Blog Posts

10 Steps to Victory in Afghanistan - New York Times opinion.

1. Reform or Go Home - David Kilcullen: Counterinsurgency is only as good as the government it supports. NATO could do everything right - it isn't - but will still fail unless Afghans trust their government. Without essential reform, merely making the government more efficient or extending its reach will just make things worse..

2. End Suicide Attacks - Robert Pape: To win in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies must prevent the rise of a new generation of anti-American terrorists, particularly suicide terrorists. The metric for measuring this threat is not the amount of territory controlled by the Taliban or Al Qaeda, but the number of people —to be recruited as suicide terrorists...

3. If You Can't Beat Them, Let Them Join - Linda Robinson: Within a year, we must persuade large numbers of insurgents to lay down their arms or switch to the government's side. Afghanistan's doughty warriors have a tradition of changing alliances, but success will require both military operations focused on the insurgent leadership and, even more important, incentives for fighters at the local level. Mid-level insurgents and their followers should be offered a chance to join a revised version of the Afghan Public Protection Force...

4. Pump Up the Police - Anthony Cordesman: For all the disputes over strategy, virtually everyone agrees that we need to strengthen the Afghan security forces, make them true partners and put them in the lead. Afghans want lasting security, and they want it to have an Afghan face. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, wisely wants to double the size of the Afghan Army and increase the police forces to 160,000 men. This requires not just money, but also a commitment to send more trainers, embedded advisers and partner units...

5. Kick Out Corruption - Nader Nadery: To defeat the insurgency, the Afghan government and its main partner, the United States, need to win the confidence of the public. Accountability must replace the widespread immunity enjoyed by officials who abuse their power. Despite all the problems with our recent election, the incoming government will have a chance to start fresh, and a proper vetting of all new officials is the place to begin...

6. Learn to Tax From the Taliban - Gretchen Peters: Skeptics of state-building proposals question whether the Kabul government - now almost fully dependent on foreign aid - will ever be able to support the military and police forces being trained. Yet there has been comparatively little investment by the international community in helping Kabul collect taxes, even though insurgents and corrupt officials have proved it can be done...

7. Polls Have the Power - Merrill McPeak: By and large, my generation of military professionals trained for and thought about what we might call "Type A" war - modern war, featuring the clash of mechanized forces fielded by industrial states. Happily, we never had to fight the Soviets on the northern German plain, though Operation Desert Storm showed we might have been pretty good at it, had the balloon gone up. In Afghanistan we're fighting a "Type B" war that is in some of its essentials "postmodern." Like postmodernism itself, the concept has a variety of meanings and may not represent a coherent set of ideas...

8. Take a Risk - Andrew Exum: While in Afghanistan last summer as part of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's initial assessment team, I found many American and other international units more focused on protecting themselves than protecting the Afghan population. Traveling through the allegedly secure city of Mazar-i-Sharif with a German unit, for example, was like touring Afghanistan by submarine...

9. Don't Believe That We Can Afford to Lose - Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan: America cannot achieve even the minimal objective of preventing Al Qaeda from re-establishing safe havens in Afghanistan without a substantial increase in forces over the coming year. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan's south is growing. The Afghan and international forces there now cannot reverse that growth. They may not even be able to stem it. That is the assessment of the top American commander there, Gen. Stanley McChrystal...

10. Pakistani Patronage - Paul Pillar: The government of Pakistan, through its intelligence agency, has long been a patron of the Afghan Taliban, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal recently warned that the collaboration continues. Pakistan sees the relationship as a way of hedging its bets in Afghanistan, an asset in its confrontation with India. It is difficult to define a clear benchmark for ending that aid because the Pakistanis refuse to acknowledge that any relationship exists...

In full at The New York Times.

Posted here with permission of The RUSI Journal - Israel's Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum (August 2009) by Sergio Catignani.

Israel's assault on Gaza in early 2009, Operation Cast Lead, achieved significant tactical successes and managed to redeem the Israel Defence Forces' poor performance during the 2006 Lebanon War. This paper examines Israel's military and public information campaign and why Cast Lead failed to accomplish the government's two main goals of stopping rocket attacks on Israel and the influx of weapons for resupplying Hamas.

Israel's Operation Cast Lead and the Gaza Strip Missile Conundrum

In Afghanistan, Training Can Look a Lot Like Fighting - Carlos Lozada, Washington Post opinion.

As President Obama and his national security team debate strategy for the war in Afghanistan, some of the options on the table involve a greater focus on training and strengthening the Afghan security forces. To an American public - and an administration - that may be reluctant to send more troops to a faltering, eight-year war, the notion of helping the Afghans fight for themselves could seem particularly attractive.

But it's an appeal that should be tempered. In a recent essay published by the security-focused Stimson Center in Washington, Robert Haddick, managing editor of the Small Wars Journal, reviews American experiences helping foreign security forces. Though he believes such initiatives will be a "growth business" in the years ahead, Haddick contends that if US policymakers hope such foreign forces can be a "competent and reliable substitute" for US military personnel, they will "frequently find themselves disappointed." ...

More at The Washington Post.

Obama's War - PBS Frontline

FRONTLINE Season Premiere

Obama's War

Tuesday, October 13, 2009, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS

Continue on for the PBS Press Release:

The Greatest Afghan War - Michael Yon, Washington Times.

The coalition is weakening. While the US has gotten serious, the organism called NATO is a jellyfish for which the United States is both sea and prevailing wind. The disappointing effort from many partners is best exemplified by the partners who are pushing hardest: The British are fine examples. The British landed in Helmand province after someone apparently vouched that Helmand would be safe, and they believed it. Helmand is today the most dangerous province in Afghanistan.

British combat tours are arduous and the troops suffer in countless ways. The soldiers sweat and freeze in the desert filth; British rations are terrible; mail can be weeks late; and they fight constantly. Troops endure high casualties yet they keep fighting. These things are true. Some say the British "lost Helmand," but this is not true. Helmand was a mess before they arrived. British soldiers are strong but their government is pitiful, leading to an average effort in Afghanistan...

More at The Washington TImes.

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) The CIA finds job security in Afghanistan,

2) Can Israel get MAD with Iran?

The CIA finds job security in Afghanistan

On Sept. 30, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell made it clear that the objective of President Obama's Afghanistan policy -- "to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda" -- remains unchanged. According to Morrell, what is currently open for discussion among Obama senior advisers is "whether or not counterinsurgency is still the preferred means of achieving that end."

As I discussed last week, Gen. Stanley McChrystal thinks counterinsurgency is the right course and has asked for at least 40,000 additional U.S. soldiers to implement this approach. It is now up to Obama to assess the risk of McChrystal's strategy and weigh whether the costs measure up to the promised benefits.

While Obama and his team deliberate, other developments are underway that will either support McChrystal's request or perhaps create alternatives. On Sept. 20, the Los Angeles Times reported on another "surge" into Afghanistan, this one by the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the article, the Central Intelligence Agency's headcount in Afghanistan will increase to 700, led by increases in paramilitary officers, intelligence analysts, and operatives tracking the behavior of Afghan government officials.

The piece discussed how McChrystal, while in charge of special operating forces in Iraq, formed teams composed of CIA paramilitary officers and special operations personnel from the U.S. military. This fusion of capabilities is credited with improving intelligence collection and direct action operations against insurgent networks. McChrystal may now be using this same technique in Afghanistan.

But raising the CIA's presence in Afghanistan to a higher plateau may set the stage for alternative approaches to U.S. strategy.

Click through to read more ...

White House Eyeing Narrower War Effort - Scott Wilson and Anne E. Kornblutm Washington Post.

Senior White House officials have begun to make the case for a policy shift in Afghanistan that would send few, if any, new combat troops to the country and instead focus on faster military training of Afghan forces, continued assassinations of al-Qaeda leaders and support for the government of neighboring Pakistan in its fight against the Taliban. In a three-hour meeting Wednesday at the White House, senior advisers challenged some of the key assumptions in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's blunt assessment of the nearly eight-year-old war, which President Obama has said is being fought to destroy al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and the ungoverned border areas of Pakistan.

McChrystal, commander of the 100,000 NATO and US forces in Afghanistan, has asked Obama to quickly endorse his call for a change in military strategy and approve the additional resources he needs to retake the initiative from the resurgent Taliban. But White House officials are resisting McChrystal's call for urgency, which he underscored Thursday during a speech in London, and questioning important elements of his assessment, which calls for a vast expansion of an increasingly unpopular war. One senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the meeting, said, "A lot of assumptions - and I don't want to say myths, but a lot of assumptions - were exposed to the light of day." ...

More at The Washington Post.

McChrystal Rejects Scaling Down Afghan Military Aims - John F. Burns, New York Times.

The top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, used a speech here on Thursday to reject calls for the war effort to be scaled down from defeating the Taliban insurgency to a narrower focus on hunting down Al Qaeda, an option suggested by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as part of the current White House strategy review. After his first 100 days in command in Kabul, General McChrystal chose an audience of military specialists at London's Institute for Strategic Studies as a platform for a public airing of the confidential assessment of the war he delivered to the Pentagon in late August, parts of which were leaked to news organizations.

General McChrystal, 55, did not mention Mr. Biden or his advocacy of a scaled-down war effort during his London speech, and referred only obliquely to the debate within the Obama administration on whether to escalate the American commitment in Afghanistan by accepting his request for up to 40,000 more American troops on top of the 68,000 already deployed there or en route. But he used the London session for a rebuttal of the idea of a more narrowly focused war. When a questioner asked him whether he would support scaling back the American military presence over the next 18 months by relinquishing the battle with the Taliban and focusing on tracking down Al Qaeda, sparing ground troops by hunting Qaeda extremists and their leaders with missiles from remotely piloted aircraft, he replied: "The short answer is: no." "You have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish to be," he said. "A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy." ...

More at The New York Times.

McChrystal Defends Military Goals in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

Speaking in London, Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal said he opposes strategies that would require fewer troops and focus on fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership through drone attacks, airstrikes and similar approaches, according to transcripts and audio recordings of his remarks. Such an approach is favored by some Obama administration officials, including Vice President Joe Biden.

However, counterinsurgency advocates have said that a narrow war effort would leave the Afghan government unprotected from encroachment by the Taliban or other extremist organizations. The strategy debate is at the heart of a sweeping review requested by President Obama as the administration grapples with a tainted Afghan presidential election, escalating violence and mounting allied casualties...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Back Your General and Send More Troops, David Miliband Urges Barack Obama - Francis Elliott and Michael Evans, The Times.

David Miliband urged President Obama to embrace a renewed "hearts and minds" strategy in Afghanistan as ministers indicated that they would not send more British troops unless the US adopted such an approach. The Foreign Secretary did not mention America by name but called on every government in the coalition to back troops, aid workers and diplomats in support of a clear plan. "We came into this together. We see it through - together," he told the Labour conference in Brighton.

His words reflect a growing concern in the Government over Mr Obama's apparent reluctance to garner political consent for a troop "surge", which commanders say is needed to build up the Afghan Army and defeat the Taleban insurgency. General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, wants a revamped counter-insurgency - more forces on the ground engaging civilians and persuading the Taleban to switch sides - as opposed to a counter-terrorism strategy focused on al-Qaeda - reducing troop numbers and attacking militants mostly with drone missile strikes. Last night, David Cameron said that that the first thing he would do if elected prime minister would be to form a war cabinet. He said that it would comprise his Foreign Secretary, Chancellor, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary and the heads of the Armed Forces, MI6 and MI5...

More at The Times.

Hillary Clinton vs. Afghan Reality - Washington Times editorial.

In a PBS interview on Monday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton dismissed Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's detailed assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. "I respect that because clearly he is the commander on the ground," she said, "but I can only tell you there are other assessments from very expert military analysts who have worked in counterinsurgencies that are the exact opposite." She said the administration's goal "is to take all of this incoming data and sort it out." We aren't sure what the secretary of state means by "the exact opposite" of Gen. McChrystal's assessment. He concluded that a change was needed in US strategy, further resources were required, the Afghan forces need to be made more effective and that success is achievable.

Should we believe the exact opposite - that a change in strategy is not needed, resources are adequate, the Afghan forces are fine as they are, and we are headed for certain failure? Mrs. Clinton is correct that there is no lack of views on the subject. Counterinsurgency "experts" proliferated in Washington after the invasion of Iraq in the same way that the city was suddenly awash in counterterrorism "experts" after the Sept. 11 attacks. The White House is free to pick and choose from among them in the same way a patient can shop for doctors until he gets the diagnosis he likes. Unfortunately, this path is frequently fatal for the patient...

More at The Washington Times.

Continue on for news and views on hybrid war vs. compound war, COIN vs. CT, Afghanistan, PME, video, images and more...

Several Afghan Strategies, None a Clear Choice - Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times.

The president, vice president and an array of cabinet secretaries, intelligence chiefs, generals, diplomats and advisers gathered in a windowless basement room of the White House for three hours on Wednesday to chart a new course in Afghanistan. The one thing everyone could agree on: None of the choices is easy. Just six months after President Obama adopted what he called a "stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy" for Afghanistan and Pakistan, he is back at the same table starting from scratch.

The choices available to him are both disparate and not particularly palatable. He could stick with his March strategy, but his commander wants as many as 40,000 more troops to make it work. He could go radically in the other direction and embrace Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.'s idea of using fewer troops, focused more on hunting down leaders of Al Qaeda, but risk the collapse of the Afghan government. Or he could search for some middle-ground option that avoids the risks of the other two, but potentially find himself in a quagmire...

More at The New York Times.

On War, Obama Could Turn to GOP - Scott Wilson, Washington Post.

With much of his party largely opposed to expanding military operations in Afghanistan, President Obama could be forced into the awkward political position of turning to congressional Republicans for support if he follows the recommendations of the commanding US general there. Congressional Democrats have begun promoting a compromise package of additional resources for Afghanistan that would emphasize training for Afghan security forces but deny Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal the additional combat troops he has indicated he needs to regain the initiative against the Taliban insurgency.

The emerging Democratic consensus is likely to constrain the president as he considers how best to proceed with an increasingly unpopular war. On Wednesday, Obama chaired a three-hour discussion on Afghanistan with Cabinet members and senior officials at the White House. The meeting was largely a reassessment of the past eight years of American involvement in the region, with the president repeatedly probing his military and civilian advisers to justify their assumptions, according to one participant. This source said there was a recognition that the decision facing Obama is one of the most critical of his presidency...

More at The Washington Post.

Gates Doubts US's Afghan Strategy - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

President Barack Obama met with senior counselors for three hours Wednesday to launch his review of Afghan war strategy, amid indications that his defense secretary - the key link between the White House and the military - is among those undecided about the right approach. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the senior US commander in Kabul, is advocating a manpower-intensive counterinsurgency strategy that focuses on protecting the Afghan populace rather than hunting individual militants. He submitted a classified assessment over the weekend calling for up to 40,000 US reinforcements.

Mr. Obama met with senior military officials, diplomats and Cabinet members Wednesday as part of the review, which White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said was designed to "poke and prod" potential new approaches to the conflict. The discussion focused on the political and security situation on the ground, according to an administration official, with military commanders detailing the gains made by the insurgency and top diplomats discussing the Afghan election results that were marred by fraud claims. Mr. Obama focused his questioning on the current threat posed by al Qaeda and whether a resurgent Taliban would give al Qaeda leaders a new haven to regroup, the official said, which could indicate Mr. Obama is more concerned about the status of a threat to the US than overall stability in Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Obama, War Council Review Afghanistan Strategy - Julian E. Barnes and Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times.

President Obama, amid political contretemps at home and expanding international turmoil over the disputed Afghan election, summoned his war Cabinet to the White House on Wednesday for a high-stakes review of his Afghanistan strategy. The session, which produced no announcements concerning additional troops or strategy, came on a day in which the highest-ranking American serving in the United Nations mission in Afghanistan was fired. Peter W. Galbraith, who had pushed for more aggressive steps to deal with alleged vote fraud, had clashed with Kai Eide, the senior UN representative in Afghanistan. in what one US official called "an ugly dispute."

The White House billed Obama's war strategy meeting as a major discussion of options, and it offered the first opportunity for Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and allied commander in Afghanistan, to address the president directly since submitting a military assessment that called for an expanded counterinsurgency campaign and pointed to the likely need for more troops. With no major decisions reached, another meeting was set for Wednesday. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said Obama remains committed to his goals, to "disrupt, dismantle and destroy Al Qaeda and its extremist allies" and prevent the reemergence of safe havens...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

On September 16th, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates delivered a speech to the Air Force Association convention. During the speech he expressed his concern that the U.S. might suffer a shortfall in long range strike capability, a shortfall that could result in a strategic setback for the U.S. and its allies. What remains for others to examine is whether Gates himself should have done more over the past three years to straighten out his department's drifting long range strike program.

Click through to read more ...

In House Report 111-166 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR

White House Starts Review of Afghan Strategy - Peter Spiegel and Jonathan Weisman, Wall Street Journal.

The White House began its review of the Afghan war strategy in earnest Tuesday, with senior administration officials meeting via videoconference with the top commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, at the start of what could be weeks of debate over whether to send thousands of reinforcements. White House officials said President Barack Obama will join in the discussions Wednesday, when he is expected to meet with Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among other top officials.

The White House unexpectedly decided to review its strategy in Afghanistan after a series of recent setbacks in the war, including allegations of fraud following last month's presidential elections and surging violence throughout the country. It begins just days after Gen. McChrystal submitted his request for as many as 40,000 additional troops to the Pentagon. Some in the administration, notably Mr. Biden, have argued for a smaller military footprint and a tighter focus on counterterrorism as the best way forward. Advocates of such a shift point to the effective use of Predator drone strikes to kill Taliban leaders in Pakistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Decision Time for Obama - Michael Gerson, Washington Post opinion.

As President Obama approaches a decision on the way forward in Afghanistan - the most historically consequential choice of his presidency so far - military leaders seem impressed with his decision-making process. During the next few weeks, Obama has scheduled considerable time to be personally involved in discussions. In the White House economy, presidential attention is the most valued commodity - coveted, hoarded and stolen. Obama's engaged, deliberate style has fans in the military. But there are also risks when arguments about military strategy are too public for too long. An enemy can try to influence the outcome of a debate with attacks and propaganda.

Al-Qaeda's most recent video warns Europeans that they are about to be abandoned: "It won't be long until the dust of war clears in Afghanistan, at which point you won't find a trace of any American, because they will have gone away far beyond the Atlantic." There are also risks for American military morale. Soldiers in Afghanistan are going outside the wire, dismounting from their vehicles and mingling with the people - increasing their chances of being killed - for the sake of a counterinsurgency approach that the president has publicly questioned and may now change. No one wants to be the last to die for the sake of yesterday's strategy. Major military decisions require deliberation. The debate, however, should generally take place in private and produce outcomes with all deliberate speed. At some point soon, the seminar must end...

More at The Washington Post.

Via Noah Shachtman at Danger Room - Draft Policy Would OK Troops' Tweets.

The Defense Department may allow troops and military employees to freely access social networks - if a draft policy circulating around the Pentagon gets approved, that is.

For years, the armed services have put in place a series of confusing, overlapping policies for using sites like Twitter and Facebook. But a draft memo, obtained by Nextgov, allows members of the military to use Defense Department networks to get on the social media sites - as well as on "e-mail, instant messaging and discussion forums." ...

More at Danger Room.

Defense to Allow Troops, Family Members to Use Social Network Sites - Bob Brewin, NextGov.

The Defense Department, which had seen some services ban the use of social networking sites, will allow troops and their families to use the popular online communication tools such as Facebook and Twitter on its unclassified networks, according to a draft memo obtained by Nextgov.

The memo, written by Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn III and due out in days, solidly backs the use of social network sites, which Lynn calls "Internet capabilities," for both official and unofficial purposes and envisions these tools as providing an information advantage for Defense.

The new policy "addresses important changes in the way the Department of Defense communicates and shares information on the Internet," Lynn wrote. "This policy recognizes that emerging Internet-based capabilities offer both opportunities and risks that need to be balanced in ways that provide an information advantage for our people and mission partners." ...

More at NextGov.

I'm following this closely as we have a stake in this fight -- the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) currently blocks our Small Wars Council discussion board. I am told our Blog, Journal and other pages are still accessible. It's also quite ironic -- the Army is taking full advantage (and here) of our reach and feedback capabilities while the Marine Corps sees fit to block what many call the most professional and useful social networking site concerning Irregular Warfare / Small Wars issues on the Internet. Go figure...

The biggest news from last week's United Nations and G-20 meetings was the revelation of a second gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility under construction on a military base near Qom, Iran. Although the Iranian government denies that its failure to disclose the construction of this facility to the IAEA constitutes a breach of Iran's obligations under the NPT, the U.S., British, and French governments disagree.

President Obama and his advisers hope that last week's dramatic disclosure will finally create the diplomatic leverage over Iran the West has heretofore lacked. They are hoping that one more case of Iran's cheating will be enough to convince Russia and China to support tougher economic and financial sanctions against Iran, sanctions that will be stern enough to change Iranian behavior. This is very unlikely to happen.

Click through to read more ...

McChrystal's Frank Talk on Afghanistan - 60 Minutes, 27 September 2009.

Watch CBS Videos Online

President Obama is rethinking his entire strategy in Afghanistan after the new commander there stunned the White House with a warning the war could be lost if he doesn't get more troops in the next 12 months. General Stanley McChrystal is up against an enemy that holds the initiative, and he's working with an Afghan government shot through with corruption.

Even with more troops, he warns, there has to be "a dramatic change in how we operate." That stark assessment comes from a man who is perhaps this country's most battle-hardened general and, according to those who have served with him, a one-of-a-kind commander.

McChrystal's Frank Talk on Afghanistan - CBS story behind the 60 Minutes interview.

There Are Only Two Choices Left on Iran - Eliot A. Cohen, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Unless you are a connoisseur of small pictures of bearded, brooding fanatical clerics there is not much reason to collect Iranian currency. But I kept one bill on my desk at the State Department because of its watermark - an atom superimposed on the part of that country that harbors the Natanz nuclear site. Only the terminally innocent should have been surprised to learn that there is at least one other covert site, whose only purpose could be the production of highly enriched uranium for atom bombs.

Pressure, be it gentle or severe, will not erase that nuclear program. The choices are now what they ever were: an American or an Israeli strike, which would probably cause a substantial war, or living in a world with Iranian nuclear weapons, which may also result in war, perhaps nuclear, over a longer period of time...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gates: Setting Afghan Withdrawal Date Would Be 'Strategic Mistake' - Jon Hilsenrath and Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates pushed back against calls by Congress for the administration to set a timeline for withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan, as unease about the White House's handling of the war grows on Capitol Hill and among the public. In two television interviews, Mr. Gates argued that the Afghan war was vital to US national security. Laying out a timeline for removing American troops from Afghanistan would be "a strategic mistake" that could embolden al Qaeda and the Taliban, he said on CNN's "State of the Union."

Mr. Gates waded into the political debate over Afghanistan at a pivotal moment in the eight-year-old war. The Obama administration is conducting a broad review of its strategy for the conflict as it weighs a request from the top American commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for up to 40,000 US reinforcements. About 65,000 American troops are now in Afghanistan. Gen. McChrystal completed the formal request several weeks ago, but delayed submitting it to the Pentagon at the request of Mr. Gates and other senior Defense Department leadership. The commander was expected to send the classified report to Mr. Gates over the weekend...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

A recommendation by COL Dave Maxwell: The Taliban in Their Own Words - Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, Newsweek.

During wars and after them, the real voice of the enemy is rarely heard. Propaganda is plentiful, as are prideful boasts - and the Taliban have certainly been quick studies at the modern art of information warfare. But the fears and ambitions of ordinary fighters are too often buried under statistics and theories propounded from thousands of miles away. That's been even more true in Iraq and Afghanistan, where reporters who might accurately convey the other side's perspective are at risk of being kidnapped or killed for their efforts.

After eight long years of war in Afghanistan, however, America and its allies can ill afford not to understand who the enemy is and why they fight. To put together this remarkable oral history, told through the words of the Taliban themselves, Newsweek turned to contributing correspondent Sami Yousafzai, who has been covering the conflict for the magazine since 2001. Over that time he has developed and maintained contact with dozens of Afghan insurgents, including the six whose stories are told here.

Working with Newsweek's Ron Moreau, Yousafzai spent more than a month crisscrossing Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet these sources. He has known them all for some time, and in the past their information has generally proved reliable. Their accounts may sometimes be self-serving - most Afghan civilians recall the Taliban regime far less fondly, for one thing - but the facts are consistent with what Yousafzai knows about the men from earlier reporting. While it's impossible to confirm the credibility of everything they say, their stories offer a rare chance to understand how the insurgents see this war, from the collapse of the Taliban, through their revival and, now, their budding ascendancy...

Much more at Newsweek.

Diverse Sources Fund Insurgency In Afghanistan - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post.

The Taliban-led insurgency has built a fundraising juggernaut that generates cash from such an array of criminal rackets, donations, taxes, shakedowns and other schemes that US and Afghan officials say it may be impossible to choke off the movement's money supply.

Obama administration officials say the single largest source of cash for the Taliban, once thought to rely mostly on Afghanistan's booming opium trade to finance its operations, is not drugs but foreign donations. The CIA recently estimated that Taliban leaders and their allies received $106 million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan...

More at The Washington Post.

McChrystal Says Insurgents Are Winning Communications Battle - Walter Pincus, Washington Post.

The United States and its allies in Afghanistan must "wrest the information initiative" from the Taliban and other insurgent groups that have undermined the credibility of the Kabul government and its international backers, according to the top US and NATO commander in the country. "The information domain is a battlespace," Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal wrote in an assessment made public on Monday, adding that the allies need to "take aggressive actions to win the important battle of perception."

As an initial step, McChrystal wants to change the goal of public relations efforts in Afghanistan from a "struggle for the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan population to one of giving them 'trust and confidence' " in themselves and their government. At the same time, he said, more effort should be made to "discredit and diminish insurgents and their extremist allies' capability to influence attitudes and behavior in Afghanistan." One way to accomplish that, McChrystal wrote, is to target insurgent networks "to disrupt and degrade" their effectiveness. Another is to expose what he calls the insurgents' "flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran," including indiscriminate use of violence and terrorism, and attacks on schools and development projects...

More at The Washington Post.

Let's Beat the Extremists Like We Beat the Soviets - Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Post opinion.

America's long war, which began on Oct. 7, 2001, when US bombs and missiles started falling on Afghanistan, has become the longest in this country's history. The eighth anniversary of the conflict beckons, with no end in sight.

The counterinsurgency campaign proposed in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's strategic assessment will prolong the war for an additional five or 10 years. The war's most ardent proponents insist that President Obama has no choice: It's either fight on or invite another 9/11.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to a global counterinsurgency campaign. Instead of fighting an endless hot war in a vain effort to eliminate the jihadist threat, the United States should wage a cold war to keep the threat at bay. Such a strategy worked before. It can work again...

More at The Washington Post.

Go All-In, Or Fold - Rajiv Chandrasekaren, Washington Post opinion.

... Waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign with current force levels could prove impossible. The 10,000 Marines deployed to Helmand province and the 4,000 Army soldiers in Stryker armored vehicles who were sent to Kandahar - all among the 21,000 troops authorized by Obama this year - may be able to improve security in the towns and districts where they are operating. But those are just a few spots on the map; there would still be plenty of populated areas in Helmand and Kandahar with few or no NATO troops. It is to those places, districts to the north of where the Strykers are, and to the west of where the Marines are, that the Taliban fighters have retreated. And it is from those places, military officials believe, that the insurgents will seek to destabilize whatever gains the new US forces make.

In theory, once the districts with the Marines and the Strykers become more stable, and once Afghan police and soldiers become capable of ensuring security, US forces can move on to the next trouble spots. The problem is that creating effective Afghan security forces takes time, and it will not be solved by adding a few thousand more trainers. Without more US troops, those sanctuaries will remain unchallenged and will pose an ongoing risk to McChrystal's protect-the-population effort.

All of which brings some here back to the extremes: Either you go all-in, or you fold...

More at The Washington Post.

What's the Right Strategy for Afghanistan? - Washington Post's Topic A opinions.

The Post asked foreign policy experts whether President Obama should maintain a focus on protecting the population and rebuilding the country, or on striking terrorists. Below are contributions from Jane Harman, Kurt Volker, Gilles Dorronsoro, John Nagl, Ronald E. Neumann, Meghan O'Sullivan and Carl M. Levin.

Topic A at The Washington Post.

"A Few Random Thoughts on COIN Theory and the Future" (or A Partial Response to the Small Wars Journal Weekend Homework Assignment!!!)

By Colonel David Maxwell

The re-emergence of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory has been important and necessary for the development of US military doctrine in the 21st century and has contributed to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in critically important ways. However, COIN seems to have evolved into a strategic doctrine and perhaps has itself become the basis for US Grand, National Security, and National Military Strategy. This begs some questions.

Is COIN theory the basis for 21st Century US Grand, National Security, and National Military Strategy?

Should COIN theory be the basis for 21st Century US Grand, National Security, and National Military Strategy?

Assuming that COIN theory in and of itself should not be the basis of 21st Century US Grand and National Security Strategy what should form the basis for it?

What if anything could form the basis of Grand, National Security, and National Military Strategy?

I think there needs to be an underlying strategic theory to form the basis for strategy development - but is there a replacement for George Kennan's Containment theory? We seem to have replaced containment of the communist threat with the theory that we can change the conditions (on a regional and global scale) that give rise to terror and insurgency. We have developed a mindset (either knowingly or unknowingly, I cannot be sure) that we think we can change nations, tribes, and cultures to cause them to act in our interests.

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Remember readers, your homework assignment is to download the current draft of the U.S. Army's Capstone Concept, read it, and provide comments. BG H.R. McMaster and his staff at TRADOC will read those comments and use them to improve this important doctrinal publication.

You will find complete instructions for your homework assignment at this link.

This is your chance to influence U.S. Army doctrine. Time is running out and woe unto those who fail to complete this assignment ... ;)

Two items recommended via e-mail by SWJ readers this morning:

Troops In Afghanistan Keep Nightmare At Bay - Scott Simon, National Public Radio (text and audio).

It was the crime of al-Qaida terrorists, whom the Taliban let use Afghanistan, that brought the US and NATO there. But even if al-Qaida now hides in the hills of Pakistan, for many of us who saw the Taliban's brutal and bloody abuse of their own people, it would seem another crime to let such murderers take power again.

US Forces Move Into Central Afghan City - Kevin Maurer, Associated Press.

The event showed how these dozen Special Force soldiers have joined in the daily life of the town's 95,000 residents since they moved in a month ago. The team is among only a few US troops to live in the midst of Afghans, but there will likely be more. The hope is to push Special Forces teams into villages throughout Afghanistan, giving them the mission of rebuilding and training Afghan police and soldiers.

The Iran Attack Plan - Anthony Cordesman, Wall Street Journal.

Iran's acknowledgment that it is developing a second uranium-enrichment facility does little to dispel the view that the regime is developing a weapons program. Israel must consider not just whether to proceed with a strike against Iran - but how.

... Iran has all of the technology and production and manufacturing capabilities needed for fission weapons. It has acquired the technology to make the explosives needed for a gun or implosion device, the triggering components, and the neutron initiator and reflectors. It has experimented with machine uranium and plutonium processing. It has put massive resources into a medium-range missile program that has the range payload to carry nuclear weapons and that makes no sense with conventional warheads. It has also worked on nuclear weapons designs for missile warheads. These capabilities are dispersed in many facilities in many cities and remote areas, and often into many buildings in each facility - each of which would have to be a target in an Israeli military strike.

It is far from certain that such action would be met with success. An Israeli strike on Iran would be far more challenging than the Israeli strike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. An effective Israeli nuclear strike may not be possible, yet a regional nuclear arms race is a game that Iran can start, but cannot possibly win. Anyone who meets regularly with senior Israeli officials, officers and experts knows that Israel is considering military options, but considering them carefully and with an understanding that they pose serious problems and risks.

One of the fundamental problems dogging Israel, especially concerning short-ranged fighters and fighter-bombers, is distance. Iran's potential targets are between 950 and 1,400 miles from Israel, the far margin of the ranges Israeli fighters can reach, even with aerial refueling. Israel would be hard-pressed to destroy all of Iran's best-known targets. What's more, Iran has had years in which to build up covert facilities, disperse elements of its nuclear and missile programs, and develop options for recovering from such an attack...

More at The Wall Street Journal.