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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/02/2009 - 12:48am | 6 comments
Erin Simpson, at Abu Muqawama, has more on Tom Ricks's WaPo piece.... I think we've systematically underestimated the impact of our flat-footedness in confronting a variety of irregular threats. This goes back at least to the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut and runs through Mogadishu, Nairobi, the USS Cole, to the Trade Towers. MajGen Taylor is concerned that we might not be able to deter nations states in the future. I think we should be concerned that we have already demonstrated inability to deter non-state actors. In fact, we have provided the opposite: a clear and compelling invitation to attack us in an irregular manner. And perhaps when these efforts focused on mere embassies and barracks, you could say that these were tragic, but isolated attacks that could be dealt with locally or tactically (ie, force protection, local counter-terrorism, etc.).But we now know that's utter folly. These aren't Lilliuputian pin-pricks. We now know that our stumbling in Lebanon and clumsiness in Somalia provided very clear lessons learned to al Qaeda and their fellow travelers... Our ham-fistedness not only failed to deter our enemies, but provided them with a clear strategy for confronting us. Today we are experiencing the long-term, strategic effects of our myopia.Like the general, I am unsure of the nature of all our future threats. And like the general, I worry that focusing on COIN could leave us somewhat more vulnerable to conventional attack. I just wish the general would worry more about the impact of our already demonstrated vulnerability to irregular assaults.
Small Wars vs Big Wars
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/01/2009 - 4:10am | 1 comment
Tom Ricks's Inbox at The Washington Post:Marine Maj. Gen. Larry Taylor, now in Iraq, recently wrote to a young Marine to warn him against assuming that the country's next war will be like those in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan. I was particularly struck by his last point -- that the danger of being wrong about a big war is far greater than the danger of being wrong about a small one...
Tom Ricks's Inbox
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/31/2009 - 9:04pm | 1 comment
Okay, we get inquiries from time to time about Dave Kilcullen blogging at SWJ. Here's the skinny -- he has promised future SWJ material and as any regular SWJ reader knows -- has been quite busy with his book, new gig at CNAS and other sundry endeavours.
That said, an alert SWJ reader sends in this pic that apparently captures Dave in his "night job". Go figure...
Dr. K and The Accidental Guerrilla Lonely Hearts Club Band
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/31/2009 - 5:59pm | 0 comments
Recommended by COL Dave Maxwell and Jedburgh at the Council - two articles in the current edition of Special Warfare:
Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan by Major Darin J. Blatt, Captain Eric Long, Captain Brian Mulhern and Staff Sergeant Michael Ploskunak
There is an ongoing discussion about the merits of engagement activities — activities between coalition military forces and foreign civilian personnel — as a means of obtaining information, influencing behavior and building an indigenous base of support for coalition and government objectives.During a recent rotation to Operation Enduring Freedom, Special Forces A-detachments 3321 and 3315 developed models in the Paktia and Paktika provinces of what can be accomplished in terms of tribal engagement by working within the existing tribal power structure in Afghanistan. An examination of the detachments' understanding of the operational environment and subsequent methods of engagement can provide a model for others to use throughout Afghanistan...Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan
Cliffhanger Fierce Battle in the Shok Valley Tests SF Team's Mettle by Janice Burton
There are no roads leading into the Shok Valley. A village that stands sentinel over the valley is home to one of the fiercest of the insurgent forces in Afghanistan - the Hezeb Islami al Gulbadin, or HIG.On April 6, 2008, a daring raid into the stronghold by Afghan Commandos and their Special Forces counterparts tested the mettle of the Afghan forces and further forged the bond between them and their SF brothers.On Dec. 12, Lieutenant General John F. Mullholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, pinned Silver Star Medals on the chests of 10 of the men involved in the raid and the ensuing six-and-a-half-hour firefight that saw more than 150 insurgents killed.The ceremony was the largest of its kind since the Vietnam era. But for the members of Team 3336 of the 3rd Special Forces Group, it was never about the medals.When you ask them to use one word to describe April 6, their words pop, much like the gunfire that rained down on them...Cliffhanger Fierce Battle in the Shok Valley Tests SF Team's Mettle
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/31/2009 - 10:39am | 1 comment
4-part blog series by Tom Ricks over at FP's Best Defense - Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong: What happened at Wanat?Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster...
Part 1 - What happened at Wanat?
Part 2 - Did we tip our hand to the enemy?
Part 3 - Did the troops have what they needed?
Part 4 - Underestimating the enemy.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/31/2009 - 12:46am | 0 comments
SWJ's 4th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Groping for a strategy in Afghanistan - What does "soft power" actually do? - But can the military prepare for all of these missions? - Are the military's schools part of the solution, or part of the problem?
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/30/2009 - 6:39am | 0 comments
We've received several e-mails highly recommending the following two articles:
Losing Their Way? - The Economist editorial
The British army suffers from lack of soldiers, lack of money and lack of conviction.
... For all the public recognition, the armed services are going through unusually difficult times. This is challenging Britain's belief in itself as a fighting nation with an important role in the world. The severe strain of waging two wars in faraway countries has been aggravated by undermanning and equipment shortages. More serious still is a new mood of self-doubt. The invasion of Iraq was controversial and its occupation inglorious; the campaign in Afghanistan is going badly. British commanders have belatedly realised that they have much to learn, or rather relearn, about fighting small wars in distant lands. "We have lost our way," says one general...Much more at The Economist.
Australia's Afghan Crossroads - Cynthia Banham, Sydney Morning Herald opinion
Australia is at a crossroads in its military contribution to the war in Afghanistan. What Australia does next will affect its relationship with the US.It will also have an impact on the reputation of our defence forces among our closest allies, the US, Britain and Canada.The questions facing the Rudd Government as it determines which path to take go well beyond whether it should simply offer more troops to the Obama Administration, if asked...Much more at The Sydney Morning Herald.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/30/2009 - 5:05am | 0 comments
Afghan Presidential Election Delayed - Dexter Filkens, New York TimesAfghan officials said Thursday that they had decided to postpone the country's presidential election until August, saying they needed more time to prepare. But the decision, which appeared to contravene Afghanistan's Constitution, raised questions about the legitimacy of what could be President Hamid Karzai's final months in office.But Afghanistan's Constitution states that the president's term expires on the equivalent of May 22 on the Roman calendar. Presidential elections, the Constitution says, must be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the term.
More at the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Times, Associated Press and Voice of America.
Obama Taps a General as the Envoy to Kabul - Eric Schmitt, New York Times
The Obama administration has picked Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, a former top military commander in Afghanistan, to be the next United States ambassador to Kabul, an administration official said Thursday. Tapping a career Army officer who will soon retire from the service to fill one of the country's most sensitive diplomatic jobs is a highly unusual choice.But Afghanistan specialists say that General Eikenberry, who served in Afghanistan twice, including an 18-month command tour that ended in 2007, knows the players and issues there well. That is a valuable commodity in a year when the United States will send thousands of additional troops to Afghanistan and the country will hold presidential elections.More at The New York Times.
Call for More Afghan Troops - Mark Dodd, The Australian
The Australian Defence Force has enough spare capacity to boost its military contribution in Afghanistan, but any increase would be meaningless unless matched by other NATO nations, counter-insurgency expert, retired Major-General Jim Molan said yesterday.Afghanistan was discussed in a 25-minute phone call to Kevin Rudd from US President Barack Obama yesterday, but there was no request for Canberra to boost its troop commitment to the understrength 55,000-strong NATO-led International Security Assistance Force there.The ADF has 1000 troops deployed, including a 300-strong Special Forces Task Group targeting insurgents.More at The Australian.
British Were Complacent in Afghanistan, Says Sir Jock Stirrup - Michael Evans, The Times
Britain's top military commander has admitted for the first time that America was right to criticise the way in which British troops carried out counter-insurgency operations against the Taleban in southern Afghanistan when they first deployed to Helmand province in 2006. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff and a former head of the RAF, blamed commanders for being "smug and complacent" about the challenges they faced in Helmand.His words echoed accusations made by Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, and several senior American military officers who claimed that their British counterparts spent too much time boasting about their experiences in Northern Ireland.More at The Times.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/29/2009 - 5:48pm | 0 comments
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report has just been released.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) released a statement on the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, which was required by the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act:
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report demonstrates that the Department of Defense's understanding of its mission and the core competencies required to achieve it has expanded quite substantially since the attacks of 9/11. The scope of the mission the Department is preparing to tackle is daunting and will require careful scrutiny.This report represents an advance by organizing in one place a host of ideas about new or newly emphasized missions for the Department -- from the need to provide support to civil authorities, to cyber warfare, to training and mentoring foreign security forces. It raises significant issues about the appropriate role of the Department in these areas that will be heavily debated in the national security community in the coming years.At the same time, this report shows the Department still has a lot of work ahead to reform its organization, budgets, and processes to execute this mission. The report makes only a small contribution to the difficult task of challenging the allocation of treasured turf and changing deeply held cultures within the Department which will be required to actually fulfill such a far reaching mission set.I am reminded that the last time this task was seriously tackled, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, it took several years and the personal intervention of President Harry Truman to reach a workable consensus. I very much appreciate the work of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates in kicking off a similar cycle of reevaluation of these issues in this report. As Congress anticipated when it established this review as a continuing requirement every four years, there remains much work to do.The six Core Mission Areas addressed in the QRM are Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HD/CS), Deterrence Operations, Major Combat Operations (MCOs), Irregular Warfare; Military Support to Stabilization Security; Transition, and Reconstruction Operations; and Military Contribution to Cooperative Security.
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report
Update:
Defense Department Releases Roles, Missions Review - AFPS
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/29/2009 - 5:31pm | 1 comment
ISF Partnering Brief
by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, US Army
Senior Combined Arms Battalion Trainer
National Training Center
I put this brief (ISF Partnering) together as a vehicle to discuss partnering with Iraqi Security Forces for units training at NTC as they prepare for deployment to Iraq. Throughout OIF we have used various phrases to describe conducting combined operations to include "put an Iraqi face on it", "IA in the lead", and "By, With, Through". I personally struggled with this in theater and I see units routinely struggle with this as they train for deployment. "IA in the Lead" often becomes a US plan and we put the IA on the lead stack to clear a building to get the "Iraqi face on it".
I prefer the term partnership. A combined approach built upon a relationship developed with our Iraqi Security Force partners. What I have put together here is based upon my experience trying to partner in Baghdad and some reflection on how I could have done it better. Partnering starts at the top with the right attitude. The commander must invest in developing relationships with Iraqi officers and truly try to integrate his staff with his counterpart. How to organize for that integration is also important, whether your unit is partnering with a brigade with several battalions or just one battalion.
We often made mistakes in not adequately preparing for a combined patrol. We show up at the IA unit 30 minutes before the patrol, without adequately conducting troop leading procedures and then complain that our partners screw up the mission. It is much more effective to include our partners in the planning process and use every patrol as a training opportunity - for them and us.
At the battalion and brigade level we should be thinking about how we can include our partners in our targeting process. In theater we started with a weekly synch meeting with the ISF to discuss the focus over the next week. Initially we did this primarily at the staff level. Over time we expanded to include battalion commanders, staffs, and company commanders from the ISF and CF and used it as a training opportunity and forum to discuss issues. We later added an intel synch meeting for the S2s to share information that helped to inform our targeting.
Finally, commanders should think about how they can conduct combined command and control. We tried several different techniques to include establishing our battalion command post as a Joint Security Station with an Iraqi Battalion and also using a smaller tactical command post in a similar role. This also served as a good place to conduct a combined morning update brief which we did two to three times a week.
ISF Partnering Brief
Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/29/2009 - 1:50pm | 0 comments
Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea by Paul B. Stares, General John W. Vessey, and Joel S. Wit, Council on Foreign RelationsOverview: North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, and despite some progress, it is by no means clear that the ongoing six-party talks will be able to reveal the full extent of the country's nuclear activities, much less persuade Pyongyang to give them up. The United States maintains tens of thousands of forces on the Korean peninsula in support of its commitments to the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a country with which the North is still technically at war. And the peninsula sits in a strategically vital region, where the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all have important interests at stake.All of this puts a premium on close attention to and knowledge of developments in North Korea. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-Il's government is perhaps the world's most difficult to read or even see. This Council Special Report, commissioned by CFR's Center for Preventive Action and authored by Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit, focuses on how to manage one of the central unknowns: the prospect of a change in North Korea's leadership. The report examines three scenarios: managed succession, in which the top post transitions smoothly; contested succession, in which government officials or factions fight for power after Kim's demise; and failed succession, in which a new government cannot cement its legitimacy, possibly leading to North Korea's collapse. The authors consider the challenges that these scenarios would pose—ranging from securing Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal to providing humanitarian assistance—and analyze the interests of the United States and others. They then provide recommendations for U.S. policy. In particular, they urge Washington to bolster its contingency planning and capabilities in cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and others, and to build a dialogue with China that could address each side's concerns.With Kim Jong-Il's health uncertain and with a new president in the United States, this report could not be more timely. And with all the issues at stake on the Korean peninsula, the subject could not be more important. Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea is a thoughtful work that provides valuable insights for managing a scenario sure to arise in the coming months or years.
Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/29/2009 - 1:47pm | 0 comments
Sons of Iraq Transfer on Pace for April Completion
By Adam Weinstein, MNC-I Public Affairs
Jan. 28, 2009
The Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces are on pace to transfer all Sons of Iraq security volunteers to Iraqi control by April, and progress on finding jobs for the men is accelerating, representatives of the camps say...
by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 01/28/2009 - 7:00pm | 2 comments
Dan Twining over at FP's Shadow Government warns the new administration about moving the goalposts in Afghanistan while Charlie at Abu Muqawama takes on the Commandant of the Marine Corps on his desire to get his Marines out of Iraq and into Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Herschel Smith talks of lies, damn lies and statistics while freting over whether John Nagl's reputation may suffer by getting an agreement nod from The Captain's Journal.
Spencer Ackerman (aka ATTACKERMAN) chimes in on about how Secretary Gate's SASC testimony offers a glimpse into a new Afghanistan policy - BUT - Jules Crittenden rounds up that same testimony quite nicely - thanks Jules.
SWJ's (and FP's) own Westhawk, at his proper blog, poses two humdinger questions - does Obama see Karzai the same way Kennedy saw Diem? -- and - what if Afghans will not defend themselves?
Tom Ricks (The Gamble) at FP's Best Defense, points out the obvious concerning a new and wise policy brief and the not so obvious in dubbing Gentile and Exum the Lewis and Martin (almost typed in Clark) of Counterinsurgency.
Max Boot at Contentions pays high praise to Yochi Dreazen for his reporting in general and for this specific dispatch from Afghanistan.
Ever diligent Bill Roggio, with no time for such speculation, keeps on keeping on with just the facts ma'am at The Long War Journal.
Something in Wednesday's water - or truly interesting times?
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/28/2009 - 4:53am | 1 comment
A must read - now available for pre-order: The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by Dr. David Kilcullen.
From the product description - David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare. A Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, his vision of war dramatically influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the surge."
Now, in The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror. Kilcullen takes us "on the ground" to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the big global war (the "War on Terrorism") and its relation to the associated "small wars" across the globe: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chechnya, Pakistan and North Africa. Kilcullen sees today's conflicts as a complex pairing of contrasting trends: local social networks and worldwide movements; traditional and postmodern culture; local insurgencies seeking autonomy and a broader pan-Islamic campaign. He warns that America's actions in the war on terrorism have tended to conflate these trends, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles and thus enormously complicating our challenges. Indeed, the US had done a poor job of applying different tactics to these very different situations, continually misidentifying insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances (whom he calls "accidental guerrillas") as part of a coordinated worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary.
Colored with gripping battlefield experiences that range from the jungles and highlands of Southeast Asia to the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the dusty towns of the Middle East, The Accidental Guerrilla will, quite simply, change the way we think about war. This much anticipated book will be a must read for everyone concerned about the war on terror.
This book should be required reading for every American soldier, as well as anyone involved in the war on terror. Kilcullen's central concept of the 'accidental guerrilla' is brilliant and the policy prescriptions that flow from it important. And that's not all; the book has many more insights drawn from various battlefields. - Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek
Order The Accidental Guerrilla now.
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/27/2009 - 8:06pm | 2 comments
Defense Department Establishes Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service
The Defense Department is forming a civilian expeditionary workforce that will be trained and equipped to deploy overseas in support of military missions worldwide, according to department officials.
The intent of the program "is to maximize the use of the civilian workforce to allow military personnel to be fully utilized for operational requirements," according to a Defense Department statement.
Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed Defense Department Directive 1404.10, which outlines and provides guidance about the program, on Jan. 23...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/27/2009 - 7:59pm | 0 comments
Interesting thoughts from Spencer Ackerman about the limits of social networking, commenting on Jonathan Stray's social network of the counterinsurgent policy crowd. Both pieces are worth a look.
This node analysis is, after all, how they found the right rat hole near Tikrit. Jonathan could be onto something.
Though it pales in comparison to the IW Bottle of Scotch challenge laid out by Frank Hoffman, there's some Thunderbird for anyone that can produce action photos of the elusive Mr. Flick in his burrow.
Update: Some more at Abu Muqawama and Ghosts of Alexander.
(Nothing Follows)
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/27/2009 - 7:20pm | 0 comments
In testimony today to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Robert Gates discussed current operations (Afghanistan and Pakistan - Iraq after SOFA - North Korea, Iran and proliferation - Russia and China) as well as ongoing institutional initiatives (Ground Force expansion and stress on the Force - National Guard - nuclear stewardship - defending space and cyberspace - wartime procurement - defense acquisition).
News Links:
Gates Warns of Prolonged Commitment in Afghanistan - Washington Post
Gates: US Lacks Strategic Plan to Win in Afghanistan - Baltimore Sun
Gates: Modest Goals, More Strikes - New York Times
Gates Says US Must Set Realistic Goals in Afghanistan - Los Angeles Times
Gates Says Afghan Terror Fight Trumps Nation-Building - Bloomberg
Afghanistan is 'Greatest Challenge - Financial Times
Afghanistan is Top US Priority: Pentagon Chief - Agence France Presse
Gates Expects More Troops in Afghanistan - Associated Press
Military Ready to Send More Troops to Afghanistan, Gates Says - AFPS
Pentagon Sees Limit on US Troops in Afghanistan - Reuters
Gates Says More Troops for Afghanistan by Summer - Associated Press
Gates Says Missile Attacks in Pakistan Will Continue - CNN
Iran Playing "Subversive" Latin America Role - Reuters
US Moves to Counter Chinese Military Modernization - Voice of America
Gates on How to Institutionalize Counterinsurgency - Washington Independent
Procurement Reform Must be Government Priority, Gates Tells Senate - AFPS
Gates: Cash Cows of War Running Dry - Wired
Continue on for several excerpts from the opening remarks by Secretary Gates...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/27/2009 - 3:55am | 0 comments
Let's Have Flexible Armed Forces - Mackubin Thomas Owens, Wall Street Journal opinionDuring the 1990s, the U.S. defense debate was dominated by those who argued that advances in technology, particularly information technology, had revolutionized military affairs and changed the nature of warfare. Under former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this view -- now called transformation -- came to characterize U.S. military planning. Based on the example of the 1991 Gulf War, advocates of transformation argued that our technological edge would allow American forces to identify and destroy targets remotely, defeating an adversary at low cost in casualties.Though the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have largely discredited staunch transformation advocates, a heated debate still rages about the shape of the future U.S. military. One side, the "Long War" school, argues that Iraq and Afghanistan are characteristic of the protracted and ambiguous wars America will fight in the future. Accordingly, they say, the military should be developing a force designed to fight the Long War on terrorism, primarily by preparing for "small wars" and insurgencies...
More at The Wall Street Journal.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/26/2009 - 6:54pm | 3 comments
How Not to Lose Afghanistan - New York TimesBarack Obama has said that his priority in the war on terrorism is Afghanistan, and is poised to increase troop levels there, perhaps by as many as 30,000. How should the United States deal with growing strength of the Taliban? Is increasing troop levels enough? We asked some analysts for their thoughts on military and political strategy in the region...
Kori Schake, former national security adviser
Andrew Exum, former United States Army officer
Bruce Riedel, former C.I.A. officer
John Nagl, former United States Army officer
Parag Khanna, senior research fellow at the New America Foundation
Read all five in full at The New York Times.
H/T to Rebecca White.
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 01/25/2009 - 4:20am | 1 comment
... let's not reset back to institutional folly like this:
Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today by Dr. Leonard Wong, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, April 2002. Synopsis and emphasis by Cavguy at the Council.
Of the 365 days in the year, approximately 109 days are unavailable for training due to weekends, federal holidays, payday activities, and the Christmas half-day schedule. This results in a total of about 256 available days for company commanders to plan and execute training.Requirements for mandatory training at the company level riginate from Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, policy letters, command training guidance, and other directives. Scrubbing all levels of command down to the Brigade level, to include Department of the Army, Major Army Command (MACOM), Corps, Division, and installation level, for anything that generates a training requirement results in the identification of over 100 distinct training requirements...... Note that, as expected, most directed mission-related training requirements come from Division-level or below. More importantly, most directed nonmission-related training requirements originate from DA and MACOM levels. This is critical since policy actions may be most effective in reducing the DA and MACOM requirements.Incorporating the amount of time necessary to execute each directed training requirement (for example, training on "The Benefits of an Honorable Discharge" takes about 60 minutes a year) results in approximately 297 days of directed training.Of the 297 days, about 85 percent (or 254 training days) is mission-related training and 15 percent (or 43 training days) is nonmission-related training.The number of days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.When we eventually get back to "normal" let's get back to the future.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/24/2009 - 12:44am | 1 comment
Over at the US Naval Institute Blog - Vice Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr. had the following to say in the commentary:... We just need to remain steady in our approach and steadfast in our resolve and I think we'll come through the next few years of ongoing conflict and economic crisis in fine fashion. There's lots of opportunities in every crisis and we're poised to take advantage of them.With respect to your comment concerning participation in the blogosphere and the upcoming milbloggers conference, let me speak pretty plainly - most of the blogs I've dropped in on and read on a regular basis leave me pretty cold. Too many seem to be interested in scoring cheap, and anonymous, hits vice engaging in meaningful and professional exchanges. There is also a general lack of reverence for facts and an excess of emotion that, for me, really reduces the value of the blog. Incorrect/inaccurate data and lots of hype may be entertaining for some, but just doesn't work for me.My best example of a truly worthwhile blog, worthy of our time and intellectual engagement, is the Small Wars Journal. The tone is always professional, the subject matter is compelling and the benefit from participating is significant.All that said, here I am - I recognize the reality of the blogosphere and the potential that exists for worthwhile exchanges that enhance our professional knowledge and overall awareness. My intent is to continue to participate when I can and where I see I can make a contribution to a professional exchange, but my view today is that the bloggers generally see their activity as far more meaningful than I do right now. I do, however, remain hopeful...
Thank you sir and we will do our damndest to live up to your kind words. Keelhaul us if we stray.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/23/2009 - 10:39pm | 0 comments
Military to Focus on Shorter-term Goals in Afghanistan, Gates Says
By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service
As part of the Obama administration's assessment of the strategy being employed in Afghanistan, the U.S. military will focus its efforts on achieving shorter-term goals there, the Defense Department's top official said here yesterday.
"One of the points where I suspect both administrations come to the same conclusion, is that the goals we did have for Afghanistan are too broad and too far into the future," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters at a Pentagon press conference.
President Barack Obama met with Gates and other National Security Council members at the White House on Jan. 21.
The United States needs to set "more concrete goals" for Afghanistan that "can be achieved realistically within three to five years," Gates said. For example, he said, efforts should be made to re-establish Afghan government control in the country's southern and eastern regions, as well boost security and improve the delivery of services to the population.
And, U.S., coalition and Afghan military operations targeting al-Qaida and Taliban insurgents must be maintained in Afghanistan to prevent the re-establishment of terrorism in the region, Gates said...
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/23/2009 - 9:32pm | 0 comments
SWJ's 3rd weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include President Obama and the coexistence doctrine; withdrawing from Iraq, too slow or too fast; and was deterrence restored in Gaza?
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/23/2009 - 7:10pm | 1 comment
Fit (and Ready) to Fight Revisited
Controlled-Aggression Techniques for Total Force Readiness
by First Lieutenant Nick Stewart
Fit (and Ready) to Fight Revisited (Full PDF Article)
Three years ago, Air and Space Power Journal published my vortices regarding the lack of physical and personnel security training provided by our nation's Air Force. As a newly-commissioned officer, I informally interviewed another newly-commissioned lieutenant who had deployed to combat-stricken Afghanistan during his enlisted service and to a senior colonel with 100+ flying hours as a combat navigator on the B-52 Stratofortress. Both combat veterans were trained in defense mechanisms and small arms weaponry just prior to their respective deployments.
However, these officers readily stated that in a situation where all ammunition is expended and with enemy soldiers or insurgents / terrorists remaining active and present, their respective capacity for survival in a hand-to-hand combat environment was non-existent. Today, my concern is solidified; Airmen are woefully unprepared to defend themselves. Training in close-quarters combatives and the utilization of weapons of opportunity is an urgent requirement for our Air Force.
Fit (and Ready) to Fight Revisited (Full PDF Article)