Blog Posts

General James Mattis, USMC, is NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. This transcript is based on his keynote speech delivered at the February 12, 2009 Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration conference, sponsored by FPRI and the Reserve Officers Association, held in Washington, D.C.

More at Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The Hon. Thomas A. Schweich is Visiting Professor of Law and Ambassador in Residence, Washington University in St. Louis. He was U.S. Ambassador for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Chief of Staff of the U.S. mission to the UN. This essay is based on his presentation at the February 12, 2009 Defense Showstoppers: National Security Challenges for the Obama Administration conference, sponsored by FPRI and the Reserve Officers Association, held in Washington, D.C.

More at Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The Introduction begins with a letter to the US Army from President John F. Kennedy that interestingly enough, notes the "several terms" that the Army used to describe guerrilla warfare and goes on to say "by whatever name, this militant challenge to freedom calls for an improvement and enlargement of our own development of techniques and tactics, communications and logistics to meet this threat. The introduction also includes a foreword by Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr, the Table of Contents and (something we could use today) a section called "Use the Right Word!" -- a handy guide to official terminology.

Part I - New Emphasis on Special Warfare includes articles The Third Challenge by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Special Warfare: A Progress Report by General George Decker, Chief of Staff of the US Army.

Part II -- Why You Should Know About Special Warfare includes articles Countering Guerilla Attack by Walt Rostow, Guerrillas: A Formable Force by Captain Thomas Collier, and Soldier of the Future by Major Boyd Bashore.

Part III -- Is Special Warfare Something New? Includes articles The US Army and Guerrilla Warfare by Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Gardner and Counterguerrilla Operations: A Case Study by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Rattan.

Part IV -- What the Army is Doing includes articles Special Forces by Charles Dodson, US Army Special Warfare Center by Brigadier General William Yarbrough, The World's Top Jungle Fighters by Nelson Axlerod, The Jungle Tigers of Viet Nam by Simon Poore, Our Secret Weapon in The Far East by Dickey Chapelle and Special Forces: Europe by Captain Robert Asprey.

Part V -- Some Thoughts on Guerrilla Philosophy and Tactics includes articles Mao's Primer on Guerilla War by Mao Tse-tung, La Guerra De Guerillas by Che Guevara, Encirclement Methods in Counterguerrilla Warfare by Major Thoung Htaik and Both Sides of The Guerrilla Hill by Brigadier R.C.H. Miers.

Part VI -- A Look at The Future includes articles Twilight War by Colonel Robert Rigg and Unconventional Warfare by Franklin Lindsay.

Part VII -- Additional contains reference listings for further reading.

With that we give a SWJ Tip O' Hat to Paul Tompkins and Dave Maxwell.

Executive Summary

Full Report

More at NPR.

Gates: U.S. Won't Allow Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

More at American Forces Press Service.

More at The Christian Science Monitor.

- Are weak states a bigger problem than strong states?

Conference summary report by Michael P. Noonan at Foreign Policy Research Institute.

On February 12, 2009, FPRI's Program on National Security held a conference on potential "defense showstoppers" for the Obama administration—critical issues that, if not fixed, could lead to a serious deterioration of American military capabilities. The event was hosted and co-sponsored by the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, D.C. Program-affiliated scholars Michael Horowitz, Michael P. Noonan, Mackubin T. Owens, and Frank G. Hoffman served as panel moderators. More than 100 individuals from academia, government, NGOs, the media, the military, and the public participated in person, and another 300-plus individuals from around the world participated by webcast. Audio and video files of the proceedings are posted at FPRI's website; the papers presented at the conference will be published in Orbis and other outlets.

A summary of the major panel presentations and discussions can be found here and include commentary by T.X. Hammes, Stephen Biddle, Roger Carstens, Frank G. Hoffman, Mackenzie Eaglen, Christopher Preble, James N. Mattis, Michael O'Hanlon, Thomas McNaugher, Frederick W. Kagan, Janine Davidson, Thomas Schweich, Ralph Peters and a conference summation by Harvey Sicherman.

As we fight the current IED fight, we need to look to the future. Next-Gen IEDs will lose the I. North Korea and others with fears of US invasion and occupation will manufacture state of the art platter-charge type devices with all sorts of unique designs to blend in any environment, counter-US electronic warfare technology, and increase lethality. With vehicle killing "panzerfausts" in unlimited numbers for urban and other terrain, adversaries may be able to create formidable web defenses when coupled with other attriting technology.

Manufactured or Military Explosive Devices might be a nice term. Irregular no longer, MEDs will be a permanent part of the defensive landscape. We need to start investigating MEDs now, as they develop, and determine doctrinal and technological responses.

Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War - by Ganesh Sitaraman (with a tip of the hat to Erin)

If you've been following the "COIN will breed COIN" debate, check out these posts by Andrew Exum, Matthew Yglesias and Spencer Ackerman. If you haven't, check them out anyway. It's an interesting discussion of whether in making COIN a doctrinal focus of operations, the U.S. military will be tempted to intervene in counterinsurgencies of choice. It's a subject I've written about often over the past 18 months. If anything has reassured me that my worries weren't warranted, it's been Secretary of Defense Bob Gates' emphasis on "strategic balance." Exum's insistence that COIN practitioners are not necessarily COIN enthusiasts rings true, too.

Still, the COIN-dinistas' scholar-warrior approach to war has made it more intelligent and less destructive, and thereby more intellectually satifying and morally palatable. Afer all, "Counterinsurgency is armed social work," as David Kilcullen has said, makes for a better marketing slogan than "War is Hell." Having experience in social work, I can say that at one point or another, we all found ourselves wishing we did have a gun, even while knowing that forced progress is no progress at all.

But I think Spencer's point about the theorist-practitioners moving into policy positions offers a better potential payoff as a line of investigation. The question, though, isn't whether or not the shift will necessarily result in more wars, but what kind of impact will it have on strategic policy? I'd identify three areas where it will have an impact:

1) An emphasis on stability as the strategic objective of American foreign policy. This is largely consistent with America's historical emphasis, primarily due to the benefits of stability to trade and commerce. But with failed states now being perceived as a national security threat vector, that will probably increase. The downside is that promoting stability, if pushed to an extreme, can translate into stifling change and progress. There's also an internal tension, since trade and liberalization often have very destabilizing effects.

2) An emphasis on understanding over knowing. This seems like a clear net plus. One of the cornerstones of the new COIN doctrine is the need to understand the culture within which the operation is unfolding. Translated into a broad policy directive, that can only have a positive effect on strategic decision-making. If there's one risk, it's that in emphasizing the socio-cultural aspect of intelligence, COIN hones the ability to shape opinion through narrative, both within the theater of operations, but also domestically. The potential for abuse should be obvious.

3) An emphasis on a whole of government approach. The advantage here is that the wholistic synthesis of interagency strengths offers better strategic guidance for identifying objectives. It's also the institutional incarnation of "smart power." The disadvantage is that it also often results in policy paralysis and turf wars. The risk, too, is that it might eventually lower the barriers to "policy entrepeneurs" that the systemic firewalls have erected between agencies. There's also the problem that, notwithstanding all of Bob Gates' protests about the militarization of American foreign policy, the military will still be the biggest-funded agency within any interagency approach for the foreseeable future. And we know what talks and what walks, especially in Washington. While that doesn't necessarily mean more wars, it does mean that strategic policy will most likely be driven by the Pentagon and informed by the military's perception of America's national interests.

That's a start. Feel free to shout back with any others I've missed.

To be fair, as normally happens, he probably reviewed a galley (or perhaps an early incomplete draft) of the book, and he therefore may not have had a chance to read it in full, read the later chapters or look at the theory chapter. Mr Bacevich's review focuses on the Iraq and Afghanistan chapters, but of course the book also analyses five other conflicts at some length (West Java, East Timor, Pakistan, Southern Thailand and radicalization in Europe), and there are three theory chapters also. I understand Mr Bacevich may have been pressed for time or short of space, and so I can completely understand a desire to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. But whatever the reason, the fact is that the book Mr Bacevich criticizes so harshly is simply not the book I wrote...

Contrary to what my good friend and fellow Marine, Frank Hoffman, argues, I believe that this continual adding of adjectives in front of "war" is counterproductive. As Clausewitz wrote, "In war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole, for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together." Every modification of the word "war" serves mainly as fodder for un-needed conferences, workshops, and meetings where the new definitions as well as the merits of these terms are debated with, in my estimation, little value added. These new terms also help confuse our officer corps and undermine a solid professional lexicon. I remain in Professor Colin Gray's corner who maintains that "warfare is warfare"---plain and simple. At most we need only think of it in two forms, wars of fire and maneuver and wars of insurgency.

Clausewitz allowed for this with two observations:

Our current enemies have adopted wars of insurgency as the form they use to challenge us.

Paul Van Riper

Updates:

Frank Hoffman responds:

I have always been informed by the tremendous scholarship of Dr. Gray and of course have benefited over the years from my interaction with General Van Riper. But they are both wrong here (I think Dr. Gray is being misquoted out of context and not wrong). We've been arguing this particular point for some time since the Army 2003 Arm War College strategy conference where I was critical of The American Way of War, and at NDU in 2008 where General Van Riper first articulated his views.

I agree with Dr. Gray's true point that War is War. War defined as a state of violent interaction between two groups, a clash of wills AND cultures, between groups (not necessarily just States) to obtain political ends is War. As he states in his great book, my Loop choice Fighting Talk, war is a relationship. Furthermore, the nature of war is immutable (violence, chance, human dimension, etc) But Warfare, Dr Gray makes pains to distinguish as a subset of War and I agree, warfare describes the military component of War, the warmaking. I recommend his chapter "There is More to War than Warfare" for those seeking more distinction.

Warfare is not immutable, quite the opposite. Dr. Gray points out that some cultures (he means ours) have a dominant military culture that precludes understanding the distinction between war and warfare (p. 32), which often leads to tactical success but strategic failure. I think Dr. Gray is right about us, for we conflate our preferences about warfare and then mirror image our enemies with our culturally induced idea about what warfare is and isnt. We focus on the warfare, and ignore the strategic context. Regrettably, General Van Riper's comments continue that misunderstanding--undoubtedly unintentionally.

I think the bromide that Warfare is Warfare is a dangerous over-simplification and residue from the poor professional conceptualization of warfare that has marked U.S. military since Vietnam. I recall the late Harry Summer's as the first in the "War is War is War" school, in his essay by that title in the post-Vietnam era. This was central to his argument that Vietnam was a conventional fight, which remains a dubious argument that has fallen aside. This has led us to the problems in our doctrine and profession reflected in operations and the poor transition to a better peace in Panama, Desert Storm and OIF. It has truncated our thinking to a narrow professional sphere in the conflict spectrum, the most irrelevant today and for the mid-range future.

There ARE forms of warfare, and different societies and cultures have they own forms or modes of warfare. There is fighting and dying in each of them, but the rule sets or principles or what Clausewitz suggested by Grammar are different. One doesn't succeed in COIN by applying conventional warfighting capabilities and one doesn't succeed in major combat operations with t he six Logical Lines of Operation of FM 3-24. Moreover, ignoring the distinction simply continues the tragedy.

Moreover, as General Van Riper points out, and as Dr. Tony Echevarria has discussed in some length in his book on Clausewitz and Contemporary Conflict, our Prussian friend was very much aware that war (more accurately warfare) has an ever evolving character. Each age he said has its own conception and preconceptions, and that war is MORE than a chameleon, that is it changes more than just color, it changes its character and characteristics. I think General Van Riper, given his profound historical founding and study, appreciates this more than most of us and actually means this in his statement, but by trying to bin everything into Warfare is Warfare, he perpetuates our misunderstanding of what has changed and what has not. This will continue to leave us poorly prepared for tomorrow's fights.

I think its patently illogical to ignore language and its influence on our professional thinking. We already have numerous adjectives about warfare: Unconventional, Irregular and "Conventional" or Traditional. I think all of these are flawed or outdated in our thinking right now. UW is related to the SOF community and needs serious updating. Irregular has become synonymous with COIN, which is a very clear case of what Colin calls "presentism." I don't agree that our enemies have picked something called Wars of Insurgency, t hat is OUR term and its a label or adjective after the noun instead of in front of it. There are many forms of Irregular Warfare for which the Joint concept leave us utterly unprepared for. What I think most folks think of as Regular or Conventional or Traditional warfare is vague but is very Western or ethno-centric. I think we need a serious professional discourse about warfare and what assumptions and illusions we hide behind when we use the terms we have.

This is a valuable debate because we are entering an era in which our conceptualization of future conflict will influence our strategy, and the allocation of scarce resources is upon us. I trust that the debate will continue.

Frank

LtGen Van Riper responds:

Ah, it is a sad task to debate a good friend in a public forum, but in this case a necessary task. Let me say at the outset, however, that for several reasons I am surprised by Frank Hoffman's focus on a term many view as simply trendy, for in the past we have both lamented the steady degrading of the military's professional lexicon in numerous conversations over dinner. (Pity our poor wives who have to listen to such professional talks for hours on end.) Moreover, from 1995 to 1997 Frank was the very best writer at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and many of his words appeared in my formal congressional testimony and speeches. Those words were simple and elegant, unburdened by use of stylish terms.

Also, let me second Frank's words that Dr. Gray's, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare and Dr. Antulio (Tony) Echevarria's Clausewitz: Contemporary War are exceptional books that serious scholars of war, strategy, and operational art need to read and study! I might also tout Dr. Gray's latest book, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities, one for which I was honored to write a forward.

I took the words "warfare is warfare" from the Conclusion (page 370) of Another Bloody Century. The lead sentence to that chapter reads, "Warfare is warfare, period." Later in that chapter Dr. Gray notes that "War, and warfare, has an enduring, unchanging nature, but a highly variable character." He also observes that "The American defense community is especially prone to capture by the latest catchphrase, the new-sounding spin on an ancient idea which as jargon separates those who are truly expert from the lesser breeds without the jargon." Though Dr. Gray's words, I believe, support my case, please read the entire chapter—better the entire book—to judge for yourself. Again, I am surprised by Frank's insistence that the word "hybrid" adds to our understanding of war, for he is "truly expert" in things military, and certainly not "from the lesser breeds."

I am fairly certain that I understand Dr. Gray's distinction between war and warfare. In fact, I would have preferred to use words I believe he spoke in 2005 at the opening of an address at the Army War College, "War is war," but not having a transcript of that address I hesitated. As a nation we are too single-minded and center our attention on warfare rather than war. Dr. Echevarria has pointed this out in numerous places, noting that it is the reason we have an "American way of battle," not war. I agree! Too few Americans understand the full impact of Clausewitz's admonition: ". . . war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs." As a Marine I am deeply interested in the "grammar" of war, but I know that it is the "logic" that is most important.

The one thing Frank and I certainly agree on is that "we already have numerous adjectives about warfare." He is also correct that my "wars of fire and maneuver" and "wars of insurgency" place the adjectives after the noun. However, my words have the distinct advantage in that they spell out a meaning; the reader does not have to guess as he or she might with words like "irregular," "unconventional," "nontraditional," forth generation," and yes, "hybrid."

Let the debate continue.

May the winner enjoy a Sam Adams and a steak at the expense of the other!

PKVR

Recent operational experience has identified the need for the United States Government to make better use of law enforcement concepts, skills and organizations to improve outcomes in population centric operations. However, within this broad consensus, there is a lack of common understanding beyond 'we need more police'. Deeper analysis of this problem space quickly identifies not just a lack of common understanding but three varying and overlapping perspectives on the role of law enforcement in this context.

From a military perspective, the value of law enforcement may be seen as enhancing the military's conduct of population centric operations through improved patrolling techniques, investigation, community engagement, graduated use of force etc. Separate to the military perspective is the potential to deploy civilian law enforcement personnel to essentially perform domestic law enforcement tasks, such as community policing, in support of broader operational goals. Finally, there is the perspective focused on long term capacity building and institutional reform of host nation law enforcement agencies, which is a prerequisite for the successful drawing down of international resources and the establishment of ongoing diplomatic relations. It should be noted that all three of these perspectives are valid and, in fact, mutually reinforcing.

The reasons for these different perspectives and associated gaps in USG capability become apparent when one considers that elements of the responsibility for law enforcement capability in international operations reside across the Departments of State, Justice and Defense in addition to USAID's role in capacity building. Additionally there is no single point of Congressional oversight and funding for these various organizations.

To help address this situation, the Emerging Capabilities Division within the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored an interagency project on Transitional Law Enforcement aimed at stimulating, informing and providing a framework for discussion on the application of law enforcement in international operations. This was achieved by first documenting the various interagency perspectives and contributions as well as the specific functions of TLE in international operations. This was supported by an analysis of the USG authorities (legislation, policies, directives, etc) that govern various aspects of TLE. The project also covered international models for deploying law enforcement expertise including a detailed analysis of the capabilities of the Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group as well as issues associated with international supply and demand for law enforcement and an overview of the law enforcement communities and international contributions of sixteen major donor nations.

The Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute has uploaded these documents for use by any interested organization. These documents are the first set of deliverables in an ongoing body of work which investigates the role of law enforcement on international operations.

Ben Fitzgerald is the Principal for Noetic Corporation, a strategy firm focused on national and homeland security issues. Scott Brady, a former Australian Army officer, is a senior analyst with Noetic.

Ten Questions with Bing West

Bing West served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan administration. A graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities, he served in Marine infantry in Vietnam. His books have won the Marine Corps Heritage Prize, the Colby Award for Military History and appeared on the Commandant's Reading List. West appears regularly on The News Hour and Fox News. He is a member of St. Crispin's Order of the Infantry and the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Newport, RI.

He recently released The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, the result of fourteen trips to Iraq embedded with front-line units over the entire course of the war, and agreed to be interviewed by the CCO on the lessons he learned from writing the book.

1. Your assessment of the national Iraqi security forces, including the Army and the Police, is pretty bleak. An important aspect of counterinsurgency is working with indigenous partners, but given that their inability to take control of the counterinsurgency effort was a major part of our change in strategy in early 2007, do we need to rethink our basic assumptions as to how best to work with the host nation? Would it have been better to adopt a grass-roots approach from the beginning, putting all our effort into working with groups from each town, city and region to secure their own areas before looking to create national forces?

President Obama has declared a total pull out by Aug of 2011. So US advisers have about two years to improve the Iraqi security forces. But the leverage of advisers has been tremendously weakened -- discounted -- because the date certain for their departure has been agreed by the US and GOI. It's too late for significantly more strengthening by US mentoring. We will provide technical training, staff procedures and logistical support. The greatest defect in our approach is the lack of police techniques appropriate to an insurgency.

The grass-roots approach makes all the sense in the world; but it cannot be applied until a majority of the locals in the affected area support the approach and are —to inform on the insurgents in their midst. In Iraq, that willingness on the Sunni side did not appear until late 2006; then it spread rapidly. On the Shiite side, the power of the Sadr extremists was not broken until the battles in Basra and Baghdad in April of 2007.

Continue on for more Q&A with Bing West...

As the CCO approaches its first anniversary, the CCO Support Office will be moving to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University (NDU) under the oversight of Hans Binenndijk and Bernie Carreau. This move introduces clear advantages as well as some manageable challenges to the CCO's charter and has thus generated some moderate debate. Based on my experience in leading the development and launch of the CCO, I thought I would offer the following insight for the SWJ readership and the CCO community of interest...

More at DoD Buzz.

The Axis of Upheaval by Niall Ferguson

The Most Dangerous Place in the World by Jeffrey Gettleman

Reversal of Fortune by Arkady Ostrovsky

State of War by Sam Quinones

Much more at Foreign Policy.

Last weekend I sent out the following "RFI" to a number of bloggers I know:

What follows are the replies I received through yesterday. Some stuck to the one-two requested paragraphs, some sent more. Rather than attempt to "over edit" and get some uniformity I opted to go with this initial batch of thoughts on this issue.

All good stuff that hopefully energizes a discourse on the impact of new media and its influence on military doctrine, concept development, training, education, and lessons learned. Without further ado (and in alphabetical order) here is Spencer Ackerman, Tom Barnett, Janine Davidson, Andrew Exum, Grim, Judah Grunstein, Dave Kilcullen, Raymond Pritchett, Mark Safranski, Herschel Smith, Starbuck, Michael Tanji, and Michael Yon...

Thoughts on the "New Media" - compiled by Small Wars Journal

Update:

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama

New Media Poised to Change the Future National Security Debate - Raymond Pritchett, Information Dissemination

SWJ, New Media and COIN - Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review

Thoughts on the New Media and Military Blogging - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

New Media + Old Military = New Military - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

The "New Media," the Surge, and the Writing of History - Mark Grimsley, Cliopatria

Media Blitz - Spencer Ackerman, Attackerman

New Media and Modern War - Joshua Foust, Registan

Legacy Futures in Cyberspace - Adam Elkus, ThreatsWatch

Small Wars Invitational on The Surge and New Media - Grim, Blackfive

The Difference - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Recommended Reading - Mark Safranski, Zenpundit

Counterinsurgency and the New Media - Starbuck, Wings Over Iraq

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.

Here is the March - April 2009 Issue lineup:

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq by Bing West

Unifying Physical and Psychological Impact During Operations by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army Retired

Narrowing the Gap: DOD and Stability Operations by Colonel David W. Shin, U.S. Army

Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi: Grass Roots Reconstruction by Captain Chad M. Pillai, U.S. Army

Not My Job: Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Latham, U.S. Army Retired

From Peddlers to Sheiks: A Contracting Case Study in Southern Baghdad by Lisa A. Verdon

All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence by Major Ben Connable, U.S. Marine Corps

Complex Operations in Africa: Operational Culture Training in the French Military by Colonel Henri Boré, French Army Retired

Testing Galula in Ameriyah: the People are the Key by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, U.S. Army

A View from Inside the Surge by Lieutenant Colonel James Crider, U.S. Army

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in South Africa by Major Timothy M. Bairstow, U.S. Marine Corps

Educating by Design: Preparing Leaders for a Complex World by Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army

The Art of Design: A Design Methodology by Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army, and Alex Ryan Ph.D.

Learning from Moderate Governments' Approaches to Islamist Extremism by Major Eric A. Claessen Jr., Belgium Army

The Future Combat System Program by Major Luis Alvarado, U.S. Army

Book Reviews

Letters

2009 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

Super (Sub) Secretaries - Thomas Friedman, New York Times

More at The New York Times.

The 2nd Quarter 2009 issue of Joint Force Quarterly is now posted.

Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JFQ is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to better meet tomorrow's challenges while protecting freedom today.

Here is the lineup:

Forum Executive Summary by David H. Gurney

What Is Economic Power? by Ellen L. Frost

The Rise of the Rest by William H. Overholt

Finance and Power by James G. Lacey and David L. Asher

Conflict Trends in the 21st Century by Michael Moodie

Transnational Movements and Terrorism by Mark E. Stout, Thomas F. Lynch III, and T.X. Hammes

Time to Improve U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere by Craig A. Deare

Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia by Michael Krepon

NATO's Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny? by Jeffrey Simon

Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer by Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo

Commercializing USCENTCOM Aerial Ports by John E. Michel and Jean M. Mahan

Looking Back on Operation Jump Start by David M. Church

Trouble with Doctrine? by David H. Gurney

Effects-based Thinking in Joint Doctrine by Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division Staff

Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design by Richard M. Swain

A Case Against Systemic Operational Design by Milan N. Vego

Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency Strategy by Jeffrey Philip Treistman

A Perfect Storm for Pentagon Reform by Travis Sharp

DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System: A Path Toward Improvement by Albert T. Church and Ted Warner

Bridging the Strategy-Resources Gap: Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis by Ionut C. Popescu

Protecting the Past to Secure the Future: The Strategic Value of Heritage Training by Laurie W. Rush and Matthew F. Bogdanos

Joint Doctrine Update by Joint Chiefs of Staff J7

More at The New York Times.

Remarks of President Barack Obama -- As Prepared for Delivery

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Friday, February 27, 2009

Good morning Marines. Good morning Camp Lejeune. Good morning Jacksonville. Thank you for that outstanding welcome. I want to thank Lieutenant General Hejlik for hosting me here today.

I also want to acknowledge all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That includes the Camp Lejeune Marines now serving with -- or soon joining -- the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq; those with Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Afghanistan; and those among the 8,000 Marines who are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. We have you in our prayers. We pay tribute to your service. We thank you and your families for all that you do for America. And I want all of you to know that there is no higher honor or greater responsibility than serving as your Commander-in-Chief.

I also want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Ryan Crocker, who recently completed his service as our Ambassador to Iraq. Throughout his career, Ryan always took on the toughest assignments. He is an example of the very best that this nation has to offer, and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. He carried on his work with an extraordinary degree of cooperation with two of our finest Generals -- General David Petraeus, and General Ray Odierno -- who will be critical in carrying forward the strategy that I will outline today.

Next month will mark the sixth anniversary of the war in Iraq. By any measure, this has already been a long war. For the men and women of America's armed forces -- and for your families -- this war has been one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our nation. You have endured tour after tour after tour of duty. You have known the dangers of combat and the lonely distance of loved ones. You have fought against tyranny and disorder. You have bled for your best friends and for unknown Iraqis. And you have borne an enormous burden for your fellow citizens, while extending a precious opportunity to the people of Iraq. Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military have served with honor, and succeeded beyond any expectation.

Today, I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end...