Journal

Does “the infantryman’s half kilometer” continue to have utility in an all-purpose service rifle in modern conflict?

The Army has an unfortunate tradition of considering insurgent conflict a sideshow effort and relegating the study of insurgencies to the fringes of military science. The Philippines campaign is a prime example.

The threat exists and continues to operate. But more importantly we must understand that it is waging unconventional warfare and only using terrorism as one of the means of its strategy.

The failure to understand and appreciate the religious dimension of political action is not without consequence.

In the book’s final chapter, Kaplan warns America’s pivot to Asia may overlook its greatest foreign policy opportunity: building an enduring partnership with Mexico to safeguard our most vulnerable flank.

Enabling our partners to conduct their own IO. There is no other way to get the message across the cultural divide.

Rebuilding our special reconaissance capability.

Building a unified foreign policy establishment.

American leaders secured victory by reviewing the strategy and making corrections.  Conversely, Tripolitan leaders placed their faith in a comfortable, outdated strategy.

Cann’s book is very much a must read, especially considering the painfully limited Anglophone literature on the Portuguese Overseas War.

While not democracy in the American image, the Arab Spring has the potential to bring Islamists into conflict with jihadists.

The Battle of Chancellorsville ended 150 years ago this week. It still holds lessons for us.

Why acronyms are ruining shared military understanding.

Syria is already in crisis but the death or departure of President Bashar al-Asad is likely to intensify violence and destruction in the country, not quell it.

Combating the marijuana cartels on America’s public lands.

A Q&A with Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics.

 

The pressures on Yemen are centrifugal rather than centripetal, by which the power of the center is weakened to the benefit of poles of regional power. These centrifugal forces could make it difficult to recreate a central state that can reach across the country

Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

This article reviews nine key insights into social banditry originally described by Eric Hobsbawm and examines their applicability regarding Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Because some of Mexico’s organized crime leaders aim to be viewed as social bandits, and visit Guatemala and the Mexico-Guatemala border region to evade authorities, the article focuses on particularities of those culture zones in the potential application of three primary strategies of information operations to contest a social bandit’s prestige: emphasizing distance between the social bandit and the local poor, portraying collusion of the social bandit with local authorities and opposition to federal authorities, and emphasizing closeness between federal power and the local poor. A criminal organization leader who desires the prestige of social banditry would have cause to oppose each strategy. The analysis predicts that the first two strategies are more realistic, potentially more important strategically, and are more likely to become intensely contested through Information Operations, within culture areas of Guatemala and the Mexico-Guatemala border region.

Why is this new age an age of instability—instead of an age of empires, or warring states, or even peace and prosperity?

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process

A critical analysis of statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri reveal a fragmented and weakened Al Qaeda disguising its internal incoherence and lack of appealing strategic and political aims.

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise mission command.

Good stories trump doctrine for effecting cultural change because they reach us emotionally; they inspire.  Consider America's first battle and what we can glean its many relevant lessons.

An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.

Some US objectives remain unmet.

Chavista strategists have decided its best course of action is to run Chavez for president for a fifth time, only this time by proxy.

The issue of the reach of the state needs to be put into a wider focus by including women and gender issues as part of the narrative.

One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.

If physical success on the battlefield cannot be translated into part of a larger aim, it is largely irrelevant even if it does a great deal of physical damage to the enemy.

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the cause.

Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago remain.

As SOCOM takes on the task of addressing population-centric conflict post-Iraq/Afghanistan, it must field a new type of SOF Operator--master of the full-spectrum of the human domain and skilled at engaging all 7 elements of national power.

Unlike other major wars the US has fought, Iraq & Afghanistan demonstrate extremely low occurrence of troops who become POW/MIA & high injury survival rates.

The study demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars with which Pakistan financed groups that kill American soldiers almost on a daily basis.

What happened to the sports college?

What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but what happens in the Middle East and South Asia spreads to the world.

Sudan is the Sub-Saharan country that most resembles those of North Africa, with its shared religion, culture, and language. Will the Arab Spring blow south?

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.

Russia has integrated cyber operations into its military doctrine.

Maintaining official armies in Africa makes little security, political or economic sense. The continent will do better without them altogether

The Egyptian Sinai is becoming a breakaway state.

While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.

Modern American values continue to grow apart from traditional military values, changing the face of military culture. Munsing offers a few ways to adjust to societal change.