More at Tom's place and related issues in Dave's new book The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One as well as Tom's latest - Great Powers: America and the World after Bush.
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
Full transcript of Dr. Strmecki's prepared statement. Also see the prepared statements of Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) and Ambassador James Dobbins.
Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).
The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.
More than three years ago, I spoke at AEI about the war in Iraq. At that time, conditions on the ground were going from bad to worse. Violence had accelerated out of control, al Qaeda had firmly entrenched itself in Anbar province, and Iranian-backed Shia militias had taken control of large swaths of Baghdad and southern Iraq. The Iraqi government and its security forces appeared hopelessly corrupt, sectarian, ineffective, and unable to break the cycle of reciprocal violence fueled by Sunni and Shiite extremists. The Bush administration continued to pursue a failed war strategy—despite mounting evidence of its catastrophic consequences. More and more Americans, members of Congress and opinion leaders wondered whether the war in Iraq could ever be won, or whether it was already lost.
It seemed obvious to me that failure in Iraq would be a calamity, and to prevent it we would have to accept the urgent necessity of a new strategy -- a strategy based on the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency, the imperative to secure the civilian population, and a significant increase in the number of American troops. Yet more than a year passed, as the deteriorating situation in Iraq approached the point of no return and a substantial majority of Americans turned firmly against the war, before President Bush at last shifted course, dismissed Secretary Rumsfeld, and adopted such a strategy.
Thanks to the courage and skill of our troops on the ground and the wisdom of leaders such as General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General Ray Odierno, the collapse of the American effort in Iraq was not just arrested but reversed. With the right strategy finally in place -- and I should note the intellectual contributions to it by General Jack Keane, Fred and Kim Kagan, Andrew Krepinevich, and Gary Schmitt -- and the resources on the ground necessary to implement it, we not only stepped back from the precipice of a strategic disaster of immense and long lasting consequences, but progressed toward obtaining our objectives in Iraq beyond the most hopeful projections for the new strategy's success.
We now face a similar moment with respect to the war in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is nowhere near as dire as it was in Iraq just two years ago -- to cite one example, civilian fatalities at their peak in Iraq were ten times higher than civilian deaths at their peak in Afghanistan last year. But the same truth that was apparent three years ago in Iraq is apparent today in Afghanistan: when you aren't winning in this kind of war, you are losing. And, in Afghanistan today, we are not winning. Let us not shy from the truth, but let us not be paralyzed by it either.
Nearly every indicator in Afghanistan is heading in the wrong direction. Civilian fatalities in Afghanistan have increased dramatically as security has deteriorated, particularly in the southern provinces of the country. The number of insurgent attacks was higher every single week in 2008 than during the same week in 2007. Since 2005, violence has increased over 500 percent, and despite the presence of tens of thousands of coalition troops, growing portions of the country suffer under the influence of the Taliban. The percentage of Afghans rating their security positively has declined from 77 percent in 2005 to 40 percent today. Only a third of Afghans say that U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their areas, down from 57 percent just two years ago, and Afghans cite the lack of security and corruption as the foremost reasons their country is moving in the wrong direction...
More at The New York Times.
Surge In Afghanistan Can Work, With Right Resources, Enough Time by John Nagl
There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan...More at U.S. News & World Report.
Afghanistan Surge Is Not Worth the Cost in Blood and Treasure by Andrew Bacevich
More than seven years after 9/11, the global war on terrorism—in Pentagon parlance, the Long War—is entering a new phase. Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight...More at U.S. News & World Report.
That perspective is based on serving long ago on both sides of the GPF / SOF fence and on current conversations with relatives having recent multiple deployments on both sides of that fence today. My belief and their belief is that there is a problem, that it is significant and that it will take a major effort to fix. Some may differ; discussion would be welcome...
The Winter 2008-2009 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.
Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.
Here is the line-up:
In This Issue - Parameters Editors
Preserving Infrastructure: A 21st Century Challenge by Michael Chertoff
The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War by Colin S. Gray
Crafting Strategy in an Age of Transition by Shawn Brimley
COIN in the Real World by David R. Haines
Georgia's Cyber Left Hook by Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg
Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an 'Azimuth Check' by Richard deVillafranca
United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge by Gawdat Bahgat
Binding the Nation: National Service in America by Carol Armistead Grigsby
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth Kansas
Limited Tenure NTE: 3 Years; Renewable -- Full Time
Duties: The scope of duties of the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of Counterinsurgency involves interaction with national and international governmental and private agencies. Serves as an advocate for counterinsurgency education within the U.S. Army. Collaborates with the Commandant (Lieutenant General), Deputy Commandant (Brigadier General), CGSC school directors, staff and faculty, course and lesson authors, curriculum developers, and CAC agencies in the development and delivery of instruction addressing counterinsurgency subject matter. Serves as a professor, sits on thesis committees, and advises and assists student monograph development. Advises and provides recommendations on the role of CGSC and CAC in changing the culture of the force through the use of experimentation, counterinsurgency articles, and the creation and sharing of knowledge and experiences.
About the Position: CGSC is a multifaceted educational institution, annually teaching over 4,000 students in its resident and non-resident populations. Its diverse population includes representation from over 70 countries and all of the armed services of the United States military. Regionally accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and a member of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, CGSC grants the Master of Military Art and Science degree to approximately 200 students annually.
The incumbent serves as the focal point for the diffusion of knowledge within CGSC and its three schools (Command and General Staff School, School of Advanced Military Studies, and School of Command Preparation) concerning all aspects of counterinsurgency.
More information at the US Army Civilian Personnel Online - Job Announcement # SWEX09142011
More at The New Yorker.
This guide, written in a collaborative "whole of government" process and endorsed at the highest levels of our diplomacy, development, and defense leadership, reflects the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 and also FM 3-07). It is not, however, a tactical or operational "how-to" guide. Rather it is intended to be a "COIN 101" for policy-makers contemplating US intervention abroad.
As reflected in the debate over the Army's new doctrine on Stability Operations (FM 3-07), some cringe at the mere articulation of COIN principles in an official government publication; suspecting it might lead us to attempt more such intervention. But as I pointed out in my blog post on FM 3-07, doctrine is not grand strategy or policy. "For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect...Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes." Indeed, this is the core theme -- and purpose- of this new publication:
"Such understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and costs of intervention are weighted against US interests in determining whether to become involved and what form that involvement should take. This decision should not be taken lightly: historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated." (COIN Guide, p. 3)
The guide provides policy makers a framework for understanding the complexity and risks associated with COIN and, importantly, under what circumstances an attempted COIN intervention might actually be "folly." As with the latest publication of the Army's FM for stability operations, FM 3-07, this Handbook should generate debate about the wisdom of- and trade-offs associated with US involvement in these interventions. It should be read, understood, and debated by political leaders and anyone else interested in the what, why, and how of US intervention abroad.
The drafting of this Guide was led by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State with special thanks to Dr. David Kilcullen, Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Lieutenant Colonel Matt Porter, U.K. Royal Marines, and Colonel (Ret.) Carlos Burgos, U.S. Army.
The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education
By Craig M. Mullaney
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty Seconds' worth of distance, run,
Yours is the Earth and everything in it,
And--which is more--you'll be a Man, my son!
--Rudyard Kipling, "If"
My only regret in reading The Unforgiving Minute is that I had not read it earlier -- when I received an advance copy in the mail several weeks ago. Now finished, I will offer up my very short summation, echo the praise lavished on this fine piece of work since its release and give it a hearty thumbs up as essential reading for those in (or veterans of) our business -- and maybe more importantly - for those who need to know what that business is all about.
The Unforgiving Minute traces Craig Mullaney's life as a student at West Point, Ranger School and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar; as a Soldier in Afghanistan; as a teacher at the US Naval Academy, and as a veteran.
His writing style displays a fine balance that allows The Unforgiving Minute to be informative, educational, moving, and entertaining for both the seasoned warrior and uninitiated civilian alike. General David Petraeus was spot on in describing Mullaney's book as a wonderful, beautifully written story of the education and development of a young soldier-scholar, the coming of age of an infantry officer, and the exercise of a small unit leader's responsibilities in a tough, complex, and frustrating situation in Afghanistan. It captures particularly eloquently and movingly the relationships among those who walk point for our nation as part of that most elite of fraternities, the brotherhood of the close fight.
Within those words -- two -- soldier-scholar -- probably describe my major take-away from The Unforgiving Minute and reinforces all I've experienced the last 30 years associated with the US military -- we can ill afford leaders equipped solely with the implements of warfare -- they must be intellectually equipped as well. Craig Mullaney is indeed a soldier-scholar and --citizen as well and his story is the story of a whole generation of young leaders.
I'll leave you with Steve Coll's description of The Unforgiving Minute - ... one of the most compelling memoirs yet to emerge from America's 9/11 era. Craig Mullaney has given us an unusually honest, funny, accessible, and vivid account of a soldier's coming of age. This is more than a soldier's story; it is a work of literature.
The Unforgiving Minute - Craig Mullaney's web site
Interview with Andrew Exum - Abu Muqawama
Interview on Afghanistan - Charlie Rose Show
Of particular note on the book's website are their practical exercises -- OPDs in their parlance, but TDGs to many of us -- complete with instructor guides, etc.
More at The Washington Post.
The Perilous State of Mexico - David Luhnow and José de Cordoba, Wall Street Journal
Detective Ramon Jasso was heading to work in this bustling city (Monterrey) a few days ago when an SUV pulled alongside and slowed ominously. Within seconds, gunmen fired 97 bullets at the 37-year-old policeman, killing him instantly.Mr. Jasso had been warned. The day before, someone called his cellphone and said he would be killed if he didn't immediately release a young man who had been arrested for organizing a violent protest in support of the city's drug gangs. The demonstrators were demanding that the Mexican army withdraw from the drug war. The protests have since spread from Monterrey -- once a model of order and industry - to five other cities.Much as Pakistan is fighting for survival against Islamic radicals, Mexico is waging a do-or-die battle with the world's most powerful drug cartels. Last year, some 6,000 people died in drug-related violence here, more than twice the number killed the previous year. The dead included several dozen who were beheaded, a chilling echo of the scare tactics used by Islamic radicals. Mexican drug gangs even have an unofficial religion: They worship La Santa Muerte, a Mexican version of the Grim Reaper.More at The Wall Street Journal and:
Mexico Travel Alert - US Department of State
Juarez Police Chief Quits After Killings of Officers, Threats - Los Angeles Times
Mexican Cop Killed as Chief Pressured to Quit - Associated Press
Mexican President: Gov't Does Not Control Areas on US Border - Threats Watch
Undercover Cop in Middle American City - Global Guerrillas
The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education - Craig Mullaney
The Unforgiving Minute is the ultimate's soldier's book - universal in its raw emotion and its understanding of the larger issues of life and death. Mullaney, a master storyteller, plunges the depths of self-doubt, endurance, and courage. The result: a riveting, suspenseful human story, beautifully told. This is a book written under fire - a lyrical, spellbinding tale of war, love, and courage. The Unforgiving Minute is the Three Cups of Tea of soldiering.Great Powers: America and the World after Bush - Thomas P.M. Barnett
In civilian and military circles alike, The Pentagon's New Map became one of the most talked about books of 2004. "A combination of Tom Friedman on globalization and Carl von Clausewitz on war, [it is] the red-hot book among the nation's admirals and generals," wrote David Ignatius in The Washington Post. Barnett's second book, Blueprint for Action, demonstrated how to put the first book's principles to work. Now, in Great Powers, Barnett delivers his most sweeping - and important - book of all.The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One - David Kilcullen
A remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror. Kilcullen takes us "on the ground" to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the big global war (the "War on Terrorism") and its relation to the associated "small wars" across the globe: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chechnya, Pakistan and North Africa.The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 - Thomas Ricks
Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned - Rufus Phillips
Phillips details how the legendary Edward G. Lansdale helped the South Vietnamese gain and consolidate their independence between 1954 and 1956, and how this later changed to a reliance on American conventional warfare with its highly destructive firepower. He reasons that our failure to understand the Communists, our South Vietnamese allies, or even ourselves took us down the wrong road. In summing up US errors in Vietnam, Phillips draws parallels with the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and suggests changes in the US approach. Known for his intellectual integrity and firsthand, long-term knowledge of what went on in Vietnam, the author offers lessons for today in this trenchant account.Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq - Peter Mansoor
This is a unique contribution to the burgeoning literature on the Iraq war, analyzing the day-to-day performance of a US brigade in Baghdad during 2004-2005. Mansoor uses a broad spectrum of sources to address the military, political and cultural aspects of an operation undertaken with almost no relevant preparation, which tested officers and men to their limits and generated mistakes and misjudgments on a daily basis. The critique is balanced, perceptive and merciless - and Mansoor was the brigade commander. Military history is replete with command memoirs. Most are more or less self-exculpatory. Even the honest ones rarely achieve this level of analysis. The effect is like watching a surgeon perform an operation on himself. Mansoor has been simultaneously a soldier and a scholar, able to synergize directly his military and academic experiences.The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq - Bing West
From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around - and the choice now facing America. We interpret reality through the clouded prism of our own experience, so it is unsurprising that Bing West sees Iraq through the lens of Vietnam. He served as a Marine officer there, and he thinks politicians and the media caused the American public to turn against a war that could have been won. Now a correspondent for the Atlantic, West has made 15 reporting trips to Iraq over the last six years and is almost as personally invested in the current conflict as he was in Vietnam; this book, his third on Iraq, is his attempt to ensure that the "endgame" in Iraq turns out better than in his last war.Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq - Linda Robinson
After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war. Linda Robinson conducted extensive interviews with Petraeus and his subordinate commanders and spent weeks with key US and Iraqi divisions. The result is the only book that ties together military operations in Iraq and the internecine political drama that is at the heart of the civil war. Replete with dramatic battles, behind-doors confrontations, and astute analysis, the book tells the full story of the Iraq War's endgame, and lays out the options that will be facing the next president.The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 - Bob Woodward
Woodward interviewed key players, obtained dozens of never-before-published documents, and had nearly three hours of exclusive interviews with President Bush. The result is a stunning, firsthand history of the years from mid-2006, when the White House realizes the Iraq strategy is not working, through the decision to surge another 30,000 US troops in 2007, and into mid-2008, when the war becomes a fault line in the presidential election. As violence in Iraq reaches unnerving levels in 2006, a second front in the war rages at the highest levels of the Bush administration. In his fourth book on President George W. Bush, Bob Woodward takes readers deep inside the tensions, secret debates, unofficial backchannels, distrust and determination within the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence agencies and the US military headquarters in Iraq. With unparalleled intimacy and detail, this gripping account of a president at war describes a period of distress and uncertainty within the US government from 2006 through mid-2008. The White House launches a secret strategy review that excludes the military. General George Casey, the commander in Iraq, believes that President Bush does not understand the war and eventually concludes he has lost the president's confidence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also conduct a secret strategy review that goes nowhere. On the verge of revolt, they worry that the military will be blamed for a failure in Iraq.We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam - Harold Moore and Joe Galloway
In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results. It would be a monumental task for Moore and Galloway to top their classic 1992 memoir. But they come close in this sterling sequel, which tells the backstory of two of the Vietnam War's bloodiest battles (in which Moore participated as a lieutenant colonel), their first book and a 1993 ABC-TV documentary that brought them back to the battlefield. Moore's strong first-person voice reviews the basics of the November 1965 battles, part of the 34-day Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. Among other things, Moore and Galloway (who covered the battle for UPI) offer portraits of two former enemy commanders, generals Nguyen Huu An and Chu Huy Man, whom the authors met - and bonded with - nearly three decades after the battle. This book proves again that Moore is an exceptionally thoughtful, compassionate and courageous leader (he was one of a handful of army officers who studied the history of the Vietnam wars before he arrived) and a strong voice for reconciliation and for honoring the men with whom he served.In a Time of War: The Proud and Perilous Journey of West Point' Class of 2002 - Bill Murphy
The West Point cadets Murphy follows through their baptism by fire are an admirable sample of young American men and women: intelligent, ambitious and intensely patriotic. Most come from career military families and hold conservative opinions. Murphy describes their four years at West Point with respect even when discussing their love lives and marriages. All yearn for battle, and most get their wish. The book's best passages describe the confusion of moving to Iraq or Afghanistan and fighting insurgents, for which they lack both training and equipment. All feel something is not right but concentrate on the job at hand; some inevitably die or are grievously wounded.Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy - Steven Metz
Today the US military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post--Cold War era. But the preoccupation with Iraq also mired the United States in the Middle East and led to a bloody occupation. What will American strategy look like after US troops leave Iraq? Metz concludes that the United States has a long-standing, continuing problem "developing sound assumptions when the opponent operates within a different psychological and cultural framework." He sees a pattern of misjudgments about Saddam and Iraq based on Western cultural and historical bias and a pervasive faith in the superiority of America's worldview and institutions. This myopia contributed to America being caught off guard by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, then underestimating his longevity, and finally miscalculating the likelihood of a stable and democratic Iraq after he was toppled. With lessons for all readers concerned about America's role in the world, Dr. Metz's important new work will especially appeal to scholars and students of strategy and international security studies, as well as to military professionals and DOD civilians. With a foreword by Colin S. Gray.I see the Taliban as a loose confederation of shifting tactical alliances of convenience, and there's a lot of opportunity for negotiation and for splitting that Taliban alliance. But we've got to do that from a position of strength so that we are not negotiating for stay of execution (for Western forces), but we're negotiating for genuine national reconciliation.
More at Reuters.
Combined Arms Center Senior Leader Conference
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 February 2009
Earlier this month, I was invited to address the senior leaders of the U.S. Army's Training and Education community at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This event, hosted by LTG William Caldwell, brought together the commandants of the Army's training and education centers to discuss issues of importance to their community. LTG Caldwell asked me, along with Beth Cole of the U.S. Institute of Peace, UK LtCol. Mike Redmond, of the U.S. Army's Stability Operations Office, and retired French LTG Raffenne to discuss how to operationalize the "Comprehensive Approach," which is the guiding theme of the Army's new Field Manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations. Although I did not have formally prepared remarks, the following is an attempt to transcribe my messy handwritten speaker notes from my little brown book into something more concrete to share with the SWJ readership...
Hat tip to Mark for sending this along.
CNAS is thrilled to announce that Michele Flournoy, our President and Co-Founder, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn-in last week as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. While we will miss Michele's leadership, drive, and deep knowledge of national security issues, we know she will do great things for the country and the Department of Defense.
Michele's appointment underscores the transition that CNAS itself is undergoing, and so we wish to take this opportunity to make several announcements about our organization and its ongoing mission of developing strong, pragmatic and principled national security policies.
Staff Changes
Dr. John Nagl, acclaimed author, West Point graduate, Rhodes scholar, retired Army officer, and Bronze Star recipient, will replace Michele as President of CNAS. John is widely respected for co-writing the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency field manual, for his book Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, and for his willingness to guide and mentor members of the younger generation of national security leaders.
Nate Tibbits, our former Chief Operating Officer, has accepted a position in Presidential Personnel dealing with national security personnel. We are pleased to announce Nathaniel Fick as our new Chief Operating Officer. Nate Fick, author of the New York Times bestseller One Bullet Away, is a former Marine officer who served in Afghanistan and Iraq before attending the Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard Business School.
In addition to John and Nate, we've also added a distinguished senior fellow to our ranks: Thomas Ricks, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, and author of The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008, published this week.
Board Moves
We are pleased to announce that with the completion of former Secretary of Defense William Perry's tenure as Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Honorable Richard J. Danzig has taken the helm as Chairman of the Board. We thank Secretary Perry for his leadership and guidance as Chairman, and look forward to continuing to work closely with him as a member of the Board. Richard Danzig, one of this nation's premier defense and national security practitioners and most committed public servants, will help build on the strong foundation Secretary Perry established.
We are pleased to announce that the Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has joined the Board of Directors of CNAS. We could not be more excited to have such a fine public servant as part of the CNAS family.
It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points how the strong man stumbled or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly...who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at best, knows the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.
--Theodore Roosevelt, 1910
I spent a good part of last night corresponding with COL Gian Gentile -- an Army officer I greatly respect and consider a dear friend. While we often find ourselves on the opposite poles of the COIN -- conventional warfare debate -- I relayed to him that this debate is a worthy debate -- critical to the future of our armed forces. He deserves the highest credit for pushing this debate into the public domain.
Gian did this, all the while opening himself up to both warranted and unwarranted criticism. He stood in the arena while others either cheered or jeered from the sidelines. I cannot express how impressed I am with those who actually take a stand -- those who stand tall in that arena.
Gian, as I said in at least two e-mails -- you done good and have everything to be proud of. I salute you sir -- as a brother in arms and as a loyal friend.
Semper Fi,
Dave
More at National Review.
More at The New York Times.