Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright speak to reporters at the Pentagon, 21 December 2001.
Blog Posts
SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 12/23/2007 - 5:54am | 0 comments
Colonel Paul Funk, Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, providing an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq, 20 December 2007.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 12/21/2007 - 6:26am | 2 comments
Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?
By Clint Watts
Afghan and Arab fighters defeated the Soviet Union by pursuing a strategy that mobilized tribes to entangle a foreign occupier in a hostile land. In rugged terrain, Soviet conventional forces lost their initiative to a ruthless insurgency campaign. Through a decade of fighting, the Soviets ultimately died from a thousand cuts. They entered Afghanistan a world power and returned home demoralized by Muslim guerrillas, hastening the collapse of their regime.
In the 1990s, Osama Bin Laden decided to use a similar strategy against the United States. Spurned by his homeland of Saudi Arabia and vexed by the presence of infidels on holy soil, Bin Laden hoped to provoke the United States into a protracted entanglement in the Middle East. This entanglement, he thought, would increase al-Qa'ida's prestige and recruitment, unify all Muslims, and ultimately exhaust the United States and lead to its withdrawal from the region...
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/20/2007 - 6:50am | 2 comments
General David Petraeus, Commanding General Multi-National Force - Iraq
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 12/19/2007 - 7:18pm | 0 comments
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq -- DoD Quarterly ReportThese reports are submitted to Congress pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13.
Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction - Proceedings Report
Organized at the request of Major General (sel.) John F. Kelly, Commanding General of I MEF (Fwd), this senior level roundtable was held over the course of two-days at Quantico, VA on September 19 and 20, 2007. It focused on interagency issues and private sector engagement. The roundtable featured an address by General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, a briefing on the current status of II MEF (Fwd) from Major General (sel.) John Allen, Deputy Commanding General of Multi National Force -- West, and a private sector initiatives address by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, Paul Brinkley. The roundtable also included presentations from the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, Treasury, and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the NGO and IO community, and Washington Post reporter and author of "Fiasco" Tom Ricks.Strategy Making Iraq Safer Snubbed for Years -- USA Today
A change has swept across Iraq, and attacks using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, have declined steadily for eight months. Casualties from the bombs are at their lowest point since 2003, the first year of the war. Troops have seized twice as many weapons caches this year as they did all of last.2007 Person of the Year Runner-up -- Time Magazine
General David Petraeus has not failed, which, given the anarchy and pessimism of February, must be considered something of a triumph. The sketchy progress he has made is the result of equal parts luck and skill. The Sunni tribal revolt against the violent grip of Salafist extremists (most notably, al-Qaeda in Iraq) was already under way when Petraeus arrived. But he was smart enough to encourage and fund the Anbar Awakening, even though Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated central government was opposed. The pacification of Anbar, the most violent province in 2006, has been the signal success of 2007.Officer Retention: The Army's Other Crisis -- Washington Monthly
In the last four years, the exodus of junior officers from the Army has accelerated. In 2003, around 8 percent of junior officers with between four and nine years of experience left for other careers. Last year, the attrition rate leapt to 13 percent. "A five percent change could potentially be a serious problem," said James Hosek, an expert in military retention at the RAND Corporation. Over the long term, this rate of attrition would halve the number of officers who reach their tenth year in uniform and intend to take senior leadership roles.Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Wed, 12/19/2007 - 7:38am | 0 comments
After Action Report by General Barry R McCaffrey, U.S. Army (retired), 18 December 2007. AAR written for the United States Military Academy based on GEN McCaffrey's 5 -- 11 December 2007 trip to Iraq. Highlights from the report follow...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/18/2007 - 5:46pm | 0 comments
The Winter 2007 - 2008 editon of Air and Space Power Journal has been posted and contains several articles that address the use of air power and Air Force capabilities in a Counterinsurgency / Irregular Warfare environment. The first article, by Dr. Conrad Crane, addresses the base-line principles and imperatives for combating insurgency.
COIN / IW
Minting COIN - by Dr. Conrad Crane.
The world became aware of the existence of a coherent body of theory about insurgency as a result of the revolutionary upheavals accompanying the deterioration of empires following World War II. Along with the propagation of ideas from Mao Tse-tung, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Carlos Marighella, and Vo Nguyen Giap came a corresponding attempt by counterinsurgents to develop their own set of practices and principles. The tenets of these mostly British and French writers were a product of many years of struggle in theaters from Algeria to Malaya to Vietnam, along with observation of many case studies. David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, and Roger Trinquier still have much useful information for current practitioners of counterinsurgency (COIN). Of recent note for anyone trying to learn about COIN from history is the comprehensive work of the Naval Postgraduate School's Kalev Sepp, who looks at scores of historical cases to develop his own list of best and worst practices for COIN.Much more...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/18/2007 - 1:54am | 0 comments
New York Times, Washington Post, Abu Muqawama and The Captain's Journal all chime in... New initiatives, top-to-bottom reviews, additional resources, NATO caveats, leadership and expectations...
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/17/2007 - 6:39am | 0 comments
The Washington Post reports today that President Bush is facing new pressure from the U.S. Military to accelerate a force reduction in Iraq in order to increase capabilities in Afghanistan.Administration officials said the White House could start to debate the future of the American military commitment in both Iraq and Afghanistan as early as next month. Some Pentagon officials are urging a further drawdown of forces in Iraq beyond that envisioned by the White House, which is set to reduce the number of combat brigades from 20 to 15 by the end of next summer. At the same time, commanders in Afghanistan are looking for several additional battalions, helicopters and other resources to confront a resurgent Taliban movement.Administration officials say the White House has become more concerned in recent months about the situation in Afghanistan, where grinding poverty, rampant corruption, poor infrastructure and the growing challenge from the Taliban are hindering U.S. stabilization efforts. Senior administration officials now believe Afghanistan may pose a greater longer-term challenge than Iraq.
According to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there are currently 41,700 troops (including National Support Elements) in Afghanistan. However, as the Post reports, Britain, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia have assumed the heaviest part of the combat burden alongside U.S. troops.
U.S. Army Gen. Dan K. McNeill, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, is asking for an additional three battalions of troops from NATO countries -- the equivalent of another brigade combat team -- but colleagues believe that would not be enough. U.S. officials are doubtful that allies will provide all the requested troops, and predict Bush will be faced with a request for even more U.S. troops, possibly after attending a NATO summit in April in Bucharest, Romania.U.S. officials said Bush may also consider revamping the current military structure in Afghanistan, which has McNeill serving alongside a four-star NATO commander. Restrictions by NATO members on how their troops can be used -- Germany, for instance, limits where its forces can be deployed -- have made it difficult to mount a coherent response to the Taliban resurgence. U.S. forces, which have been largely confined to a small part of the country in the east, have little presence in the south, where much of the insurgency has taken hold.Nothing follows.
by Dave Dilegge | Mon, 12/17/2007 - 6:21am | 0 comments
Urban Operations Journal -- 28 February 2003
General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret); experienced in the theory, planning, and conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as well as a leading proponent of cultural intelligence; developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations. The successful conduct of operations in Iraq extends well beyond 'taking down Saddam'. The end state we achieve in Iraq - and how we achieve it - will have a direct and serious impact on all future operations in the conduct of our war on terrorism.
They are presented here as helpful guidelines on winning the peace before, during, and after the dust settles in Baghdad and other Iraqi urban areas...
by Jim Guirard | Sun, 12/16/2007 - 10:18am | 0 comments
In a "Small Wars" context but with very serious implications relating to the worldwide Cold War II now being waged between (a) America and the West on the one hand and (b) our new "Islamo-fascist" enemies and some of our "Socialist" enemies from Cold War I on the other, there was a close electoral victory for our side recently in Venezuela.
That South American country's egomaniacal, "Socialism or Death" dictator Hugo Chavez was narrowly defeated in the carefully contrived December 2, 2007 referendum which would have enabled him to follow in Fidel Castro's "President for Life" footsteps. So, a genuine "Hooray For Our Side!!" is very much in order...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 12/15/2007 - 6:47pm | 0 comments
A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War
Lieutenant Colonel Gian P. Gentile
I propose a consideration to adjust the Principles of War as accepted by the American military since J.F.C. Fuller first came out with them in the early 1920s and the American Army's use of them in the majority of its major doctrinal manuals. I do not propose radically new principles of war like Lieutenant Commander Christopher Van Avery did in a recent summer Armed Forces Journal article. His proposal of very different Principles seemed too "new-ageish" for me and in my mind wrongly assumed that the information revolution of the 1990s produced a concomitant revolution in military affairs (a still debated and contested notion by scholars). Too, with regard to Avery, I do not accept his historical premise of now as the time to radically adjust the Principles of War because of the so called recent RMA; one could easily make the argument that we should have produced new Principles of War shortly after August 1945 and the advent of atomic war and Bernard Brodie's classic The Absolute Weapon...
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/13/2007 - 4:23am | 1 comment
Robert Burns of the Associated Press reports on senior command changes at Multi-National Force - Iraq.The U.S. military in Iraq is undergoing its biggest changeover in senior commanders since Gen. David Petraeus launched a new counterinsurgency strategy nearly a year ago.The high-level shifts come at a particularly delicate stage in the war as U.S. troop levels begin to decline, Iraqis are handed more security responsibility and Petraeus seeks to ensure that the gains achieved over the past several months continue...With the exception of Petraeus, senior commanders generally arrive and depart with their units, which means most of those now leaving or preparing to leave have been there for up to 15 months.
Command changes / status:
Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno (Multi-National Corps-Iraq) is scheduled to leave in February and will be replaced by Lt. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of 18th Airborne Corps. Odierno commands 3rd Corps.Maj. Gen. Jeffery W. Hammond is scheduled to assume command of Multi-National Division Baghdad on 19 December, replacing Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil of the 1st Cavalry Division. Hammond is now commander of the 4th Infantry Division.In western Iraq, Maj. Gen. John F. Kelly (I Marine Expeditionary Force FWD) will replace Maj. Gen. Walter Gaskin (II Marine Expeditionary Force FWD) in February at Multi-National Forces - West.In northern Iraq, Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling (1st Armored Division) replaced Maj. Gen. Benjamin Mixon (25th Infantry Division) in late October at Multi-National Division - North.South of Baghdad, Multi-National Division-Central will not change commanders. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, will remain until next summer.Nothing follows.
by Dave Dilegge | Wed, 12/12/2007 - 4:00pm | 0 comments
The December '07 issue of Armed Forces Journal contains two commentary pieces that are harbingers of a debate brewing "inside and outside the beltway" concerning Counterinsurgency (COIN) / Irregular Warfare (IW) operations "after Iraq." While the two AFJ articles focus on Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine approved last December and its execution in Iraq, the issues the authors raise will most certainly carryover into a larger debate that will shape our National Security Strategy and military capabilities for decades to come...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 12/11/2007 - 6:38am | 1 comment
An excellent piece by Steve Schippert and Nick Grace over at ThreatsWatch (Hat Tip ZenPundit) - The Fiction of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.Fully engaged in the Information War, al-Qaeda in Iraq continues to put forth its message in Iraq under the umbrella of a notional Islamic State of Iraq and employing an Iraqi actor to fill the fictitious shoes of its purported Iraqi leader, "Abu Omar al-Baghdadi." While al-Qaeda in Iraq is in dire straits in Iraq - as evidenced by the content of "al-Baghdadi's" latest al-Qaeda-prepared speech - its information campaign has kicked back into gear in earnest, deriding the "apostates" of the Iraqi Awakening movement (Sahawah al-Iraq or SAI) and announcing a new campaign through the end of January. The United States needs to engage in more creative means of participation in this Information War, exploiting al-Qaeda's faults and weaknesses beyond dry news releases and press conferences.In a continuation of its PSYWAR campaign, al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) strategic and operational effort to maintain battlefield morale and to consolidate its leadership of the broader insurgency, AQI's al-Furqan Media released a 46 minute long audio file (MP3) onto the Internet late Monday night. The recording features a speech by the notional emir of AQI's umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). An Arabic-language transcript, in Word, Adobe PDF, and Flash, was posted shortly after the appearance of the audio...
Much more at ThreatsWatch.
Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 12/10/2007 - 6:36pm | 0 comments
Major General W.E. Gaskin, Commanding General, MNF-West, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), speaks with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update of ongoing operations in western Iraq.
by SWJ Editors | Fri, 12/07/2007 - 11:23pm | 2 comments
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps, GAO-08-39. November 6, 2007.
Summary
In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers...by SWJ Editors | Fri, 12/07/2007 - 5:27am | 11 comments
Today's Washington Post provides an update on the U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems - The Army's $200 Billion Makeover by Alec Klein.... In the Army's vision, the war of the future is increasingly combat by mouse clicks. It's as networked as the Internet, as mobile as a cellphone, as intuitive as a video game. The Army has a name for this vision: Future Combat Systems, or FCS. The project involves creating a family of 14 weapons, drones, robots, sensors and hybrid-electric combat vehicles connected by a wireless network. It has turned into the most ambitious modernization of the Army since World War II and the most expensive Army weapons program ever, military officials say. It's also one of the most controversial. Even as some early versions of these weapons make their way onto the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, members of Congress, government investigators and military observers question whether the Defense Department has set the stage for one of its biggest and costliest failures. At risk, they say, are billions of taxpayer dollars spent on exotic technology that may never come to fruition, leaving the Army little time and few resources to prepare for new threats...
Future Combat Systems - Official U.S. Army Web Page
Video Analysis of Army's Modernization Program - Washington Post
Future Combat: The Wireless War - Online Discussion with Washington Post's Alec Klein
Discuss - Small Wars Council
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by Dave Dilegge | Fri, 12/07/2007 - 1:17am | 2 comments
While not all inclusive, here are some items that caught my eye and interest so far this week - Meeting Abu Muqawama and the SWJ / AM COIN Academy book drive, Roggio on Iran's ratlines into Iraq, HTS in Iraq and CORDS in Vietnam, Barnett and Boot on Iran and the NIE, ThreatsWatch and Westhawk on State-Defense Africa rift, and Betz on Hoffman on civil-military relations...
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/06/2007 - 6:41pm | 0 comments
COIN Intelligence Requirements 1963
With a hat tip to an alert SWJ reader who sent this in via e-mail, we downloaded Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency from the Central Intelligence Agency's Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
A bit of history and an insight on how some things concerning COIN remain unchanged (excepting the focus on Communist insurgencies) is offered up in this United States Intelligence Board, Office of the Chairman, Memorandum for the Military Representative of the President dated 13 August 1963. The linked SWJ document contains the jpg images of the 11 original pages and includes the cover letter, memorandum from JCS, summary, essential elements of information for counterinsurgency actions enclosure, and countries to be considered appendix.
Other recently added items at the CIA FOI site that may be of interest (see What's New at FOIA?):
Review of Insurgency Problems - 1966
U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam - 1984
Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba - 1961
... or search the FOI database using insurgency or counterinsurgency as a keyword for much more.
Nothing follows.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/06/2007 - 5:51pm | 0 comments
Via e-mail, Inside the Pentagon report of a new Interagency COIN manual in the works:The State Department is leading an effort to issue a draft version of a counterinsurgency guide in the next four to six weeks to help Washington-based government agencies and departments defeat future subversive movements. A final doctrine is expected next year.
The effort follows last year's Army and Marine Corps manual on the same subject.
The new guide -- "Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers: A Work in Progress" -- is an educational, strategic-level primer for senior policymakers, according to a State Department official in the bureau of political-military affairs.
He spoke with Inside the Pentagon this week on condition of anonymity.
The guide is different from the military manual, which is used at the operational-tactical level, the official said.
"It's inspired by that but we found that we needed to do some counterinsurgency 101 across the entire government including within State," the official said. He added the draft guide speaks to the importance of coordinated interagency assistance to the affected governments, "to help them provide security and effective governance," and spells out what planning and assessment tools are available.
The United States and its allies are fighting two counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, prompting the establishment of new doctrines based on lessons gained from these battles...
Encouraging news on a much needed addition to our COIN doctrine database. That said, there is still much work to be done before we have a workable Interagency process in place.
Update: Greg Grant, Government Executive, has more on the new Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress manual.
State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs led the effort, which was informed in part by the counterinsurgency experiences of Australia and the United Kingdom. Former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen, who recently served as an adviser to U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, is overseeing an interagency effort to produce a civilian counterinsurgency doctrine, which is due out in early 2008.The guide is the first serious government-wide effort to create a national counterinsurgency framework since the Kennedy administration tried to stem the spread of communism in Vietnam in 1962. At that time, there was extensive interagency involvement in rural development and security efforts, particularly by USAID, which at one point had nearly 15,000 officers serving in Vietnam.The manual combines current counterinsurgency theory with lessons learned by personnel from State, USAID, the military and other agencies. Drafters emphasized that it is not an academic document, but aims to fill a hole that exists because there is no civilian agency publication on counterinsurgency to complement the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual.According to the guide, insurgency is "armed politics," and while military action is essential to establishing security, only political resolution will lead to ultimate success. The guide recommends that civilian and military efforts join in an integrated "clear, hold and build" strategy that focuses on first on securing the populace, then on long-term economic development assistance -- a clear reference to the counterinsurgency strategy being applied in Iraq under Petraeus.The guide also emphasizes the importance of providing information in counterinsurgency operations to create a narrative enhancing an embattled government's legitimacy. Such a narrative, it says, "must resonate with the population and be based upon verifiable facts and measurable progress rather than promises." The primary effort must be seen by the local population as indigenous, because only a local government can mobilize the support of its people against an insurgent movement, the drafters wrote.More at Government Executive.
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by Josh Manchester | Tue, 12/04/2007 - 9:08pm | 1 comment
Lazam Faraj Rwaili, aged 23, joined the Iraqi Police Service Unit in August of this year.
In early November, Lazam was in a contingent of Iraqi Police traveling from their own city in Anbar Province to another station in Salah-ad-Din Province. Sitting in jail in the other station was the most wanted man for their own city: a very dangerous terrorist, responsible for many Iraqi and American deaths. They were going to attempt to retrieve him and return him to their city, where he could be further (and lawfully) interrogated by those with a more vested interest in the information he might provide than his jailers in the other province, where he had gone to ground.
When the police arrived at the station, they soon found their man and took photos of him in jail, proving that he was there. Unfortunately, they could not obtain his transfer because the paperwork had become fouled at some higher level in the police bureaucracy. So they departed to return to their city.
The road between these two cities is not a pleasant place. The US and Iraqi forces have been so successful in pushing terrorists out of populated areas that many have taken up refuge between them. The police convoy came under automatic weapons fire from another vehicle, which then sped away. The police, in several Ford F-350s with mounted PKC machine guns, began a flanking movement to pursue and cut off their attackers. At this point, Lazam, riding in the bed of one of the trucks, was struck by a shot to his left lung. He began to cough up a great deal of blood. His vehicle stopped the pursuit in order for his fellows to render first aid, while the rest of the convoy continued their pursuit. Just as they were maneuvering to cut off the enemy, a US Army convoy came down the road, blocking their fields of fire. The enemy slipped away. The police halted the convoy and tried to explain what had happened, but both were without a translator. One thing was clear to both though: Lazam was in bad shape, and needed help fast...