Journal

The explosive effects of rumors in Syria and insurgenceis around the world.

The trajectory of developments holds value as a guide to the challenges of the next decade and the education and training needed to meet them.

Constraint, imagination, and collaboration can produce meaningful innovations.

Do the terrain and the friendly and enemy situations allow stability operations at the village or district level?

Knowing the balance between when to exercise power and when to hold back is vital to maintaining America’s strength.

The only long-term solution to end the LRA’s child soldiering is through a decisive victory, which requires expanded regional and international involvement.

Regardless of whether Britain and France arm the rebels, Syria faces more challenges than Assad’s rule. An interview with Nathaniel Rosenblatt from Caerus Ascociates by Robert Tollast.

The provision of both financial and development programs in the northern territories of Mali is an effective way to deter vulnerable groups from adhering to AQ ideology.

Successful information operations (IO) often require effective inter-cultural communications in order to inform and influence foreign audiences.

The realities of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated “just-in-time” cultural training that focused heavily on the “do’s and don’ts.” A more deliberate approach is warranted in Asia.

Making IPB an “entire staff” process is critically important to achieve shared understanding of the various mission variables. 

Paul was an independent thinker, uninterested in unifomity of behavior in others. His thinking and practice were contextual—shaped by and for each new situation

A proof of concept for an integrated language and culture learning program.

Women are acting as combatants in approximately one-third of present-day armed insurgencies. Are there lessons for the US military?

The CIA should focus on gathering intelligence to inform policy makers and to attack the underlying causes and enablers of terrorist group formation and action.

When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.

This article proposes a positive vision for how disruptive junior officers and established senior officers should advance the discussion about improving their services.

West German law enforcement used combinations of intelligence analysis and HUMINT collection while simultaneously engaging and disrupting the Red Army Faction.

Under certain conditions, supporting rebels can achieve strategic objectives without causing instability or humanitarian catastrophe.

Miller traces the history of conflict resolution and negotiation during the four Tuareg rebellions in Mali, focusing primarily on the role of ideology.

Israel’s defenses against rockets and ballistic missiles provide important strategic benefits to the state, and they may change the face of Middle Eastern warfare in the future.

If the coalition consolidates on major bases along the ring road and attempts a Soviet-style hub and spoke concept, the result will be the same: defeat. 

Those interested in Vietnam, the mechanics of secret peace talks, and the national decision making of several countries will find this an important and historic work.

As someone who was born and lived in Iraq, I witnessed much of what Dr. Sassoon describes and believe that his analysis is profound and accurate.

From 13-14 May 2010, the COIN shura took place in Kabul aboard Camp Julien, the COIN Academy in Afghanistan to refocus the Surge's forces on COIN.

Through the use of conventional and irregular forces, Gen Nathaniel Greene brought Cornwallis' forces to a culminating point and precipitated the surrender at Yorktown.

An economic approach to understanding the nature of rural corruption in Afghanistan suggests that ISAF anti-corruption measures should focus directly, not indirectly, on this issue.

Capo-militaries, by their diverse portfolio of activities, such as the use of sophisticated weapons, logistics, and tactics, have become threats to national and international security.

The Afghan knows he has much to learn from the American. Americans are often too intellectually arrogant to admit they have several things that they can learn from Afghans.

Garbology: As our soldiers gain insights, more and more talking trash with the locals will provide a whole new body of intelligence.

The primacy of the state may be nowhere more pronounced than where terrestrial political borders have no relevance.

Canadian Army Officer A. A. Cohen has written a new and refreshing book on the life, ideas, and intellectual struggles of the French officer David Galula.

The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army is struggling for survival.

Like the war itself,the length of The Outpost will dissuade most Americans from bothering with it, but Tapper wants us to remember those who served in a forgotten valley.

During the second half of the 19th century, stability in southeastern Europe was challenged by newly emerging nation-states as well as the decay of the Ottoman Empire.

Times of crisis can be a brief window of opportunity for large institutional bureaucracies to overcome jurisdictional boundaries and make changes to business as usual. 

What is operational art? An example from the Normandy breakout in WWII.

Afghanistan required a different approach yet we failed in our analysis, strategy, and application of resources.

The Surge was only one piece of a broader confluence of events, critically the Shiite victory in the civil war, the formation of “Sons of Iraq” groups, the cease-fire of the Mahdi Army, and the role of regional actors. 

A model for the Iraqi military that seeks to minimize the threats of sectarianism, insurgency, and rampant unemployment over the next five years through mandatory conscription—a strategy designed to forge a national consensus.

Insurgency has evolved in five seminal ways since Mao's time. Ideas and literature on it should too.

Scott balanced risk and opportunity through a combination of careful planning and preparation, combined with strategic and operational understanding and patience.

The growth of Islamism in the Pakistan Army is a distinct threat to US interests in the region.

The Joint Force requires culturally “savvy” leaders capable of developing a global perspective, able to synthesize diverse viewpoints, and with the ability to collaborate across a range of cultures.

Military historian Martin van Creveld argues that women’s presence in the military is little but an expensive charade.

Operators must understand local culture and must harness the power of local institutions to fight an irregular enemy. A proposed method to do so.

When an adversary arrives in a form that was unanticipated, an intellectually curious officer will be able to draw upon years of education tested not in the classroom, but in the real world.

Terrorism can and should be defined for the discrete purpose of developing international counterterrorism strategies by countries with common interests and shared objectives. 

An interesting entree into the utility of game theory: There is an application of mathematical logic which illustrates why peer evaluations are bad.

True to its name, Syed Saleem Shahzad’s Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban goes beyond the common misperception of Al-Qaeda as a static organization serving the whims of Osama Bin Laden.