Blog Posts

By Justin Logan and Christopher Preble

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Senator Richard Lugar argue that "some of the greatest threats to our national security" come from the "brittle institutions and failing economies of weak and poorly governed states." As a result, they argue, the creation of a nation-building office within the State Department is "essential for our national security." This proposal is based on a fundamental misreading of the predicament we face today, and threatens to compound our recent strategic errors.

The experience in Iraq has apparently taught us little. Rice and Lugar propose populating the nation-building office with 250 full-time staffers, who would then draw on a reserve corps of perhaps some 2,000 federal employees, plus another 500-person cadre of think-tankers and civilians...

More...

From the abstract:

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By Captain Timothy Hsia

This past Veteran's day, several politicians and news outlets discussed the current generation of men and women fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as the "next greatest generation." By labeling my peers as the "next greatest generation," politicians and the media seek to applaud and highlight the sacrifices of the young men and women fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the "next greatest generation" is an inappropriate moniker. In reality, many members of my generation do not understand the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This label of the "next greatest generation" is confusing for service members and the American public as a whole because it seeks to describe a generation when in fact it describes only a tiny segment of my generation. The truth is the vast majority of my generation spent their holiday season at the mall oblivious to the war while their military counterparts in the military served in harms way.

More...

Rocky Blogger Major Andrew Olmsted Killed in Iraq - David Montero, Rocky Mountain News.

Major Olmsted's Rocky Mountain News Blog -- From the Front Lines

Major Olmsted's final post on AndrewOlmsted.com.

Bound for War, Set to Blog - David Montero, Rocky Mountain News (23 June 2007)

Slideshow Tribute to Major Olmsted - Rocky Mountain News

Sustaining the Peace after Civil War. Authored by Dr. T. David Mason.

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan. Authored by Colonel Dennis O. Young.

Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability. Authored by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.

Intrepidity... And Character Development within the Army Profession. Authored by Dr. Don M. Snider.

Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective. Authored by Dr. Roger B. Myerson.

Nothing follows.

In-sourcing the Tools of National Power for Success and Security

Matt Armstrong

Military operations may neutralize immediate kinetic threats and strategic communications may make promises, but enduring change comes from systemic overhauls that stabilize unstable regions. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for ultimate democratization. (1) These are the real propaganda of deeds. Without competent and comprehensive action in these areas, tactical operations are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

Bullets and bombs represent short-term tactical responses to a much larger strategic dilemma. Any text worth reading on insurgency or counterinsurgency recognizes and emphasizes the operational and strategic center of gravity is the people. Failing to address grinding poverty and disillusionment in regions creates fertile breeding grounds for extremists, terrorists, and insurgents to attack the national interests of the United States.

The U.S. must in-source the tools of national power that support and compliment reconstruction and stabilization efforts to pacify and stabilize regions. The National Security Strategy declares the need to bring all of the elements of America's national power to bear to build the "infrastructure of democracy" and to be a champion of "human dignity". But, instead of consistent, coherent, and coordinated, operations, the U.S. relies on ad hoc reconstruction and stabilization solutions heavily dependent on outsourcing in lieu of any substantial internal capacity. This outsourcing of national power also relies on ad hoc solutions as companies quickly assemble teams that too often operate outside of existing military and other governmental operations in the region. We all know this is a fundamental requirement, even if we do not realize it. Consider the discussions surrounding the "Phase IV" planning for Iraq that recalled the Marshall Plan for post-war Europe. Too frequently lost in those discussions was the strategic and operational planning by the U.S. in the years prior to the collapse of Germany, as well as the civil and humanitarian aid that followed the American and British forces in the march to Germany.

Today the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is a solution to address the structural problems of America's response to unstable regions. Based on a "whole of government" approach, this office will in-source the most essential tools of national power while centralizing the ability to effectively partner with private sector providers. However, this civilian-based requirement of "winning" the post-conflict struggle cannot move forward because of a combination of misunderstanding and domestic posturing...

Next - The Belmont Club on recent trends concerning U.S. and Iraqi war casualties.

More at both links.

Next - Jules Crittenden (Forward Movement) on casualties and the Gen. Petraeus Q&A in his post Blood Dividend.

Finally - Small Wars Council member LTC Gian Gentile in an Army Times op-ed that provides another view of the Surge.

Nothing follows.

The Winter 2007 - 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum by Ali A. Jalali

New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency by Steven Metz

US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective by Alexander Alderson

Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq by Bruce J. Reider

The Military and Reconstruction Operations by Mick Ryan

Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by David Szabo

Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance by Zachary Selden

The Moral Equality of Combatants by Carl Ceulemans

Editor's Shelf

Review Essay

Book Reviews

Sneak Preview: Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy by Dr. Steven Metz.

Preface

Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it becomes a master, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to the public.

-- Winston Churchill

Like most Americans, I thought little about Iraq before the summer of 1990. Having spent my entire adult life teaching and writing about national security I could not, of course, ignore it entirely. I knew a horrific war took place there in the 1980s but its most intense images were of slaughtered Iranian youth, not the bluster of mustachioed Iraqi generals. Like most Americans, I was perplexed that a regime like the one in Teheran, inured to suffering and driven to barbarity by religious fervor, could exist in the modern world. It was so out of place, almost surreal, an echo of a different time. As a student of the Third World, though, I found Saddam Hussein lamentably familiar and, in Hannah Arendt's word, "banal." I knew of many more like him, from Mobutu to Ceausescu. They littered the world. But even this perception—as wrong as it turned out to be--was only a passing thought. I remained immersed in other regions, other issues, other problems. Iraq was peripheral, best left for Middle East experts (which I am not)...

For insights and analysis as events develop in Kenya the blogosphere place to be is Chris Blattman's Blog. Blattman's latest and prime example of why his blog is a must visit and bookmark for SWJ readers - Kenya in the Blogosphere:

Nothing follows.

Very interesting piece in Friday's Washington Post concerning a central figure in Charlie Wilson's War. Ann Scott Tyson profiles the young ex-Green Beret officer who was the brains behind the Afghanistan Mujahedin strategy while working for Gust Arakotos at the CIA. Sorry, Charlie. This Is Michael Vickers's War is a good read on Vickers's next big challenge -- "working to implement the U.S. military's highest-priority plan: a global campaign against terrorism that reaches far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan".

From Michael Vickers's OSD Bio Page: Vickers was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities) on 23 July 2007. He is the senior civilian advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the capabilities and operational employment of special operations forces, strategic forces, and conventional forces. He is also the senior civilian advisor on counterterrorism strategy, irregular warfare, and force transformation.

Prior to his appointment as ASD (SO/LIC&IC), Vickers served as Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). In this capacity, he provided advice on Iraq strategy to President Bush and his war cabinet. He also was a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and Executive Director of the QDR "Red Team," which provided an assessment of the QDR for the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. In late 2005, Vickers conducted an independent assessment of special operations forces ("The Downing Report") for the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of numerous publications, among which is "The Revolution in War" (2004).

From 1973 to 1986, Vickers served as an Army Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officer, Special Forces Officer, and CIA Operations Officer. During this period, he had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. His operational experience spans covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism (including hostage rescue operations), counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

During the mid-1980s, Vickers was the principal strategist for the largest covert action program in the CIA's history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan. Vickers oversaw a major change in U.S. strategy, provided strategic and operational direction to an insurgent force of more than 300 unit commanders, 150,000 full-time fighters, and 500,000 part-time fighters, coordinated the efforts of more than ten foreign governments, and controlled an annual budget in excess of $2 billion in current dollars.

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Links

Michael Vickers is a Busy Man - Westhawk

Charlie Wilson (Mike Vickers Bonus Edition) - Abu Muqawama

Maybe you were in a hurry, maybe you felt awkward.

Maybe they were in a hurry, maybe they felt awkward.

Next time say it; it's easier than you think... and means more than you think.

So visit the monuments, wear your red shirt on Friday,

and keep that yellow ribbon on your car.

Just don't miss the opportunity to thank the person right in front of you.

It's not about politics. It's about service, and sacrifice and it's about gratitude.

If you appreciate their service, give them a sign.

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

APO AE 09342-1400

28 December 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

As 2007 draws to a close, you should look back with pride on what you, your fellow troopers, our Iraqi partners, and Iraqi Coalition civilians have achieved in 2007. A year ago, Iraq was racked by horrific violence and on the brink of civil war. Now, levels of violence and civilians and military casualties are significantly reduced and hope has been rekindled in many Iraqi communities. To be sure, the progress is reversible and there is much more to be done. Nonetheless, the hard-fought accomplishments of 2007 have been substantial, and I want to thank each of you for the contributions you made to them.

In response to the challenges that faced Iraq a year ago, we and our Iraqi partners adopted a new approach. We increased our focus on securing the Iraqi people and, in some cases, delayed transition of tasks to Iraqi forces. Additional U.S. and Georgian forces were deployed to theater, the tours of U.S. unites were extended, and Iraqi forces conducted a surge of their own, generating well over 100,000 more Iraqi police and soldiers during the year so that they, too, had additional forces to execute the new approach. In places like Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jabour, and Baghdad, you and our Iraqi brothers fought—often house by house, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood—to wrest sanctuaries away from Al Qaeda-Iraq, to disrupt extremist militia elements, and to rid the streets of mafia-like criminals. Having cleared areas, you worked with Iraqis to retain them—establishing outposts in the areas we were securing, developing Iraqi Security Forces, and empowering locals to help our efforts. This approach has not been easy. It has required steadfastness in the conduct of tough offensive operations, creative solutions to the myriad problems on the ground, and persistence over the course of many months and during countless trying situations. Through it all, you have proven equal to every task, continually demonstrating an impressive ability to conduct combat and stability operations in an exceedingly complex environment.

Your accomplishments have given the Iraqi people new confidence and prompted many citizens to reject terror and confront those who practice it. As the months passed in 2007, in fact, the tribal awakening that began in Al Anbar Province spread to other parts of the country. Emboldened by improving security and tired of indiscriminate violence, extremist ideology, oppressive practices, and criminal activity, Iraqis increasingly rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq and rogue militia elements. Over time, the desire of Iraqis to contribute to their own security has manifested itself in citizens volunteering for the police, the Army, and concerned local citizen programs. It has been reflected in citizens providing information that has helped us find far more than double the number of arms and weapons caches we found last year. And it has been apparent in Iraqi communities now supporting their local security forces.

As a result of your hard work and that of our Iraqi comrades-in-arms—and with the support of the local populace in many areas—we have seen significant improvements in the security situation. The number of attacks per week is down some 60 percent from a peak in June of this year to a level last seen consistently in the early summer of 2005. With fewer attacks, we are also seeing significantly reduced loss of life. The number of civilian deaths is down by some 75 percent since its height a year ago, dropping to a level not seen since the beginning of 2006. And the number of Coalition losses is down substantially as well. We remain mindful that the past year's progress has been purchased through the sacrifice and selfless service of all those involved and that the new Iraq must still contend with innumerable enemies and obstacles. Al Qaeda-Iraq has been significantly degraded, but it remains capable of horrific bombings. Militia extremists have been disrupted, but they retain influence in many areas. Criminals have been apprehended, but far too many still roam Iraqi streets and intimidate local citizens and Iraqi officials. We and our Iraqi partners will have to deal with each of these challenges in the New Year to keep the situation headed in the right direction.

While the progress in a number of areas is fragile, the security improvements have significantly changed the situation in many parts of Iraq. It is now imperative that we take advantage of these improvements by looking beyond the security arena and helping Iraqi military and political leaders as they develop solutions in other areas as well, solutions they can sustain over time. At the tactical level, this means an increasing focus on helping not just Iraqi Security Forces—with whom we must partner in all that we do—but also helping Iraqi governmental organizations as they endeavor to restore basic services, to create employment opportunities, to revitalize local markets, to refurbish schools, to spur local economic activity, and to keep locals involved in contributing to local security. We will have to do all of this, of course, while continuing to draw down our forces, thinning our presence, and gradually handing over responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. Meanwhile, at the national level, we will focus on helping the Iraqi Government integrate local volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces and other employment, develop greater ministerial capacity and capability, aid displaced persons as they return, and, most importantly, take the all-important political and economic actions needed to exploit the opportunity provided by the gains in the security arena.

The pace of progress on important political actions to this point has been slower than Iraqi leaders had hoped. Still, there have been some important steps taken in recent months. Iraq's leaders reached agreement on the Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation with the United States, which lays the groundwork for an enduring relationship between our nations. The United Nations Security Council approved Iraq's request for a final renewal of the resolution that authorizes the Coalition to operate in Iraq. Iraq's leaders passed an important Pension Law that not only extends retirement benefits to Iraqis previously left out but also represents the first of what we hope will be additional measures fostering national reconciliation. And Iraq's leaders have debated at length a second reconciliation-related measure, the Accountability and Justice Bill (the de-Ba'athification Reform Law), as well as the 2008 National Budget, both which likely will be brought up for a vote in early 2008. Even so, all Iraqi participants recognize that much more must be done politically to put their country on an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable economic development. We will, needless to say, work closely with our Embassy teammates to support the Iraq Government as it strives to take advantage of the improved security environment by pursing political and economic progress.

The New Year will bring many changes. Substantial force rotations and adjustments already underway will continue. One Army brigade combat team and a Marine Expeditionary Unit have already redeployed without replacement. In the coming months, four additional brigades and two Marine battalions will follow suit. Throughout that time, we will continue to adapt to the security situation as it evolves. And in the midst of all the changes, we and our Iraqi partners will strive to maintain the momentum, to press the fight, and to pursue Iraq's enemies relentlessly. Solutions to many of the tough problems will continue to be found at your level, together with local Iraqi leaders and with your Iraqi Security Force partners, in company and battalion areas of operation and in individual neighborhoods an towns. As you and your Iraqi partners turn concepts into reality, additional progress will emerge slowly and fitfully. Over time, we will gradually see fewer bad days and accumulate more good days, good weeks, and good months.

The way ahead will not be easy. Inevitably, there will be more tough days and tough weeks. Unforeseen challenges will emerge. And success will require continued hard work, commitment, and initiative from all involved. As we look to the future, however, we should remember how far we have come in the past year. Thanks to the tireless efforts and courageous actions of the Iraqi people, Iraq's political and military leaders, the Iraqi Security Forces, and each of you, a great deal has been achieved in 2007. Thus, as we enter a new year, we and our Iraqi partners will have important accomplishments and a newfound sense of hope on which we can build.

As always, all or your leaders, our fellow citizens back home, and I deeply appreciate the dedication, professionalism, commitment, and courage you display on a daily basis. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with each of you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

David H. Petraeus

The January -- February 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site.

Featured Articles

Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. The secretary of defense says the U.S. must develop a cadre of deployable civilians to strengthen the Nation's "soft" power in today's national security environment.

U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm? By Sean McFate. The tenth and newest unified command, AFRICOM, stands up in October 2008. Civilian-heavy and with a security-development focus on Africa, this hybrid will not look like its brethren.

Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, Spring 2006 by Colonel Michael A. Coss, U.S. Army. The "clear-hold-build-engage" strategy used by Combined Joint Task Force-76 during Operation Mountain Lion (April-June 2006) could be a template for future counterinsurgency efforts.

Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future by Major James B. Cogbill, U.S. Army. Well before D-Day, America planned to protect European art and cultural treasures. Failure to do the same in Iraq suggests we need a permanent DOD structure to ensure we don't repeat our mistake.

Northern Ireland: A Balanced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration by Major John Clark, British Army. The political, economic, and security dimensions of societal reconstruction are ineluctably symbiotic. A veteran of the Northern Ireland "troubles" analyzes how that conflict has been brought to the brink of resolution.

The Rule of Law for Commanders by Captain Christopher M. Ford, U.S. Army. Without rule of law there is no chance for civil society and little likelihood of stabilizing a conflict. Iraq is a case in point.

International Law and Slavery by Mark D. Welton, J.D. Human trafficking remains a problem throughout the world—one that often arises in areas of armed conflict and, thus, is of concern to military professionals.

Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs by Colonel Eugene V. Bonventre, U.S. Air Force. Measures of effectiveness, normally ubiquitous throughout DOD, do not exist for monitoring and evaluating military humanitarian assistance activities. Making efforts to gauge these programs can pay dividends in stability operations.

Threat Analysis: Organized Crime and Narco-Terrorism in Northern Mexico by Gordon James Knowles, Ph.D. Below America's southern border, conditions are ripe for spawning potential mechanisms of terrorism directed at United States citizens. Awareness and cooperation with Mexican authorities are essential for controlling the threat.

Contest Winners

The New Legs Race: Critical Perspectives on Biometrics in Iraq by Andrew R. Hom. Biometric technology (retinal scans, gait analysis, voice recognition, etc.) is inherently invasive. Using it to map the Iraqi people could alienate those whose hearts and minds we claim to covet.

Finding America's Role in a Collapsed North Korean State by Captain Jonathan Stafford, U.S. Army. Instead of fighting every battle in the War on Terrorism ourselves, we should help better positioned allies prepare for possible flashpoints. One such flashpoint could well be North Korea.

On Luck and Leadership by Major David Cummings, Jamaica Defence Force. How many times in our careers as professional Soldiers have we heard individual officers described as being lucky? What is this thing called luck?

Merging Information Operations and Psychological Operations by Lieutenant Colonel Fredric W. Rohm Jr., U.S. Army. Merging the IO functional area and the Psychological Operations branch into one specialty may be cost effective. Combining resources, training, and functions can only help improve our effort in the information war.

Insights

Iraq: The Way Ahead by Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D. Security in Iraq has clearly improved over the last year, but the Iraqi Government has made little progress on the political end. "Soft-partitioning" seems to be the best solution to the government's paralysis.

Redefining Insurgency by Lieutenant Colonel Chris North, U.S. Army, Retired. The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are more complex than the word "insurgency" suggests. A new definition may be in order.

Book Reviews

Letters

Military Review: November - December 2007 Issue

News

Full Coverage - Google

Full Coverage - Yahoo

Full Coverage - Dawn

Bhutto Assassinated - Washington Post

Bhutto Assassinated - New York Times

Bhutto Assassinated - Los Angeles Times

Bhutto Assassinated - London Times

Bhutto Assassinated - Sydney Morning Herald

Bhutto Assassinated - Associated Press

Bhutto Assassinated - Reuters

Pakistan in Chaos - The Australian

Assassination Ignites Disarray - New York Times

Turmoil Grips Pakistan - Boston Globe

Assassination Sparks Riots - Washington Times

Pakistan Thrust into Chaos - USA Today

Death Rocks Pakistan - Christian Science Monitor

Bhutto's Killing Stokes Unrest - Associated Press

Bush Condemns Assassination - Washington Post

Bush Condemns Assassination - New York Times

World Leaders React - Washington Times

U.S. Beefs Up Pakistan Force - The Australian

Last Pictures - New York Times

Last Pictures - Washington Post

Last Pictures - Miami Herald

Last Moments Video - New York Times

Last Moments Video - Globe and Mail

Op-Ed / News Analysis

Musharraf's Moment -- London Times editorial

The Pakistan Test -- Washington Post editorial

Pakistan Elections Must Go Ahead -- London Daily Telegraph editorial

World Plunged Deeper into Chaos -- The Australian editorial

From Benazir into the Unknown -- Sidney Morning Herald editorial

Beyond Benazir -- Los Angeles Times editorial

Bhutto Risked All for Democracy -- Toronto Star editorial

Death Kills Best Chance for Democracy - New Zealand Herald editorial

Pakistan's Bitter Political Harvest -- Canberra Times editorial

Murder and Politics -- Baltimore Sun editorial

Pakistan Must Stay Course to Democracy -- The Independent editorial

Pakistan's Perilous Path -- Washington Times editorial

Foe of Extremists Pays Ultimate Price -- Miami Herald editorial

Assassination of Benazir Bhutto - Philadelphia Inquirer editorial

Pakistan's Predicament - New York Post editorial

Pakistan on the Brink -- Ottawa Citizen editorial

Target: Pakistan - Wall Street Journal editorial

Assassination in Pakistan - Washington Post editorial

After Benazir Bhutto - New York Times editorial

The Nightmare Scenario -- London Times editorial

Pakistan's Perilous Path - Washington Times editorial

Benazir Bhutto - Washington Times editorial

Democracy Assassinated - Boston Globe editorial

Murder and Politics - Baltimore Sun editorial

Assassination Steals key to U.S. Strategy - USA Today editorial

Death in Rawalpindi -- Guardian editorial

The Assassination of Benazir Bhutto - Philadelphia Inquirer editorial

Bhutto's Legacy - San Francisco Chronicle editorial

Pakistan's Best Chance -- Chamberlin and Weinbaum, Washington Post

Pakistan: After the Shock -- Greg Sheridan, The Australian

Bloody Reflections on the Dynasties -- Graham Stewart, London Times

Tragedy Born of Despotism and Anarchy -- Tariq Ali, Guardian

Apocalypse? Mmm, Bring it On -- Matthew Parris, London Times

Terror's New Theater - Stephen Schwartz, New York Post

Defying Fate Pointless for Bhutto -- Amir Taheri, London Times

Setback for the War on Terror -- Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star

All Eyes on Musharraf -- Simon Tisdall, Guardian

Bhutto's Bravery - Rich Lowry, New York Post

Terrorism Strikes Heart of Pakistan's Democracy - Irfan Yusuf, New Zealand Herald

Tragedy Recasts the Race -- David Nason, The Australian

Real World Intrudes on the Race -- Mona Charen, National Review

Bhutto's Death Hardliner Victory -- Con Coughlin, London Daily Telegraph

After Bhutto - National Review roundtable

Blow to U.S. Goal for Pakistan -- Wright and Kessler, Washington Post

Assassination Shatters Hopes for Stability - Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times

Where Bhutto's Death Leaves U.S. - Thompson and Bennett, Time

Death Deals Blow to U.S. - Matthew Lee, Associated Press

Making a Martyr of Bhutto - Aryn Baker, Time

Can Democracy Survive? - Bronwen Maddox, London Times

Pakistan's Bloody Curse - Saeed Shah, Globe and Mail

In the Mist of Benazir Bhutto - Deborah Simmons, Washington Times

Pakistan Civil War? - Wilkinson, Edwards and Blair, London Daily Telegraph

Bhutto Killing Inflames Pakistan - Wonacott and Solomon, Wall Street Journal

Civil War Feared - Zahid Hussain, London Times

Lived in Eye of Storm - Perlez and Burnett, New York Times

Pakistan at an Uncertain Hour - Teresita Schaffer, Washington Post

Salvaging U.S. Diplomacy - Cooper and Meyers, New York Times

The Queen is Dead, Long Live the Cause -- Ben Macintyre, London Times

Bhutto and Democracy -- Michael Hirsh, Newsweek

Benazir Bhutto - Andrew McCarthy, National Review

Benazir Bhutto -- Max Boot, Commentary

Benazir Bhutto: Headlong -- David Ignatius, Washington Post

Supping with the Terrorist Devils - Ramesh Thakur, Ottawa Citizen

Democracy Sidetracked Again - Brian Katulis, Baltimore Sun

Not All are Mourning Bhutto - Tristan Mabry, Philadelphia Inquirer

Musharraf's Political Future Appears Troubled - David Rhode, New York Times

Roots of Conflict - Eric Carvin, Associated Press

Who Did It? -- Jason Burke, Guardian

When an Assassin Succeeds - Rich Lowry, Real Clear Politics

Many Had the Desire, Means to Kill Bhutto - Warrick and Ricks, Washington Post

Main Suspects are Warlords and Security Forces - Jeremy Page, London Times

In the Arms of Extremists - Raheel Raza, Ottawa Citizen

Daughter of Destiny -- Christopher Hitchens, Slate

More Peril for Pakistan? - Kim Barker, Chicago Tribune

The Benazir I Knew - Mansoor Ijaz, Christian Science Monitor

The Benazir I Knew - Amy Wilentz, Los Angeles Times

Coming of Age in the Benazir Bhutto Era - Huma Yusuf, Boston Globe

The Traditional Rebel - Molly Moore, Washington Post

Weathered Political Storm - John Burns, New York Times

The Dangerous Void Left Behind -- Ahmed Rashid, Washington Post

Benazir Bhutto -- Mark Steyn, National Review

Aristocrat Who Championed Democracy - Henry Chu, Los Angeles Times

Grief, Anger After a Voice is Stilled - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer

Bhutto Killing Rocks '08 Trail -- Allen, Martin and Smith, Politico

Blogs

The Insider Brief - Pakistani blog

All Things Pakistan - Pakistani blog

State of Pakistan - Pakistani blog

Bloggers Pakistan - Pakistani blog aggregator

Analysis of the Bhutto Assassination - Counterterrorism

Benazir Bhutto Assassinated - The Long War Journal

What Died with Benazir Bhutto? - The Belmont Club

Benazir Bhutto, RIP - Abu Muqawama

As Pakistan Descends Into Mourning - Information Dissemination

Assassinated! - ZenPundit

Reactions to Bhutto - MountainRunner

Bhutto's Assassination - Thomas P.M. Barnett

Pakistan on the Brink - Counterterrorism

Al Qaeda Takes Credit - The Long War Journal

Bhutto Shot While Waving Through Sunroof - ThreatsWatch

Al-Qaida Claiming Credit - Counterterrorism

Moving On - The Belmont Club

Thoughts on the Assassination - The Captain's Journal

A Reminder This Is A Real War - Counterterrorism

What Next for Pakistan? - Captain's Quarters

They Finally Got Her - Westhawk

Uppity Muslim Woman Killed - tdaxp

Benazir Bhutto Assassinated - Michelle Malkin

Lethal Assault on Democracy - Counterterrorism

Attack on Democracy - PrairiePundit

Candidate's Reactions - Captain's Quarters

Bloggers React - Blogs of War

Recent Interviews / Op-Eds by Bhutto

Interview with Benazir Bhutto -- Parade Magazine

Interview with Benazir Bhutto -- Washington Post

Interview with Benazir Bhutto -- Washington Post

Interview with Benazir Bhutto -- Washington Post

Interview with Benazir Bhutto -- Washington Post

Interview with Benazir Bhutto - Christian Science Monitor

Musharraf's Electoral Farce -- Benazir Bhutto, Washington Post

Campaigning in the Face of Terror - Benazir Bhutto, Wall Street Journal

I Will Not Acquiesce to Tyranny - Benazir Bhutto, Globe and Mail

Discuss

Small Wars Council

Nothing follows.

Nothing follows.

So... SWJ and AM have decided to aid in building the library with a little help from our friends. We e-mailed the COIN Academy requesting their reading list. They responded with titles of books and movies that once in hand would go a long way in establishing a world-class COIN library.

To streamline our effort we have set up the Afghanistan COIN Library on Amazon.

Kahl is right; Al Qaeda must be destroyed, not converted. But having spent years on battlefields as a Marine in Vietnam and now as a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, I am leery of academic categories. In the actual fight, it's hard to distinguish the 'hearts and minds' from unreconstructed 'coercion'. Counterinsurgency is not an either-or proposition. Kahl rightly praised the Army/Marine manual on counterinsurgency for emphasizing moral behavior. But COIN is still war. It is a bromide to assert that an insurgency is 80 percent political. American soldiers do not win the hearts and minds of al Qaeda in Iraq; they kill them. Killing members of al Qaeda is the essential 20 percent.

In Anbar Province, the heart of the insurgency, the tribes have rebelled against the al Qaeda extremists they welcomed a few years ago. The United States didn't win those Sunni hearts; al Qaeda lost them. The tribes chose to align with our soldiers because, as one sheik told me, "Marines are the strongest tribe." The tribes could not destroy al Qaeda; our military could. To cement the gains, the US military is also acting as an ombudsman for the Sunnis (the "hearts" part) and pressuring the Shiite government we created to provide the Sunnis with resources and assurances. That 80 percent political solution has followed after - and depended upon - the 20 percent battlefield success that was due to the daily grind and grit of our soldiers.

The COIN manual has set the proper strategic tone in Iraq. It has also provided foreign policy elites with an intellectual rationale for grudging acceptance of the fact that the US military is prevailing in Iraq. Nonetheless, Kahl concludes that Iraq remains "a recipe for likely failure" and thus illustrates that even the best counterinsurgency theories cannot change some hearts and minds.

Nothing follows.

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By David Glasner

The real world, even under normal conditions, is a complicated and confusing place. In war, complications and confusion increase exponentially. Ever since January, when President Bush announced what he called a new way forward (and others called "the surge") in Iraq and selected General David Petraeus, whose ideas for counterinsurgency warfare, codified in the Army's new Counterinsurgency Manual which he co-authored, provided the rationale and blueprint for the new strategy, to take command of American forces in Iraq, arguments about whether the new strategy was really working have been going back and forth. After months of confusion, the picture has become unmistakably clear. The surge worked...

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