Journal

Review of Chris Dalby's "CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico's Deadliest Cartel" by SWJ−El Centro Senior Fellow John P. Sullivan.

This article examines the role that the Mexican military has played in combating drug trafficking, organized crime, and violence. It highlights the security policies and utilization of the military during the Felipe Calderón and Peña Nieto administrations. While President Andrés Manuel López Obrador criticized the militarization of the drug war, he created a national guard, which consist primarily of the military, and deployed them to strategic locations. The article then examines the public opinion data, which shows the high levels of trust in the military. It then turns to regression analysis based to analyze factors that may influence trust in the military. Ultimately, this article concludes that the military remains better trusted than other institutions, but the armed forces have been overutilized in recent decades for a litany of internal security issues.

What is the influence of Colombian organized crime in Ecuador’s Armed Conflict? Building on the concepts of post-insurgencies and border effect, this paper assesses the security crisis in Ecuador by studying criminal learning and subcultures among Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs). While analysts and pundits often highlight the impact of Colombia’s criminal world in the Ecuadorian context, few fathom it. Focusing on the trajectories of CAGs, the paper gathers different lessons resulting from Colombian counterinsurgency over the years and what they mean to Ecuador. The paper zooms in on the criminal learning between CAGs in borderland regions of Nariño (Colombia) and Esmeraldas (Ecuador). It argues that criminal learning is fundamental in how Ecuadorian CAGs, particularly Tiguerones, understand and engage in criminal wars. Furthermore, Tiguerones’ case shows how subculture and symbolic power remain important in post-insurgencies and criminal learning. The authors use official data from law enforcement and secondary information from Colombia and Ecuador.

On January 17th, 2024, the United States redesignated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). In the weeks that have followed, the United States has become increasingly active in the Gulf, shooting down Houthi drones and striking Houthi targets in Yemen. Given the United States’ increasing involvement with the Houthis, this paper seeks to review the conflict to evaluate both the insurgent and counterinsurgent performance to date. In this evaluation, I argue that not only does the insurgency possess key indicators of success, but the counterinsurgency’s weaknesses debilitate the possibility for success.

This commentary summarizes the author’s keynote address to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) FY26-30 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy Review and Panel Discussions and Conference at the Pentagon, Washington, DC on 8 May 2024. The POM Review was chaired the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy, in the Office for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoD. The author is Executive Director of the International Coalition Against Illicit Economies (ICAIE).

The shadow of Chinese military aggression looms large over Taiwan. While the island nation has invested in conventional military capabilities, the reality is that a conflict with China could be a classic David and Goliath scenario. To effectively deter an invasion and resist occupation, if necessary, Taiwan needs to move beyond its traditional military focus and embrace a multi-layered defense strategy that includes insurgency and resistance.

Last year, an authorization for the use of force against Mexican cartels was introduced in Congress. Several senior US politicians, including a presidential candidate, have advocated for military strikes against criminal actors involved in trafficking fentanyl. What if the United States engaged in unilateral military action in Mexico? In Blackjack, an American working covertly against criminal organizations finds himself trapped when US drones begin engaging cartel targets. He struggles to reach the US−Mexico border as the bilateral situation deteriorates and chaos erupts around him. Blackjack is a work of “useful fiction” as described by August Cole and PW Singer. It brings together an engaging story with research to provide a glimpse of a near future scenario.

In Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States, Dr. Mara Karlin presents a comparative case study of four United States Government (USG) attempts to strengthen partner militaries’ internal defense. Building Militaries opens with a summary of the Islamic State’s defeat of the Iraqi Army in 2014 after the USG trained the Iraqi Army for ten years and provided $20B in assistance. This scene-setter underscores Karlin’s assessment that the USG’s traditional approach of throwing resources and training at fragile states to shore up those states’ internal defense is not working.

On Monday, 22 April 2024 two paramedics in Celaya, Guanajuato were killed when alleged members of a criminal armed group (CAG) attacked ambulances believed to be linked to their rivals. This attack included armed assault and arson. It occurred during a spike in violence between rival criminal cartels. The violent surge also included fatal attacks on police. 

This opinion piece by SWJ−El Centro Fellow Robert Muggah and transnational organized crime scholar Rajeev Gunnar looks at surging criminal violence and gang proliferation in the Caribbean.

The purpose of this paper is to examine foreseeable patterns of social infrastructure collapse, as brought on by severe resource shortage, and to provide a perspective of the subsequent effects upon the nKorean administrative and political systems.  This paper will discuss general, baseline political consequences resulting from these shortages, and link these consequences to a framework of phases leading to the collapse of the nKorean administrative and political systems. This examination employs assessments based in structure-functionalism analyses of the nKorean administrative system coupled with behavioral analyses of historical Korean socio-political patterns (though the details of those analyses are not included in this paper). This paper will avoid discussion of war except as a calculated alternative to prevent irreparable fracture to the nKorean political system, which would be perceived by the current leadership as the end of their regime.

The "Battle of the Straits" catalyzes a new era in international relations as the great powers realize that a prolonged conflict would lead to mutual economic destruction and global destabilization. It prompts a comprehensive reassessment of foreign policy and the introduction of the "3D+C Integrated Statecraft Solutions" approach—an amalgamation of Diplomacy, Development, Defense, and Commerce to address the complex challenges posed by compound maritime insecurity.

This essay by assess potential regional and global responses to current ISIS-K activities.

This near-future vignette posits a scenario where maritime chokepoints become the stages for a new brand of warfare—a conflict fought in the shadows, where the weapons are as likely to be cyber as they are to be traditional arms. It underscores the fragility of global trade networks and the precariousness of geopolitics in a multipolar world where strategic waterways have become the chessboard for Great Power confrontation.  ]

Challenges to maritime security, especially in choke points like the Red Sea, threaten global trade and present complex, ‘compound security’ issues. These challenges include military threats to navigation that affect energy supplies, economic stability, and efforts to address climate insecurity issues, and especially through energy transition. The United States' Operation Prosperity Guardian seeks to safeguard the waters of the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb strait but has had limited success. Current military and diplomatic strategies are inadequate to fully protect these vital economic lifelines, hence the need for a multifaceted "3D+C" approach—combining Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Commercial strategies.

This research note examines the kidnapping and murder of former Venezuelan military officer, Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda by suspected members of the Tren de Aragua gang in Chile.

SWJ−El Centro Associate reviews "Frontera: a journey across the US-Mexico Border" by Sergio Chapa and Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera.

F-16s will soon be arriving in Ukraine.   That is publicly available information.  What is not known, is what armaments packages they will bring- what rockets, missiles, electronic warfare, navigation systems and bombs they will carry.  We have, in the past, sent in weapons platforms with the suboptimal weapons for the Ukrainian mission, and we should not make that mistake again with the F-16s. 

Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) is expanding its reach into Chile. The group, also known in English, as the First Capital Command is reportedly consolidating its expansion into Chile. This expansion is triggering intense political debate in Chile as the Chilean state seeks to come to terms with transnational organized crime’s impact on the local criminal ecosystem and challenges state capacity to address globalized gangs.

USMA: The latest public relations debacle is taking “Duty, Honor, Country” out of the school’s mission statement. 

Book Review Essay by SWJ−El Centro Intern Zachary Z. Horsington on "Climate Change, Conflict, and (In)Security: Hot War." This review essay provides an in-depth examination of this essential book on the critical implications of climate conflict and security.

Mission Command was made in America. While the formal term Mission Command was not coined until 2003, it has been in practice throughout American military history.  Three core tenets of Mission Command are Commander’s Intent, Mutual Trust, and Common Understanding. In essence: Commanders communicate intent; subordinates must understand this intent and then determine how it is best accomplished. A bedrock of mutual trust bolsters and strengthens relationships between commanders and subordinates, and optimizes the execution of commander’s intent on the battlefield. According to Army doctrine, “Mission command is the approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.”  Mission Command is how the Joint Force grants agency to the lowest appropriate echelon.

Due to the decisions of our elected leadership America of 2024 is more vulnerable to outside conventional and unconventional attack than it has been in over 200 years.  We’re also in a position where the possibility of conflict with nations who can conventionally and unconventionally attack us grows greater with each passing year.  Our open borders, inattention to the illegal alien invasion and inability to monitor our own Western Hemisphere neighbors effectively could cost us hugely, both as open highway for terrorists to attack us and an open flank for enemy nations to exploit.  We (the US) need to fix this, fast.

In August of 2023, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) updated its 2021 study, "Breaking Barriers: Women in Army Special Operations."1 According to an Army News Service article, the study "outlined 42 recommendations... to better address obstacles facing female Soldiers serving in special operations units and to retain its top talent," and its "findings will guide USASOC in optimizing female warfighters while noting their physical and anatomical differences." The study's focus group responses highlighted "equipment fitting, childcare, gender bias, social support, sexual harassment, pregnancy and postpartum, and morale and wellbeing." According to the USASOC commander, Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga, "Although disappointed by some of the findings and comments in the study, we are committed to addressing these issues with candor and transparency."

Organized crime groups (OCGs) in Mexico are some of the most violent and sophisticated active criminal cells. The conflict with the Mexican state, commonly understood to have begun in 2006, has resulted in approximately 400,000 casualties. The focus of this research is the discourse produced by Mexico’s OCGs. The tropes within the discourse projected by these groups present an ominous threat to the legitimacy of the Mexican state. OCGs operate, largely, in the rural areas of Mexico, those with populations that have been, in their eyes, long forgotten by the central government. These groups establish a discourse in which the state is weak, corrupt, and a distant outsider in their communities. Further, the populations of these regions should invest their trust and loyalties to the OCG rather than the state. This paper utilizes available theoretical frameworks to trace the parameters of OCG discourse to better understand how it functionally serves these groups and how it serves to undermine the legitimacy of the Mexican state. In doing so, this paper draws on the teachings of several scholars of the region from various diverse backgrounds. This paper also utilizes data collected from several organizations measuring the mood of the Mexican people surrounding their relationship with their government. Finally, this paper uses available examples of discourse through the works of prominent journalists who work in Mexico. This paper concludes that while these groups do not have a direct objective to replace the state, the discourse they produce to legitimize their activities is expansive in scope and successfully devalues the popular perception of the state.

The Ukraine war which the Russians so ill-advisedly began two years ago has been fascinating to watch.  Not only for the emergence of new technologies and methods of warfighting but for the sheer grit, determination, and imagination of the Ukrainians in successfully (to a point) fending off their much larger Russian adversaries.  The Russians on the other hand put lie to their pre-war claims that they were professionalizing their military by conducting an invasion that looked far more like their ham-handed interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the 1950s and 1960s than the Red Army’s textbook 1945 campaigns in Germany and Manchuria.  For a time, it seemed to many observers (not all of whom were untrained) that the Ukrainians might be able to pull off a complete battlefield victory and eject the Russians from their country entirely.  Unfortunately, that optimism perished in the dense minefields north of Tokmak this past summer.  The fronts have been frozen (literally and figuratively) for months now, while each side girds itself for the spring.

Recently, and tragically, a case study has unfolded illustrating this modern variant of warfare: Hamas’ attack on Israel. While Hamas certainly used conventional military capabilities in the attack, it was also able to innovate and greatly undercut traditional military development cycle times by using commercial technologies. On October 7, Hamas launched a horrific attack across the Israeli border. The attack contradicted Hamas’ earlier claims that it did not deliberately target civilians. A key part of this attack was based on commercial technology – commercially available drones, pickup trucks, bulldozers, motorcycles, and ATVs – or improvised technology like homemade rockets, combined with widely available military munitions, explosives, and firearms. 

Book Review of Deborah Bonello's "Narcas: The Secret Rise of Women in Latin America’s Cartels" by SWJ−El Centro Senior Fellow Dr. Nathan P. Jones.

56 years ago, I was sitting behind a newly ploughed berm at the Xuan Loc Airfield literally repelling hordes of VC as they attempted to storm the city.  I was the senior advisor to the 52d Vietnamese Ranger Bn and had just been introduced to the Tet Offensive.

This paper puts forward the thesis that the concept of “Too-Big-To-Fail” functions as a cover for the impunity conferred to financial elites in the United States in cases that also involve transnational organized crime, such as drug trafficking activities and drug-related violence. The authors illustrate their argument by examining the case of the HSBC bank (2012), in which no entity or person suffered a federal conviction for extensive criminal conduct for banking/financial violations that facilitated money laundering by Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations. In Mexico, these criminal enterprises seek political protection through the bribery of public officials. By explaining this case, the authors demonstrate the futility of protecting big banks in related circumstances, and note that larger banking institutions have indeed failed without precipitating a collapse of the economy. The authors conclude with recommendations for reforms to the penalties typically applied in these types of cases facilitating money laundering of criminal groups.

The cluster munitions narrative needs to change if we are to successfully deter Russia and China.  Artillery has long been the #1 killer on land battlefields, as it is in Ukraine.  While aircraft carriers, fighters, UAVs, cyber, electronic warfare, and hypersonic missiles are of course important, the Ukraine war brings into focus the importance of artillery, and especially cluster munitions, for the future deterrence of our enemies in a land war.  Cluster munitions were one of the main pillars of our Air-Land Battle defense plan against a massive Russian army with significant fire superiority in artillery, and deterrence worked from 1945-1991, when the Soviet Union finally collapsed.  But cluster munitions have disappeared from the literature on great power deterrence. 

From a serving officer in the Ukraine military. The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in Ukraine across various domains: in the air (ACC), on land (LCC), at sea (MCC), in cyberspace (Cyber), and in space (Space). The aim is to fully understand the current situation and predict its medium-term development within the framework of applying NATO principles. An additional task involves identifying the 'Centre of Gravity (COG),' a crucial aspect that often receives insufficient attention in contemporary operational planning and combat strategies.The aim of this study is to conduct a critical evaluation of the current security situation in the most threatening areas of the front to achieve a realistic understanding and to propose measures for its improvement. Acquiring a thorough awareness of the situation during the period of russian aggression is crucial for identifying correct priorities in neutralizing the enemy's offensive potential by the military-political leadership of Ukraine. This approach also allows for consideration of the genuine challenges faced by the civilian population.

As the Russia-Ukraine War wages on, Turkey’s balancing position between Russia and Ukraine becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. Following the May 2023 presidential elections in Turkey, which secured his third term as president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan initiated significant political maneuvers which had the potential to unsettle the delicate equilibrium he had established among Turkey, Russia, and the West and at the same time were seen as a hopeful sign of Turkey aligning more closely with the Western alliance. During Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s visit to Turkey in July 2023, Erdogan made a surprise move and let five former Azov commanders return to Ukraine facing the risk of Russian criticism of violating the prisoner exchange agreement signed last year. During the same visit in a press conference, Erdogan reaffirmed his support for Ukraine and stated that “Ukraine deserves to be a NATO member” which was consistent with his earlier statements about Ukraine and in line with his other more recent moves bringing him closer to Turkey’s traditional Western allies.

In the opening days of 2024, events in the Red Sea provide an object lesson in the consequences of what many would characterize as a weak or ill-advised foreign policy. On October 7th, 2023, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), two terrorist organizations based in the Gaza Strip, breached a fortified border and attacked Israeli civilians. More than a thousand Israelis were killed, and several hundred were taken back to Gaza as hostages. Both Hamas and PIJ receive the bulk of their financial and operational support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is widely recognized as the leading sponsor of international terrorism. Of course, blame for the October 7th attack, and subsequent efforts by Hamas and PIJ to exact a toll on Israel, falls entirely upon those groups and their sponsors. However, since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Biden Administration's critics have suggested that America's withdrawal from Afghanistan, and President Biden's own long-term record, emboldened American enemies around the world. By October, domestic political pressure against a "blank check for Ukraine" was ongoing, caused in no small part by Biden's failure to build bi-partisan consensus for his foreign policy.

Prehistory spans a vast period before the advent of written records, making it difficult to pinpoint specific conflicts with great precision. However, we can identify some significant disputes and developments in human history from the time of Troy (often associated with the late Bronze Age) up to World War I. These conflicts and events are characterized by the transition from prehistoric to historic times. The Trojan War (circa 12th century BCE), as described in Homer's epics, the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," involved a Greek coalition led by Agamemnon besieging the city of Troy. Though the historical accuracy is debated, it symbolizes the transition from the prehistoric to the historic period.

If you’re looking for something new to read in 2024, this article provides a list of resources that junior officers and NCOs might find informative when trying to understand potential Large-Scale Combat Operations in the future.

Guerreros Unidos, a transnational crime organization (TCO) based in the Mexican state of Guerrero, has been linked to violent crimes, including the disappearance of 43 university students in 2014. The organization’s history of widespread violence, drug trafficking, corruption, and other crimes has made the Guerreros Unidos a notable concern to both the United States and Mexico. Understanding how this illicit network operates can provide valuable information on how to disrupt other transnational crime organizations. Social network analysis was used to map the relationships of members of the organization and measure their centrality within the network. The data for this analysis was collected from the United States v. Cuevas et al. (2014) indictment, which included wiretaps and surveillance conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This counternarcotics operation included the Illinois subnetwork of the Guerreros Unidos organization. This portion of the Guerreros Unidos network was centralized around a few highly central actors and densely interconnected. Based on this information, comparisons to other illicit networks can be made to identify trends and create strategies for disruption.

A bit over two years ago, the United States experienced its greatest foreign policy defeat since Vietnam when the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) that we had brought to power in Afghanistan after 9-11 collapsed and the Taliban – whom we had deposed a full generation before – returned to power.  The disgraceful rout was hailed as a “well-organized evacuation” and a “logistical miracle” by the administration and the media.  (The tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked for us that were left behind could not be reached for comment).  Since then, we have maintained an Afghan interest section in Doha Qatar that still speaks with Taliban representatives.  However, we have no diplomatic representation in Afghanistan itself.

It’s the New year’s season and the Ukraine war has largely frozen in place.  The heady hope that the Western equipped Ukrainian Army’s “summer offensive” could break through and re-establish Ukrainian sovereignty to pre-2022 borders foundered in the maze of Russian defensive belts north of Tokmak.  Ukrainian operations now seem more tied towards IO and fundraising than any coherent scheme of maneuver. Meanwhile, the Russian’s spastic and ill-thought-out counterattacks further north gain mere yards at great cost.  Both armies are desperately tired and seem to be “phoning-it-in” when responding to their respective political masters repeated urges to, ”Do more!  Do More!”.  Only the suffering of the troops is real.

The prior “bad reputation” of cluster munitions has prevented the press from highlighting the significant contributions that cluster artillery munitions, supplied by the allies, have made on defeating the Russian army in Ukraine and helping to save Ukraine.   There are three significant dates that stand out in the timetable of the Ukraine War in which cluster munitions have altered the fate of the war- November 2022, July 2023, and October 2023.  And the data from these charts will show the meaning of these dates.  The fact is that cluster munitions have caused the majority of Russian casualties in this war.  

Over the last year an unprecedented wave of Venezuelan immigrants flooded the US-Mexico border prompting talk of a new migrant crisis. The Venezuelan migration to the US is part of the largest such exodus in the history of the Americas. The scale and scope of the Venezuelan migration crisis raises important questions. Why have so many Venezuelans opted to leave their country in recent years? How have Venezuelan migrants fared in other countries and how in turn have they affected those countries that receive them? What dangers and opposition do they face on their journeys? What is the future of Venezuelan migrants in the US? And how is this phenomenon impacting US-Venezuelan relations? In this article, we draw on dozens of semi-structured interviews and informal conversations conducted between 2019 and the present by the authors with Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. Combining these primary sources with other available academic and media-based publications, we explore why so many Venezuelans have left their country in recent years, the realities awaiting them in receiving countries and along their journeys, and what ultimately this means for this new diaspora in the United States and for the country itself.

Those of us of a certain age grew up thinking that the first space battles would be between units of astronauts with lasers.  However, November of 2023 saw the demonstration of Israel’s cutting-edge missile defense capabilities, when it intercepted a ballistic missile fired by Houthi rebels in Yemen with the Arrow missile defense system. This event highlights the ever-evolving landscape of irregular warfare and the significance of nation-states being prepared to fully use capstone capabilities, which were originally developed to defend against other nation-states, in safeguarding their citizens from irregular threats posed by non-state actors. This demonstrates the dual realities of irregular warfare: nations not only engage in such conflicts to gain strategic advantages over their adversaries, but they must also defend against the same tactics when used against them. For instance, Iran's deployment of proxies equipped with advanced weapons likely demands a conventional, rather than irregular, response.

And so, “River City” is an apt fit for the title of John Waters’ novel, River City One (Simon and Schuster, 2023). The protagonist’s demeanor and mental state are much like those of any Marine or soldier who heard these words called over the radio. Here is a character slipping away from reality.

Categories: drones - unmanned aerial systems - El Centro 1 December 2023 The global rise of drones has made vast changes to how countries wage war, spy on their enemies, and even deliver goods. Terrorist groups are also rapidly incorporating drone technology for intelligence, propaganda, and attack purposes. The impact of weaponized drone use has been felt in conflicts all over the world including the Russo-Ukraine war, conflicts in the Middle East, and now it has begun to enter Africa. There have been more struggles between governments and violent nonstate actors in Africa than anywhere in the world, and now that drones are actively being used by radical Islamist terrorist organizations in the continent, it is important to analyze how they have utilized drones since 2018 and how that usage may change via an indications and warning (I&W) perspective.

In the past year we have been bombarded by stories about the military – particularly the Army, experiencing a recruiting crisis that has caused major shortfalls in manning the force.  There are various reasons given for this recruiting shortfall.  From pushback against the “woke” military by traditional military families to non-participation by normally liberal/progressive communities,  the impact of the Afghan debacle and the mismanaged “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) conflicts of the first two decades of the 21st century to highly publicized veteran’s issues (suicide etc.), the involuntary separation of thousands of servicemembers who were reticent to take the COVID vaccine, changing demographics, competitive pay scales in the civilian workplace and cumbersome recruiting processes, the causes given for the recruiting crisis are legion and likely all true to some extent.  

The Soviet Union’s decade-long incursion into Afghanistan has been compared to the American experience in Vietnam. Both wars bore some surface similarities to each other, though closer examination would reveal a multitude of differences behind the circumstances that brought them about, the relative commitment both great powers had to these conflicts, and the motivations for their involvement in the first place. But one striking similarity exists: both wars saw heavy use of the helicopter in an offensive role. The U.S. had taken notice of the successes the French had seen with these weapons of war in Algeria. The Bell AH-1 Cobra that the United States came to rely on in Vietnam was the first dedicated helicopter gunship ever fielded, and proved similarly instrumental to the U.S. war effort. Inspired by this design, the Soviets incorporated notable features from the AH-1 into their own flying gunship, the Mil Mi-24 helicopter, referred to by NATO observers as the “Hind.” Borrowing further characteristics from the contemporaneous UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopter, the Hind would make its international debut in the early 70s and come to prominence in the Soviet-Afghan War.

Terrorists, suicide bombers in particular, create chaos and bring death and destruction to the masses. Not only are innocent people hurt or killed, buildings and critical infrastructure will likely be damaged or destroyed. Police, firefighters, medics, and other first responders may struggle to respond when bridges and roads are compromised and saving lives means entering collapsing, contaminated buildings and potentially placing their own lives at risk. Drones are increasingly being used to help.

This paper proposes that a three-phase approach is necessary for Burma’s resistance movement to be victorious.  Phase One requires all ethnic minority groups to put differences aside and mass kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to defeat the junta.  Phase Two demands both substantial international support for the resistance we well as increased global pressure on the junta.  Phase Three involves minority groups agreeing to a common strategic vision for post-junta Myanmar.  It is critical that Phase One takes priority and reaches a certain level of success before any subsequent phases can effectively occur.  Phases Two and Three may take place simultaneously. 

The full use and utility of special operations forces has been underappreciated in the context of food security. It is food (in)security that lies at the heart of every conflict today and yet invisible to most in its most fundamental context as a matter, and driver, of global security and defense. Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer unique capabilities that can respond best to USAID Administrator Samantha Powers’ concluding statement in the 2022-2026 U.S. Global Food Security Strategy that, “Conflict remains the single largest driver of food crises worldwide, so the Strategy also leverages investments in conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and social cohesion.” The COVID pandemic has brought our global food systems to the public eye, and it is the Russo-Ukrainian War that has made the fragility of the food system all the more visible and hard-felt.

To address the dangerous and illegal actions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) requires a comprehensive Irregular Warfare (IW) campaign strategy. The word “campaign” is used since this is an enduring effort that requires constant assessment and refinement to ensure effectiveness. The first part of this paper outlines strategic focus areas that the IW campaign should be built upon. The second part of this paper describes specific lines of effort that may be used as building blocks toward strategic success. The emphasis on the second part of the paper is to inspire new, creative thinking toward undermining CCP malign activity.