Ex-Navy Instructor Promises to Hit Back If Attacked on Torture
Spencer Ackerman of TPM Muckraker on an interview with SWJ Blogger Malcolm Nance...
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by Robert Bateman | Tue, 11/06/2007 - 9:20pm | 15 comments
The Abuse of Military History: An Introduction to the Problems of Victor Davis Hanson
I am a soldier, first and foremost, and this is as it should be. But I am also an academic historian.
As a member of two cultures, I find that they have much in common, at least in theory. Foremost among those is an inclination to distrust the first report, and to privilege the written word. In my historical writing, however, I seek to create a thesis for the reader which accurately represents a synthesis of facts and ideas that come from sometimes quite disparate sources. In developing that thesis, I am bound by the facts. This, also, is as it should be. But there is something else my two professions share. In short, members of both professions hate liars and those who twist the truth around.
My book on the events at No Gun Ri in 1950 devotes fully half of the text to understanding how lies worked their way into the historical record and people's understanding of what took place near that small South Korean village more than 50 years ago. The bottom line is that I have a strong sentiment against people putting falsehoods into the record...
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/05/2007 - 9:58pm | 3 comments
Regular readers here are aware that
href="http://homepages.stmartin.edu/fac_staff/dprice/">Dr. David Price
is an ardent critic of the "pilfered scholarship" behind
href="http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf">FM
3-24, COIN
. There are many nuances to that discourse, and I don'tdoubt that I am about to bludgeon them into one dimension. But a core issue Dr.
Price consistently raises is that of attribution. Or more accurately, non-attribution.
Non-attribution seems to be the big proton-like nucleus issue around which the electron
issues of plagiarism, shoddiness, informed consent, ethics, dim-wittedness,
speed-to-press, and pesky utility to the warfighter seem to spiral in infinite relativistic
velocity.
The COIN authors' counter to the
href="http://www.counterpunch.org/price10302007.html">Counterpunch
article, et al, has fairly consistently been that it is a manual,
not an academic work. Not so fast....
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/05/2007 - 6:28pm | 0 comments
In response to a Daily Kos screed...Unfortunately, no one seems to be calling our elected officials or the traditional media on this nonsensical idea that the "Petraeus strategy" should be credited with stanching the flow of blood. No one seems to notice that, as with everything else in Iraq, the Iraqis are going to do what they want, when they want. When al-Sadr lays down his arms, there will be relative peace. When he takes them up, Americans will die in dozens.Regardless, the fortunes of Iraq will turn on Iraqi decisions made in Baghdad and Najaf, not in Washington, D.C. and the halls of Congress. As this situation shows, peace in Iraq lies in the hands of Iraqis. It cannot—and will not—be forced by Americans at the point of a gun.
... the folks at Blackfive respond with a lesson on counterinsurgency and MNF-I strategy.
The Surge is not our strategy and he is correct that it is not responsible for the tremendous success in Baghdad, the surrounding belts, Al Anbar, Diyala and now even in some of the Shia tribal areas as well. Our strategy is Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and the additional troops, known as the Surge, are simply part of that effort along with every other military member and civilian over there. Read LTC Kilcullen for an elegant primer on COIN in the Small Wars Journal.COIN is completely different than the nation-building and national institution-building that we had been doing since toppling Saddam and up until the beginning of this year. We had hunkered down on the FOBs heading out on patrols and then back inside the wire. Now we cleared areas and then stayed and lived side by side with the Iraqis, and once they saw that we were staying they "awakened" and determined that al Qaeda brought death and destruction and the Americans brought electricity and water, not to mention security.More at Blackfive.
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by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/05/2007 - 3:21pm | 1 comment
Iraq: A False Choice
Dr Adam Cobb
The real choice before the American people is much starker than whether to act on General Petraeus' advice to Congress. Bottom-line: we have to accept the current situation and be realistic about fixing it or we cut our losses and get out.
America's enemies and competitors watch fascinated as Washington turns on itself over Iraq. Gen Petraeus' plea for just a little bit more time underscores the dilemma the US faces. On average, successful counterinsurgencies take over a decade to resolve. The US needs many more years to attempt to achieve a stable, self governing, Iraq. With growing opposition in Congress, including senior Republicans, the Administration is running on incrementalism. Bold policy options are needed, anything else is weakness.
Those who hope for US failure in Iraq know that they win when they do not lose. The deciding factor therefore is time, something America's enemies inside Iraq have in abundance. Time provides the space in which the low flame of insurgency can continue flickering against both US will, and the increasingly dislocated politics of Iraq...
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/05/2007 - 6:35am | 0 comments
Westhawk cuts to the quick in his analysis on the roles and missions implications behind the Air Force's recent attempt to be designated the "executive agent" for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Shot down by the Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, the Air Force is apparently not giving up - taking their appeal to Congress. An excerpt from the Westhawk post:The U.S. Air Force's attempt to seize control over all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that fly above 3,500 feet is just a glimpse at what will very likely become the most important battle over military roles and missions in sixty years. The maturation of aerial drone technology has already revolutionized reconnaissance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But this is just the beginning. Drones will introduce very-long endurance capabilities and, as drone costs decline, something approaching an "everywhere" presence on the battlefield. These are new qualities not possible when aircraft required human crews. It is the arrival of these qualities that will shake up the allocation of roles and missions among the Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps.The fact that all of the services are rapidly expanding their drone fleets and experimenting with even more exotic models is the strongest proof of the success of battlefield UAVs. Fearing a gutting of its relevance and thus its budget, the U.S. Air Force, led by its Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley, attempted to take command of all UAVs that fly above 3,500 feet. The Air Force argued that consolidating medium- and high-altitude UAVs under one "executive agent" would ensure efficiencies in research and procurement, and would deliver system-wide compatibility. The other services, particularly the Army, retorted that the Air Force's power grab would stifle innovation, and leave the ground forces vulnerable to a possibly unresponsive Air Force, both in development and on the battlefield.
Much more at Westhawk.
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by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/04/2007 - 5:40am | 3 comments
Abu Muqawama; a blog dedicated to issues related to contemporary insurgencies, and counterinsurgency tactics and strategy; spins off from their recent COIN Reading List post with a new feature titled COIN Book Club. AB's first pick is a good one, David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.This slim volume has probably had more effect on the way in which Abu Muqawama views counterinsurgency warfare than any other book or article. FM 3-24 is great doctrine, but Galula gives his reader a feel for counterinsurgency warfare in a way the field manual does not. It is also very short, and to-the-point. Which is why, over the past few years, Abu Muqawama has taken to mailing photocopies of this book to friends in the field. One friend, an infantry company commander outside of Baghdad, read the book a little over a year ago while deployed to Iraq and had this to say:Just finished reading Galula's book. What a great read! It's so common sense, so right, so easy to understand, it begs the questions: Why haven't I heard of it before, and Why aren't they teaching this stuff at the Advanced Course?
Bernard Fall; author of Street Without Joy and prominent war correspondent, historian, political scientist, and expert on insurgencies and COIN; called Counterinsurgecy Warfare the best "how-to" guide.
Nothing follows.
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 11/04/2007 - 1:20am | 5 comments
31 October 1917 - Australian mounted troops (4th and 12th Light Horse) take Beersheba, Palestine, by launching what is often billed as the last successful cavalry charge in military history.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/03/2007 - 6:22pm | 2 comments
By Dan GreenTo enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147
Continue on to Part 2 of Glubb's Guide to the Arab Tribes...
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Glubb's Guide to the Arab Tribes (Part 1)
Meet Glubb - Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement
by Bing West | Sat, 11/03/2007 - 10:26am | 20 comments
In his op-ed, Mr. Nance on waterboarding successfully squared the circle when he wrote: "I have personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of people. Waterboarding should never be used as an interrogation tool. It is beneath our values. Is there a place for the waterboard? Yes. It must go back to the realm of training our operatives, soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines."
This professional website is not the place to untangle Mr. Nance's eschatology. Waterboarding has become a tool of political gotcha that demeans serious discussion of the changing values underlying our operational approach to national security. It is politics, not morality, when senators vote their conscience along overwhelmingly party lines...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/03/2007 - 6:19am | 7 comments
This morning's London Times lead editorial -- The Petraeus Curve - boldly goes where few "mainstream media" news outlets dare, stating flat out that serious success in Iraq is not being recognized as it should be.Is no news good news or bad news? In Iraq, it seems good news is deemed no news. There has been striking success in the past few months in the attempt to improve security, defeat al-Qaeda sympathisers and create the political conditions in which a settlement between the Shia and the Sunni communities can be reached. This has not been an accident but the consequence of a strategy overseen by General David Petraeus in the past several months...
Moreover, The Times recognizes that the "surge" is much more than the number of boots on the ground -- it is "what" they are doing that is showing results.
While summarised by the single word "surge" his efforts have not just been about putting more troops on the ground but also employing them in a more sophisticated manner. This drive has effectively broken whatever alliances might have been struck in the past by terrorist factions and aggrieved Sunnis. Cities such as Fallujah, once notorious centres of slaughter, have been transformed in a remarkable time...Continuing, the editorial rightly cautions that this success does not necessarily guarantee that past difficulties are history.
A weakened al-Qaeda will be tempted to attempt more spectacular attacks to inflict substantial loss of life in an effort to prove that it remains in business. Although the tally of car bombings and improvised explosive devices has fallen back sharply, it would only take one blast directed at an especially large crowd or a holy site of unusual reverence for the headlines about impending civil war to be allowed another outing. The Government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has become more proactive since the summer, but must immediately take advantage of these favourable conditions...And in conclusion.
Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have to appreciate that Iraq is no longer, as they thought, an exercise in damage limitation but one of making the most of an opportunity. The instinct of too many people is that if Iraq is going badly we should get out because it is going badly and if it is getting better we should get out because it is getting better. This is a catastrophic miscalculation. Iraq is getting better. That is good, not bad, news.Related
Not Cricket - Jules Crittenden's Forward Movement
In Iraq, a Lull or Hopeful Trend? - Washington Post
Iraqi Civilian Deaths Plunge - Los Angeles Times
Deaths in Iraq 'Continue to Fall' - BBC
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/02/2007 - 9:05pm | 0 comments
By Dan GreenTo enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147
As military units prepare for service in the Middle East, it is not uncommon for them to consult the published works of British military personnel and diplomats who played such a large role in the politics of the region in the 1910s to the 1930s. It is already customary for deployers to consult the works of T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell and for those who have read more expansively, perhaps even the writings of Sir Alec Kirkbride, Sir Percy Cox, or even General Aylmer L. Haldane. Collectively, these various authors have taught our military personnel a great deal about working in the region, fighting alongside Arab irregulars, working with tribes, building governments, fostering development, and combating insurgents. The reason I've written this brief essay is to bring to your attention another great British soldier and diplomat, John Bagot Glubb, whose experience is as expansive if not more so than many of the aforementioned authors. His robust experience of thirty-six years in the great deserts and Bedouin tents of Iraq and Jordan greatly informs our current operations. I have written a brief biography of Glubb in order to familiarize the reader with his achievements and then compiled a collection of his observations, thoughts, and musings taken from his published writings about working with the Arab tribes, fighting guerillas, service to the nation, and on operating in the Middle East. Glubb's views are as useful today as when he made them, incorporating them into our operations in the Middle East will greatly improve our chances for victory...
by Dave Dilegge | Fri, 11/02/2007 - 7:48pm | 0 comments
A good friend and mentor of mine and of the Small Wars Journal community of interest sent along a link to his latest article -- Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam by Ambassador David Passage.
This article appears in the November 2007 edition of Foreign Service Journal.
From the Introduction:
The CORDS Program could not have beensuccessful in today's Iraq or Afghanistan.
Over the past year, President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials have on numerous occasions invoked the U.S. assistance program in South Vietnam as an experience that offers lessons for Iraq. Specifically, the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program has frequently been held up as a model for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently operating in Afghanistan and Iraq.The CORDS teams administered both security and development programs at the provincial and district levels in South Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like today's PRTs, they comprised military and civilian personnel, the former always significantly outnumbering the latter. The civilians came primarily from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, augmented by a limited number of direct hires from other agencies (e.g., Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture). There were also a limited number of personnel whom USAID brought on board expressly for CORDS, with no promise of career employment beyond Vietnam.Yet despite basic similarities and parallels between the CORDS teams and today's PRTs, there are also important and sharp distinctions. Lest today's policymakers be misled into assuming that the earlier experience can be replicated today, I believe it is vital to identify several critical differences that affect the Foreign Service's ability to help Iraq and Afghanistan deal with their internal difficulties and emerge as functioning economies with democratic societies...Much more and well worth the read.
Links contained within quoted text inserted by SWJ.
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Link
"Iraq is Not Vietnam" - The Belmont Club
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/01/2007 - 8:26pm | 1 comment
We interrupt our normally scheduled program on waterboarding and anthropology (1) to bring you this BBC piece concerning one of SWJ's favorite counterinsurgency experts from down-under - David Kilcullen:
In a frank and outspoken interview, David Kilcullen, who has just become policy advisor to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, outlines his view of the conflict in Iraq and the future of the struggle with militant jihadism.
He tells the BBC's security correspondent Frank Gardner that the coalition is achieving success by a radical change in its tactics in Iraq...
More at the link and this BBC article by Hugh Levinson.
Now back to our regularly scheduled program... (2)
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Endnotes:
(1) Everything ever written by everyone who ever wrote about anything.
(2) This information will not be used in the conduct of military operations, planning, wargaming, training, education or doctrine writing.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/01/2007 - 1:00pm | 1 comment
In response to a SWJ e-mail concerning Dr. David Price's recent Counterpunch article U.S. Army spokesman Major Tom McCuin:
As Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl stated:
Military Field Manuals have their own grammar and their own logic. They are not doctoral dissertations, designed to be read by few and judged largely for the quality of their sourcing; instead, they are intended for applied use by Soldiers. Thus authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively.The essential point to be made is that the messages contained in the manual are valid, regardless of any discussion of academic standards. Any argument over missing citations should in no way diminish the manual's utility in the current counterinsurgency fight. The emphasis on cultural understanding and increased reliance on non-lethal forms of engagement to achieve military goals represents a giant leap forward in U.S. military doctrine.
Unfortunately, Dr. Price has chosen to focus his disagreement with current American foreign policy on the Human Terrain System. Rather than accept the Army's several offers to enter in a reasoned dialogue on the merits -- or lack of merits - of the role anthropologists can play in helping to reduce the use of lethal force to achieve military and political objectives, Dr. Price has chosen to wage a public and increasingly personal media campaign to discredit HTS and the dedicated social scientists associated with it.
The Human Terrain System is recognition of the fact that academic study and applied social science has practical uses, and those who have chosen to devote their time and efforts to exploring non-lethal alternatives to combat are making a vital contribution to the nation's efforts to secure a peaceful, stable and secure future for the people of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The long term by-product of their heroic efforts will be better informed military decisions that minimize casualties and suffering, and ultimately, optimized policy decision making within government that is harmonized with the ethical principles social science values the most.
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"Desperate People with Limited Skills" - LTC John Nagl, Small Wars Journal
Controversy: FM 3-24 Plagiarism "Scandal" -- Abu Muqawama
More on 3-24 and the Vanguard of Revolution -- Abu Muqawama
FM 3-24 "Scandal": Nagl Responds -- Abu Muqawama
Counterinsurgency Author Hits Back on "Plagiarism" - Danger Room (Wired)
A Surge in Plagiarism? - Harpers Magazine
Nagl Responds to Price - Savage Minds
Anthropologists and a True Culture War - Discuss at Small Wars Council
"Desperate People with Limited Skills" - Discuss at Small Wars Council
by John A. Nagl | Thu, 11/01/2007 - 11:54am | 6 comments
Writing and Employing the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
In the current issue of "Counterpunch", anthropologist Dr. David Price continues his assault on social scientists assisting national efforts to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This time he impugns the work of anthropologists who helped write Field Manual 3-24, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was published by the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006 and republished by the University of Chicago Press in July 2007.
Price's essay is extensive, but the argument and the tone of the whole can be extrapolated from this paragraph on the first page:
Most academics know that bad things can happen when marginally skilled writers must produce ambitious amounts of writing in short time periods; sometimes the only resulting calamities are grammatical abominations, but in other instances the pressures to perform lead to shoddy academic practices. Neither of these outcomes is especially surprising among desperate people with limited skills-- but Petraeus and others leading the charge apparently did not worry about such trivialities: they had to crank out a new strategy to calm growing domestic anger at military failures in Iraq.I will attempt to explain the motivation for the project that led to the writing of the Field Manual as I observed it, provide a few words explaining the process of writing doctrine, and then discuss the effects of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual in the field and on the American military. This is not an official response to Price's essay, and I do not speak on behalf of the Army, General Petraeus, or any of the other members of the team that produced the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, but only for myself...
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See also a response to the response -- David Price's reply in Counterpunch. Published 3 Nov.
by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 10/31/2007 - 4:47pm | 0 comments
In reference to an earlier post - COIN Seminar: Dr. David Kilcullen -- Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has posted my summary report (pdf -- word) of the event.
From the earlier post (updated):
The Small Wars Center of Excellence had the privilege of organizing a Counterinsurgency (COIN) seminar featuring Dr. David Kilcullen on 26 September at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.Dr. Kilcullen spoke to a standing room only crowd at the Gray Research Center and provided an excellent and very informative brief (1 ½ hour) followed by a Q&A period that could have lasted well beyond the allotted 45 minutes.The purpose and scope of the COIN seminar was to share some basic observations on COIN theory and practice derived primarily from Dr. Kilcullen's service in Iraq (2006 and 2007), Afghanistan (2006), and pre 9/11 campaigns in SE Asia and the Pacific. Additionally, the forum served as a conduit to open a discussion on issues relevant to seminar attendees.Dr. Kilcullen opened with a caveat -- everyone sees Iraq differently, depending on when they served there, what they did and where they worked. Because the environment is highly complex, ambiguous and fluid; observations from one time / place may or may not be applicable elsewhere -- even in the same campaign in the same year. He enjoined the audience to first understand the essentials of the environment, then determine whether analogous situations exist, before attempting to apply "lessons". Dr. Kilcullen's role in Iraq (hence his bias) was as Senior COIN Advisor to General David Petraeus (Commanding General, Multi-National Force -- Iraq [M-NF -- I]). He spent approximately 65 percent of his time in the field and the remainder at M-NF -- I Headquarters and the US Embassy in Baghdad.The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's Wargaming Division has posted Dr. Kilcullen's briefing slides here. The SWJ has posted a 'backup' copy of the brief here. The presentation, as well as the Q&A were videotaped and will be made available; along with the briefing slides, the summary report, a 45 minute video interview with Dr. Kilcullen, and several of his articles and SWJ Blog postings; on DVD. I'll post another heads-up as the DVD production date nears.Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 10/31/2007 - 3:41pm | 0 comments
General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, answers a question concerning his opinion on "A Failure in Generalship" by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, May 2007 Armed Forces Journal, at a recent Government Executive Magazine event.
Nothing follows.
by Malcolm Nance | Wed, 10/31/2007 - 3:30pm | 218 comments
I'd like to digress from my usual analysis of insurgent strategy and tactics to speak out on an issue of grave importance to Small Wars Journal readers. We, as a nation, are having a crisis of honor.
Last week the Attorney General nominee Judge Michael Mukasey refused to define waterboarding terror suspects as torture. On the same day MSNBC television pundit and former Republican Congressman Joe Scarborough quickly spoke out in its favor. On his morning television broadcast, he asserted, without any basis in fact, that the efficacy of the waterboard a viable tool to be used on Al Qaeda suspects.
Scarborough said, "For those who don't know, waterboarding is what we did to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is the Al Qaeda number two guy that planned 9/11. And he talked ..." He then speculated that "If you ask Americans whether they think it's okay for us to waterboard in a controlled environment ... 90% of Americans will say 'yes.'" Sensing that what he was saying sounded extreme, he then claimed he did not support torture but that waterboarding was debatable as a technique: "You know, that's the debate. Is waterboarding torture? ... I don't want the United States to engage in the type of torture that [Senator] John McCain had to endure."
In fact, waterboarding is just the type of torture then Lt. Commander John McCain had to endure at the hands of the North Vietnamese. As a former Master Instructor and Chief of Training at the US Navy Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape School (SERE) in San Diego, California I know the waterboard personally and intimately. SERE staff were required undergo the waterboard at its fullest. I was no exception. I have personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of people. It has been reported that both the Army and Navy SERE school's interrogation manuals were used to form the interrogation techniques used by the US army and the CIA for its terror suspects. What was not mentioned in most articles was that SERE was designed to show how an evil totalitarian, enemy would use torture at the slightest whim. If this is the case, then waterboarding is unquestionably being used as torture technique...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 10/30/2007 - 2:54pm | 1 comment
Ralph Peters in the November 2007 edition of American Legion Magazine - 12 Myths of 21st Century War. Visit the link for Peters' commentary, plus his reasoning behind each myth.... Two trends over the past four decades contributed to our national ignorance of the cost, and necessity, of victory. First, the most privileged Americans used the Vietnam War as an excuse to break their tradition of uniformed service.....
Second, we've stripped in-depth U.S. history classes out of our schools.
Myth No. 1: War doesn't change anything.Myth No. 2: Victory is impossible today.
Myth No. 3: Insurgencies can never be defeated.
Myth No. 4: There's no military solution; only negotiations can solve our problems.
Myth No. 5: When we fight back, we only provoke our enemies.
Myth No. 6: Killing terrorists only turns them into martyrs.
Myth No. 7: If we fight as fiercely as our enemies, we're no better than them.
Myth No. 8: The United States is more hated today than ever before.
Myth No. 9: Our invasion of Iraq created our terrorist problems.
Myth No. 10: If we just leave, the Iraqis will patch up their differences on their own.
Myth No. 11: It's all Israel's fault. Or the popular Washington corollary: "The Saudis are our friends."
Myth No. 12: The Middle East's problems are all America's fault.
... The unprecedented wealth and power of the United States allows us to afford many things denied to human beings throughout history. But we, the people, cannot afford ignorance.Discuss at Small Wars Council
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 10/28/2007 - 8:35am | 1 comment
Abu Muqawama's counterinsurgency reading list to include bare bones essentials, intermediate reading (colonial and modern), advanced reading, political Islam and Islamist violence, fiction and films can be found here. Recommended additions to the list by site visitors can be found in comments.
One that I would add is The Village by Bing West.
To see what Council members are reading go here.
Nothing follows.
by Dave Dilegge | Sun, 10/28/2007 - 6:24am | 0 comments
Iraq: 10 Myths and 10 Reasons to be OptimisticH/T Bottom Line Up Front
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 10/27/2007 - 9:26pm | 0 comments
Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to better meet tomorrow's challenges while protecting freedom today.
Issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007 of Joint Force Quarterly is now posted. Here are several articles of interest:
The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement by Robert Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr.The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Warfare by Mark Moyar
Arresting Insurgency by Kyle Teamey
The U.S. Air Force and Stability Operations Transformation by Oliver Fritz and Gregory Hermsmeyer
The Missing Component of U.S. Strategic Communications by William M. Darley
Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Process by Richard B. Andres and Jeffrey B. Hukill
Five Years after Operation Anaconda: Challenges and Opportunities by Michael W. Isherwood
Countering Chinese Influence in Africa by Philippe Rogers
Five Lessons from China's War on Terror by Martin Wayne
More in this "Focus on China" edition of JFQ.
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 10/27/2007 - 2:31pm | 0 comments
Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, reports on a new US State Department intitiative; nay, order; that will see additional diplomats taking posts in Iraq next year because of expected shortfalls in filling openings, the first such large-scale forced assignment since the Vietnam War. As far as we are concerned this is a long overdue move by State to fulfill its end of the 80% political, 20% military counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in Iraq.
While we applaud (what we call "long overdue") this move, we do acknowledge that State and other non-military departments and agencies lack the resources to fulfill their COIN obligations. It is time for Congress to get serious and ensure that our Nation has the capacity to deploy fully-trained and mission-capable personnel that truly represent all elements of national power.
More...
by Gary Anderson | Sat, 10/27/2007 - 2:30pm | 2 comments
One presidential candidate's recent remarks regarding a possible unilateral preemptive strike into Pakistan sent a cold shiver down the spines of many national security professionals and officers in the armed forces. It was particularly surprising coming from someone who was an early and often critic of what he saw as the Bush administration's unilateral, preemptive attack on Iraq. The candidate's aides have back tracked saying that he would seek President Musharif's concurrence, but almost everyone who knows the region knows that Musharef would be committing political suicide to allow such an overt action. The potential unintended consequences of a unilateral U.S. strike are sobering; the possibility of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of a radical Islamic Pakistani successor government is foremost among the defense community's nightmare scenarios. It would make al Qaeda look like the "Wiggles", and for all we know, al Qaeda might be shadow partners in the new governing mix.
More...