Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

Oh, what a tangled web we weave...

by Robert Bateman | Tue, 12/04/2007 - 8:22pm | 0 comments

LTC Bob Bateman here again. It has been a busy few days for those who keep track of things like journalism and war, and the intersection thereof. This post first appeared on Media Matters and I thought I's share it with SWJ.

There are three things on the plate: The New Republic, National Review Online, and Bilal Hussein.

I will start with the first, and simplest, observation. Several months ago I wrote about my doubts about the veracity of a young man named Scott Thomas, who was then writing for Franklin Foer's The New Republic. The short version of what I wrote was that his stories seemed really fishy to me, and I cautioned about wholly believing these purportedly true stories, and I left it at that. About a week later it was revealed that his real name was Scott Thomas Beauchamp, and bloggers on the right side of the aisle took off in a howling pack, hunting for more information. They found some. Foer and TNR, meanwhile, went into what can only be described as a journalistic full defensive crouch...

FOX News Interview: General David Petaeus

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/03/2007 - 8:15pm | 0 comments

General David Petraeus; Commanding General, MNF-I; interviewed on FOX News by Geraldo Rivera on 2 December 2007. Hat tips to Gateway Pundit and PrairiePundit.

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As the Stomach Turns

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/03/2007 - 6:58pm | 2 comments

More on the jeering, foot stomping, teeth gnashing academics who love to hate the Army's Human Terrain System by Noah Shachtman over at Wired's Danger Room - Academics Turn On "Human Terrain" Whistleblower.

The fight between the Army and academics over the military's social science projects has taken a strange, ugly new turn.

On Thursday, Zenia Helbig, a former researcher with the Army's "Human Terrain System," took the stage at the annual meeting of the American Association of Anthropologists. The executive board of the organization had already spoken out against the program, to embed social scientists into combat units as cultural advisers. And so when Helbig began taking the the military to task for its "inept management and execution at every level" of the Human Terrain effort, audience members nodded their heads in approval. (Here is the text of Helbig's talk.)

But as Helbig started answering questions, the mood turned ugly. Turns out Helbig still backed the idea of boosting the military's cultural IQ -- she just didn't think the Human Terrain program was doing a particularly good job at making it happen. That set some in the audience off...

Coal in all their stockings.

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Blame Canada Sunday

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/02/2007 - 5:34pm | 0 comments

Blame Canada

30 November Afghanistan Briefing

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 12/01/2007 - 12:15pm | 0 comments

Colonel Edward Daly and Major General Murad Ali, providing an update on training of the Afghan National Army and recent operations against the Taliban in the Mazar-E-Sharif area of northern Afghanistan, 30 November 2007.

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First, the Good News...

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 12/01/2007 - 11:24am | 0 comments

I read with great interest Michael Phillips' Wall Street Journal piece - In Counterinsurgency Class, Soldiers Think Like Taliban - as well as several e-mails concerning what is right and what is wrong with the Army's new Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

From the WSJ article:

... Six years into the Afghan war, the Army has decided its troops on the ground still don't understand well enough how to battle the Taliban insurgency. So since the spring, groups of 60 people have been attending intensive, five-day sessions in plywood classrooms in the corner of a U.S. base here, where they learn to think like a Taliban and counterpunch like a politician.

The academy's principal message: The war that began to oust a regime has evolved into a popularity contest where insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for public support and the right to rule. The implicit critique: Many U.S. and allied soldiers still arrive in the country well-trained to kill, but not to persuade.

In April, the Army gave a 26-year-old Rhodes scholar, Capt. Dan Helmer, six weeks to get the school up and running. Capt. Helmer tells his students, who rank as high as colonel, that the important battles here are 80% political and just 20% military. He exhorts them to go to great lengths to understand local politics, culture and history, to make sure actions they take on the battlefield help convince Afghans that the Kabul government will serve and protect them...

For a synopsis of the good and the bad please see Ad-hockery in Afghanistan by SWJ's COIN counterparts and partners in crime (Charlie and AM) over at Abu Muqawama. An excerpt:

The Wall Street Jounal has a long and excellent article about the COIN Academy in Afghanistan. Establishing tactical schools in-country is a well known COIN best practice (the Jungle Warfare School in Malaya is perhaps the best known amongst COIN scholars). And, as part of our steep learning curve in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have put together such schools in both countries...

This no knock on Capt. Dan Helmer--the 26 year old Army captain and Rhode Scholar tasked with setting up the Academy. (Your faithful bloggers have benefitted from many email exchanges with him, and they all share a common mentor in fellow West Point Rhodie, LTC John Nagl.)

But, as he'll tell you, he's a freaking Army captain. Charlie is quite certain that Capt. Helmer is among the best and the brightest, but he's not among those who can get @^*% done in the Army (or Afghanistan). If we were serious about such things, we might assign someone with a bit more institutional clout. Someone who could get paper copies of FM 3-24 for the Academy (it's cool, the Army posts them online. The students just wait 47 hours to download them over what passes for an internet connection in Kabul). Someone who could actually institutionalize the Academy within the Army instead of it being a Frankenstein science project dreamed up by folks who've read ATOM one too many times.

We can't win the war without places like the COIN Academy and officers like Capt. Helmer. But we also can't do it with them alone...

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What the SecDef Didn't Call For, But Should Have

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 11/30/2007 - 2:26am | 4 comments

What the SecDef Didn't Call For, But Should Have

By Matt Armstrong

Today, American public diplomacy wears combat boots. In the global media and the blogosphere, the military and its uniformed leaders shape the image of the United States. But that is not how it has always been. On the contrary, American public diplomacy was born out of the need to directly engage the global psyche and avoid direct martial engagement.

On November 26, 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, speaking at Kansas State University, recalled how the United States marshaled its national power at the beginning of the Cold War. Mr. Gates reminded his audience that sixty years ago the United States dramatically restructured itself in the face of a global threat and passed the National Security Act of 1947, created the United States Information Agency and the United States Agency for International Development, among other agencies and institutions. Key to the success of all of these was the timely creation and transmission of quality information, or truthful propaganda...

SWJ Odds and Ends

by Dave Dilegge | Thu, 11/29/2007 - 8:01pm | 2 comments

While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - COIN reading, more on Secretary Gates and soft power, Iraq, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda IO, AFRICOM, Uganda, Pakistan, barbarians, Saudi Arabia, anti-war movies...

A 'Surge' for Afghanistan

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/29/2007 - 6:46am | 0 comments

Gordon Lubold in today's Christian Science Monitor - A 'Surge' for Afghanistan.

The top general of the Marine Corps is pushing hard to deploy marines to Afghanistan as he looks to draw down his forces in Iraq, but his proposal, which is under discussion at the Pentagon this week, faces deep resistance from other military leaders.

Commandant Gen. James Conway's plan, if approved, would deploy a large contingent of Marines to Afghanistan, perhaps as early as next year. The reinforcements would be used to fight the Taliban, which US officials concede is now defending its territory more effectively against allied and Afghan forces.

Within the Pentagon, General Conway's proposal has led to speculation about which, if any, American forces would be best suited to provide reinforcements for a mission that, most agree, has far more political appeal than the one in Iraq. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already recommended against the proposal, at least for now, a military official said Tuesday...

Conway says that Marines, who have been largely responsible for calming Anbar Province in Iraq, can either return home or "stay plugged into the fight" by essentially redeploying to Afghanistan...

Rick Rogers, San Diego Union-Tribune, on USMC current operations in Anbar, Iraq and implications for the Afghanistan mission - Marines' Duties go Well Beyond Combat.

... some Marine commanders and defense specialists question whether the Corps' expeditionary combat strengths are being wasted in Anbar.

The Marines are revered for their offensive capabilities, said Loren Thompson, chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute think tank in Arlington, Va.

"At some point, we are going to have to ask why are we sending a quick-strike force to do nation building. It really would make more sense to send them to Afghanistan to chase insurgents than to have them helping locals in Anbar province build schools," Thompson said.

"If the mission becomes more reconstruction, then it is more of an Army job," he added.

The proposal for handing Marines the lead combat role in Afghanistan has been espoused by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. [General] James Mattis, Helland's immediate predecessor at Camp Pendleton...

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Wednesday Night Recommended Reading

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/28/2007 - 9:52pm | 0 comments

Noah Shachtman's Wired article - How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic.

The future of war began with an act of faith. In 1991, Navy captain Arthur Cebrowski met John Garstka, a captain in the Air Force, at a McLean, Virginia, Bible-study class. The two quickly discovered they shared more than just their conservative Catholic beliefs. They both had an interest in military strategy. And they were both geeks: Cebrowski — who'd been a math major in college, a fighter pilot in Vietnam, and an aircraft carrier commander during Desert Storm — was fascinated with how information technologies could make fighter jocks more lethal. Garstka — a Stanford-trained engineer — worked on improving algorithms used to track missiles.

Over the next several years, the two men traded ideas and compared experiences. They visited businesses embracing the information revolution, ultimately becoming convinced that the changes sweeping the corporate world had applications for the military as well. The Defense Department wasn't blind to the power of networks, of course — the Internet began as a military project, after all, and each branch of the armed services had ongoing "digitization" programs. But no one had ever crystallized what the information age might offer the Pentagon quite like Cebrowski and Garstka did. In an article for the January 1998 issue of the naval journal Proceedings, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," they not only named the philosophy but laid out a new direction for how the US would think about war...

And yet, here we are. The American military is still mired in Iraq. It's still stuck in Afghanistan, battling a resurgent Taliban. Rumsfeld has been forced out of the Pentagon. Dan Halutz, the Israeli Defense Forces chief of general staff and net-centric advocate who led the largely unsuccessful war in Lebanon in 2006, has been fired, too. In the past six years, the world's most technologically sophisticated militaries have gone up against three seemingly primitive foes — and haven't won once.

How could this be? The network-centric approach had worked pretty much as advertised. Even the theory's many critics admit net-centric combat helped make an already imposing American military even more effective at locating and killing its foes. The regimes of Saddam Hussein and Mullah Omar were broken almost instantly. But network-centric warfare, with its emphasis on fewer, faster-moving troops, turned out to be just about the last thing the US military needed when it came time to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan. A small, wired force leaves generals with too few nodes on the military network to secure the peace. There aren't enough troops to go out and find informants, build barricades, rebuild a sewage treatment plant, and patrol a marketplace...

Much more, well worth the read...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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Arabic Cultural-Awareness Training Now Available

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/28/2007 - 8:45pm | 0 comments

ZARQA, Jordan (Army News Service, Nov. 28, 2007) - Arabic cultural-awareness training from Third U.S. Army/U.S. Army Central and the Jordanian Armed Forces is now available to all American service-members...

27 November Iraq Briefing

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/28/2007 - 4:56pm | 0 comments

Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Director of Multi-National Force-Iraq's Communications Division, and Brigadier General Jeffrey Dorko, Commander of the US Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, 27 November 2007.

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Six Questions for Doug Macgregor

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 11/28/2007 - 5:11am | 6 comments

Answer the following six questions concerning Iraq and the "surge" then head on over to Harpers Magazine to read Colonel Douglas Macgregor's (US Army, ret.) reply to these questions as posed by Ken Silverstein.

1. How big of a change has there been in recent months in the military situation in Iraq?

2. Has the "surge" in troop levels played an important role here as well?

3. So is the problem in Iraq one of refining counterinsurgency tactics?

4. How will this play out in terms of Iraqi political reconciliation?

5. What's the likelihood of a future full-out clash between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites?

6. What's Iraq going to look like five years down the road?

Douglas Macgregor is a retired Army colonel and a decorated Persian Gulf War combat veteran who was an active duty officer (and Pentagon advisor) until 2004. He has authored three books on modern warfare and military reform. His latest is Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing the Way America Fights. He is also authored Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century.

Macgregor writes for the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C. He recently replied by email to a series of questions about the current situation, and future prospects, in Iraq.

Hat tip to Small Wars Council member LTC Gian Gentile for the pointer.

His [Macgregor] answers are not of the "matrix" and as usual challenge conventional wisdom. Considering the MG Scales Op-Ed on culmination, Macgregor's answers offer up a different conceptualization of the war in Iraq and the way ahead.

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SECDEF Gates Address at Kansas State University

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/27/2007 - 6:08pm | 1 comment

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007

Full Transcript -- Department of Defense

Video - Kansas State University

Audio - Kansas State University

Excerpt (SWJ Links and Bolded Emphasis Inserted)

... In 1968, the first full year I lived in Washington, was the same year as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where American troop levels and casualties were at their height. Across the nation, protests and violence over Vietnam engulfed America's cities and campuses. On my second day of work as a CIA analyst, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. And then came the 1970s - when it seemed that everything that could go wrong for America did.

Yet, through it all, there was another storyline, one not then apparent. During those same years, the elements were in place and forces were at work that would eventually lead to victory in the Cold War - a victory achieved not by any one party or any single president, but by a series of decisions, choices, and institutions that bridged decades, generations, and administrations...

Confronting Iran: Securing Iraq's Border (Updated)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/27/2007 - 5:09pm | 0 comments

Confronting Iran

Securing Iraq's Border:

An Irregular Warfare Concept

By Brigadier General David L. Grange (U.S. Army ret.) and Scott Swanson, MSI

Special to Small Wars Journal

Contributions by Major General John Singlaub (U.S. Army ret.), Billy Waugh (U.S. Army Special Forces ret.), Rowdy Yeats (U.S. Army Special Forces ret.) and Chuck de Caro (U.S. Army Special Forces ret.)

Excerpt

Background

Iran is intentionally employing disruptive, anti-US activities that complicate the peace process in the Iraqi Freedom Theater of operation. Iran's actions kill US personnel, drain resources, and compromise stability in the region. While these actions -- particularly cross-border activities into Iraq -- are a significant menace, international attention to Iran's destabilizing efforts has largely been overshadowed by concerns about its uranium enrichment program, which has garnered the priority for debate, diplomacy, and sanctions. The US could, however, confront Iran's hostile actions in Iraq by addressing their illegal border movements with a regional special operations strategy that can work in conjunction with the nuclear proliferation conflict. Findings from some historical successes and challenges in Special Operations Forces (SOF) efforts during previous conflicts offer possible solutions for the Iraq/Iran border today that can be expanded to other border issues with Iraq/Turkey, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and Iraq/Syria. These border issues are related to Iran's regional influence capabilities and offer an excellent platform for the US to deter some key Iranian endeavors...

Intelligence Collection and Sharing (Updated)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/27/2007 - 1:37pm | 4 comments

By Captain Tim Hsia, U.S. Army

"Who controls the past controls the future" - George Orwell, 1984

Years from now after the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have ended; historians will pore over the operations and tactics of the U.S. Army during both campaigns. They will likely applaud the all-volunteer force and the courage of the individual soldier; just as likely, however, they will criticize the lack of information sharing and management between the militarily and civilian departments of the U.S. government. Specifically, they will note the military's poor record in information management, accessibility of intelligence gathered, and the inability to apply years of accumulated intelligence to current battlefield operations. A way to patch the current intelligence gap within the U.S. government would be to adopt an information collection program that accumulates data similar to major internet stock market trackers. Market trackers absorb information continuously, rigorously track trends, and enable traders to formulate decisions based off the latest news combined with historical data. The ability of market trackers to store and quickly recall historical data should be mimicked by the U.S. government so that commanders and diplomats possess relevant records that enable them to make decisions which take into account the economic, historical, cultural, political, anthropological, and environmental aspects of the region they are operating within...

Sanchez Delivers Democratic Party Weekly Radio Address (Updated)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 11/27/2007 - 12:17pm | 10 comments

Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, U.S. Army (retired) served as the commander of coalition forces in Iraq (CJTF 7 / MNF-I) from June 2003 to June 2004. He delivered the weekly Democratic radio address this morning. We begin with the transcript of Sanchez's address and follow with some background and what we term a "quick-look" reaction.

Transcript

"Good morning, this is Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, U.S. Army, retired.

"I speak to you today, not as a representative of the Democratic Party, but as a retired military officer who is a former commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq. In that capacity, I saw firsthand the consequences of the Administration's failure to devise a strategy for victory in Iraq that employed, in a coordinated manner, the political, economic, diplomatic, and military power of the United States. That failure continues today. At its base is the mistaken belief, despite years of evidence to the contrary, that victory can be achieved through the application of military power alone.

Much more..

Conversation with General William Ward, U.S. Africa Command

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/26/2007 - 7:50pm | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - A conversation with General William "Kip" Ward, U.S. Africa Command, 14 November 2007.

Links:

US Africa Command

General William E. Ward - Commander, US AFRICOM

Ambassador Mary C. Yates - Deputy Commander for Civilian-Military Activities

Admiral Robert T. Moeller - Deputy Commander for Military Operations

26 November Iraq Briefing

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/26/2007 - 7:26pm | 0 comments

Colonel Don Farris, Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, speaks via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq on 26 November 2007.

US Sets New Political Goals for Iraq

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/26/2007 - 4:04am | 0 comments

Reports and commentary over the last several months have indicated that signs (benchmarks) of Iraqi national political reconciliation would include movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-Baathification reform. Yesterday the New York Times reported that military success of late has outpaced Iraqi political gains resulting in the U.S. administration lowering its expectations of political settlement and instead focusing on more achievable near-term goals.

Steven Lee Meyers and Alissa Rubin - U.S. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity.

... administration officials say they are focusing their immediate efforts on several more limited but achievable goals in the hope of convincing Iraqis, foreign governments and Americans that progress is being made toward the political breakthroughs that the military campaign of the past 10 months was supposed to promote.

The short-term American targets include passage of a $48 billion Iraqi budget, something the Iraqis say they are on their way to doing anyway; renewing the United Nations mandate that authorizes an American presence in the country, which the Iraqis have done repeatedly before; and passing legislation to allow thousands of Baath Party members from Saddam Hussein's era to rejoin the government. A senior Bush administration official described that goal as largely symbolic since rehirings have been quietly taking place already.

... administration officials have not abandoned their larger goals and emphasize the importance of reaching them eventually. They say that even modest steps, taken soon, could set the stage for more progress, in the same manner that this year's troop "surge" opened the way, unexpectedly, for drawing Sunni tribesmen to the American side.

Voice of America reported that Iraq's parliament began discussing a draft law Sunday that would ease job restrictions on former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party. But a political faction loyal to radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr jeered and raised objections that halted the presentation of the bill. It is the first time this year that Iraq's parliament has debated a major bill that Washington hopes will promote reconciliation among Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds. The proposed law would make it easier for former Baathists, many of them Sunnis, to apply for jobs in the Iraqi government.

Zaid Sabah and Sudarsan Raghavan have more at the Washington Post.

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Baghdad Briefing 21 November 2007

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 11/26/2007 - 3:45am | 0 comments

Lieutenant General James Dubik, Major General Kevin Bergner, General Babaker Zibari, and Adnan al-Asadi, speaking with reporters, provide an operational update on 21 November 2007.

Food for Thought Sunday

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 11/25/2007 - 1:39am | 1 comment

A Time for Choosing and a Rendezvous with Destiny - 27 October 1964

Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 11/24/2007 - 4:16am | 2 comments

In an earlier post we linked to a Fredericksburg Free Lance Star interview with Colonel Dan Kelly, Director of the new Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. At that time we could not locate a web page for the CIW -- this morning we did. From the index page:

Mission

The Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) is the central Marine Corps agency for identifying, coordinating, and implementing irregular warfare capability development initiatives across all elements of DOTMLPF in order to increase, improve, and enhance Marine Corps capabilities and capacities to conduct operations across the spectrum of war against irregular threats.

Intent

USMC CIW improves IW and related capabilities across the entire operational spectrum with particular emphasis on the irregular operational challenges by researching best practices, supporting doctrinal development, providing subject matter expertise to leaders and organizations, and by coordinating and supporting improvement and integration of IW tenets into training and education programs and curricula. CIW conducts outreach to other military and civilian entities with a shared interest in irregular warfare and non-kinetic effects operations.

Be sure to check out the IW 101 slide presentation. Other material includes the CIW Charter, the IW Joint Operating Concept and the QDR Roadmap. It appears the CIW will also begin producing a monthly newsletter in the near future.

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Black Friday SWJ Odds and Ends

by Dave Dilegge | Fri, 11/23/2007 - 7:57am | 0 comments

Dr. Marcus Griffin on the American Anthropological Association Executive Board's Statement on the Human Terrain System Project - Andrew Exum and Stephen McInerney on Lebanon - BBC interview with Dr. Dave Kilcullen - tons on the new Pakistan COIN strategy from Bill Roggio, Phil Carter and Westhawk - more on LTG Sanchez's Democratic radio address - ZenPundit's new home and look - John Robb now officially a Best and Brightest - and Max Boot on Army promotions...

Sanchez to Give Dem Radio Reply

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 11/22/2007 - 10:10pm | 0 comments

Anne Flaherty of the Associated Press offers a sneak preview on the remarks retired US Army Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez will make in this Saturday's weekly Democratic radio address.

"Retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top commander in Iraq shortly after the fall of Baghdad, said this week he supports Democratic legislation that calls for most troops to come home within a year...

"The improvements in security produced by the courage and blood of our troops have not been matched by a willingness on the part of Iraqi leaders to make the hard choices necessary to bring peace to their country...

"There is no evidence that the Iraqis will choose to do so in the near future or that we have an ability to force that result."

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's office issued a media advisory on Sanchez's remarks yesterday. Here are the excerpts authorized for immediate release.

"The keys to securing the future of Iraq are aggressive regional diplomacy, political reconciliation and economic hope. Yet, as our current commanders in Iraq have recently noted, the improvements in security produced by the courage and blood of our troops have not been matched by a willingness on the part of Iraqi leaders to make the hard choices necessary to bring peace to their country. There is no evidence that the Iraqis will choose to do so in the near future or that we have an ability to force that result...

"Our Army and Marine Corps are struggling with changing deployment schedules that are disrupting combat readiness training and straining the patience and daily lives of military families. It will take the Army at least a decade to repair the damage done to its full spectrum readiness, which is at its lowest level since the Vietnam War. In the meantime, the ability of our military to fully execute our national security strategy will be called into doubt, producing what is, in my judgment, unacceptable strategic risk...

"The funding bill passed by the House of Representatives last week, with a bipartisan vote, makes the proper preparation of our deploying troops a priority and requires the type of shift in their mission that will allow their numbers to be reduced substantially."

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