The North was burning. It was the summer of 2006, and I was a young lieutenant in the newest company of recruits in the Bedouin Scout Battalion 585. Our soldiers had been inducted four months earlier, and the company staff was involved in a two-day workshop on the coast of Netanya after successfully guiding the soldiers through basic training. The workshop was run by two women, organizational consultants brought in from the civilian sector. I sat astounded. The other commanders were deliberately misrepresenting the situation in the company. I struggled to understand why they were un—to face our problems and improve themselves and their soldiers. The answer became clear to me as the workshop progressed, and has served me as a paradigm for understanding Arab culture.

The 585 is the only unit of its kind in Western militaries. Its soldiers come almost exclusively from Israel's Arab communities. The majority of soldiers and almost all of the officers' corps come from Israel's sizeable Bedouin minority. There is a large number of Muslim Arabs who are not Bedouin, called Felahim, as well several Christian Arabs. The only non-Arabs are the occasional Circassian, and Jewish officers transferred in to fill command positions when the battalion lacks the manpower to do so.

I was the only Jew in my company. Upon completing the eight month Officers School in February 2006, I requested a position in the 585. I had done my basic training on the same base as their recruits, and had several Bedouin friends from various courses we had completed together. I admired the battalion's singular mission and its soldiers' bravery, and I saw an opportunity to discover a new facet of Israeli society while instructing young Arab Israelis who had volunteered for service. Naí¯ve, maybe, but to me this was real Zionism.

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by COL David Maxwell

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America's New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm

by Jonathan Morgenstein & Eric Vickland

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by Dr. David A. Anderson

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Enduring Counterinsurgency Imperatives

by LTC Robert M. Cassidy

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An Economic Model of Terrorism & Insurgency

by 1stLt John A. Sautter

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AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM

by COL Philip Lisagor

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Consider the Soviet Lessons in Afghanistan

by MAJ Daniel S Morgan

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British Strategic Planning and Operations in Central Asia, 1917-1919

by Frederick Dotolo, PhD

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by Major David L. Peeler, Jr.

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by Greg Mills & Terence McNamee

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Marine Corps Organizational Culture and Adaptation to Cultural Terrain

by Maj Ben Connable

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by LtCol Robert R. Scott

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Collateral Damage and Counterinsurgency Doctrine

by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

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