Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
More at The Times.
The Obama announcement (followed up by a press conference with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General James Cartwright, USMC) is essentially a redefinition of the U.S. response to the broad Iranian ballistic missile threat. The Bush plan was focused on hedging against an Iranian IRBM/ICBM threat, thought to be possible around 2015. The Iranian short and medium range missile threat was always a known problem but in the Bush era was managed separately. The Obama team has redefined the "Europe missile defense" issue by encompassing the entire Iranian ballistic missile threat, which in the short run won't involve Europe at all (unless you count Turkey in Europe).
In any case, here, lifted from the White House website, is the four-phase plan:
Click through to read more ...
The beat goes on, the beat goes on
Drums keep pounding a rhythm to the brain
La de da de de, la de da de da...
The Center for Defense Studies can be found here. From the "About" page:
The American Enterprise Institute is pleased to announce the creation of its Center for Defense Studies (CDS). The primary purpose of the center is to impart a distinct identity to the scholarship on defense issues and military affairs currently produced at AEI, while signaling a new, focused intent to pursue rigorous studies and analysis on a range of strategic, programmatic, and budgetary issues.
The center will be anchored by a series of targeted studies and reports. The American military establishment is an enormous and complex institution, only occasionally (and usually in moments of crisis) amenable to decisive direction, but also requiring constant smaller course corrections. For every major strategic point of deflection in American defense policy, there are dozens of programmatic, budgetary, and force posture decisions and assessments to be made. One purpose of CDS will be to better shape and influence these decisions, to the extent that they both determine larger strategic choices and are the systemic expressions of American strategic purposes. To that end, CDS has undertaken the following projects:
- a study, cosponsored by the Brookings Institution, on the emerging requirements for U.S. nuclear forces which will re-examine the purpose and posture of America's strategic systems and capabilities;- a comprehensive assessment of American security commitments and defense requirements modeled on the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review;
- an ongoing study on the performance of the first Stryker brigade deployed to Afghanistan, undertaken in an effort to better understand and communicate to policymakers the technological requirements for conducting mounted operations in the theater;
- an evaluation of the "hard power" capabilities of America's allies and security partners—and how they impact U.S. defense spending and alliance culture.
To complement these scholarly efforts, CDS will also host a blog, FYSA "For Your Situational Awareness" where AEI scholars and others will regularly post commentary and analysis. The CDS website also features a frequently updated column titled "Must Reads," designed to highlight a selection of noteworthy books, reports, and articles which are (or should be) informing and driving the day's defense policy debates.
We hope that the website serves as a useful resource, and we welcome your comments.
More at The New York Times.
Moer at The New York Times.
Call for an Afghan Surge - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.
America's top military officer endorsed sending more US troops to Afghanistan, a shift in Pentagon rhetoric that heralds a potential deepening of involvement in the Afghan war despite flagging support from the public and top Democrats in Congress. Addressing a Senate panel, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered no new details about how many American reinforcements will be needed in Afghanistan. But his comments mean that both Adm. Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who spoke on the subject last week, now appear —to order more forces to Afghanistan despite their earlier skepticism about expanding the American military presence there.Their support makes it easier for President Barack Obama to approve the plans of Gen. Stanley McChrystal - whom the Obama administration installed as the top American commander in Kabul - when he submits a formal request later this month for as many as 40,000 new troops, in addition to 62,000 now there...More at The Wall Street Journal.
Mullen: More Troops 'Probably' Needed - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.
The nation's top military officer told Congress on Tuesday that the US war in Afghanistan "probably needs more forces" and sought to reassure lawmakers skeptical of sending additional troops that commanders were devising new tactics that would lead to victory over a resurgent Taliban.Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that 2,000 to 4,000 additional military trainers from the United States and its NATO partners will be needed to "jump-start" the expansion of Afghan security forces and strongly suggested that more US combat troops will be required to provide security in the short term. "A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably needs more forces," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mullen spoke amid a growing political debate over Afghanistan as President Obama weighs a recently completed assessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander there...More at The Washington Post.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen Says More Troops Probably Needed in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.
Facing increasingly skeptical congressional Democrats, the nation's top uniformed officer said Tuesday that the Obama administration's strategy to counter Afghanistan militants probably means that more troops will be needed there. The comments are likely to sharpen an intensifying national debate over the future of the mission in Afghanistan that could force President Obama to decide between military leaders pushing for more firepower and his political base wary of a quagmire. Growing numbers of Democrats, including top congressional leaders, have expressed doubts about increasing the number of combat troops.Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday that he had not received a formal request for additional trainers and combat troops. But Mullen said that, based on the strategy outlined by Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top allied commander in Afghanistan, a larger force is likely to be needed. "He is alarmed by the insurgency, and he is in a position where he needs to retake the initiative from the insurgents, who have grabbed it over the last three years," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee...More at The Los Angeles Times.
President Obama's Top Military Adviser Exposes Afghanistan Rifts - Giles Whittell, Michael Evans and Catherine Philp, The Times.
Deep rifts at the heart of Western policy on Afghanistan were laid bare yesterday when President Obama's top military adviser challenged him to authorise a troop surge that his most senior congressional allies have said they will oppose. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that more US troops as well as a rapid increase in the size and capability of the Afghan army were needed to carry out the President's own strategy for prevailing in Afghanistan as the eighth anniversary of a debilitating war approaches.His remarks to a Senate hearing came as Bob Ainsworth, the British Defence Secretary, said that the Taleban had proven a resilient enemy. "We're far from succeeding against them yet but I reject that we're not making progress," he said at King's College London. Mr Obama also rejected claims that Afghanistan was turning into a quagmire akin to Vietnam, but his immediate dilemma is political: approving a surge could trigger a high-level mutiny within his own party. Making matters worse, a new poll showed that public support for the war has slumped since April...More at The Times.
Tara McKelvey at Columbia Journalism Review takes a cheap and shallow shot at Tom Ricks in Too Close for Comfort? - as do several in the comments section. I'd respond, but why bother when someone much more informed about such matters can do it much more eloquently? See Jamie McIntyre's CFR's Errant Dart at Line of Departure. Money quote: And the primary charge against Tom Ricks seems to be that he's done too much research, talked to too many people, knows too much history, and is unafraid to say what he really thinks.
Speaking of Tom Ricks - he has several interesting posts up at Best Defense - Marine generals to Cheney: Knock it off, mac. Money quote: ... we never imagined that we would feel duty-bound to publicly denounce a vice president of the United States, a man who has served our country for many years. In light of the irresponsible statements recently made by former Vice President Dick Cheney, however, we feel we must repudiate his dangerous ideas -- and his scare tactics. Also see Tom's Rory Stewart on being a government consultant. Money quote: It's like they're coming in and saying to you, 'I'm going to drive my car off a cliff. Should I or should I not wear a seatbelt?' And you say, 'I don't think you should drive your car off the cliff.' And they say, No, no, that bit's already been decided -- the question is whether to wear a seatbelt.' And you say, 'Well, you might as well wear a seatbelt.' And then they say, 'We've consulted with policy expert Rory Stewart and he says ... And speaking of Rory Stewart, Emily Stokes over at The Financial Times as a great synopsis of her interview with Rory - Lunch with the FT. Certainly an interesting man living in interesting times.
At The National - Foreign Correspondent Gretchen Peters reports on an expert panel that says NATO has lost trust of Afghans - serious stuff if true and something that cannot be taken lightly.
Moving on, The Associated Press' John Milburn has penned a decent overview of the U.S. Army's advisor training program at The Columbus Ledger-Enquirer. Bottom-line: the mission is moving from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, and significantly expanding. Good news.
Joshua Foust at Registan, not one of our fans but that is most certainly okay with us, offers up the case for Afghanistan in regards to recent historical considerations. This is part 3 of a ? part series...
The GAO offers up a US NORTHCOM "report card" in a very recent Homeland Defense report to Congress titled U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.
Chris Schnaubelt has a very nice research piece at the NATO Defence College's web page - NATO and the New U.S. "Afpak" Policy - bottom line is we can do better. Dr. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the College.
There's more but out of time - I'll leave you with sites (not all inclusive mind you) I should be reading more - given eight days a week - Ex's Abu Muqawama, Best Defense - Tom Ricks again, AFPAK Channel at Foreign Policy, Marc Lynch also at FP, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Max Boot at Contentions, Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal, Steve Coll at The Think Tank, Danger Room - especially Noah, Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement, GrEaT sAtAn'S gIrLfRiEnD - still figuring that one out - but I like it, In Harmonium, Information Dissemination, Kings of War, The Lede at the NYT and thanks for the link guys, SWJ great friend Matt Armstrong's MountainRunner, Outside the Beltway, Schmedlap, Shadow Government at FP, The Long War Journal's The Threat Matrix, Joshua Foust's Registan, the whole crew at Threats Watch, uber-embed and boots on the ground reporter David Wood, Spencer Ackerman at The Washington Independent, Wings Over Iraq, Michael Yon - another boots on the ground - never comes home kinda guy, and of course Zenpundit aka Mark Safranski - always last but not least.
I've missed a few I like a lot, I'm sure...
By Tom Donnelly
OK, I'll take the bait.
To offer the killing of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan as evidence of the success of a strategy of "offshore balancing" would be myopic in the extreme. By press accounts, it was a very well conducted SEAL raid, but let's not confuse good tactics with good strategy.
Let's begin with U.S. strategy toward Somalia. Since the withdrawal from Mogadishu in the wake of the "Black Hawk Down" incident -- and let's remember why this was Osama bin Laden's favorite movie, an exemplar of America the "weak horse," unable to run the course -- keeping that failed state from becoming an al Qaeda haven has been a very narrowly run thing, at best. Arguably, the single most effective step in accomplishing that goal was the Ethiopian invasion that removed the Islamic Courts Union. Certainly, our support to the various UN-approved governments there hasn't made a lasting impact -- local "proxies" or "indigenous forces" have failed to establish anything remotely resembling stability. We've been safely offshore, but haven't achieved much balance.
Click through to read more ...
Somalia strike and offshore balancing
A helicopter-borne U.S. special operations group, apparently operating from a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean, attacked and killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan along with several of his associates along a road in southern Somalia. According to the cited New York Times article, the U.S. special operations soldiers recovered the bodies and presumably other interesting intelligence products from the site.
This strike will boost the argument for "offshore balancing," a subject of intense discussion after an email by General Charles Krulak, USMC (ret) in support of offshore balancing for Afghanistan found its way to Small Wars Journal blog.
Click through to read more ...
More at The Washington Independent.
Rageh Omaar, Al-Jazeera International, investigates the US' military and political strategy for Africa and how its relationship with the continent may change under US president Obama. The first part of the documentary (Witness - America's New Frontline) can be seen from Sunday, September 20; and the second part airs from Sunday, September 27. US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) cooperated with Al-Jazeera, in the filming of this documentary.
More at The New York Times.
More at The New York Times.
US Says Raid in Somalia Killed Terrorist With Links to Al-Qaeda - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.
Helicopter-borne Special Forces troops attacked and killed a top al-Qaeda-linked suspect in a raid in southern Somalia early Monday, US officials said. Officials said Saleh Ali Nabhan, 30, a Kenyan sought in the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned resort in Kenya and an unsuccessful attempt that year to shoot down an Israeli airliner, was among four men killed in the attack. US troops fired from the air at a vehicle in which the men were traveling.At least four helicopters participated in the raid, launched from a nearby US naval vessel, a senior military official said. At least one of them landed, and troops retrieved the bodies. "You want to go in there, do this fast, and get out before you're detected," the official said...More at The Washington Post.
More at The Washington Post.
More at The Wall Street Journal.
Much of the debate centers over a series of articles and rebuttals which have occurred over the past six weeks, but intensifying with George Will's exhortation to give up on nation-building in Afghanistan and pursue al Qaeda via "over-the-horizon" capabilities. Will was joined by General Charles Krulak, the former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, who also echoed many of Will's arguments in an e-mail earlier this week. Both George Will and General Krulak--as well as many within the defense community, such as Col. Gian Gentile and Col. TX Hammes--feel that Afghanistan has outlived its strategic relevance due to al Qaeda's relocation into Pakistan and the perceived futility of building a nation-state in Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Yingling, on the other hand, feels that population-centric counterinsurgency can work in Afghanistan, given the right amount of troops and time. To Yingling, building a stable nation-state in Afghanistan is a necessary step in countering al Qaeda. Other prominent military thinkers agree with Yingling, such as retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, president of the Washington-based think-tank, Center for a New American Security.
Our professional community thrives on respectful, professional debate, such as the debate that exists over the strategic and operational goals in Afghanistan. We owe it to the men and women of ISAF to decide whether or not Afghanistan warrants further involvement, and if the situation does warrant involvement, we must determine the best course towards achieving ISAF's goals...
More at The Australian.
A Short Reply to the Dubik and Kagans' Washington Post Oped
Lieutenant General James Dubik, Dr Kim Kagan, and Dr Fred Kagan, the three authors of a Sunday Washington Post oped titled The Afghan Illusion: Kabul's Forces Aren't Yet a Substitute for Our Own, conclude their Oped with this statement:
"Building Afghan forces dramatically is part of a strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan and permitting the reduction of foreign forces. It cannot, however, be the whole strategy."And to ask this reoccurring question one more time, what is the "whole strategy"? Although the authors do not come out and say it, armed nation building is clearly the "whole" strategy.
Why do we think nation building at the barrel of an American gun can work in Afghanistan? The authors cleverly tell us at the end of the article that the building up of the Afghani National Forces will allow the Americans to "begin" to reduce their footprint in 2011. But then again, that statement is followed by the idea that building Afghani forces is part of a larger strategy of (implied) nation building which I infer from the piece actually requires a generational effort. Realistically and being blunt and honest how could building an Afghanistan Nation up from what it is now take anything less than a generation?
More at The Washington Post.
The concept of Strategic Communication had, until late 2008, received only scant attention in the UK. However the production of the UK's counterinsurgency doctrine (still to be definitively named but catalogued as Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution) presented an opportunity for this to be addressed in what was to be a chapter on military influence.
That the doctrine has still not been published, after nearly two years of development, is indicative of the difficulties the British Armed Forces are experienceing in articulating not just lessons learned from Iraq and on-going operations in Afghanistan - but also in applying the same to future scenarios. To assist the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its work the UK Defence Academy's Director of Communication Research; Commander Tatham, a media operations expert and author of the 2006 polemic study 'Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion; produced and published the Strategic Communication Primer in late 2008. This document attempts the first definition of strategic communication by the UK and considers some of the problems of communication in 21st Century conflict, settling on the pragmatic complexity model presented by Arizona State's Consortium for Strategic Communication. Tatham's primer has been followed by the roll out of a Strategic Communication education program across all UK Staff Courses. Trialed initially on the UK's Tri-Service Warrant Officer's course - where the concept was warmly welcomed - it has subsequently been rolled out to the initial (8 week) staff courses (for Lieutenants and Captains), the Advanced (1 year) staff course (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) and the Higher Staff Course for very senior officers.
Key in Tatham's findings are the belief that Strategic Communication is not simply the tighter binding of Information Operations, Public Affairs, etal, but that Strategic Communication should be a core component of the Command function; that recognizing every action, however benign it may superficially appear, will generate an informational effect. That effect can alter perception and for many perception equals reality. Tatham advised Brigadier (now Major General) Andrew Mackay during his planning for 52 Brigade British Army deployment to Helmand. Mackay centralized the idea, from lowest private to the highest ranks, that popular consent was vital and the story of his preparation and deployment is told in the recent British Army Review article by Commander Tatham linked above.
More at The Washington Times.
More at Foreign Policy.
Preparing to Lose the Information War? - Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner.
It has now been eight years since 9/11 and we finally seem to understand that in the modern struggles against terrorism, insurgency, and instability, the tools of public diplomacy are invaluable and essential. We live in a world where an individual with a camera phone can wield more influence than an F-22 stealth fighter jet. The capability of engaging public audiences has long been thought of as the domain of civilians. But for the past eight years, the functions, authorities, and funding for engaging global audiences, from anti-AIDS literature to soccer balls to development projects, has migrated from the State Department to the Defense Department. It seems whole forests have fallen over the same period on the need to enhance civilian agencies - be it the State Department or a new USIA-like entity - to provide a valid alternative to the Defense Department who most, even the detractors, agree was filling a void left by civilians who abrogated their responsibility for one reason or another.This summer may be a turning point. Some in Congress have unilaterally decided that 2010 is the year America's public diplomacy will stop wearing combat boots. Sounds good, right? This is the future most, including analysts and the military, have wished for. The military has been the un—(if passionate once engaged) and often clumsy surrogate and partner for the State Department in representing the US and its interests in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world through what the House Armed Services Committee now calls "military public diplomacy." In some regions, State is almost wholly dependent on Defense money and resources to accomplish its mandate...More at MountainRunner.
Topics include:
1. A U.S.-Gulf alliance against Iran?
2. Karzai has some thinking to do.
The men and women who served on the ground in Afghanistan who have risked and often sacrificed their lives since the awful events of September 11th have been trying to win from the very beginning, but over time they were abandoned by a Bush administration more interested in taking the fight to Iraq. Now the Obama administration is trying to salvage America's War in Afghanistan, which we've been truly fighting for only eight weeks, after the Bush Administration basically lost the war over eight years.
The Obama administration is about to announce a major increase in our troop levels to Afghanistan. Voices on both the left and the right are emerging in opposition to our efforts to control the ground in Afghanistan so we can hunt and defeat al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. Many such opponents and supposedly impartial observers, from across the political spectrum (The Nation, George Will, and Time Magazine) have taken to calling the war in Afghanistan "Obama's War." They have laid the success or failure of the conflict at the feet of the eight-month-old Presidency of Barack Obama. This view misplaces the credit of how catastrophically the Bush administration failed in Afghanistan, and how much of a fully national effort will be required to turn this debacle around...