Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/17/2009 - 11:47pm | 0 comments
Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan - Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Witnesses were Dr. John Nagl, President, Center for a New American Security (prepared statement); Dr. Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (prepared statement); and Rory Stewart, Director, Carr Center on Human Rights Policy (prepared statement). A video recording of the hearing can be found here (click on the title).
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/17/2009 - 11:09pm | 4 comments
Afghanistan is Hard All the Time, but It's Doable - David Petraeus, The Times opinion (General David Petraeus is Commander, United States Central Command. This is an edited and abridged version of a speech that he gave last night at a Policy Exchange event in London).

... Countering terrorists and extremism requires more than a conventional military approach. Military operations enable you to clear areas of extremist and insurgent elements, and to stop them from putting themselves back together. But the core of any counterinsurgency strategy must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.

Focusing on the population can, if done properly, improve security for local people and help to extend basic services. It can help to delegitimise the methods of the extremists - especially if you can contrast your ability and willingness to support and protect the population with the often horrific actions of extremist groups. Indeed, exposing their extremist ideologies, indiscriminate violence and oppressive practices can help people to realise that their lives are unlikely to be improved if under the control of such movements.

For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution...

More at The Times.

by Robert Haddick | Thu, 09/17/2009 - 6:36pm | 8 comments
Today President Obama scrapped the Bush administration's plan to install 10 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles and a high-powered radar in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, Obama proposed a distributed four-phase build-up of missile defense capability in Europe, focusing at first on the shorter range missile threats from Iran and later on potential intermediate (IRBM) and intercontinental (ICBM) range threats. Progressively improved versions of the U.S. Navy's Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) will be the centerpiece of the new architecture.

The Obama announcement (followed up by a press conference with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General James Cartwright, USMC) is essentially a redefinition of the U.S. response to the broad Iranian ballistic missile threat. The Bush plan was focused on hedging against an Iranian IRBM/ICBM threat, thought to be possible around 2015. The Iranian short and medium range missile threat was always a known problem but in the Bush era was managed separately. The Obama team has redefined the "Europe missile defense" issue by encompassing the entire Iranian ballistic missile threat, which in the short run won't involve Europe at all (unless you count Turkey in Europe).

In any case, here, lifted from the White House website, is the four-phase plan:

Click through to read more ...

by Dave Dilegge | Thu, 09/17/2009 - 5:04pm | 3 comments

The beat goes on, the beat goes on

Drums keep pounding a rhythm to the brain

La de da de de, la de da de da...

by Dave Dilegge | Thu, 09/17/2009 - 7:16am | 0 comments
I headed downtown last night to attend a reception for the kick-off of American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies. AEI was a first-class host (h/t to Tom Donnelly and crew) making for a very enjoyable evening. CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen was the guest of honor and he delivered an insightful overview address concerning national security issues in general and of course Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq in particular.

The Center for Defense Studies can be found here. From the "About" page:

The American Enterprise Institute is pleased to announce the creation of its Center for Defense Studies (CDS). The primary purpose of the center is to impart a distinct identity to the scholarship on defense issues and military affairs currently produced at AEI, while signaling a new, focused intent to pursue rigorous studies and analysis on a range of strategic, programmatic, and budgetary issues.

The center will be anchored by a series of targeted studies and reports. The American military establishment is an enormous and complex institution, only occasionally (and usually in moments of crisis) amenable to decisive direction, but also requiring constant smaller course corrections. For every major strategic point of deflection in American defense policy, there are dozens of programmatic, budgetary, and force posture decisions and assessments to be made. One purpose of CDS will be to better shape and influence these decisions, to the extent that they both determine larger strategic choices and are the systemic expressions of American strategic purposes. To that end, CDS has undertaken the following projects:

- a study, cosponsored by the Brookings Institution, on the emerging requirements for U.S. nuclear forces which will re-examine the purpose and posture of America's strategic systems and capabilities;

- a comprehensive assessment of American security commitments and defense requirements modeled on the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review;

- an ongoing study on the performance of the first Stryker brigade deployed to Afghanistan, undertaken in an effort to better understand and communicate to policymakers the technological requirements for conducting mounted operations in the theater;

- an evaluation of the "hard power" capabilities of America's allies and security partners—and how they impact U.S. defense spending and alliance culture.

To complement these scholarly efforts, CDS will also host a blog, FYSA "For Your Situational Awareness" where AEI scholars and others will regularly post commentary and analysis. The CDS website also features a frequently updated column titled "Must Reads," designed to highlight a selection of noteworthy books, reports, and articles which are (or should be) informing and driving the day's defense policy debates.

We hope that the website serves as a useful resource, and we welcome your comments.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/16/2009 - 6:08am | 1 comment
Afghanistan's Other Front - Joseph Kearns Goodwin, New York Times opinion.

Allegations of ballot-stuffing in the presidential election in Afghanistan last month are now so widespread that a recount is necessary, and perhaps even a runoff. Yet this electoral chicanery pales in comparison to the systemic, day-to-day corruption within the administration of President Hamid Karzai, who has claimed victory in the election. Without a concerted campaign to fight this pervasive venality, all our efforts there, including the sending of additional troops, will be in vain.

I have just returned from Afghanistan, where I spent seven months as a special adviser to NATO's director of communications. On listening tours across the country, we left behind the official procession of armored SUV's, bristling guns and imposing flak jackets that too often encumber coalition forces when they arrive in local villages. Dressed in civilian clothes and driven in ordinary cars, we were able to move around in a manner less likely to intimidate and more likely to elicit candor.

The recurring complaint I heard from Afghans centered on the untenable encroachment of government corruption into their daily lives - the homeowner who has to pay a bribe to get connected to the sewage system, the defendant who tenders payment to a judge for a favorable verdict. People were so incensed with the current government's misdeeds that I often heard the disturbing refrain: "If Karzai is re-elected, then I am going to join the Taliban." ...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/16/2009 - 5:16am | 1 comment
Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge US Afghan Force - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

The nation's top military officer pushed back Tuesday against Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time.

That assessment by the officer, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stopped short of an explicit request for more troops. But it signals that the military intends to have a public voice in the evolving debate as many Democrats express reluctance to expand the war and President Obama weighs options...

Moer at The New York Times.

Call for an Afghan Surge - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

America's top military officer endorsed sending more US troops to Afghanistan, a shift in Pentagon rhetoric that heralds a potential deepening of involvement in the Afghan war despite flagging support from the public and top Democrats in Congress. Addressing a Senate panel, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered no new details about how many American reinforcements will be needed in Afghanistan. But his comments mean that both Adm. Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who spoke on the subject last week, now appear —to order more forces to Afghanistan despite their earlier skepticism about expanding the American military presence there.

Their support makes it easier for President Barack Obama to approve the plans of Gen. Stanley McChrystal - whom the Obama administration installed as the top American commander in Kabul - when he submits a formal request later this month for as many as 40,000 new troops, in addition to 62,000 now there...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Mullen: More Troops 'Probably' Needed - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.

The nation's top military officer told Congress on Tuesday that the US war in Afghanistan "probably needs more forces" and sought to reassure lawmakers skeptical of sending additional troops that commanders were devising new tactics that would lead to victory over a resurgent Taliban.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that 2,000 to 4,000 additional military trainers from the United States and its NATO partners will be needed to "jump-start" the expansion of Afghan security forces and strongly suggested that more US combat troops will be required to provide security in the short term. "A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably needs more forces," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mullen spoke amid a growing political debate over Afghanistan as President Obama weighs a recently completed assessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander there...

More at The Washington Post.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen Says More Troops Probably Needed in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

Facing increasingly skeptical congressional Democrats, the nation's top uniformed officer said Tuesday that the Obama administration's strategy to counter Afghanistan militants probably means that more troops will be needed there. The comments are likely to sharpen an intensifying national debate over the future of the mission in Afghanistan that could force President Obama to decide between military leaders pushing for more firepower and his political base wary of a quagmire. Growing numbers of Democrats, including top congressional leaders, have expressed doubts about increasing the number of combat troops.

Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday that he had not received a formal request for additional trainers and combat troops. But Mullen said that, based on the strategy outlined by Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top allied commander in Afghanistan, a larger force is likely to be needed. "He is alarmed by the insurgency, and he is in a position where he needs to retake the initiative from the insurgents, who have grabbed it over the last three years," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

President Obama's Top Military Adviser Exposes Afghanistan Rifts - Giles Whittell, Michael Evans and Catherine Philp, The Times.

Deep rifts at the heart of Western policy on Afghanistan were laid bare yesterday when President Obama's top military adviser challenged him to authorise a troop surge that his most senior congressional allies have said they will oppose. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that more US troops as well as a rapid increase in the size and capability of the Afghan army were needed to carry out the President's own strategy for prevailing in Afghanistan as the eighth anniversary of a debilitating war approaches.

His remarks to a Senate hearing came as Bob Ainsworth, the British Defence Secretary, said that the Taleban had proven a resilient enemy. "We're far from succeeding against them yet but I reject that we're not making progress," he said at King's College London. Mr Obama also rejected claims that Afghanistan was turning into a quagmire akin to Vietnam, but his immediate dilemma is political: approving a surge could trigger a high-level mutiny within his own party. Making matters worse, a new poll showed that public support for the war has slumped since April...

More at The Times.

by Dave Dilegge | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 8:30pm | 9 comments
Between the day job requirements and scouring the 'Net to bring you the most relevant Small Wars related news and commentary there are points in time where I just want to say -- too much -- make it stop! That said, here are several items I really would like to comment on or excerpt more completely but just do not have the time. I offer them up in digest form for your consideration.

Tara McKelvey at Columbia Journalism Review takes a cheap and shallow shot at Tom Ricks in Too Close for Comfort? - as do several in the comments section. I'd respond, but why bother when someone much more informed about such matters can do it much more eloquently? See Jamie McIntyre's CFR's Errant Dart at Line of Departure. Money quote: And the primary charge against Tom Ricks seems to be that he's done too much research, talked to too many people, knows too much history, and is unafraid to say what he really thinks.

Speaking of Tom Ricks - he has several interesting posts up at Best Defense - Marine generals to Cheney: Knock it off, mac. Money quote: ... we never imagined that we would feel duty-bound to publicly denounce a vice president of the United States, a man who has served our country for many years. In light of the irresponsible statements recently made by former Vice President Dick Cheney, however, we feel we must repudiate his dangerous ideas -- and his scare tactics. Also see Tom's Rory Stewart on being a government consultant. Money quote: It's like they're coming in and saying to you, 'I'm going to drive my car off a cliff. Should I or should I not wear a seatbelt?' And you say, 'I don't think you should drive your car off the cliff.' And they say, No, no, that bit's already been decided -- the question is whether to wear a seatbelt.' And you say, 'Well, you might as well wear a seatbelt.' And then they say, 'We've consulted with policy expert Rory Stewart and he says ... And speaking of Rory Stewart, Emily Stokes over at The Financial Times as a great synopsis of her interview with Rory - Lunch with the FT. Certainly an interesting man living in interesting times.

At The National - Foreign Correspondent Gretchen Peters reports on an expert panel that says NATO has lost trust of Afghans - serious stuff if true and something that cannot be taken lightly.

Moving on, The Associated Press' John Milburn has penned a decent overview of the U.S. Army's advisor training program at The Columbus Ledger-Enquirer. Bottom-line: the mission is moving from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, and significantly expanding. Good news.

Joshua Foust at Registan, not one of our fans but that is most certainly okay with us, offers up the case for Afghanistan in regards to recent historical considerations. This is part 3 of a ? part series...

The GAO offers up a US NORTHCOM "report card" in a very recent Homeland Defense report to Congress titled U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.

Chris Schnaubelt has a very nice research piece at the NATO Defence College's web page - NATO and the New U.S. "Afpak" Policy - bottom line is we can do better. Dr. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the College.

There's more but out of time - I'll leave you with sites (not all inclusive mind you) I should be reading more - given eight days a week - Ex's Abu Muqawama, Best Defense - Tom Ricks again, AFPAK Channel at Foreign Policy, Marc Lynch also at FP, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Max Boot at Contentions, Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal, Steve Coll at The Think Tank, Danger Room - especially Noah, Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement, GrEaT sAtAn'S gIrLfRiEnD - still figuring that one out - but I like it, In Harmonium, Information Dissemination, Kings of War, The Lede at the NYT and thanks for the link guys, SWJ great friend Matt Armstrong's MountainRunner, Outside the Beltway, Schmedlap, Shadow Government at FP, The Long War Journal's The Threat Matrix, Joshua Foust's Registan, the whole crew at Threats Watch, uber-embed and boots on the ground reporter David Wood, Spencer Ackerman at The Washington Independent, Wings Over Iraq, Michael Yon - another boots on the ground - never comes home kinda guy, and of course Zenpundit aka Mark Safranski - always last but not least.

I've missed a few I like a lot, I'm sure...

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 5:30pm | 6 comments
Alternate Viewpoint on the Somalia Strike and Offshore Balancing

By Tom Donnelly

OK, I'll take the bait.

To offer the killing of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan as evidence of the success of a strategy of "offshore balancing" would be myopic in the extreme. By press accounts, it was a very well conducted SEAL raid, but let's not confuse good tactics with good strategy.

Let's begin with U.S. strategy toward Somalia. Since the withdrawal from Mogadishu in the wake of the "Black Hawk Down" incident -- and let's remember why this was Osama bin Laden's favorite movie, an exemplar of America the "weak horse," unable to run the course -- keeping that failed state from becoming an al Qaeda haven has been a very narrowly run thing, at best. Arguably, the single most effective step in accomplishing that goal was the Ethiopian invasion that removed the Islamic Courts Union. Certainly, our support to the various UN-approved governments there hasn't made a lasting impact -- local "proxies" or "indigenous forces" have failed to establish anything remotely resembling stability. We've been safely offshore, but haven't achieved much balance.

Click through to read more ...

by Robert Haddick | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 12:56pm | 2 comments
Three stories in today's news connect directly to themes discussed here at the Small Wars Journal blog. These three themes are central and unresolved questions about how the U.S. and the West should protect themselves from global terror threats.

Somalia strike and offshore balancing

A helicopter-borne U.S. special operations group, apparently operating from a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean, attacked and killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan along with several of his associates along a road in southern Somalia. According to the cited New York Times article, the U.S. special operations soldiers recovered the bodies and presumably other interesting intelligence products from the site.

This strike will boost the argument for "offshore balancing," a subject of intense discussion after an email by General Charles Krulak, USMC (ret) in support of offshore balancing for Afghanistan found its way to Small Wars Journal blog.

Click through to read more ...

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 11:10am | 0 comments
Afghanistan Troop Request May Contain Political Fail-Safe - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent.

A forthcoming request from the commander of US troops in Afghanistan for additional resources for the war is likely to take the form of a palette of options, not simply an appeal for more troops, according to Obama administration officials. Combined with a recent congressional proposal to delay a troop request, the options request might allow President Obama to avoid the politically thorny question of ordering a second escalation of US forces in Afghanistan this year.

Administration officials said that the widespread expectation within the administration was that Gen. Stanley McChrystal would present Obama with a series of options for how to resource the US effort to combat the deterioration of security in Afghanistan, along with a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of each. Among the options anticipated by the officials: an accelerated increase in Afghan security forces; the transference of US or Afghan troops to relatively volatile parts of the country; substituting US support troops for US combat troops while holding overall troop levels static; or increasing US troops in total. The officials would not speak for attribution, citing the sensitivity of the internal Afghanistan debate...

More at The Washington Independent.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 5:37am | 0 comments

Rageh Omaar, Al-Jazeera International, investigates the US' military and political strategy for Africa and how its relationship with the continent may change under US president Obama. The first part of the documentary (Witness - America's New Frontline) can be seen from Sunday, September 20; and the second part airs from Sunday, September 27. US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) cooperated with Al-Jazeera, in the filming of this documentary.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 4:13am | 2 comments
Obama Rejects Afghanistan-Vietnam Comparison - John Harwood, New York Times.

President Obama rejected comparisons on Monday between the war in Afghanistan and the conflict in Vietnam a generation ago, but he expressed concern about "the dangers of overreach" and pledged a full debate before making further decisions on strategy. The president's comments, in an interview at the White House with The New York Times and CNBC, appeared to be a response to rising unease within his own party in Congress about the possibility of the United States becoming bogged down in Afghanistan.

Asked whether he worried about repeating the fate of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to seek re-election in 1968 as a result of the turmoil over Vietnam, Mr. Obama replied: "You have to learn lessons from history. On the other hand, each historical moment is different. You never step into the same river twice. And so Afghanistan is not Vietnam." But, he added, "The dangers of overreach and not having clear goals and not having strong support from the American people, those are all issues that I think about all the time."

The president promised to weigh the recommendation of the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on whether the United States should commit more troops. But he took issue with assertions that the job of dismantling terrorism networks can be handled by drones and other alternatives to soldiers on the ground...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/15/2009 - 3:42am | 3 comments
US Kills Top Qaeda Leader in Southern Somalia - Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, New York Times.

American commandos killed one of the most wanted Islamic militants in Africa in a daylight raid in southern Somalia on Monday, according to American and Somali officials, an indication of the Obama administration's willingness to use combat troops strategically against Al Qaeda's growing influence in the region.

Western intelligence agents have described the militant, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, as the ringleader of a Qaeda cell in Kenya responsible for the bombing of an Israeli hotel on the Kenyan coast in 2002. Mr. Nabhan may have also played a role in the attacks on two American embassies in East Africa in 1998...

More at The New York Times.

US Says Raid in Somalia Killed Terrorist With Links to Al-Qaeda - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

Helicopter-borne Special Forces troops attacked and killed a top al-Qaeda-linked suspect in a raid in southern Somalia early Monday, US officials said. Officials said Saleh Ali Nabhan, 30, a Kenyan sought in the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned resort in Kenya and an unsuccessful attempt that year to shoot down an Israeli airliner, was among four men killed in the attack. US troops fired from the air at a vehicle in which the men were traveling.

At least four helicopters participated in the raid, launched from a nearby US naval vessel, a senior military official said. At least one of them landed, and troops retrieved the bodies. "You want to go in there, do this fast, and get out before you're detected," the official said...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/14/2009 - 5:55am | 4 comments
Time to Deal in Afghanistan - Fareed Zakaria, Washington Post opinion.

It is time to get real about Afghanistan. Withdrawal is not a serious option. The United States, NATO, the European Union and others have invested massively in stabilizing that country over the past eight years, and they should not abandon it because the Taliban is proving a tougher foe than anticipated. But there is still a large gap between the goals the Obama administration is outlining and the means available to achieve them. This gap is best closed not by sending in tens of thousands of more troops but, rather, by understanding the limits of what we can reasonably achieve in Afghanistan.

The most important reality of the post-Sept. 11 world has been the lack of any major follow-up attack. That's largely because al-Qaeda has been on the run in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The campaign against terrorist groups in both countries rests on ground forces and intelligence. A senior US military official involved in planning these campaigns told me that America's presence in Afghanistan has been the critical element in the successful strikes against al-Qaeda leaders and camps. Were America to leave the scene, all the region's players would start jockeying for influence over Afghanistan. That would almost certainly mean the revival of the poisonous alliance between the Pakistani military and the hardest-line elements of the Taliban...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 11:30pm | 0 comments
Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan - Lindsey Graham, Joseph I. Lieberman and John McCain, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Growing numbers of Americans are starting to doubt whether we should have troops in Afghanistan and whether the war there is even winnable. We are confident that not only is it winnable, but that we have no choice. We must prevail in Afghanistan. We went to war there because the 9/11 attacks were a direct consequence of the safe haven given to al Qaeda in that country under the Taliban. We remain at war because a resurgent Taliban, still allied with al Qaeda, is trying to restore its brutal regime and re-establish that country as a terrorist safe haven.

It remains a clear, vital national interest of the United States to prevent this from happening. Yet an increasing number of commentators, including some of the very same individuals who opposed the surge in Iraq and called for withdrawal there, now declare Afghanistan essentially unwinnable. Had their view prevailed with respect to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, the consequences of our failure there would have been catastrophic.

Similarly, the ramifications of an American defeat in Afghanistan would not only be a devastating setback for our nation in what is now the central front in the global war on terror, but would inevitably further destabilize neighboring, nuclear Pakistan. Those who advocate such a course were wrong about Iraq, and they are wrong about Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by Crispin Burke | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 12:55pm | 21 comments
In the past two days, the debate has heated up at Small Wars Journal between two exceptionally brilliant officers regarding the future of NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan. On one side of the debate is Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, author of a critique of military organizational culture entitled "A Failure in Generalship". The other is noted "COINtra", Col. Gian Gentile, a history professor at West Point.

Much of the debate centers over a series of articles and rebuttals which have occurred over the past six weeks, but intensifying with George Will's exhortation to give up on nation-building in Afghanistan and pursue al Qaeda via "over-the-horizon" capabilities. Will was joined by General Charles Krulak, the former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, who also echoed many of Will's arguments in an e-mail earlier this week. Both George Will and General Krulak--as well as many within the defense community, such as Col. Gian Gentile and Col. TX Hammes--feel that Afghanistan has outlived its strategic relevance due to al Qaeda's relocation into Pakistan and the perceived futility of building a nation-state in Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Yingling, on the other hand, feels that population-centric counterinsurgency can work in Afghanistan, given the right amount of troops and time. To Yingling, building a stable nation-state in Afghanistan is a necessary step in countering al Qaeda. Other prominent military thinkers agree with Yingling, such as retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, president of the Washington-based think-tank, Center for a New American Security.

Our professional community thrives on respectful, professional debate, such as the debate that exists over the strategic and operational goals in Afghanistan. We owe it to the men and women of ISAF to decide whether or not Afghanistan warrants further involvement, and if the situation does warrant involvement, we must determine the best course towards achieving ISAF's goals...

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 12:25pm | 0 comments
An Afghan Headache - The Australian editorial.

Washington wants closure, but election fallout continues. Realpolitik suggests that the sooner a functioning government can be established in Kabul the better. But after weeks of revelations about widespread fraud in the August 20 election, the prospect of moving on quickly in Afghanistan remains elusive. At the weekend, opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah urged supporters not to take to the streets in protest, but insisted he would not be part of a national unity government with President Hamid Karzai - the solution being pressed by the international community.

With about 90 per cent of the vote counted, Mr Karzai has more than 54per cent support but the stories of bribery and ballot-box interference have destroyed confidence in the outcome. Monitors suggest up to 23per cent of votes counted so far could be fraudulent, according to a report in The Sunday Times.

It's a mess, but the problem is what happens next as governments involved in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force face falling domestic support for involvement in Afghanistan. It is a particular headache for the US, which favoured Mr Karzai in the first presidential election in 2004. With Americans increasingly unhappy about their troops in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama needs the electoral debacle to go away before it undermines his military strategy...

More at The Australian.

by Gian Gentile | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 9:19am | 29 comments
Nation Building at the Barrel of an American Gun?

A Short Reply to the Dubik and Kagans' Washington Post Oped

Lieutenant General James Dubik, Dr Kim Kagan, and Dr Fred Kagan, the three authors of a Sunday Washington Post oped titled The Afghan Illusion: Kabul's Forces Aren't Yet a Substitute for Our Own, conclude their Oped with this statement:

"Building Afghan forces dramatically is part of a strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan and permitting the reduction of foreign forces. It cannot, however, be the whole strategy."

And to ask this reoccurring question one more time, what is the "whole strategy"? Although the authors do not come out and say it, armed nation building is clearly the "whole" strategy.

Why do we think nation building at the barrel of an American gun can work in Afghanistan? The authors cleverly tell us at the end of the article that the building up of the Afghani National Forces will allow the Americans to "begin" to reduce their footprint in 2011. But then again, that statement is followed by the idea that building Afghani forces is part of a larger strategy of (implied) nation building which I infer from the piece actually requires a generational effort. Realistically and being blunt and honest how could building an Afghanistan Nation up from what it is now take anything less than a generation?

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 6:49am | 0 comments
The Afghan Illusion - Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and James M. Dubik, Washington Post opinion.

While some are discussing whether the US presence in Afghanistan should be maintained, the Obama administration does not appear to be seriously considering withdrawal. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and others have instead proposed expanding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) first and raising US force levels only if that approach is unsuccessful. This option holds out hope of success without the need to send more US troops, but we believe it is illusory.

Withdrawal now would allow Afghanistan to again become a haven for terrorists. It would destabilize Pakistan by giving refuge to terrorist and insurgent groups attacking Islamabad and by strengthening the forces within the Pakistani government and security forces that continue to support the Taliban as a hedging strategy against precisely such an American retreat. Pursuing an offshore strategy of surgical strikes using aircraft and Special Forces units would destabilize Pakistan for the same reasons. Further, if such a strategy could work against al-Qaeda, the commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal - the most accomplished practitioner of Special Forces counterterrorism campaigns - would be advocating it. Instead, he is advocating counterinsurgency...

More at The Washington Post.

by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 09/13/2009 - 12:22am | 0 comments
Commander Steve Tatham, Royal Navy, who recently authored Tactical Strategic Communication! - Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command for British Army Review and republished here at Small Wars Journal, also penned Strategic Communication: A Primer.

The concept of Strategic Communication had, until late 2008, received only scant attention in the UK. However the production of the UK's counterinsurgency doctrine (still to be definitively named but catalogued as Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution) presented an opportunity for this to be addressed in what was to be a chapter on military influence.

That the doctrine has still not been published, after nearly two years of development, is indicative of the difficulties the British Armed Forces are experienceing in articulating not just lessons learned from Iraq and on-going operations in Afghanistan - but also in applying the same to future scenarios. To assist the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its work the UK Defence Academy's Director of Communication Research; Commander Tatham, a media operations expert and author of the 2006 polemic study 'Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion; produced and published the Strategic Communication Primer in late 2008. This document attempts the first definition of strategic communication by the UK and considers some of the problems of communication in 21st Century conflict, settling on the pragmatic complexity model presented by Arizona State's Consortium for Strategic Communication. Tatham's primer has been followed by the roll out of a Strategic Communication education program across all UK Staff Courses. Trialed initially on the UK's Tri-Service Warrant Officer's course - where the concept was warmly welcomed - it has subsequently been rolled out to the initial (8 week) staff courses (for Lieutenants and Captains), the Advanced (1 year) staff course (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) and the Higher Staff Course for very senior officers.

Key in Tatham's findings are the belief that Strategic Communication is not simply the tighter binding of Information Operations, Public Affairs, etal, but that Strategic Communication should be a core component of the Command function; that recognizing every action, however benign it may superficially appear, will generate an informational effect. That effect can alter perception and for many perception equals reality. Tatham advised Brigadier (now Major General) Andrew Mackay during his planning for 52 Brigade British Army deployment to Helmand. Mackay centralized the idea, from lowest private to the highest ranks, that popular consent was vital and the story of his preparation and deployment is told in the recent British Army Review article by Commander Tatham linked above.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/12/2009 - 5:09am | 4 comments
Why Afghanistan Matters - Clifford D. May, Washington Times opinion.

Eight years ago this week, Osama bin Laden watched and then celebrated as a terrorist attack he had authorized brought down the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon, slaughtering thousands of innocent Americans.

Bin Laden was, at that time, in Afghanistan, which was, at that time, ruled by the Taliban. Soon, US forces and their anti-Taliban Afghan allies would chase bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar across the border into the wild tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. From that base, they would organize an insurgency against US and NATO forces and a new Afghan government.

Conservatives are now divided over this conflict. The debate on the right is interesting but academic. Barack Obama - no conservative - is president. During his campaign for the White House, he blasted President Bush for diverting to Iraq resources needed for Afghanistan, the "good war," the war that, he emphasized, must be fought and won.

If Mr. Obama intends for this mission to succeed, he will have to return to this theme. He will have to use his not-inconsiderable powers of persuasion to make the case that Afghanistan is both worth winning and winnable. If he cannot bring himself to do that - with at least as much passion as he has put into the debate on health care - support for Afghanistan will collapse, and nothing pro-mission conservatives say, write or do will prevent it. Does history offer any precedent of an ambivalent commander in chief leading a nation to victory in war? ...

More at The Washington Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/12/2009 - 3:02am | 0 comments
Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom - Matt Armstrong, Foreign Policy.

The State Department suffers from low morale, bottlenecks, and bureaucratic inepititude. Do we need to kill it to save it?

Discussion over the fate of Foggy Bottom usually focuses on the tenure of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the troubles of public diplomacy, and the rise of special envoys on everything from European pipelines to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Americans would benefit more from a reassessment of the core functionality of the US State Department.

Years of neglect and marginalization, as well as a dearth of long-term vision and strategic planning, have left the 19th-century institution hamstrung with fiefdoms and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The Pentagon now funds and controls a wide range of foreign-policy and diplomatic priorities - from development to public diplomacy and beyond. The world has changed, with everyone from politicians to talking heads to terrorists directly influencing global audiences. The most pressing issues are stateless: pandemics, recession, terrorism, poverty, proliferation, and conflict. But as report after report, investigation after investigation, has highlighted, the State Department is broken and paralyzed, unable to respond to the new 21st-century paradigm...

More at Foreign Policy.

Preparing to Lose the Information War? - Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner.

It has now been eight years since 9/11 and we finally seem to understand that in the modern struggles against terrorism, insurgency, and instability, the tools of public diplomacy are invaluable and essential. We live in a world where an individual with a camera phone can wield more influence than an F-22 stealth fighter jet. The capability of engaging public audiences has long been thought of as the domain of civilians. But for the past eight years, the functions, authorities, and funding for engaging global audiences, from anti-AIDS literature to soccer balls to development projects, has migrated from the State Department to the Defense Department. It seems whole forests have fallen over the same period on the need to enhance civilian agencies - be it the State Department or a new USIA-like entity - to provide a valid alternative to the Defense Department who most, even the detractors, agree was filling a void left by civilians who abrogated their responsibility for one reason or another.

This summer may be a turning point. Some in Congress have unilaterally decided that 2010 is the year America's public diplomacy will stop wearing combat boots. Sounds good, right? This is the future most, including analysts and the military, have wished for. The military has been the un—(if passionate once engaged) and often clumsy surrogate and partner for the State Department in representing the US and its interests in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world through what the House Armed Services Committee now calls "military public diplomacy." In some regions, State is almost wholly dependent on Defense money and resources to accomplish its mandate...

More at MountainRunner.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 09/11/2009 - 8:19pm | 1 comment
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1. A U.S.-Gulf alliance against Iran?

2. Karzai has some thinking to do.

by Jonathan Morgenstein | Fri, 09/11/2009 - 6:55pm | 8 comments
Many of those advocating drawing down from Afghanistan argue that we have been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years, and if we haven't won the war by now, we never will. The reality is that the White House has only really dedicated the effort to win for just over eight weeks, not eight years. This a worthy cause. Only if we control the ground in Afghanistan can we hunt and kill Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The men and women who served on the ground in Afghanistan who have risked and often sacrificed their lives since the awful events of September 11th have been trying to win from the very beginning, but over time they were abandoned by a Bush administration more interested in taking the fight to Iraq. Now the Obama administration is trying to salvage America's War in Afghanistan, which we've been truly fighting for only eight weeks, after the Bush Administration basically lost the war over eight years.

The Obama administration is about to announce a major increase in our troop levels to Afghanistan. Voices on both the left and the right are emerging in opposition to our efforts to control the ground in Afghanistan so we can hunt and defeat al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. Many such opponents and supposedly impartial observers, from across the political spectrum (The Nation, George Will, and Time Magazine) have taken to calling the war in Afghanistan "Obama's War." They have laid the success or failure of the conflict at the feet of the eight-month-old Presidency of Barack Obama. This view misplaces the credit of how catastrophically the Bush administration failed in Afghanistan, and how much of a fully national effort will be required to turn this debacle around...