Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 09/11/2009 - 5:19pm | 0 comments
A Miltary Review twofer on the military-media relationship:

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage? - Thom Shanker, New York Times, and Major General Mark Hertling, U.S. Army.

In the information age, the first casualty of war is often trust—between those who fight the wars and those who report them. A general and a journalist express their ideas about truth, trust, and getting the story straight.

Fostering a Culture of Engagement - Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud, U.S. Army, and Mr. Anton Menning.

In the contemporary media environment, the Army must move beyond "business as usual" to embrace a culture of engagement. This dynamic mediascape can be potentially chaotic, but it also offers opportunities.

Much more in the September - October 2009 edition of Military Review.

by Paul Yingling | Fri, 09/11/2009 - 5:43am | 63 comments
Ten years ago, the ideas about warfare expressed in General Krulak's email to George Will would have been merely disappointing. However, after eight years of war have we have learned many hard lessons at a very high price, and the ideas attributed to General Krulak are now incomprehensible.

General Krulak appears unsure as to whether al-Qaeda and the Taliban are our enemies, and whether the United States has an interest in preventing Taliban control of Afghanistan. Exactly eight years ago today, al-Qaeda operatives supported by the Taliban-controlled government of Afghanistan murdered 3,000 Americans on American soil. The answer to the general's question is yes - al-Qaeda and the Taliban are America's enemies.

General Krulak advocates the use of 'hunter-killer teams' backed by airpower governed by minimal rules of engagement to 'take out the bad guys.' This light footprint tactic has failed for the last eight years. Aircraft operating with few or no ground forces cannot distinguish between insurgents and innocent civilians. Minimal rules of engagement result in maximum civilian casualties, tacitly assisting our enemies as they seek sanctuary and support from civilian populations.

General Krulak misrepresents the manpower requirements necessary for success in Afghanistan. Most of the troops required to provide security for the Afghan people can and will come from the Afghans themselves. Indeed, the most important task for American military forces is to strengthen the capabilities of Afghan security forces to accomplish this task.

General Krulak speculates that the American people would not provide the resources necessary to prevail in Afghanistan. While every citizen is entitled to his or her opinion, it's not clear that General Krulak has any particular expertise in the area of domestic American political opinion.

What's more certain is that the American people and their elected representatives have provided virtually everything asked of them by our military leaders. If there are insufficient resources to prevail in Afghanistan, it is the responsibility of senior military officers and other leaders within the executive branch to ask for more. It is dismaying that a retired general officer would advocate abandoning the war in Afghanistan out of concern for its impact on military personnel or equipment. We must tailor our forces to meet the demands of our wars, rather than vice versa.

After eight years of war, we have learned some hard lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, including:

* Al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates pose a serious threat to the security of the United States, our people and our allies

* Airpower and special operations forces are a necessary part of any counter-terrorism operation, but in and of themselves are insufficient to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations.

* Developing host-nation security forces is an essential component of counterinsurgency operations. These forces are more credible, more enduring and more cost-effective than relying exclusively or primarily on U.S. forces.

* It is the responsibility of general officers to ask for the resources necessary to win our wars.

I respect General Krulak for his decades of service to our country. However, I was dismayed that any officer, active or retired, could still hold the views attributed to him on September 11, 2009.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/10/2009 - 10:48pm | 2 comments

They tried to destroy us but they only made us stronger.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/10/2009 - 5:09pm | 4 comments
General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, responds to "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan" - a Washington Post op-ed by George Will in this e-mail.

Here's the intro paragraph:

I would imagine that your article "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan" will result in some "incoming" on your Command Post. First and Foremost, let me say that I am in total agreement with your assessment. Simply put, no desired end state has ever been clearly articulated and no strategy formulated that would lead us to achieve even an ill defined end state.

General Krulak goes on to articulate several points concerning our efforts in Afghanistan.

More at General Krulak's e-mail to George Will.

by Robert Haddick | Thu, 09/10/2009 - 4:07pm | 1 comment
Here is a collection of recent essays on China:

Evan Medeiros of RAND wrote a book-length report on China's international behavior. Medeiros concludes that China is a status quo power. According to Medeiros, China's leaders are focused on China's internal problems and development and are using China's increasing economic and diplomatic presence in the global community to improve China's domestic situation. Medeiros asserts that China does not seek to push the U.S. out of east Asia and that China does not foresee a conflict with a major power within a 15-20 year planning horizon. However, he believes China will resist actions the U.S. might take which would constrain China's options, especially in the Asian region.

Click through for more ...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/10/2009 - 3:06pm | 3 comments
Worst Case Unfolding in Afghanistan? - Greg Grant, DoD Buzz.

What if the entire US strategy in Afghanistan is based on a flawed premise? A counterinsurgency campaign is waged to defeat insurgents who are trying to supplant a central government with some version of their own. In Afghanistan, the US military has been trying to defeat a largely Pashtun insurgency that doesn't care much for our man in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai.

That goal never appeared easy; the Pashtun are an extremely war like bunch and they don't like foreign armies on their soil either. Now things have gotten even worse as the insurgency has spread far beyond the Pashtun community, driven in large measure by the illegitimacy of the Karzai regime. It was hoped that national elections would serve to unify the country. Widespread accusations of voter fraud have dashed those hopes.

Last month, speaking at the US Institute of Peace, Tuft University's Andrew Wilder, who has spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan, said the "fundamental flaw" in the US counterinsurgency strategy there was trying to extend the reach of the central government when the local people view the central government as the number one cause of insecurity...

More at DoD Buzz.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 09/10/2009 - 5:20am | 0 comments
Obama's Afghan Hopes Meet Reality - Jim Hoagland, Washington Post opinion.

The aftermath of Afghanistan's elections has been uglier and more consequential than the campaign that preceded the voting. It has become clear that President Hamid Karzai's bid for reelection was tainted by widespread fraud, a development that represents the Obama administration's first significant failure in foreign affairs...

The disputed elections are not simply a political embarrassment. They pose significant questions about the new US counterinsurgency strategy of population protection, which was initially keyed to clearing areas contested by the Taliban - largely the Pashtun-inhabited southern region - to enable people there to vote freely.

But even in many of the "cleared" villages, Afghans refused to come out to vote, apparently fearing that in a matter of weeks or months the Taliban would seep back into their zones and seek vengeance on those who went to the polls...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/09/2009 - 5:57am | 7 comments
Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops Blog - James Dao, New York Times.

... There are two sides to the military's foray into the freewheeling world of the interactive Web. At the highest echelons of the Pentagon, civilian officials and four-star generals are newly hailing the power of social networking to make members of the American military more empathetic, entice recruits and shape public opinion on the war.

Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of American forces in Iraq, is on Facebook. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, has a YouTube channel and posts Twitter updates almost daily.

The Army is encouraging personnel of all ranks to go online and collaboratively rewrite seven of its field manuals. And on Aug. 17, the Department of Defense unveiled a Web site promoting links to its blogs and its Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube sites.

The Web, however, is a big place. And the many thousands of troops who use blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites to communicate with the outside world are not always in tune with the Pentagon's official voice. Policing their daily flood of posts, videos and photographs is virtually impossible - but that has not stopped some in the military from trying...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/08/2009 - 10:19pm | 0 comments

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' first interview with Al-Jazeera.

More on Secretary Gates 4 September interview with Al-Jazeera:

Secretary Gates Interview with Al Jazeera at the Pentagon - Transcript

Pakistan Tops List of Challenges, Gates Says - American Forces Press Service

Gates Praises Pakistan's Grip on Extremists - Agence France-Presse

Gates Reaffirms US Commitment to Afghanistan - Washington Post

US Cannot Think of Afghan Withdrawal - American Forces Press Service

Gates Corrects Holbrooke on Afghanistan Metrics - Washington Independent

Gates Speaks Frankly on Pakistan, Iraq - American Forces Press Service

US Enlists Arabs to Pressure Tehran - The Australian

Gates: Arab World Should Arm Against Iran - Jerusalem Post

Gates Labels Iran as Problem - American Forces Press Service

Gates: Arab World Should Unite to Counter Iran Threat - Voice of America

Gates Urges Arabs to Strengthen Military Ties - Agence France-Presse

by Robert Haddick | Tue, 09/08/2009 - 11:16am | 1 comment
What is the greatest threat to U.S. security? The greatest threat to U.S. security is something that would upset the usefulness of the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the consolidated U.S. government database of terrorist suspects around the world. The government uses that database to establish watch lists, no-fly lists, screen visa applicants at U.S. consulates, conduct surveillance, coordinate investigations with foreign and local partners, etc. It was the lack of such a database and its applications that permitted 9/11 to happen. Today, the TIDE database and the activities it supports is the U.S. government's most important counterterrorism tool.

According to a story in Sunday's Washington Post, TIDE information, in theory at least, is currently available to the public through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The intelligence community wants to end that possibility through legislation that will exempt TIDE information from FOIA disclosure. According to the story, several privacy interest groups are lobbying against passage of such an exemption.

What's the problem? An excerpt from the article:

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/08/2009 - 2:42am | 0 comments
Crux of Afghan Debate: Will More Troops Curb Terror? - Eric Schmitt and Scott Shane, New York Times.

... most specialists on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, inside and outside the government, say terrorism cannot be confronted from a comfortable distance, such as by airstrikes or proxy forces alone. It may take years to turn Afghanistan into a place that is hostile to Al Qaeda, they say, but it may be the only way to keep the United States safe in the long term. Many agree with the classified strategy for a troop buildup that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, has presented to Mr. Obama and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent days.

They say a large American-led NATO ground force is needed to clear Taliban-held territory and hold it while instructors train sufficient, competent Afghan soldiers and police officers to secure those areas. The allied force, the argument goes, will buy time and space to help the Afghans build more effective local, provincial and national governments, and create some semblance of an economy. Since many polls in Afghanistan show little support for the Taliban, a stable, peaceful country would not be likely to become a home for terrorists...

More at The New York Times.

by Dave Dilegge | Mon, 09/07/2009 - 3:08pm | 0 comments

See Cartoons by Cartoon by Pat Bagley - Courtesy of Politicalcartoons.com - Email this Cartoon

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/07/2009 - 2:19pm | 1 comment
Lieutenant Colonel North on Poppy

By Allison Brown

Everyone has read by now that Afghanistan's poppy production is down for the second year running because the farmgate price is too low for farmers to bother planting. Production has become ever more concentrated in Helmand and other southern provinces where the national government has no hold. Oliver North (Blooming Financial Support at Fox News) does not address the dynamics of these changes, only a few current policing actions from a rather narrow, US- and militray-centric point of view.

Here are some shortcomings in North's presentation...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/07/2009 - 12:42pm | 0 comments
Colonel Dave Maxwell; who sent along an earlier recommendation, see Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare; also recommends Cracking the Code on Measures of Effectiveness by Sergeant Christopher E. Howard published in the September - October 2009 edition of Special Warfare. SGT Howard's article took 1st place in the Alfred H. Paddock Psychological Operations Essay Contest.

One of the most perplexing problems facing the PSYOP community is measuring the effectiveness of Psychological Operations. The larger the scale of the PSYOP effort, the more complex the problem grows, thus making operational PSYOP of a national or regional scope more difficult to measure than tactical efforts of limited scope.

Units often rely on measures of performance, or MOP, - showing what and how much they did - in lieu of measures of effectiveness, or MOE, because the former are comparatively easier to ascertain. But MOP alone do not answer the critical question, "Is the PSYOP effort working?" Although MOP serve a purpose, the greater emphasis should always be on obtaining valid, accurate MOE, since they provide decision-makers with the information necessary to determine which efforts deserve continued funding, which should be used as templates for future efforts and which should be adjusted or even abandoned.

Solving the MOE riddle requires that PSYOP planners and analysts do the "heavy lifting" before initiating PSYOP. Establishing the criteria for assessment requires solid planning and analysis. Unfortunately, those activities are often dispensed with in the name of expediency...

More at Special Warfare.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/07/2009 - 10:04am | 6 comments
Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare - Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, Special Warfare.

In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the U.S. military experienced a revival of interest in irregular warfare, or IW, similar to the one that is occurring today. In both of the previous periods, the topic enjoyed a celebrity-like popularity in professional military forums until such time that circumstances allowed it to be relegated back to the margins in favor of a return to "proper soldiering."

Both previous revivals produced high-quality doctrine and curriculum in professional-education courses. So why, then, did IW fail to become ingrained as part of the military mainstream? The manner in which a topic is framed can significantly influence the opinion of the target audience. Suggesting that IW is the graduate level of warfare, while clearly expressing the topic's difficulty, fails to recognize the considerable effort that the Army has invested in mastering major combat operations, or MCO. Given the imbalance between the Army's investment in MCO and in IW, it's not surprising that, by comparison, IW appears more difficult and complex. Over the last several decades, old IW concepts have often been reintroduced or reinvented under new names, such as "low-intensity conflict" and "military operations other than war." While there is no question that those concepts are complex, presenting them as new byproducts of emerging and changing world conditions, such as globalization, urbanization and radicalization, brings into question not only the enduring nature of the IW requirement but also whether these conflicts are, in fact, merely anomalies to be weathered. While labels and marketing techniques may be helpful in reconciling our collective discomfort with the topic, they undermine the overall integration of the topic by further entrenching skeptics...

More at Special Warfare.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 09/07/2009 - 4:16am | 0 comments
Should Obama Go 'All In' On Afghanistan? - Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times opinion.

Back in January when he took office, Barack Obama had amassed a very considerable pile of chips. Events since then have appreciably reduced that stack. Should he wager what remains on Afghanistan? That's the issue the president now faces.

The first true foreign policy test of the Obama presidency has arrived, although not in the form of a crisis coming out of nowhere announced by a jangling telephone at 3 a.m. Instead, a steady drip-drip of accumulating evidence warns that Afghanistan is coming apart...

Obama's advisors - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen and Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander on the ground in Afghanistan - have been quite candid in arguing that half-measures won't suffice. The war is going badly. The Taliban is gaining in strength. Seven-plus years of allied efforts in Afghanistan have accomplished very little.

Even if the military's recently rediscovered catechism of counterinsurgency provides the basis for a new strategy, turning things around will take a very long time - five to 10 years at least. Achieving success (however vaguely defined) will entail the expenditure of vast resources: treasure (no one will say how much) and, of course, blood (again, no one offers an estimate)...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

by Robert Haddick | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 2:45pm | 2 comments
Who better to ask than Ryan Crocker for advice on what to do about Afghanistan?

Crocker is a 37-year veteran of the Foreign Service and spent virtually his whole career in the Middle East and South Asia. He was U.S. Chief of Mission to six countries: Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. He is a Career Ambassador and was awarded the Medal of Freedom.

Does Crocker have the answer to Afghanistan? Well, no easy answer. In this essay for Newsweek, in which he recaps his career, Crocker says:

1) Don't expect what worked in Iraq to work in Afghanistan,

2) The Taliban and al Qaeda have strategic patience; the U.S. better get some, too.

3) The world, and the bad guys, won't allow the U.S. to walk away.

So no simple answer, even from Ryan Crocker. But his Newsweek essay is still worth reading.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 10:37am | 0 comments
This just released by the Institute for the Study of War: Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer by LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.). Full report here. Overview below:

This report discusses how U.S. commanders in Iraq vastly accelerated the growth of the Iraq Security Forces as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy to supplement the Surge of U.S. forces into the region.

The author, Lieutenant General James Dubik (ret.), who served as the commander of Multi-National Security and Transition Command -- Iraq (MNSTC-I) from mid-2007 to mid-2008, oversaw a rapid growth in the quantity of Iraqi Security Forces, an improvement of their operational capability due to the partnership and training with the U.S., and a reformation of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense to help institutionalize the growth of these indigenous security forces. Despite the success in developing security forces during the Iraqi Surge, our current military doctrine does not reflect the lessons learned or best practices used in 2007 -- 2008.

Future conflicts will likely arise in failing states and will therefore involve the Army in counterinsurgency (COIN) or stability operations. The conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries. This requirement is consequently not an aberration, unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning, training, doctrine, and acquisition must take account of this mission and support it.

And from the Conclusions:

In fragile, failing, or failed states, it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment, in which case the U.S. must prepare to engage in a long-term cooperative security arrangement with the host nation.

Nations that require security force assistance and security sector reform are likely also to require external funding for these tasks. Foreign contributions are necessary for success and can have a double benefit -- by contributing to the growth of state finances as well as security forces.

Organizations with responsibilities like MNSTC-I have to be staffed with leaders experienced in operating large, institutional organizations and staffed with members able to link their tactical, day-to-day actions to strategic effects. The Army must train its officers and its general officers better to meet these management requirements.

Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer.

by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 5:43am | 7 comments
Last paragraph from Secretary of Defence Robert Gates' letter to Thomas Curley, President and Chief Executive Offer of The Associated Press, concerning the publication of a photograph of Lance Corporal Joshua Bernard, United States Marine Corps, as he lay fatally wounded in Afghanistan.

I cannot imagine the pain and suffering Lance Corporal Bernard's death has caused his family. Why your organization would purposefully defy the family's wishes knowing full well that it will lead to yet more anguish is beyond me. Your lack of compassion and common sense in choosing to put this image of their maimed and stricken child on the front page of multiple American newspapers is appalling. The issue here is not law, policy or constitutional right - but judgment and common decency.

The Associated Press statement concerning this affair can be found here. A Small Wars Council discussion on this issue can be found here.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 5:23am | 0 comments
The Afghanistan Abyss - Nicholas Kristof, New York Times opinion.

President Obama has already dispatched an additional 21,000 American troops to Afghanistan and soon will decide whether to send thousands more. That would be a fateful decision for his presidency, and a group of former intelligence officials and other experts is now reluctantly going public to warn that more troops would be a historic mistake.

The group's concern - dead right, in my view - is that sending more American troops into ethnic Pashtun areas in the Afghan south may only galvanize local people to back the Taliban in repelling the infidels.

"Our policy makers do not understand that the very presence of our forces in the Pashtun areas is the problem," the group said in a statement to me. "The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition. We do not mitigate the opposition by increasing troop levels, but rather we increase the opposition and prove to the Pashtuns that the Taliban are correct. "The basic ignorance by our leadership is going to cause the deaths of many fine American troops with no positive outcome," the statement said...

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 5:12am | 0 comments
A Stable Pakistan Needs a Stable Afghanistan - Frederick W. Kagan, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Winning the war in Afghanistan - creating a stable and legitimate Afghan state that can control its territory - will be difficult. The insurgency has grown in the past few years while the government's legitimacy has declined. It remains unclear how the recent presidential elections will affect this situation.

Trying to win in Afghanistan is not a fool's errand, however. Where coalition forces have conducted properly resourced counterinsurgency operations in areas such as Khowst, Wardak, Lowgar, Konar and Nangarhar Provinces in the eastern part of the country, they have succeeded despite the legendary xenophobia of the Pashtuns.

Poorly designed operations in Helmand Province have not led to success. Badly under-resourced efforts in other southern and western provinces, most notably Kandahar, have also failed. Can well-designed and properly-resourced operations succeed? There are no guarantees in war, but there is good reason to think they can. Given the importance of this theater to the stability of a critical and restive region, that is reason enough to try...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 09/06/2009 - 4:40am | 2 comments
In Afghanistan, Let's Keep It Simple - Ahmed Rashid, Washington Post opinion.

For much of the 20th century before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was a peaceful country living in harmony with its neighbors. There was a king and a real government, which I witnessed in the 1970s when I frequently traveled there. Afghanistan had what I'll call a minimalist state, compared with the vast governmental apparatuses that colonialists left behind in British India and Soviet Central Asia.

This bare-bones structure worked well for a poor country with a small population, few natural resources and a mix of ethnic groups and tribes that were poorly connected with one another because of the rugged terrain. The center was strong enough to maintain law and order, but it was never strong enough to undermine the autonomy of the tribes. Afghanistan was not aiming to be a modern country or a regional superpower. The economy was subsistence-level, but nobody starved. Everyone had a job, though farm labor was intermittent. There was a tiny urban middle class, but the gap between rich and poor was not that big. There was no such thing as Islamic extremism or a narco-state...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 09/05/2009 - 9:14am | 23 comments
Why We're Getting it Wrong in Afghanistan - Anthony King, Prospect.

Writing in this month's Prospect, Stephen Grey details the political and military mistakes that have been made in Helmand. Perhaps most importantly, he identifies the role of the institutional culture of Britain's armed forces: "cracking on"—the unshakeable determination of Britain's troops. Grey is right that the ethos of "cracking on" is the army's greatest quality; effective armies require fortitude and morale in order to endure the losses that they will inevitably suffer. Yet, as he notes, it may be the army's greatest weakness too...

A new Afghan strategy is essential—and the announcements from US General McChrystal and Gordon Brown at the end of August recognise this. However, their new strategy in Helmand also requires a reformation of Britain's armed forces themselves. The success of General Petraeus in Iraq rested finally on a common recognition by the US Army and Marine Corps that the way in which they trained, planned and conducted military operations required profound revision. In short, operational success demands institutional reform at home. While valuable at the tactical level, the culture of "cracking on" needs to be expunged from operational command. The armed forces, the ministry of defence and government need to develop more mature criteria on which to assess the performance of commanders—judging them by their political contribution to the campaign, not by the number of air assault operations they have conducted....

More at Prospect.

Cracking on in Helmand - Stephen Grey, Prospect.

... Even in chaos and dysfunction, the British army is good at preserving a belief in order and purpose. And when men die their officers steel them and move onwards with poetic speeches, just as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Thomson did on 10th July 2009, after a dreadful day near the town of Sangin in Helmand in which five of his men were killed. In his eulogy Thomson wrote about men saluting the fallen, and returning to the ramparts. "I sensed each rifleman tragically killed in action today standing behind us as we returned to our posts, and we all knew that each one of those riflemen would have wanted us to 'crack on'... And that is what we shall do."

Crack on. From Basra to Sangin, I've heard that phrase as regularly as Amen in church. Cracking on: the army's greatest quality, and perhaps its greatest weakness. I remember standing vigil on Sergeant Johnson's body at dusk on a hilltop, after he had died in the battle for the town of Musa Qala in December 2007. His fellow soldiers were silhouettes, drawn close to their commander. On the horizon muffled bombs flashed through the drizzle. Major Jake Little told his men to put their grief to one side, to deal with it later. After the battle.

Cracking on could also mean failing to challenge impossible orders, or unwillingness to expose a flawed strategy...

More at Prospect.

by Robert Haddick | Fri, 09/04/2009 - 7:30pm | 9 comments
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1. Afghanistan and civil-military relations,

2. Communication breakdown.

by Dave Dilegge | Fri, 09/04/2009 - 7:11pm | 5 comments
From time to time we get asked about the image SWJ and SWC uses in the upper left hand corner of all the main pages... The image is called Tracking Bin Laden and was painted by U.S. Army Center of Military History, Museum Division's staff artist Sergeant First Class Elzie Ray Golden, US Army.

SFC Golden produced fourteen works of art as a member of the Soldier-Artist Team 25 in 1990 that documented ROTC training at Fort Lewis, Washington. He designed the May 1992 cover of Soldiers magazine featuring women in the Army during World War II, the 1991-1994 Army Aviation Association Commander's Conference posters, and the Armed Forces Day posters for 2001 and 2002. His works of art are featured in the Center of Military History books, Portrait of an Army and Soldiers Serving the Nation. The Army Historical Foundation also featured his work in the book The Army, published in 2001. SFC Golden has been the subject of articles and interviews for ArtForum and Der Spiegel magazines, German public television and public radio, and the Hartford Courant newspaper.

He won first place in 2000 in the fine art category of the first Military Graphic Artist of the Year (MILGRAPH) competition, and again in 2002.

SFC. Golden studied fine art at the School of Visual Arts in New York and the University of Arizona. He entered active military duty in October 1984. His assignments include the 13th Support Command, Fort Hood Texas; 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, South Korea; Training Support Activity, Eighth Army, East Korea, Yongsan, South Korea; and the 10th Aviation Brigade, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Tracking Bin Laden won First Place - DINFOS MILGRAPH 2002, Military Graphic Competition, Fine Art category.

Continue on for several examples of SFC Golden's work...