Blog Posts

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 - Thomas Ricks

Winners - General Odierno, the West Point social science and history departments, President Bush, AEI and Jack Keane, the U.S. Army, and the foreigners (Skye, Kilcullen and Othman).

Losers - The general officer corps and Colonel Gian Gentile.

Curious Omissions - Brigade commanders, the National Security Council and the new media.

Much more at Abu Muqawama.

Going the Distance. The war in Afghanistan isn't doomed. We just need to rethink the insurgency. By Seth G. Jones.

Not Even the Afghans Know How to Fix It. By Edward P. Joseph.

The war in Iraq isn't over. The main events may not even have happened yet. By Tom Ricks.

More at The Washington Post.

By John J. Kruzel

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13, 2009 -- The U.S. military boasts dominant nuclear and conventional capabilities, but must improve its capacity to fight irregular wars, NATO's supreme allied commander for transformation said yesterday.

Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, who also serves as the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, said the United States has lost some of its nuclear and conventional war edge in recent years, but remains superior on these fronts.

"We are not superior in irregular warfare," he said in a speech at the Foreign Policy Research Institute here. "And that's what we've got to be."

Mattis discussed the need for the U.S. military to transform to a "hybrid" force that expands its nonconventional means without sacrificing classic warfighting competence.

Broadly defined, irregular warfare refers to conflict with an enemy that does not organize itself as a traditional military. As in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, this type of fighting entails stealthy attacks such as roadside bombings and ambushes, instead of direct military-to-military engagement.

In calculating how to establish greater balance among the two types of warfare, the general said, he noticed a common thread among past armies that morphed to meet a new set of challenges...

One result of that failure to be deployed as a result of deferring to process as a forestalling tactic was an unintended consequence of little desired Congressional involvement. As I recall, the Defense Appropriation Acts of 1992 and 1993 dedicated 5,000 experienced Active Component soldiers. All captains had to be branch qualified and all NCOs, mostly SSG and above and had to have recent troop experience.

At the time those structures came into being, I was working in a large headquarters and happened to be in the Commanding General's Office when he telephonically questioned a Senate staff member of his acquaintance as to why Congress had passed a rather convoluted law that led to the establishment of the Advisory 'Brigades.' The response was to the effect that Congress wished to ensure that in future wars The Army National Guard Brigades were deployed. The General's response to the Staff person was "Well, you haven't done that. There's no assurance as I read this law that will happen and what you have done is create a bureaucratic nightmare that will waste Active Component Spaces and is likely to be a detriment to the Reserve Components..." or words to that effect.

Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, authors of The Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition, appeared on WNYC's Brian Lehrer Show and The Gamble author and Best Defense blogger Tom Ricks on The Daily Show below:

Important Things With Demetri Martin

Joke of the Day

45th Munich Security Conference

General David H. Petraeus

Remarks for Panel Discussion - 8 February 2009

Well, good morning to you all. And thanks to Chairman Ischinger and his team. It's an honor to be with you -- and it's great to be on the stage with my new diplomatic partner, AMB Richard Holbrook. You know, it's every Commander's dream to have an ambassadorial wingman who is described by journalists with nicknames like "The Bulldozer." PAUSE. In all seriousness, I want to publicly salute this gifted, selfless diplomat for taking on his new position, an appointment that conveys how significant the focus in the United States is on Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the South and Central Asia region more broadly.

This morning's topic is Afghanistan, which Secretary of Defense Gates recently described to the US Congress as posing "our greatest military challenge right now." As he noted, our fundamental objective in Afghanistan is to ensure that transnational terrorists are not able to reestablish the sanctuaries they enjoyed prior to 9/11. It was to eliminate such sanctuaries that we took action in Afghanistan in 2001. And preventing their reestablishment remains an imperative today -- noting, to be sure, that achievement of that objective inevitably requires accomplishment of other interrelated tasks as well. And, [as has been explained,] President Obama has directed a strategy review that will sharpen the clarity of those tasks.

Afghanistan has been a very tough endeavor. Certainly, there have been important achievements there over the past seven years -- agreement on a constitution, elections, and establishment of a government; increased access to education, health care, media, and telecommunications; construction of a significant number of infrastructure projects; development of the Afghan National Army; and others.

But in recent years the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda has led to an increase in violence, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Numerous other challenges have emerged as well, among them: difficulties in the development of governmental institutions that achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; corruption; expansion -- until last year -- of poppy production and the illegal narcotics industry; and difficulties in the establishment of the Afghan police.

In fact, there has been nothing easy about Afghanistan. And, as Senator Lieberman observed in a recent speech to the Brookings Institution, "Reversing Afghanistan's slide into insecurity will not come quickly, easily, or cheaply." Similarly, Secretary Gates told Congress, "This will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight." I agree. In fact, I think it is important to be clear eyed about the challenges that lie ahead, while also remembering the importance of our objectives in Afghanistan and the importance of the opportunity that exists if we all intensify our efforts and work together to achieve those objectives.

Many observers have noted that there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan. That is correct. Nonetheless, military action, while not sufficient by itself, is absolutely necessary, for security provides the essential foundation for the achievement of progress in all the other so-called lines of operation -- recognizing, of course, that progress in other areas made possible by security improvements typically contributes to further progress in the security arena -- creating an upward spiral in which improvements in one area reinforce progress in another.

Arresting and then reversing the downward spiral in security in Afghanistan thus will require not just additional military forces, but also more civilian contributions, greater unity of effort between civilian and military elements and with our Afghan partners, and a comprehensive approach, as well as sustained commitment and a strategy that addresses the situations in neighboring countries.

This morning, I'd like to describe in very general terms the resource requirements that are under discussion in Washington and various other national capitals. Then I'll describe briefly a few of the ideas that helped us in Iraq and that, properly adapted for Afghanistan, can help guide GEN McKiernan and ISAF...

In an address, on 29 January, to the Brookings Institution, Senator Joe Lieberman (ID-CT) outlined a comprehensive civil-military campaign with five major elements to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Below are excerpts and the full text of the speech as prepared for delivery:

"There is no question, we all need to be realists when it comes to Afghanistan, both about our objectives and about the limits of our power. But we should not and cannot take any false comfort from declaring 'modest expectations' for Afghanistan."

"We all agree, our foremost interest in Afghanistan is preventing that country from becoming a terrorist safe haven. But the only realistic way to prevent that from happening is through the emergence of a stable and legitimate political order in Afghanistan, backed by capable indigenous security forces—and neither of those realities is going to materialize without a significant and sustained American commitment. This will be difficult, but it is absolutely necessary."

"...As General David Petraeus put it two years ago about another battlefield: 'hard is not hopeless.' In my remarks today, I want to speak, first, about why—despite the missteps and difficulties in Afghanistan—I am still confident we can turn the tide there; second, about how we can do so; and third, about why I believe we must do so."

"...the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan this year is both right and important. As the Bush administration learned the hard way in Iraq, counterinsurgency is manpower-intensive. Our military coalition is undermanned and overstretched in Afghanistan today."

"However, as we also learned in Iraq, successful counterinsurgency requires more than a heavy military footprint. In fact, our allied coalition has already doubled the number of troops in Afghanistan over the last two years. But at the same time, security has worsened."

"That is why we must match the coming surge in troop strength in Afghanistan with at least five other surges that are equally important."

"First, we need a surge in the strategic coherence of our war effort. The problem in Afghanistan today is not only that we have devoted too few resources, but that the resources we have devoted are being applied incoherently."

"In contrast to Iraq, where General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker came together two years ago to develop a nationwide civil-military campaign plan to defeat the insurgency, there is still no such integrated nationwide counterinsurgency plan for Afghanistan. This is an unacceptable failure. It is also the predictable consequence of a fragmented military command structure under NATO, an even more incoherent civilian effort, and no unified leadership between the two. This is no way to run a counterinsurgency."

"Second, we must insist that any military surge in Afghanistan is matched by a surge in civilian capacity."

"Third, as the United States steps up its commitments in Afghanistan, it is equally critical that we help the Afghans surge with us."

"Fourth, as many have observed, we cannot deal with Afghanistan in a vacuum. That is why we also need a surge in our regional strategy."

"Fifth and perhaps most importantly, success in Afghanistan requires a sustained, realistic political and public commitment to this mission here at home."

"...there are already voices on both the left and the right murmuring the word 'quagmire.'"

"They say Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires, that we should abandon any hope of nation-building there, and that President Obama should rethink his pledge to deploy additional forces."

"Why, then, is this wrong? Why should we send tens of thousands of our loved ones to a remote country on the far side of the world?"

"The most direct answer is that Afghanistan is the frontline of the global ideological and military war we are waging with Islamist extremism. Afghanistan is where the attacks of 9/11 were plotted, where al Qaeda made its sanctuary under the Taliban, and where they will do so again if given the chance."

Continue on for the full transcript...

More at The Washington Post.

Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey J. Mellinger assumed the duties of the U.S. Army Materiel Command's Command Sergeant Major on Nov. 2, 2007. CSM Mellinger was previously assigned to the U.S. Army Alaska and spent several months speaking to units and groups on his experiences.

CSM Mellinger was drafted on April 18, 1972, at Eugene, Oregon. Following basic and advanced training at Fort Ord, California, he completed airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia. His first assignment was in the Federal Republic of Germany as a unit clerk. Upon his return from Germany, CSM Mellinger was assigned to the 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington. For the next five years, CSM Mellinger served as unit clerk, battalion personnel staff NCO, machinegun squad leader, rifle squad leader, rifle platoon sergeant and weapons platoon leader. He then performed drill sergeant duty at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and returned to the 2nd Ranger Battalion, serving again as a platoon sergeant.

Additional assignments include: Special Forces Military Freefall Instructor, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; senior team leader, 75th Ranger Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Fort Benning, Georgia; assistant professor of Military Science, University of Alaska-Fairbanks; First Sergeant, Company C (Airborne), 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Senior Enlisted Advisor, 41st Separate Infantry Brigade, Oregon Army National Guard; Command Sergeant Major, 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Command Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; Commandant, U.S. Army Alaska Noncommissioned Officer's Academy, Fort Richardson, Alaska; Command Sergeant Major of United States Army Japan and 9th Theater Support Command, Camp Zama, Japan; Command Sergeant Major, First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; and Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Force--Iraq from August 2004-May 2007.

Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey J. Mellinger - Official Biography

America's Last Draftee: "I'm a Relic" - Mark Thompson, Time

Much more at Time.

The Generals' Insurgency: The Story Behind the U.S. Troop Surge in Iraq - Washington Post. Follow the link for the story behind the story on Tom Ricks' latest book - The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. Includes key documents, key players, timeline, video, and related content.

The Gamble will be released on 10 February 2009.

Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.

Since early 2007 a new military order has directed American strategy. Some top U.S. officials now in Iraq actually opposed the 2003 invasion, and almost all are severely critical of how the war was fought from then through 2006. At the core of the story is General David Petraeus, a military intellectual who has gathered around him an unprecedented number of officers with both combat experience and Ph.D.s. Underscoring his new and unorthodox approach, three of his key advisers are quirky foreigners—an Australian infantryman-turned- anthropologist, an antimilitary British woman who is an expert in the Middle East, and a Mennonite-educated Palestinian pacifist.

The Gamble offers new breaking information, revealing behind-the-scenes disagreements between top commanders. We learn that almost every single officer in the chain of command fought the surge. Many of Petraeus's closest advisers went to Iraq extremely pessimistic, doubting that the surge would have any effect, and his own boss was so skeptical that he dispatched an admiral to Baghdad in the summer of 2007 to come up with a strategy to replace Petraeus's. That same boss later flew to Iraq to try to talk Petraeus out of his planned congressional testimony. The Gamble examines the congressional hearings through the eyes of Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their views of the questions posed by the 2008 presidential candidates.

For Petraeus, prevailing in Iraq means extending the war. Thomas E. Ricks concludes that the war is likely to last another five to ten years—and that that outcome is a best case scenario. His stunning conclusion, stated in the last line of the book, is that "the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered by us and by the world have not yet happened."

Thomas E. Ricks is The Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent, where he has covered the U.S. military since 2000. Until the end of 1999 he held the same beat at The Wall Street Journal, where he was a reporter for seventeen years. A member of two Pulitzer Prize- winning teams for national reporting, he has reported on U.S. military activities in Somalia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He is the author of Fiasco, Making the Corps, and A Soldier's Duty.

Much more at The Washington Post.

More at The New York Times.

The Insurgent Who Loved 'Titanic' - Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post

This excerpt was taken from The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008.

More at The Washington Post.

David Kilcullen is the author of The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. In his new book, Kilcullen attempts to disentangle the global "war on terror" from the array of small wars that originate from unique local circumstances. Kilcullen is a retired Australian army officer, holds a Ph.D., and was a top adviser to Gen. David Petraeus in Baghdad and to the U.S. State Department. He is also one of the most popular contributors to Small Wars Journal, which collected his writings here.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an advisor to the U.S. government, has authored Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. In this book, Barnett attempts to get his audience to consider what America's grand strategy should be, taking into account not only U.S. military and economic power, but also America's cultural reach and the influence it has had over the past century. Barnett discussed his new book in this Small Wars Journal interview.

Mullen Addresses Need for 'Whole Government' Approach

By Jim Garamone

American Forces Press Service

All portions of the U.S. government have a role in dealing with any instability that results from the world's financial crisis, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said here yesterday

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen gave a public talk sponsored by Princeton University and its Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, visited with the college's ROTC detachment and participated in a roundtable discussion with the faculty.

In his remarks, the chairman expressed concern about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.

"What is overarching is the global financial crisis," Mullen said. "I worry a great deal as we work our way through this -- and I think it's going to take longer rather than shorter to do that. I worry about the effect that will have on instability throughout the world."

The chairman noted that throughout history, the United States hasn't been good about predicting where instability will occur. "As this crisis really takes hold, there will be places that become unstable that we haven't anticipated," he said. "We need a whole-of-government approach."

The United States military is a force for freedom and good in the world, Mullen said, but it's not the solution to every problem. "The United States military is necessary, but it is not sufficient alone," Mullen said. He pointed out that the American military is stretched and is doing missions that servicemembers have not been trained to do.

"They are an incredible group of young people who are incredibly adaptive and creative and innovative, and they do this unbelievably well," he said. "But we need to back off of that over time."

Other Cabinet-level departments -- State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice -- have the proper expertise for "soft-power" missions and need to have personnel able to deploy to address these problems, Mullen said. "But in my opinion," he added, "we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments."...

The United States needs to develop the capacity to conduct complex operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field. This study is comprehensive review of this national need and examines how the need can best be met.

Its main conclusion is that current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional attention, including new legislation and resources, to complete the task. It recommends what civilian capacity to build, how much of it is needed, and how to manage and organize it.

Read the full 223 page report or continue on for the major findings by chapter...

More at Voice of America.

More at The Washington Post.

More at Newsweek.

Afghanistan Is Not Iraq, So US Best Not Surge Ahead Blindly - Christopher Brown, US News and World Report

More at US News and World Report.

Plans Emerge for New Troop Deployments to Afghanistan - Chip Cummins, Roshanak Taghavi and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Obama Seeks Narrower Focus in Afghan War - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post

More at The Washington Post.

Reports: Christopher Hill to Be US Ambassador to Iraq - Voice of America

News outlets in the United States are reporting that Christopher Hill, the lead American negotiator on North Korea, is expected to be nominated as the next U.S. ambassador to Iraq.

There has been no official confirmation of the reports Monday on CBS, ABC, the Associated Press and Reuters, which quote unnamed officials who say Hill is expected to be the nominee.

Hill is currently the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Hill has previously served as ambassador to South Korea, Poland and Macedonia. He was also special envoy to Kosovo. Before he started his career in the foreign service, Hill served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon.

If nominated and confirmed by the US Senate, Hill would replace another career diplomat, Ryan Crocker, as Washington's top diplomat in Iraq.