Journal

Defining differences between design theory and design planning

Decolonization, insurgency, and nation and state building in Africa

Critique of OIF/OEF memoires

Knowing how insurgencies last so long can help to understand why they last so long

Any future framework for operational adaptation must incorporate the effects of technological change, while avoiding the seductions of strategic paralysis theory.

Why Better Information Operations are needed

Kyrgyzstan as a tipping point for charters?

Examining the structure and relationships between lines of operations (LOOs), measures, and indicators at various organizational levels

Sometimes in the course of military operations ill-conceived ideas survive to produce unacceptable outcomes.  When this happens, frustrated leaders might ask, “What made us think this would work?”

The importance of leadership in insurgent mobilization, recruitment, and expansion of the base

Better understanding the plight of the Fatah

How do we get the "Big Picture" right?

The Story of the Ultimate Counterinsurgent: An Interview with William Doyle, Author of A Soldier’s Dream: Captain Travis Patriquin and the  Awakening of Iraq. SWJ Interview by Octavian Manea.

Ditching Career Centric COIN:  Exhuming Robert Komer with the Drawdown in Afghanistan

Better understanding China

When is a child ready to fight?

Rebellion at sea

The creation of South Sudan leaves Sudan's doors open for the growth of terrorism, but the perilous situation is fertile with potential for focused U.S. engagement.

Smaller and weaker opponents do not have a monopoly on asymmetric warfare and it does not need to be left to Guerrilla movements for us to romantically read about in the future.   We need to become better at fighting with very few resources.

A review of the use of new media in recent insurgencies.

The practical application of the principles of VSO over 150 days of planning, operations, and refinement in Afgahnistan.

Reading the Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

Where does legitimacy derive from in the local populace?

Octavian continues his inquiry into Pakistan

A Contrarian’s Lament

Understanding how Egyptian's understand their past rebellions

Refining analytical methods for a better war

Better understanding the so-called Arab Spring

Imperatives for Confronting Irregular Challenges

A Revisionist Approach to Foreign Policy

Overcoming apathy through empowerment is the key to success in Afghanistan

Is the threat of AQAP overblown and sensationalized?

20 Articles of Effective Assessments in Counterinsurgency

Author describes operations in Iraq in 2008

Social Scientist explores human emotions and reactions in the conflict in Iraq

Theory of elasticity suggests gun control measures are ineffective without a corresponding increase in security.

Author describes his unit's methodology of measuring effectiveness in Afghanistan

Declassified outline of Rhodesian Tips, Tactics, and Procedures in COIN.

Nearly ten years into the war, the Afghan Army still struggles to learn basic soldiering skills.

A conversation on the United States military's history of manhunting.

Can local law enforcement use technology to deter riots?

Are Al Qaeda's piracy and raiding efforts merely disruption tactics or part of a larger strategy for control of the Middle East's waterways?

How does your organization think, and how does it not think?

Former Battalion Commander describes frustrations of command relationships in Afghanistan and offers recommendations.

Is Pakistan in a low-level equilibrium trap or simply too focused on India?  Octavian investigates for SWJ.

An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.

Current doctrine framing Irregular Warfare is wron -- historically, semantically and conceptually -- and should be reexamined to enable decision-makers at all levels to better identify emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities, better allocate resources, and in the process, enhance our national defense.

Current doctrine fails to fully expound on the tactical leader's involvement in economic activity and the necessity for achieving sustainable economic development in the operating environment

by Bob Tollast

Download the Full Article: Obama's Pledge: A Responsible End to War in Iraq?

At the beginning of May, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan presented CWC report 4 to Congress, detailing the forthcoming State Department mission in Iraq. It lays bare the challenges in what will be an historic mission, in uncharted waters. It also raises serious questions about Obama's pledge to bring the war to a responsible end, and whether this will be fully resourced.

Download the Full Article: Obama's Pledge: A Responsible End to War in Iraq?

Robert Tollast is an English Literature Graduate from Royal Holloway University of London, and he is a periodic contributor to Small Wars Journal.

Book Review by Frank G. Hoffman

Download the Full Review: Transforming Command

In the Foreword of this well executed book, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, USA warns that American thinking about defense transformation and Revolutions in Military Affairs up until Iraq and Afghanistan had begun to eclipse the doctrine or command philosophy called "mission command." "The orthodoxy of defense transformation," he notes, "considered war as mainly a targeting exercise and divorced war from its political, human, psychological and cultural dimensions." He goes on to associate the neglect of mission command with negative impacts on U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Israeli efforts in Southern Lebanon in 2006.

Thus, Transforming Command is certainly timely. Partly in response to the effects of the transformation agenda promoted by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and partly in recognition of the leadership challenges posed by operations against today's adaptive adversaries, the requirement for empowered and decentralized leadership is once again being recognized in the United States. The U.S. Army's latest capstone concept, developed by General McMaster stressed "Future operations...must remain grounded in the Army's long-standing concept of Mission Command defined as the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment." The Army goes on to emphasize disciplined initiative and prudent risk taking based on commander's intent as key elements of mission command.

Likewise the U.S. Marine Corps has updated its Marine Operating Concepts with a chapter on Mission Command. It defines it as "A cultivated leadership ethos that empowers decentralized leaders with decision authority and guides character development of Marines in garrison and combat." For the Marines, Mission Command "promotes an entrepreneurial mindset and enables the strong relationships of trust and mutual understanding necessary for decentralized decision making and the tempo of operations required to seize the initiative..."

Download the Full Review: Transforming Command

Frank G. Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies. He is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.