Small Wars Journal

Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/24/2009 - 6:40pm | 0 comments

We hope that our single-issue voters will at least attempt to look at this issue from all sides.

 

In The Know: New Iraqi Law Requires Waiting Period For Suicide Vest Purchases

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/22/2009 - 7:34pm | 5 comments
We are at no risk of being on the cutting edge of technology, but we have made some updates to our site to blow some of the dust off it.

Let me ask all our curmudgeons and luddites to just ignore this post. But for the more progressive of you that might actually know what we think we're talking about, here are some of the things to look for:

Throughout most of the site, the new "share" button in the left bar menu gives easy access to the universe of stuff like Digg, Delicious, StumbleUpon, etc., plus some print and email features.

In the Small Wars Council, there have been some social bookmarking buttons there for a while, all the way down at the bottom of the page.

RSS feed buttons are now more prominent, in the right bar menu of the SWJ Blog and near the top left in the Small Wars Council.

For those who prefer just the feed URL, the options are:

SWJ Blog

Small Wars Council posts (recommended):

Small Wars Council threads only:

Note that the SWC feeds contain only the unregistered / guest-viewable content. You have to go to the board to get the members-only material.

We are alive on Facebook.

We are alive on Twitter, as mentioned earlier.

At risk of overkill, we are inelegantly shoving updates by RSS to both of those sites. The risk of an SWJ FB Tweet overdose is real. Please drink responsibly.

We have a long way to go, but we actually have some resources now and can break ground. Implementing a full CMS and adding web 2.0 features to our Reference Library, Reading List, and Research Links is on the plate, as is a freshening of the site design and finally un-@$$ing the interim Journal format. We are in the market for technical expertise in that regard, and are particularly interested in Drupal as a platform. Your advice and solicitations are welcome.

In the interm, please make use of the new features, and continue to advance our profession and interest.

(Nothing more follows)

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 03/21/2009 - 8:44pm | 4 comments

I'll defer to Bill, Robert and our Council moderators to post their CPs...

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/21/2009 - 9:43am | 0 comments
Via e-mail from CCO:

Dear CCO Members,

Greetings from the CCO Support Center. Attached is the latest issue of the CCO Newsletter. We hope you will continue to find it an informative and useful vehicle for keeping apprised of recent CCO activities. The biggest news is that the CCO recently moved to the National Defense University, and is now located within the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. In conjunction with the move, the CCO is now the Center for Complex Operations. Our new location and name will enhance the CCO's role by positioning it in an academic setting, while maintaining close links to policymakers in our partner organizations at Departments of Defense and State, and USAID.

This edition of the newsletter also includes a number of interesting features, including a contribution from Colonel Daniel Rubini (Ret.) on developing rule of law in Iraq, information on the Case Study series sponsored by the CCO together with the Cebrowski Institute at Naval Postgraduate School, an interview with Bing West on his most recent book The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, upcoming events in the complex operations community and more.

Please feel free to forward this newsletter to your colleagues who may not have heard of the CCO and who might be interested in our activities.

Best regards,

David A. Sobyra

Acting Director, Center for Complex Operations

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/21/2009 - 8:55am | 1 comment
A Conversation With David Kilcullen - Carlos Lozada, Washington Post interview

Why is an Aussie anthropologist coaching American generals on how to win wars? David Kilcullen, an Australian army reservist and top adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus during the troop surge in Iraq, has spent years studying insurgencies in countries from Indonesia to Afghanistan, distinguishing hard-core terrorists from "accidental guerrillas" -- and his theories are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the West. Kilcullen spoke with Outlook's Carlos Lozada on why Pakistan is poised for collapse, whether catching Osama bin Laden is really a good idea and how the Enlightenment and Lawrence of Arabia helped Washington shift course in Iraq.

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/20/2009 - 1:57pm | 0 comments
Our Role in Iraq's Year of Decision

By Gary Anderson

2009 is being called a Year of Decision in Iraq. The counterinsurgency campaign will be largely turned over to Iraqi control. We have not successfully turned over a counterinsurgency effort from the American military to a host nation since the middle of the last century in the Philippines. The turnover of the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort was interrupted by the North Vietnamese conventional invasion in 1975; consequently, we will never know how successful that effort might have been. We are in unfamiliar, but not unknown, territory. In many ways, we will have to use common sense and lessons learned from what has gone right or wrong to date.

Perhaps the first thing we need to realize that the days of brick and mortar projects are largely over in the COIN fight. Future building projects should be largely left to long term development agencies such as USAID and the NGOs. If we do find the need to build new facilities, we need to ensure that we have hard Memorandums of Agreement with the Iraqi agency that will be taking over to include salaries for employees and operations and maintenance. We have a depressing history of building facilities and training staff only to see the Iraqis bring in their own people, often untrained, when they take over. Even though it may well involve some graft and nepotism, it is much more cost effective to have them identify the long term operators up front and train them whether or not we think they are the best people to do the job.

Likewise, we need to try to ensure that the Iraqis have identified the long term operations and maintenance (O&M) funding. It does us no good to build a clinic that will not have a staff or supplies. Otherwise it becomes an instant relic...

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/20/2009 - 1:35pm | 9 comments
Trends, Threats, and Expectations

By Dr. Steven Metz

I've just returned from a Department of Defense symposium which discussed the future strategic environment twenty years out. This was a useful window on official thinking and expectations, but it reinforced my feeling that American security strategy is careening forward on flawed assumptions. Specifically, we have not grasped the magnitude of the revolution underway in the strategic environment and the nature of security, and hence have not adjusted.

A few years ago symposia and documents dealing with the future strategic environment were dominated by discussions of "the long war," "GWOT," terrorism, proliferation, and Islamic extremism. For the past two years, the focus has been on "hybrid threats." In the event I just attended, those things were almost wholly absent from the discussion. Everything centered on technological change, economic turmoil, culture, demographics, and climate change.

Two things about this jumped out at me. First, there was very little discussion of exactly what the U.S. military is going to do about these trends and the threats that they generate. The unspoken assumption seems to be that the primary military mission over the next few decades will be stabilizing collapsed states. I don't buy this. I think it is a misreading of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if things turn out well in those two places, I'm convinced that future political leaders and strategists will conclude that the costs (economic, political, and human) outweighed the benefits (in terms of greater security).

Second, I was convinced that the U.S. military and strategic community have not fully grasped the extent and depth of change underway in the strategic environment. At the symposium everyone nodded when a speaker said that the threats of the future will be dispersed, non-state entities, but few seemed to understand that this obviates the very essence of American strategy and the current focus of the military. Put simply, our strategy seeks to reverse history--to strengthen nation states so that they can "control ungoverned spaces" when trends are toward the devolution of economic, political, and economic power AWAY FROM national governments...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 11:40pm | 0 comments
Panel Announcement: New Media Agora

Via Milblogging Conference - 24-25 April 2009, Washington, D.C.

We're pleased to announce another panel, and moderator Greyhawk has tweaked the focus of the panel a bit.

New Media Agora: What is the impact of the "new media" on issues concerning national security, military doctrine and concept development, training, education, and lessons learned? A discussion of the issue by those at the frontlines of the debate.

Moderated by: Greyhawk - Mudville Gazette

Panel Members:

Dave Dilegge - Small Wars Journal

Andrew Exum - Abu Muqawama

Bill Roggio - Long War Journal

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 7:24pm | 0 comments
We just got word that SWJ's own Robert Haddick (This Week at War) will be a guest on WAMU's The Diane Rehm Show. Show-time is 1000 EST. Robert will participate as a panel member with Tom Shanker, Robert Work, and Andrew Exum discussing the state of the US military, the stop-loss policy, the DoD budget, QDR, and of course etc... Should be a good one.

Update: This was a good one indeed. You can listen to a recording of this morning's broadcast here at WAMU.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 1:47pm | 0 comments
Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare - John Nagl and Brian Burton, The Washington Quarterly

After a slow start, the U.S. military has made remarkable strides in adapting to irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is beginning to institutionalize those adaptations. Recent Department of Defense (DOD) directives and field manuals have elevated stability operations and counterinsurgency to the same level of importance as conventional military offensive and defensive operations. These changes are the outcome of deep reflection about the nature of current and likely future threats to U.S. national security and the military's role in addressing them. They represent important steps toward transforming a sclerotic organizational culture that long encouraged a ''we don't do windows'' posture on so-called ''military operations other than war,'' even as the nation's leaders called upon the armed forces to perform those types of missions with increasing frequency...

More at The Washington Quarterly.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 1:43pm | 0 comments
Via the USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Center Blog - The US Army's comprehensive approach to COIN for brigades, battalions, and companies is now available as an Approved Final Draft - FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in COIN.

FMI 3-24.2 is designed to be a user-manual for tactical level units and establishes doctrine for tactical counterinsurgency operations by combining the historic approaches to COIN, lessons learned from current operations, and the realities of today's operational environment.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 3:29am | 0 comments
Our Must-Win War - John McCain and Joseph Lieberman, Washington Post opinion

Later this month, the Obama administration will unveil a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan. This comes as most important indicators in Afghanistan are pointing in the wrong direction. President Obama's decision last month to deploy an additional 17,000 U.S. troops was an important step in the right direction, but a comprehensive overhaul of our war plan is needed, and quickly.

As the administration finalizes its policy review, we are troubled by calls in some quarters for the president to adopt a "minimalist" approach toward Afghanistan. Supporters of this course caution that the American people are tired of war and that an ambitious, long-term commitment to Afghanistan may be politically unfeasible. They warn that Afghanistan has always been a "graveyard of empires" and has never been governable. Instead, they suggest, we can protect our vital national interests in Afghanistan even while lowering our objectives and accepting more "realistic" goals there -- for instance, by scaling back our long-term commitment to helping the Afghan people build a better future in favor of a short-term focus on fighting terrorists...

More at The Washington Post.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/19/2009 - 2:35am | 0 comments
Road Map for Afghanistan - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion

Last October, the Bush administration arranged a briefing for aides to Barack Obama and John McCain on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Among the expert advisers was David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency guru who had been one of the architects of the U.S. troop surge in Iraq.

"We said the situation was extremely difficult in Afghanistan, with a security crisis and a political crisis occurring at the same time," Kilcullen remembers. Obama had been talking on the campaign trail as if Afghanistan's problems could be fixed by adding more U.S. troops. The briefing was a wake-up call that the next president would face some agonizing policy decisions...

More at The Washington Post.

by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 03/18/2009 - 8:44pm | 1 comment
From our good friends at Kings of War - Regular Warfare is Increasingly Irregular by Dr. David Betz (Note to self - you have not been visiting Kings of War of late as much as you should).

Fascinating article in the Straits Times from a couple of days ago 'North Korea Rethinks War-fighting Strategy'. The upshot of it is that North Korea is increasingly reliant on irregular measures. Personally, I see this as yet another reinforcement of Frank Hoffman's hybrid wars concept (the link goes to the KCL events page--scroll two thirds of the way down and you will find a podcast of Frank's lecture here from 21 January)...

The North Koreans are learning lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. Chief among those would seem to be: when fighting Western armies you can tie them in knots with irregular techniques whereas confronting them in a conventional order of battle is a good way to get slaughtered. What lessons are we learning? According to some it's that we should stop messing around with this irregular warfare stuff because, hey, North Korea might want to do some high-intensity manoeuvre warfighting with all those heavy divisions it's got!

More at Kings of War.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/18/2009 - 5:40pm | 0 comments
A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program

Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

In providing additional military forces for the Afghanistan war, the Obama administration has demonstrated that Afghanistan is no longer an economy-of-force campaign. But a troop surge alone is not enough to win the war. In orthodox counterinsurgency theory, providing essential services and strengthening governance are as important as fighting the enemy with guns and bullets.

In a new policy brief published by CNAS, authors John Nagl, Andrew Exum, and Ahmed Humayun recommend that the United States increase its support for Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program (NSP) and similar development initiatives. Launched in 2002 by Afghanistan's Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the NSP is a rural development project that disburses modest grants to elected village councils. The NSP has not just simply provided tangible services to Afghans; it is "owned" by Afghans and run with an emphasis on transparency. The NSP is one of the few initiatives from Kabul to have generated significant goodwill among rural communities. Increasing U.S. funding for programs like the NSP can strategically leverage all instruments of American national power instead of relying on military force alone. Accordingly, this policy brief describes the structure of the NSP, its achievements, explains the underlying reasons for its success, and proposes a course by which the United States can help sustain and expand the program moving forward.

A Pathway to Success in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/18/2009 - 12:13am | 0 comments
Yes, we are up on Twitter under the userid smallwars.

We'll auto-tweet the title and a link of all new entries on the SWJ Blog and most new threads in the Small Wars Council. At the moment, the following things do NOT feed: blog comments, discussion board posts on old threads, and new discussion board threads within the members-only area.

Thanks to many folks who encouraged and/or nudged us to get aboard. The list includes Jules Crittenden, Matt Armstrong, Julian Tolbert, and, indirectly, Ellyn Angelloti.

For those of you who prefer your RSS straight up, feeds are available for the SWJ Blog and the Small Wars Council.

We have also established a Facebook page, but aren't driving content feeds there yet. If you join us on Facebook, you still might be able to say you were there before it was cool. However, we already have 127 members in the group there, and some of them are raising the cool bar for us.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/17/2009 - 2:43pm | 0 comments
US Army / US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center announces the next COIN Leadership Workshop.

From 27 April - 1 May 2009, the United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center will present its next Counterinsurgency Leader Workshop at the Lewis and Clark Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This event is a five-day program focused on understanding the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is a version of the same extremely popular workshop offered to hundreds of military and civilian attendees over the past two years.

This workshop will feature presentations from prominent general officers and guest speakers from the interagency community on the COIN environment in addition to the instructional material.

We have expanded the number of slots available to compensate for the high demand of previous sessions. The proceedings are UNCLASSIFED and registration is open to all interested US government and allied personnel.

The COIN Leader Workshop Site is open for registration. Please head to the COIN Center website, click on "Events" and then click on the "27 April - 1 May 2009 COIN Leader Workshop" to view more detailed information and register.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/17/2009 - 4:38am | 0 comments
West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has released the March 2009 issue of the CTC Sentinel.

The March issue contains the following articles:

Somalia's New Government and the Challenge of Al-Shabab by David H. Shinn

Inside Look at the Fighting Between Al-Shabab and Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama by Abdulahi Hassan

Pakistan's Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency Strategy by Ahmed Rashid

Al-Qa`ida's Involvement in Britain's 'Homegrown' Terrorist Plots by James Brandon

Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad by Farhana Ali and Mohammad Shehzad

Deconstructing Ibn Taymiyya's Views on Suicidal Missions by Rebecca Molloy

Muslim Brotherhood Faces Growing Challenges in Egypt by Steven Brooke

The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group by Carlos Echeverrí­a Jesíºs

Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity

March 2009 issue of the CTC Sentinel.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/16/2009 - 2:56am | 3 comments
A Counterinsurgency Primer - Max Boot, Wall Street Journal book review of The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by David Kilcullen.

Almost everyone, even if otherwise ignorant of military affairs, has heard of Karl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Very few people, though, have heard of C.E. Callwell, David Galula or Robert Thompson. Yet they, too, wrote immortal works on military strategy -- but on unconventional, or guerrilla, conflicts.

For all their timeless wisdom, their books were also a product of their times -- Callwell of the imperial wars of the late 19th century, Galula and Thompson of the wars of "national liberation" in the mid-20th century. Because of the global jihadist insurgency, the early 21st century has produced a new epoch in the annals of low-intensity struggle. It is fitting, then, that to help us understand the current conflict another soldier-scholar has emerged in the tradition of Callwell, Galula and Thompson.

In "The Accidental Guerrilla," a combination of memoir and military analysis, David Kilcullen looks at the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Indonesia and southern Thailand, all of which, excepting the last, he has seen first-hand. He then draws lessons from his experiences and those of other soldiers...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/15/2009 - 5:04pm | 1 comment
Why Washington Worries - Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek

... The problem with American foreign policy goes beyond George Bush. It includes a Washington establishment that has gotten comfortable with the exercise of American hegemony and treats compromise as treason and negotiations as appeasement. Other countries can have no legitimate interests of their own—Russian demands are by definition unacceptable. The only way to deal with countries is by issuing a series of maximalist demands. This is not foreign policy; it's imperial policy. And it isn't likely to work in today's world.

More at Newsweek.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/14/2009 - 11:58pm | 0 comments
Pentagon Rethinking Old Doctrine on 2 Wars - Thom Shanker, New York Times

The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing the Obama administration to rethink what for more than two decades has been a central premise of American strategy: that the nation need only prepare to fight two major wars at a time.

For more than six years now, the United States has in fact been fighting two wars, with more than 170,000 troops now deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. The military has openly acknowledged that the wars have left troops and equipment severely strained, and has said that it would be difficult to carry out any kind of significant operation elsewhere.

To some extent, fears have faded that the United States may actually have to fight, say, Russia and North Korea, or China and Iran, at the same time. But if Iraq and Afghanistan were never formidable foes in conventional terms, they have already tied up the American military for a period longer than World War II.

More at The New York Times.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/14/2009 - 5:21am | 0 comments

Horse Soldier, Horse Soldier - Corb Lund - H/T to Lou DiMarco - A Horse Soldier's Thoughts
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/14/2009 - 3:17am | 0 comments
SWJ's 10th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - The generals declare war on "war adjectives" - Special operations forces - the talent-poaching elite?
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/13/2009 - 8:21pm | 6 comments

Massed Bands at the Royal Tournament, July 1991.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/12/2009 - 5:15pm | 0 comments
Can We Defeat the Taliban? - David Kilcullen, National Review (Accidental Guerrilla book excerpt)

On the basis of my field experience in 2005--08 in Iraq, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, I assess the current generation of Taliban fighters, within the broader Taliban confederation (which loosely combines old Taliban cadres with Pashtun nationalists, tribal fighters, and religious extremists), as the most tactically competent enemy we currently face in any theater. This judgment draws on four factors: organizational structure, motivation, combat skills, and equipment.

Taliban organizational structure varies between districts, but most show some variation of the generic pattern of a local clandestine network structure, a main force of full-time guerrillas who travel from valley to valley, and a part-time network of villagers who cooperate with the main force when it is in their area. In districts close to the Pakistan border, young men graduating from Pakistani madrassas also swarm across the frontier to join the main force when it engages in major combat - as happened during the September 2006 fighting in Kandahar Province, and again in the 2007 and 2008 fighting seasons...

More at National Review.