Blog Posts

Can the US Lead Afghans? - Mark Moyar, New York Times opinion.

The Afghanistan debate is increasingly focused on two words: troop numbers. Those numbers certainly deserve serious attention as President Obama decides whether to raise them even further this year. But in Afghanistan, as in past counterinsurgencies, it is important to remember that all troop numbers are not created equal. When it comes to indigenous forces, quality often matters more than quantity, and quality often declines when quantity increases.

Current recommendations of American and Afghan troop strengths are, for the most part, based on the size of the Afghan population. Dennis Blair, the director of national intelligence, has produced figures using a ratio of 25 troops for every 1,000 Afghans. His methodology assumes that increasing American troop strength by, say, 20 percent will increase counterinsurgency capacity by roughly the same amount. That assumption is correct, because the quality of the additional American units will be broadly similar to that of the others. Where the methodology fails is in its assumption that doubling Afghan troop strength, as many now advocate, will double counterinsurgency capacity by roughly the same amount.

Where the methodology fails is in its assumption that doubling Afghan troop strength, as many now advocate, will double counterinsurgency capacity. In reality, such an increase is likely to cause quality to fall. With Afghan security forces already two-and-a-half times as large as the American forces, and America lacking the political will to reduce that ratio, the counterinsurgency cannot afford such a drop...

More at The New York Times.

The Same Old Mistake - Kimberly Marten, New York Times opinion.

The US and Afghan governments have announced a new policy to pay tribal militias to provide security in Afghanistan. This began as a measure to deter Taliban attacks during recent elections but is set to become permanent.

Almost point for point, this plan repeats the terrible mistake that the British colonial army made in the Pashtun tribal areas in what would become Pakistan, in the late 19th century.

The British disrupted local Pashtun power balances by injecting outside money into tribal politics. British intelligence officers created charts of which sub-tribes and leaders (or maliks) had the most influence, and paid them extra money. The favored maliks in turn used these funds for patronage, paying off their supporters. Canny Pashtun factions second-guessed the British, creating security problems that they then "solved" to look more powerful. British payments to the new "official maliks" became hereditary. This system violated the tribal code of equality among all Pashtun men, but the official maliks accepted it with enthusiasm...

More at The New York Times.

Washington's Afghan Brawl - Thomas Rid, Kings of War. (H/T Bernard Finel)

The debate on the pros and cons of Afghanistan is raging inside the Beltway. And it is a bit unsettling.

On the one side are those who say no, America has no national interests in Afghanistan — and yes, it's a war of choice: let's leave the hellhole and get out asap. On the other side are those who say yes, our security is on the line and al-Qaeda must be defeated in Afghanistan — and no, it's a war of necessity: let's do it seriously and pour in more troops and money. Until it's fixed, like Iraq.

You've seen it. Shrill and loud, some of the contributions. The other side is brandished as "foolish" and "not serious." Both sides make up straw-men and then mow them down. And don't look at the reader comments. All that is even more disturbing if you consider that people are dying in this business.

So what should we make of it? As often in verbal fistfights, both sides have a couple of valid points. Let's block out the shouting and try listening to some of the nuances. I would venture to say that most experts should be able to agree on ten assumptions — some of them are just statements of fact...

Much more at Kings of War.

The US Army / USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Major Josh Wineera during a COIN Center Webcast Wednesday, 23 SEP 09 from 1000 to 1100 CST (1100 - 1200 EST). Major Wineera will explore the difficulty in capturing a greater understanding of the complex contemporary operational environment. To explore that difficulty, Wineera examines the role of the Human Terrain System teams and a developing New Zealand Army model to control what David Kilcullen has labeled the conflict ecosystem. As a lead-in to this webcast please see Wineera's The Colloquium article Inter-Bella: Understanding the Area of Operations Ecosystem.

Major Josh Wineera, New Zealand Army, has served in Iraq, East Timor, Bougainville, and Bosnia. He is a guest lecturer at the New Zealand Defence College and Massey University, and is a part-time Master's student at the Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at this link and participate via Adobe Connect as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

US to Boost Combat Force in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

US officials are planning to add as many as 14,000 combat troops to the American force in Afghanistan by sending home support units and replacing them with "trigger-pullers," Defense officials say. The move would beef up the combat force in the country without increasing the overall number of US troops, a contentious issue as public support for the war slips. But many of the noncombat jobs are likely be filled by private contractors, who have proved to be a source of controversy in Iraq and a growing issue in Afghanistan. The plan represents a key step in the Obama administration's drive to counter Taliban gains and demonstrate progress in the war nearly eight years after it began.

Forces that could be swapped out include units assigned to noncombat duty, such as guards or lookouts, or those on clerical and support squads. "It makes sense to get rid of the clerks and replace them with trigger-pullers," said one Pentagon official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the plans have not been announced. Officials have spoken in recent days about aspects of the plan...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

A Middle Way On Afghanistan? - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It's the nature of Afghanistan that nothing there ever works out quite the way outsiders expect, and that certainly was the case with last month's presidential election. Rather than producing a mandate for good governance, as US officials once hoped, the balloting has instead brought allegations of fraud, political squabbling and delay, and a new set of headaches in the war against the Taliban...

To get the flavor of McChrystal's strategy (the actual document remains classified), I reviewed the counterinsurgency guidance he has prepared for his troops. The headline reads: "Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy." ...

The counterinsurgency doctrine McChrystal is advocating has excited a new generation of military officers. I've seen it applied in outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it's impossible not to be impressed by the dedication and even the idealism of its proponents. But there is little hard evidence that it will work in a country as large and impoverished as Afghanistan. Even in Iraq, the successes attributed to counterinsurgency came as much from bribing tribal leaders and assassinating insurgents as from fostering development projects and building trust...

More at The Washington Post.

What's Right With Afghanistan - Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel, Wall Street Journal opinion.

The national mood on the Afghanistan war has soured fast, and it's not hard to see why. American combat deaths have exceeded 100 for the summer, the recent Afghan election was tainted by accusations of intimidation and fraud, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen says the security environment there is "deteriorating." Meanwhile, congressional leaders worry about the war's impact on the health-care debate and the Obama presidency more generally. Antiwar groups are starting to talk about "another Vietnam." Opposition is mounting to the current policy - to say nothing of possible requests for additional troops from the US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

The questions and concerns being raised are legitimate. Clearly, the mission has not been going well. Problems with our basic strategy, especially on the economic and development side, still need immediate attention. Moreover, our Afghan friends have a crucial role to play in both security and development, and if they fail to do so the overall warfighting and state-building effort will not succeed.

However, it is important to remember our assets, and not just our liabilities, in the coming debate over Afghanistan policy this fall. Democracies sometimes talk themselves out of keeping up the faith in tough situations, and we should avoid any such tendency towards defeatism, especially so early in the execution of the Obama administration's new military/civilian/economic strategy, which combines stronger and more widespread counterinsurgency measures with increased nation-building efforts. Indeed, the US, our NATO allies, and the future Afghan government - be it another Hamid Karzai presidency, or a new administration - have a number of major strengths in this mission...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Taliban Surprising US Forces With Improved Tactics - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

The Taliban has become a much more potent adversary in Afghanistan by improving its own tactics and finding gaps in the US military playbook, according to senior American military officials who acknowledged that the enemy's resurgence this year has taken them by surprise.

US rules of engagement restricting the use of air power and aggressive action against civilians have also opened new space for the insurgents, officials said. Western development projects, such as new roads, schools and police stations, have provided fresh targets for Taliban roadside bombs and suicide attacks. The inability of rising numbers of American troops to protect Afghan citizens has increased resentment of the Western presence and the corrupt Afghan government that cooperates with it, the officials said.

As President Obama faces crucial decisions on his war strategy and declining public support at home, administration and defense officials are studying the reasons why the Taliban appears, for the moment at least, to be winning...

More at The Washington Post.

The U.S. Army War College just announced the launch of its Information as Power blog:

"Information is an element of national power along with diplomatic, military and economic power. The current information environment challenges the United States as never before. It has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but non-state actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure. The Information as Power web site is an online resource that provides an electronic library of current and historical articles and documents. Its purpose is to facilitate an understanding of the information element of power in this new and difficult environment in order to better address the national security issues we currently face. Unlike sites focused on one aspect of the information element this site attempts to broadly consider all the dimensions of the information environment: physical, informational and cognitive."

Visit Information as Power.

The Stimson Center has published an essay I wrote for it on the future of security force assistance.

Theme: In the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, U.S. policymakers will look for new approaches to implement U.S. national security strategy. Security force assistance will attract a lot of attention and is likely to be a "growth business." But security force assistance is no panacea. Top U.S. policymakers will have to give their attention to some significant reforms if security forces assistance is to achieve its promise and avoid some of its perils.

Read the whole essay here.

See Cartoons by Cartoon by John Cole - Courtesy of Politicalcartoons.com - Email this Cartoon

A Catalogue of Errors that Shames the UK - David Cameron, The Times opinion.

Twelve days ago, Abdul Baset Ali al-Megrahi was released by the Scottish government. His freedom came two decades after a bomb, which was smuggled on to Pan Am Flight 103, exploded over Lockerbie, killing 11 people on the ground and 259 people on the plane. The only man convicted of the crime, al-Megrahi spent just eight years in prison - less than a fortnight for each victim - and was welcomed back to Tripoli as a returning hero.

Decisions concerning the fate of criminals, not least those responsible for mass murder, often provoke widespread public anger. But the outrage at this one has crossed continents and damaged our relationship with our closest ally, America. It has been a fiasco.

At its heart lies a series of failure of judgment. The first failure was the decision by Kenny MacAskill, the Scottish Justice Secretary, to release al-Megrahi on "compassionate grounds". Due process found al-Megrahi guilty, a verdict upheld on appeal. The Libyan Government accepted responsibility for the bombing and paid compensation to the Lockerbie families. Any doubts about the safety of al-Megrahi's conviction should have been tested by the second appeal, which he instead withdrew. That is why I said that compassionate release was completely inappropriate. We are dealing here with someone convicted of one of the biggest mass murders in British history. Al-Megrahi's victims were not allowed the luxury of "dying at home". What on earth was Mr MacAskill thinking of when he made this utterly bizarre decision?

The second misjudgment was Gordon Brown's failure to speak up clearly and promptly. On a matter fraught with such emotion, and with the potential to damage Britain's reputation abroad, a decisive lead from the Prime Minister was required. Mr Brown should have condemned the decision to release al-Megrahi. At the very least, he should have expressed an opinion. But all we got, day after day, was a wall of silence, finally broken after a long week when Mr Brown declared that he was "angry" and "repulsed" at scenes in Tripoli. We all were...

Much more at The Times. David Cameron is the leader of the Conservative Party and Leader of the Opposition in the United Kingdom. He has occupied both positions since December 2005.

Time to Get Out of Afghanistan - George Will, Washington Post opinion.

... US strategy - protecting the population - is increasingly troop-intensive while Americans are increasingly impatient about "deteriorating" (says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) conditions. The war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined US involvements in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible.

The US strategy is "clear, hold and build." Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that US forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state.

Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only about a third of the country - "control" is an elastic concept - and " 'our' Afghans may prove no more viable than were 'our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime." ...

Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting? - Washington Post opinions.

On Monday the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan called for a new strategy to fight the Taliban. The Post asked experts whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. Below are contributions from John Nagl, Andrew J. Bacevich, Erin M. Simpson, Thomas H. Johnson and Danielle Pletka.

McChrystal Delivers Afghan Assessment to US, NATO Leaders - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service. The commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan has completed his assessment of the situation there and has forwarded it to NATO and US leaders, Defense Department officials said today. Speaking to reporters during a visit to a Lockheed-Martin F-35 plant in Fort Worth, Texas, today, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he has not yet seen Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's assessment, but expects to read it in the next day or two. The secretary said he believes the assessment will point to the challenges before foreign and Afghan troops. "I think it will also point to areas where we can do better and can make improvements in our strategy and tactics," he said. "There is no question that we have a tough fight ahead of us in Afghanistan, and a lot of challenges." McChrystal also forwarded the assessment to NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen. "While there is a lot of gloom and doom going around, I think General McChrystal's assessment will be a realistic one and set forth the challenges we have in front of us," Gates said. "At the same time, we have some assets in place and some developments that hold promise." The number of US and European troops in Afghanistan has increased, with 62,000 American servicemembers and 39,000 from NATO and NATO-partner nations serving there, he said. With more troops, more areas can be accessed and cleared of the Taliban, al-Qaida and other terror groups. "This means our casualties will be higher," Gates acknowledged. "I am concerned about getting assets into Afghanistan to help us deal with the improvised explosive device problem."

Afghanistan Commander's Report Submitted, But Secret - Al Pessin, Voice of America. The US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, has delivered his eagerly-awaited assessment to his bosses in Washington and Brussels, but the document is being kept secret. Pentagon officials say it will be followed by international consultations and possibly requests for more US and international forces. According to a NATO release, General McChrystal writes that "the situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable." The general is quoted as saying success will require "a revised implementation strategy," as well as commitment, resolve, and increased unity of effort. But that is all that has been made public. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he has not yet seen the assessment, but told reporters what he expects it to contain. "I think that his assessment, without having read it, I suspect is going to point to the challenges that remain before us in Afghanistan. I think it will also point to areas where we can do better and can make improvements in our strategy and tactics," he said. Some civilian advisers invited to Afghanistan to help General McChrystal prepare his assessment have said he needs more troops to put down a resurgent Taliban and establish security at least in Afghan population centers. Some analyses of the current situation have been fairly dire, including one by the top US military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, who has said security in Afghanistan is "serious and deteriorating." But Secretary Gates says he expects a balanced assessment from General McChrystal.

Gen. McChrystal Calls for New Strategy in Afghan War - Yochi J. Dreazen and Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal. The US and its allies need to change course in Afghanistan to salvage the faltering war effort and prevent the Taliban from extending their recent gains, the top American commander in Afghanistan warned in a highly anticipated strategic assessment. Gen. Stanley McChrystal said that conditions on the ground were "serious," but expressed confidence that the war could still be won if the US and NATO better coordinated their efforts and focused more heavily on protecting the Afghan populace from Taliban attack. The report, which wasn't released publicly, concluded that the Taliban had survived a series of recent US military strikes and were pushing deeper into once-stable parts of northern and western Afghanistan, according to three officials familiar with its contents. The report argued that the US and its allies needed to devote more troops to vulnerable Afghan population centers in southern Afghanistan's Kandahar Province and eastern Afghanistan's Khost Province, the officials said. It also emphasized the importance of limiting corruption in Kabul and building stronger local and provincial governments across the country, the officials said. The report didn't call for any additional US forces. Gen. McChrystal will instead detail any request for more troops in a second document next month, according to US officials familiar with the matter. The commander is considering asking for up to eight additional brigades, or roughly 40,000 troops, but the officials said no decisions had yet been made.

US General Calls for New Strategy Against Taliban - William Branigin, Washington Post. The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan called Monday for a revised strategy and increased unity in efforts to defeat radical Islamist insurgents in the country, saying that the situation is "serious" but that success can still be achieved. Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal delivered the assessment as he sent a long-awaited strategic review to the Pentagon by way of the US Central Command. The review was also being sent to NATO headquarters. McChrystal stopped short of requesting more troops for Afghanistan in the review, but news agencies quoted NATO officials as saying he was expected to do so in a separate recommendation. The strategic review comes as Afghanistan's radical Taliban movement inflicts increasing casualties on US and NATO forces in an insurgency against the government of President Hamid Karzai, who is locked in a slow-moving reelection battle against former Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah.

Groundwork Is Laid for New Troops in Afghanistan - Dexter Filkens, New York Times. The top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said Monday that conditions on the ground were "serious" but that the war here is still winnable, part of a long-awaited assessment of the American-led war. Officials in Washington say that while the general's classified report did not request additional American troops, it effectively lays the groundwork for such a request in coming weeks. The change in strategy envisioned by General McChrystal would invest the United States more extensively in Afghanistan than it has been since toppling the Taliban government in 2001, Washington officials said. For President Obama, who already ordered another 21,000 troops to Afghanistan this year, the prospect of an even more extensive commitment of American troops would test his political commitment to the war at a time when he is already trying to tamp down discontent in his liberal base. In recent weeks, senior American officers here have said that they do not have enough troops to succeed. The American commanders and officials in Kabul were ordered to neither reveal the details of the assessment nor talk about them.

Gen. McChrystal Calls for Overhaul of Afghanistan War Strategy - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times. The top commander in Afghanistan has submitted his initial assessment of the war in Afghanistan, calling today for a full overhaul of the military's war strategy, NATO officials said today. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the newly appointed head of US and NATO forces, wants to intensify development of Afghan security forces, improve the country's government and refocus economic development initiatives, according to a description of the assessment released by NATO officials. The assessment is meant to be a more "philosophical" look at the current situation and does not contain any explicit requests for more troops or other resources. "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort," McChrystal said in the assessment, according to NATO officials. The assessment reflects McChrystal's belief that the military needs to follow an overhauled counter-insurgency strategy that focuses on making Afghan citizens feel safer, military officials said. The report was forwarded today to NATO and to Gen. David H. Petraeus, head of US Central Command, which controls forces in the Mideast.

US Commander General Stanley McChrystal: Afghanistan Strategy is Failing - Matt Spence and Deborah Haynes, The Times. The campaign in Afghanistan is failing and the strategies in place must be revised, the commander of US and NATO forces said today. General Stanley McChrystal described the situation in the country as "serious", but said success could be achieved there with a new approach. Gen McChrystal today delivered the results of his 60-day strategic assessment to US and NATO commanders in a long-awaited review of strategy ordered by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates. He said: "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort." Gen McChrystal has been working on the review since President Obama put him in charge of the war on June 15. His review, sent to the US military's Central Command (CentCom), responsible for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to NATO headquarters in Brussels, is not expected to make firm recommendations about future troop levels. That recommendation is due out in another report later in the year. However, military officials say it will form the basis for a decision about force size which could be taken within weeks.

Obama Aides See Need for More Troops in Afghanistan - Adam Entous and Arshad Mohammed, Reuters. Many of President Barack Obama's top advisers on Afghanistan agree with military commanders that more troops are needed to reverse Taliban gains in the country's east and south, US officials said on Monday. But there is wariness within the White House to another large-scale increase at a time when public support for the eight-year-old war against a resurgent Taliban is eroding, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Military commanders and administration and congressional leaders have held preliminary discussions about future troop options, including sending a second 5,000-member Marine Regimental Combat Team to southern Afghanistan, a Taliban stronghold, participants said. This would boost the number of Marines in the country to 15,000-18,000 from just over 10,000. The debate is expected to intensify after Monday's long-awaited assessment of the war by US Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal called for the United States and its allies to change strategy, laying the ground for a likely request for more troops later, officials said. McChrystal has about 103,000 troops under his command, including 63,000 Americans, half of whom arrived this year as part of an escalation strategy started by former President George W. Bush and ramped up under Obama. The force is set to rise to 110,000, including 68,000 Americans, by year's end, stretching the US military to its limits, military officials said.

Marine Commander Sees Progress in Afghanistan - Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times. The general in charge of US Marines in Afghanistan said Monday that progress is being made in wresting a key southern province from Taliban control but cautioned that process will be slow and difficult to measure. Marine Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland also said the Marine Corps was ready to send more troops to Afghanistan if asked by top US officials. "Everything we're doing is preparing to put more forces in theater," Helland said. The Marines' goal is to train the Afghan security forces to carry the fight to the Taliban. The training is going slowly, Helland said. "They don't understand leadership, they don't understand noncommissioned officers," he said. "To use a Marine term, they're a herd. But once trained, they're warriors." Helland is set to retire Friday after 41 years of military service, beginning as an Army enlisted man with the Special Forces in Vietnam. For the last two years he has been the commanding general of 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and Marine Force Central Command, with authority over Marines in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Marines have 12,000 troops in southern Afghanistan's Helmand province, where Taliban fighters are entrenched and opium poppy fields provide an illegal cash crop that funds the insurgency against the US-backed central government in Kabul, the capital.

New Strategy, Not Troops, Needed for Afghanistan - Joshua Foust, Registan. General Stanley McChrystal has finally come out and said what the rest of us have known for years: there needs to be some fundamentally new thinking in Afghanistan. While the various news stories talk about McChrystal's desire for a new strategy, all they seem to focus on is the (informed) assumption that he will request new troops in a separate, perhaps followup assessment. It seems, then, that Gen. McChrystal is taking his cues from Anthony Cordesman, who is out in the Washington Post saying that what we really need is more troops. Like many commentators on McChrystal's review team, Cordesman comes from a deep background in military studies but knows comparatively little about the vital civil side of the equation - therefore, all the problems he sees are problems of security and not necessarily other things. What is needed, however, is not necessarily more troops. As I wrote back in January, adding more troops to the mix would only make sense if they were going to serve a new strategy, one fundamentally different from the current, failing, strategy in the country. The biggest sin Gen. McChrystal has committed so far, at least in my view, is that there is actually very little "new" about his command so far, fawning media coverage notwithstanding. So if the reports of General McChrystal's report are right, then he is making the right decision to craft a new strategy for the country. The trouble is, to really know how to move forward, simply having an intimate understanding of the Army and military operations will only get you so far. You also have to have an intimate understanding of Afghanistan as well, and that kind of understanding simply wasn't on the McChrystal review team (nor is it on the many think tank panels that purport to discuss Afghanistan but just rehash vague generalities)

How to Lose in Afghanistan - Anthony H. Cordesman, Washington Post opinion.

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months - any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war. I did not see any simple paths to victory while serving on the assessment group that advised the new US commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on strategy, but I did see all too clearly why the war is being lost.

The most critical reason has been resources. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States never provided the forces, money or leadership necessary to win, effectively wasting more than half a decade. Our country left a power vacuum in most of Afghanistan that the Taliban and other jihadist insurgents could exploit and occupy, and Washington did not respond when the US Embassy team in Kabul requested more resources...

More at The Washington Post.

Also see The Afghan War: A Survey of "Metrics" by Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas B. Greenough at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Afghan-Pakistan conflict is a complex conflict that covers two countries and has ideological, political, governance, economic, military, and security dimensions that are extremely difficult to measure and portray in summary form. NATO/ISAF, the United Nations, the US Department of Defense, and various polls and nongovernmental organizations have, however, gradually developed summary metrics and maps of the conflict. Whilke these data have serious gaps, and often attempt to "spin" the war in political directions, they stil provide a useful overview of developments in the conflict and are beginning to go beyond the military dimension to the political and economic dimensions and to show how Afghans and Pakistanis perceive the conflict...

Full Reports and Subreports at CSIS.

H/T Ex at Abu Muqawama (see the link for Ex's commentary) - Heritage Foundation: Panel Discussion on the Presidential Election in Afghanistan by C-SPAN.

Watch C-SPAN's coverage of a discussion on the Presidential election in Afghanistan. With just ten-percent of the votes counted, President Hamid Karzai has a small lead over his nearest rival Abdullah Abdullah. The final results won't be announced until mid-September. The Heritage Foundation in Washington hosted this event. (1 hr. 30 min. broadcast)

SWJ friend Joe Galloway reports on former Army LT William Calley's apology for the My Lai massacre in his McClatchy commentary regrets for My Lai massacre decades late.

Former Lt. Rusty Calley has finally spoken about the My Lai Massacre in terms of his remorse for the deaths of between 300 and 400 unarmed Vietnamese villagers who were slaughtered on one terrible day in March, 1968, 41 years ago, and his remorse for the ruined lives of American soldiers he and others ordered to do the killing...

After decades of refusing all requests for interviews, Calley this month accepted an invitation to speak to a Kiwanis Club in Columbus, Ohio, and there confessed to daily feeling "remorse" over his actions and their consequences...

In this case I am afraid that a "sorry" near the end of a comfortable life just doesn't cut it, Lt. Calley. I doubt it will buy much leeway on Judgment Day either.

Meanwhile, Michael Sullivan of National Public Radio reports that in Vietnam, Calley's My Lai apology barely registers.

Ten days ago, the only man convicted for the My Lai massacre publicly expressed remorse for what happened there in March 1968. The publicity-shy William Calley told a Kiwanis club lunch there was "not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened. I am very sorry." After his apology, Voice of America expressed interest in having Calley apologize on the air in Vietnam, but few seem interested in hearing it.

US Sets Metrics to Assess War Success - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

The White House has assembled a list of about 50 measurements to gauge progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan as it tries to calm rising public and congressional anxiety about its war strategy.

Administration officials are conducting what one called a "test run" of the metrics, comparing current numbers in a range of categories -- including newly trained Afghan army recruits, Pakistani counterinsurgency missions and on-time delivery of promised U.S. resources -- with baselines set earlier in the year. The results will be used to fine-tune the list before it is presented to Congress by Sept. 24...

More at The Washington Post.

US Fears Clock Ticking on Afghanistan - Paul Richter and Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

The Obama administration is racing to demonstrate visible headway in the faltering war in Afghanistan, convinced it has only until next summer to slow a hemorrhage in US support and win more time for the military and diplomatic strategy it hopes can rescue the 8-year-old effort.

But the challenge in Afghanistan is becoming more difficult in the face of gains by the Taliban, rising US casualties, a weak Afghan government widely viewed as corrupt, and a sense among US commanders that they must start the military effort largely from scratch nearly eight years after it began.

A turnaround is crucial because military strategists believe they will not be able to get the additional troops they feel they need in coming months if they fail to show that their new approach is working, US officials and advisors say...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Coalition Airmen Offered Unique Irregular Warfare Training at Green Flag Little Rock

By Captain Joe Knable

19th Airlift Wing Public Affairs

If you stumbled upon a man wearing a Muslim headdress, an Iraqi security police colonel and military officers from three coalition countries, you might think you're somewhere in the Middle East.

However, this scene was part of Irregular Warfare training at Little Rock Air Force Base this week as part of the Green Flag Little Rock exercise.

Green Flag Little Rock is held in conjunction with the Joint Readiness Training Center exercise based at Fort Polk, La., which is training 5,000 Soldiers "deployed" to an austere environment at Fort Polk. The Air Force is providing airlift and airdrop capabilities, aeromedical evacuation and bare-base set up and operations for the JRTC exercise.

The goal of Green Flag Little Rock is for aircrews to fly their first five simulated combat missions in a safe environment, said Maj. Earl Burress, the trainer/mentor in charge of irregular warfare training at Green Flag Little Rock. The irregular warfare exercises are part of the rigorous training the Air Force members receive to prepare them for theater operations...

Rough Terrain - Vanessa M. Gezari, Washington Post.

Under an experimental program in Afghanistan, teams of anthropologists and social scientists are working alongside soldiers to help win the war by winning over the Afghan people. It may seem like a brilliant idea. But in this battle, nothing is as it seems...

The deployment of US soldiers to Maywand was an experiment. So, too, was the Human Terrain project and the road map to progress envisioned by the bespectacled social scientist joining the patrol that day. The war had not gone well. This was not a time for old approaches but for bold new ones that might seem crazy or that just might work.

Karl Slaikeu had asked for this assignment. A 64-year-old psychologist and conflict-resolution specialist from Texas, Karl had been nursing an idea that he thought could change the course of the war. He was looking for a village that, with concerted attention, could be turned into a model of development and security. Pir Zadeh, where the patrol was bound, was a place where locals had formed a neighborhood watch and where the village elder seemed to like Americans...

More at the Washington Post.

Cited in the article above:

Winning the War in Afghanistan

An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for Coalition Forces

by Dr. Karl A. Slaikeu, Small Wars Journal

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

While granting that Afghanistan is centuries behind Iraq in terms of infrastructure, the central question remains: can we build on the successes and lessons learned in Iraq and a half century of other counterinsurgency (COIN) wars to emerge victorious over the Taliban and al Qaeda? Or, will we go the way of Great Britain and Russia, who left Afghanistan in defeat? This paper offers a plan for victory that builds on classic COIN--the oil spot or ink spot strategy--customized to address the unique challenges of the Afghan area of operations (AO).

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1. Are Saudi Arabia and Iran at war in Yemen?

2. The autumn of Afghan discontent.

New UK Army Chief Faces Two Battles: Taliban and Resources - Alistair MacDonald, Wall Street Journal.

When Gen. Sir David Richards takes over as head of the British army on Friday he inherits two battlefields: the war in Afghanistan, and a battle for resources between the UK's military and government. On both counts Gen. Richards, a respected soldier who earned his stripes in the jungles of Sierra Leone, faces tough challenges. As the second-biggest contributor of North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Afghanistan, the UK has suffered high casualties, sapping public support for the war at home.

One reason for that, according to some critics in the UK, is that the army is hampered by a lack of resources after decades of cutbacks by Downing Street. Gen. Richards may soon hit the same quandary his predecessors struggled with: trying to play the role of a superpower with a military that hasn't been funded to play that part since World War II.

The UK has found it difficult to adapt its military hardware, within a budget, for conflicts that have morphed from the Cold War to peacekeeping operations to insurgency over the past 20 years. That problem will get harder as the UK faces budget cuts to battle its record debt, a situation that is heightening tensions between military and political leaders...

More at the Wall Street Journal.

Afghan Civilian Deaths Decline Under New US Tactics - Laura King, Los Angeles Times.

Western troops have killed far fewer Afghan civilians since the top US general imposed strict new rules of engagement aimed at addressing one of the most contentious issues of the conflict, according to newly declassified US military figures.

However, the data cover a relatively short period of eight weeks, and make it clear that civilians are still dying in large numbers, a pattern blamed in part on the Taliban's campaign of violence surrounding last week's national elections. The toll on civilians has angered Afghanistan's government and poisoned public opinion against the presence of American and allied troops. The Obama administration has made reducing such deaths a top priority for the US military.

The period since the new rules took effect have also coincided with some of the heaviest losses of the war for Western forces. But military spokesmen deny any link, saying record fatalities were caused by the summer's troop buildup and an accompanying push into areas controlled by the Taliban, rather than any greater hazard to troops posed by the new rules...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Military Prepares Profiles on Reporters Visiting War Zones - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.

The US military in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere regularly assesses the content and tone of the work of individual reporters to prepare for trips and interviews by those reporters, according to defense and military officials.

But the officials denied that the analysis has been used to exclude journalists from embedding with US military units in combat zones or to bar them from interviewing military personnel.

A controversy has arisen in recent days over media work performed for the US military command in Afghanistan by the Rendon Group, a contractor that classifies the content of stories by reporters as positive, negative or neutral in relation to military objectives...

More at The Washington Post.

Message to Muslim World Gets a Critique - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has written a searing critique of government efforts at "strategic communication" with the Muslim world, saying that no amount of public relations will establish credibility if American behavior overseas is perceived as arrogant, uncaring or insulting.

The critique by the chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, comes as the United States is widely believed to be losing ground in the war of ideas against extremist Islamist ideology. The issue is particularly relevant as the Obama administration orders fresh efforts to counter militant propaganda, part of its broader strategy to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate," Admiral Mullen wrote in the critique, an essay to be published Friday by Joint Force Quarterly, an official military journal...

More at The New York Times.

Seven Observations on the Potential Strategic Implications of Population-Centric Counter-Insurgency Doctrine

By Bernard Finel

Dr. Bernard I. Finel is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Project where he directs research on counter-terrorism and defense policy He is the lead author of ASP's annual report, "Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle against Violent Jihadism."

Continue on for his 7 Observations on Population-Centric COIN...

At last week's TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, I heard BG H.R. McMaster deliver a presentation on the U.S. Army's forthcoming Capstone Concept. Here is a news article from TRADOC and the U.S. Army that describes what the Army's Capstone Concept is and what it will mean to the Army in the years ahead. A few excerpts from the article:

The new Capstone Concept, McMaster said, examines how the Army operates under conditions of complexity and uncertainty in an era of persistent conflict. The concept's purpose is to put into operational terms Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey's vision of balancing the Army to win today's wars while describing how the future Army will fight the wars of tomorrow.

[...]

The primary purpose of the capstone concept is to lead force development and employment by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations; place modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict; establish a conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts; guide experimentation in Army operations and capabilities; and guide capability development.

"We looked at how the Army intends to operate and face the challenges in the future operating environment against what we're calling hybrid threats," said McMaster. "By looking at the current operating environment and the hybrid threats we face and could face in the future, this helps the Army make a grounded projection into the near future and understand what challenges our Army will face as part of a Joint, interdepartmental and multinational force, and then develop the capability our Army will need to fight the future battle."

BG McMaster is leading a team that will complete work on the Capstone Concept by the end of this year. The new Capstone Concept is then supposed to guide the development of subordinate Army doctrine. The Capstone Concept effort thus represents important guidance for Army training, leader development, and combat unit organization.

During his presentation last week, BG McMaster emphasized the differences between the doctrine his team is completing and the doctrine the Army operated under a decade ago. Small Wars Journal hopes to provide further discussion of the Army Capstone Concept as it nears completion. For now, I recommend reading the article linked to above.