Blog Posts

Civilian Goals Largely Unmet in Afghanistan - Elisabeth Bumiller and Mark Landler, New York Times.

Even as President Obama leads an intense debate over whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, administration officials say the United States is falling far short of his goals to fight the country's endemic corruption, create a functioning government and legal system and train a police force currently riddled with incompetence.

Interviews with senior administration and military officials and recent reports assessing Afghanistan's progress show that nearly seven months after Mr. Obama announced a stepped-up civilian effort to bolster his deployment of 17,000 additional American troops, many civil institutions are deteriorating as much as the country's security. Afghanistan is now so dangerous, administration officials said, that many aid workers cannot travel outside the capital, Kabul, to advise farmers on crops, a key part of Mr. Obama's announcement in March that he was deploying hundreds of additional civilians to work in the country. The judiciary is so weak that Afghans increasingly turn to a shadow Taliban court system because, a senior military official said, "a lot of the rural people see the Taliban justice as at least something." ...

More at The New York Times.

Counterintuitive Counterinsurgency - Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, Los Angeles Times opinion.

As the Obama administration debates whether to stick with the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, opponents point to that nation's flawed presidential election as a reason why this approach cannot work. Counterinsurgency is premised, they argue, on the presence of a legitimate national government that can win allegiance from local populations. Given credible allegations of rampant abuse in Afghanistan's August election, President Hamid Karzai's newly illegitimate government cannot play this role. As a result, the United States has little choice but to change strategies.

This argument is badly flawed. Electoral fraud will render our task in Afghanistan more difficult, but it does not make counterinsurgency impossible. On the contrary, a counterinsurgency approach - and not a narrowly tailored mission focused solely on killing or capturing enemies - remains the best path to success in Afghanistan. To understand why, consider the analogous case of Iraq over the last three years. In January 2007, the "surge" of combat forces began as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized clearing areas of fighters, holding that territory and building the infrastructure and institutions that had been so badly lacking - just as Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has proposed for Afghanistan...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Obama's Afghan Meetings a Public Spectacle - Jon Ward and Matthew Mosk, Washington Times.

President Obama's weeks-long review of US strategy in Afghanistan has turned the normally secretive process of deciding how many troops to deploy to a war zone and how best to use them into an oddly public affair that has been pored over day after day by television analysts, scrutinized by his critics and sized up by the nation's allies and enemies. As Mr. Obama presided over the fourth meeting of his war council in two weeks at the White House on Friday, even the enemy was trying to influence the outcome. While the White House sizes up whether the Taliban is a threat to the United States or whether it would re-create a safe haven in Afghanistan for al Qaeda, the group placed a statement on Web sites this week saying it does "not have any agenda to harm other countries."

"That was a political message to President Obama in an attempt to change the terms of the debate," said Peter Mansoor, a professor of military history at Ohio State University who served as a top adviser to Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command. "You can see all sides ratcheting up the pressure on the president - more pressure than would perhaps otherwise be there if this process was going on behind closed doors," Mr. Mansoor said...

More at The Washington Times.

Two Wrongs Make Another Fiasco - Frank Rich, New York Times opinion.

Those of us who love F. Scott Fitzgerald must acknowledge that he did get one big thing wrong. There are second acts in American lives. (Just ask Marion Barry, or William Shatner.) The real question is whether everyone deserves a second act. Perhaps the most surreal aspect of our great Afghanistan debate is the Beltway credence given to the ravings of the unrepentant blunderers who dug us into this hole in the first place. Let's be clear: Those who demanded that America divert its troops and treasure from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2002 and 2003 - when there was no Qaeda presence in Iraq - bear responsibility for the chaos in Afghanistan that ensued. Now they have the nerve to imperiously and tardily demand that America increase its 68,000-strong presence in Afghanistan to clean up their mess - even though the number of Qaeda insurgents there has dwindled to fewer than 100, according to the president's national security adviser, Gen. James Jones.

But why let facts get in the way? Just as these hawks insisted that Iraq was "the central front in the war on terror" when the central front was Afghanistan, so they insist that Afghanistan is the central front now that it has migrated to Pakistan. When the day comes for them to anoint Pakistan as the central front, it will be proof positive that Al Qaeda has consolidated its hold on Somalia and Yemen...

More at The New York Times.

All is Not Yet Lost - Dr. Nasim Ashraf, Washington Times opinion.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's report told us what we were afraid to hear. We are going to lose the war in Afghanistan! President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan policy, launched just in March, whose main goal was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, doesn't seem to be going well. Growing insurgency and a totally ineffective and discredited government in Afghanistan pose lethal threats that can result in America's total defeat unless something is done immediately.

I agree with Gen. McChrystal that more troops may be needed presently. However, before additional troops are sent to Afghanistan, there must be a clear operational strategy as well as a political surge. Military victory is not possible, and the path of extended military engagement is a recipe for disaster. But simply abandoning the region is also not an option. This would be the same mistake the United States made in 1989 after helping to expel the Soviet army from Afghanistan. The sooner Afghanistan is stabilized politically, the earlier the United States can disengage militarily. How does America do that? ...

More at The Washington Times.

Obama Wanted a Petraeus. Buyer Beware. - Greg Jaffe, Washington Post opinion.

It is hard not to look at Stanley McChrystal without seeing David Petraeus. Both generals are fitness freaks, capable of running soldiers half their age into the ground. Within hours of taking command of faltering wars, both were vowing to remake their forces. "We must change the way we think, act and operate," McChrystal wrote in September instructions to his troops in Afghanistan. He was practically channeling Petraeus, circa 2007, who challenged his troops in Iraq to adopt a new "warrior-builder-diplomat" mind-set.

These similarities were a big selling point for the Obama administration, which this summer decided it wanted its own Petraeus - a creative wartime commander and gifted manager who could push the military in Afghanistan into unfamiliar realms, such as economic development and tribal politics. But the past week showed that a Petraeus redux comes with some heavy baggage - for McChrystal as well as the White House. As the administration debated its strategy in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and national security adviser James Jones publicly upbraided McChrystal, who is seeking a major increase in forces, for stating in a speech in London that a shift to a smaller US presence and a narrower focus on killing al-Qaeda terrorists would be "shortsighted." ...

More at The Washington Post.

In the Afghan War, Aim for the Middle - Richard N. Haass, Washington Post opinion.

Why does Afghanistan matter? We generally hear four arguments. First, if the Taliban returns to power, Afghanistan will again be a haven for terrorist groups. Second, if the Taliban takes over, Afghanistan will again become a human rights nightmare. Third, a perceived defeat of the United States in Afghanistan would be a blow to US prestige everywhere and would embolden radicals. Fourth, an Afghanistan under Taliban control would be used by extremists as a sanctuary from which to destabilize Pakistan.

None of these assumptions is as strong as proponents maintain. Afghanistan certainly matters - the question is how much. Al-Qaeda does not require Afghan real estate to constitute a regional or global threat. Terrorists gravitate to areas of least resistance; if they cannot use Afghanistan, they will use countries such as Yemen or Somalia, as in fact they already are. No doubt, the human rights situation would grow worse under Taliban rule, but helping Afghan girls get an education, no matter how laudable, is not a goal that justifies an enormous US military commitment. And yes, the taking of Kabul by the Taliban would become part of the radicals' narrative, but the United States fared well in Asia after the fall of South Vietnam, and less than a decade after an ignominious withdrawal from Beirut, the United States amassed the international coalition that ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. There are and always will be opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of US power. The one issue...

More at The Washington Post.

Embedded video from CNN Video

CNN's Christiane Amanpour talks strategy with David Kilcullen.

The Missing Debate on Afghanistan - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal opinion.

All in. All out. Double down. Withdraw. The language of the Afghanistan debate is stark, as seem the choices. But at least the debate has begun, forced by the blunt recent comments of Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It is overdue. At the very least, less than a full airing of all the facts, realities, challenges and possibilities in that region shows insufficient respect and gratitude toward those we've put in harm's way. Nobody, really, is certain what to do, or wherein lies wisdom. It isn't a choice between right and wrong or "clearly smart" versus "obviously stupid" so much as a choice between two hells, or more than two.

The hell of withdrawal is what kind of drama would fill the vacuum, who would re-emerge, who would be empowered, what Pakistan would look like with a newly redrawn reality in the neighborhood, what tremors would shake the ground there as the US troops march out. It is the hell of a great nation that had made a commitment in retreat, abandoning not only its investment of blood and treasure but those on the ground, and elsewhere, who had one way or another cast their lot with us. It would involve the hell, too, of a UN commitment, an allied commitment, deflated to the point of collapse.

The hell of staying is equally clear, and vivid: more loss of American and allied troops, more damage to men and resources, an American national debate that would be a continuing wound and possibly a debilitating one, an overstretched military given no relief and in fact stretched thinner, a huge and continuing financial cost in a time when our economy is low. There is no particular guarantee of, or even completely persuasive definition of, success. And Pakistan may blow anyway. The debate is over which hell is less damaging in the long term, which hell is more livable...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

No Substitute for Boots on the Ground - Vincent J. Heintz, Wall Street Journal opinion.

In 2008 I commanded a team of US Army combat advisers in northern Afghanistan's remote Chahar Darreh district. We patrolled with about 50 Afghan police troopers, conducting ambushes, reconnaissance, law-enforcement tasks and reconstruction. These missions had one purpose: to build trust between the police and the people and thereby isolate the insurgents moving among them. Some Afghan troopers were thieves and Taliban infiltrators. Most served with honor and courage. A growing chorus of Americans rejects operations of this kind. Opposition has hardened in response to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's call to launch a fully resourced counterinsurgency effort. Naturally, the peaceniks want us to leave Afghanistan altogether. Other opponents of the McChrystal plan urge President Barack Obama to select a safer, cheaper cleaner method of defeating al Qaeda.

Some conservative isolationists, joined by Vice President Joe Biden, argue that we should rely on commando raids and missile strikes to zap terrorist targets from afar, thereby sparing infantrymen like us the risks that go with living among the Afghans. Tellingly, the Biden camp has yet to offer any details about the sources of real-time intelligence needed to execute precision strikes, or the locations of the bases from which they would be launched. In the years prior to 9/11, our leaders gambled with the nation's safety by employing "surgical" cruise missiles attacks (that blew up only abandoned tents) and organizing specialized counterterrorism forces (that never deployed due to a poverty of intelligence). Nowadays, any talk of returning to this over-the-horizon concept is shockingly naí¯ve...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Perhaps we should strike COIN and CT from the lexicon and talk about real strategy of ends, ways, and means instead of trying to devise strategy based on formulas (e.g., 20-25 troops for every 1000 people) - of course we love the science because it is too hard to explain the art.

--Colonel David Maxwell

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Blame James Jones for fraying civil-military relations,

2) A Pakistani officer recommends an archipelago for Afghanistan.

Blame James Jones for fraying civil-military relations

A series of articles in the Washington Post this past week has revealed more than just a contentious White House debate over Afghanistan strategy. These reports have also exposed confusion and misunderstandings among top policymakers which have led to fraying relations between civilian and military officials. These misunderstandings, confusion, and fraying relationships are symptoms of inadequate staff work within the White House. And that staff work is the responsibility of James Jones, the national security adviser.

Writing in the Oct. 8 edition of the Washington Post, Rajiv Chandrasekaran chronicled the history of the Obama team's deliberations on Afghan strategy, starting from last winter. According to Chandrasekaran, Gen. Stanley McChrystal's call for up to 40,000 additional U.S. soldiers inflicted "sticker shock" on some at the White House. This quote from Chandrasekaran's piece sums up the feeling:

Click through to read more ...

Testing Obama's Doctrine - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

Is there an "Obama Doctrine" lurking among the zigs and zags of the president's foreign policy over these first nine months? I think there is, in his repeated invocation of global rights and responsibilities. The problem is that this lawyerly framework hasn't been applied to the really tough issues, such as what to do in Afghanistan. I have been looking for a "doctrine" because, frankly, strategic thinking has been this administration's weak spot. A pragmatic president has surrounded himself with pragmatic advisers - a retired Marine general as national security adviser, a former senator as secretary of state, a career intelligence officer as secretary of defense. None are grand strategists on the model of Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Reviewing Barack Obama's major speeches, I do find one theme that he returns to again and again. To take the version that the president used in his inaugural address: "What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility." This involves a reciprocal exchange - "mutual interest and mutual respect" is how Obama put it that cold day in January, and he has returned often to that formulation. This idea - of balancing rights and responsibilities - strikes me as a central pillar of Obama's foreign policy. Iran has the right to civilian nuclear power but the responsibility to abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Israel has the right to live in peace but the responsibility to refrain from building settlements, which Obama rejects as illegitimate...

More at The Washington Post.

Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al Qaeda - Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times.

President Obama's national security team is moving to reframe its war strategy by emphasizing the campaign against Al Qaeda in Pakistan while arguing that the Taliban in Afghanistan do not pose a direct threat to the United States, officials said Wednesday. As Mr. Obama met with advisers for three hours to discuss Pakistan, the White House said he had not decided whether to approve a proposed troop buildup in Afghanistan. But the shift in thinking, outlined by senior administration officials on Wednesday, suggests that the president has been presented with an approach that would not require all of the additional troops that his commanding general in the region has requested.

It remains unclear whether everyone in Mr. Obama's war cabinet fully accepts this view. While Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has argued for months against increasing troops in Afghanistan because Pakistan was the greater priority, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates have both warned that the Taliban remain linked to Al Qaeda and would give their fighters havens again if the Taliban regained control of all or large parts of Afghanistan, making it a mistake to think of them as separate problems. Moreover, Mr. Obama's commander there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has argued that success demands a substantial expansion of the American presence, up to 40,000 more troops. Any decision that provides less will expose the president to criticism, especially from Republicans, that his policy is a prescription for failure...

More at The New York Times.

Civilian, Military Officials at Odds Over Resources Needed for Afghan Mission - Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post.

In early March, after weeks of debate across a conference table in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the participants in President Obama's strategic review of the war in Afghanistan figured that the most contentious part of their discussions was behind them. Everyone, save Vice President Biden's national security adviser, agreed that the United States needed to mount a comprehensive counterinsurgency mission to defeat the Taliban. That conclusion, which was later endorsed by the president and members of his national security team, would become the first in a set of recommendations contained in an administration white paper outlining what Obama called "a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan." Preventing al-Qaeda's return to Afghanistan, the document stated, would require "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy."

To senior military commanders, the sentence was unambiguous: US and NATO forces would have to change the way they operated in Afghanistan. Instead of focusing on hunting and killing insurgents, the troops would have to concentrate on protecting the good Afghans from the bad ones. And to carry out such a counterinsurgency effort the way its doctrine prescribes, the military would almost certainly need more boots on the ground...

More at The Washington Post.

The following quote has been getting under my skin since I first read it. Here at the Washington Post. It really has - It stinks to high heaven - and it is disturbing to say the least- at least to me - tell me why I am wrong on this - why an inside the Beltway puke can spit on the boots of an on the ground assessment? Ex has commented on it as others have - so sue me if I too can call this unnamed source an ass of the first order - nay - a too-smart-for-his-or-hers-britches-who-does-not-know-shit-from-shineola-of-the-first-order.

But White House officials are resisting McChrystal's call for urgency, which he underscored Thursday during a speech in London, and questioning important elements of his assessment, which calls for a vast expansion of an increasingly unpopular war. One senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the meeting, said, "A lot of assumptions -- and I don't want to say myths, but a lot of assumptions - were exposed to the light of day."

Hey senior admin official - I'd like to take you outside for a talking to - yea - that's the ticket.

Yes, I know -- there you go again Dave -- a SWJ guy who does not post much concerning his personal opinions -- doing just that. That said, Gen McChrystal and his assembled group provided us ground truth on the situation in Afghanistan and by extension Pakistan. I for one am glad he has been pressing this assessment in the mainstream news media. Ground truth trumps all and the average Joe should be just as informed as the senior admin official.

Afghanistan Journal at Politics Daily.

How the Taliban Might Respond to McChrystal's New War Plan

The Taliban's response to the Afghan war strategy proposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal could be shocking and grim, with insurgents redoubling suicide attacks and ambushes against American troops, aircraft and road convoys, triumphantly setting up "liberated zones,'' and executing Afghan police and collaborators in areas abandoned by US and allied forces. The first months of the new strategy, rather than feeling like a winning new campaign, could feel a lot like losing.

In the short term, at least, that's the dismaying expectation of a wide range of counterinsurgency and Afghanistan experts if President Obama authorizes McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, to implement a wide-ranging counterinsurgency campaign with as many as 40,000 additional US troops. Pentagon and White House officials say that decision will be made within weeks...

Obama's War: Take Your Time

Out on Afghanistan's dusty battlefields, the war is so complicated that some of America's most hardened, experienced counterinsurgency warriors are stymied and frustrated. Frustrated that they don't have the right tools or enough manpower or, most of all, enough time. Frustrated at the difficulty of grappling with IEDs, corrupt Afghan officials and contractors, and a sullen and skeptical population. Frustrated that their troops don't speak the local language or understand the local culture. Frustrated at trying to manage battles without harming civilians, and struggling to coax signs of life from a flat-lined economy and an inept and sometimes venal government.

One brigade commander, Col. Michael Howard, is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan and understands it like few others. Still, there are pieces of this war that stop him cold. One of them is government corruption. "It's a cancer without a cure in Afghanistan, and if we don't come up with a cure, it will cause us to fail,'' Howard told me last month, biting off his words angrily.

A battalion commander in eastern Afghanistan, also fed up with the war's complexity, confessed: "Sometimes you just want a good, old-fashioned firefight to settle this whole damn thing.'' ...

Afghanistan: How the Kunduz Air Strike Shapes the Debate

The bombs fell about three hours before dawn. Two seven-foot-long steel torpedo shapes sliced silently through the darkness, each packed with 192 pounds of Tritonal high explosive, released and guided by American F-15E strike fighters high over Kunduz province, Afghanistan.

Hours later the news broke, briefly interrupting reports of the latest bickering over health care reform, Michael Jackson's memorial service and unrest in China. Two gasoline tanker trucks, hijacked by the Taliban, had exploded in the attack, killing dozens of insurgents and perhaps civilians. The incident in early September ignited a brief flare-up of questions about air strike policy and civilian casualties, before attention turned back to point scoring on health care and speculating when Gen. Stanley McChrystal's Afghan war assessment would be unveiled. Maybe there's no other way to think about the Afghanistan war except in the most abstract terms. Air strikes or "boots on the ground"? Nation-building, or population-centric security? Counter-insurgency strategy, or counter-terrorism strategy? ...

Much more at David Wood's Afghanistan Journal.

Obama Rules Out Large Reduction in Afghan Force - Peter Baker and Jeff Zeleny, New York Times.

President Obama told Congressional leaders on Tuesday that he would not substantially reduce American forces in Afghanistan or shift the mission to just hunting terrorists there, but he indicated that he remained undecided about the major troop buildup proposed by his commanding general. Meeting with leaders from both parties at the White House, Mr. Obama seemed to be searching for some sort of middle ground, saying he wanted to "dispense with the straw man argument that this is about either doubling down or leaving Afghanistan," as White House officials later described his remarks.

But as the war approached its eight-year anniversary on Wednesday, the session underscored the perilous crosscurrents awaiting Mr. Obama. While some Democrats said they would support whatever he decided, others challenged him about sending more troops. And Republicans pressed him to order the escalation without delay, leading to a pointed exchange between the president and Senator John McCain of Arizona, his Republican opponent from last year's election.

Mr. McCain told the president that "time is not on our side." He added, "This should not be a leisurely process," according to several people in the room. A few minutes later, Mr. Obama replied, "John, I can assure you this won't be leisurely," according to several attendees. "No one feels more urgency to get this right than I do." ...

More at The New York Times.

Afghan Strategy Divides Lawmakers - Scott Wilson, Washington Post.

Congressional leaders left a rare bipartisan meeting with President Obama on Tuesday divided over what strategy the administration should adopt to fight an increasingly unpopular war in Afghanistan and how quickly it must do so to protect US forces already on the ground. Obama called congressional leaders to the White House at a key moment in his Afghanistan policy review, which will determine whether the United States pushes deeper into a war that military officials have warned will probably be won or lost over the next 12 months.

Congress must approve any additional resources that Obama would need if he accepts the recommendations of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, who favors a broad expansion of the effort on the battlefield and the push to build a stable national government. But much of the president's party is resisting calls for more combat troops after eight years of war, forcing him to seek support from Republicans who favor McChrystal's strategy...

More at The Washington Post.

Obama Mulls Middle Ground in Afghanistan War Strategy - Christi Parsons and James Oliphant, Los Angeles Times.

At a White House meeting aimed at tempering increasingly politicized debate over the war in Afghanistan, President Obama told congressional leaders Tuesday that he does not plan to dramatically reduce the American troop level or switch to a strictly counter-terrorism mission. Asking for patience until he completes an assessment of the situation over the next few weeks, the president urged lawmakers to keep their minds open to a nuanced range of options. Obama did not indicate to the bipartisan group whether he is leaning toward or against a significant troop escalation. Instead, he suggested he is looking at the middle range of the spectrum, somewhere between a major increase in forces and a large drawdown. "The president reiterated that we need this debate to be honest and dispense with the straw man argument that this is about either doubling down or leaving Afghanistan," one senior administration official said after the meeting ended.

Still, the 90-minute session demonstrated the growing pressures on the president, who has to contend with many fellow Democrats hesitant to increase American troop levels and Republicans eager to boost the war effort. Several people in attendance said some Republicans openly embraced the recent analysis of Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO commander in the Afghanistan effort, who has recommended sending as many as 40,000 additional troops. Republican lawmakers expressed concerns about how long Obama is taking to review the war strategy, saying US troops need more support now and that a delay is putting them at higher risk...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Behind Afghan War Debate, a Battle of Two Books Rages - Peter Spiegel and Jonathan Weisman, Wall Street Journal.

The struggle to set the future course of the Afghan war is becoming a battle of two books - both suddenly popular among White House and Pentagon brain trusts. The two draw decidedly different lessons from the Vietnam War. The first book describes a White House in 1965 being marched into an escalating war by a military viewing the conflict too narrowly to see the perils ahead. President Barack Obama recently finished the book, according to administration officials, and Vice President Joe Biden is reading it now. The second describes a different administration, in 1972, when a US military that has finally figured out how to counter the insurgency is rejected by political leaders who bow to popular opinion and end the fight. It has been recommended in multiple lists put out by military officers, including a former US commander in Afghanistan, who passed it out to his subordinates.

The two books - "Lessons in Disaster," on Mr. Obama's nightstand, and "A Better War" on the shelves of military gurus - have become a framework for the debate over what will be one of the most important decisions of Mr. Obama's presidency. On Tuesday, in a White House meeting that went well over its allotted hour, Mr. Obama discussed the war with 31 members of Congress. Republican leaders, and some Democrats, pressed him to quickly accept the judgment of his commanders and send as many as 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan. But some Democrats asked if the war was winnable...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Obama and the General - Wall Street Journal editorial.

Democrats have found someone worth fighting in Afghanistan. His name is Stan McChrystal. The other night, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi went after the commander of US and allied forces in Afghanistan, "with all due respect," for supposedly disrespecting the chain of command. Around the Congressional Democratic Caucus, we're told Members refer to General McChrystal as "General MacArthur," after the commander in Korea sacked by Harry Truman.

White House aides have fanned these flames with recent leaks to the media that "officials are challenging" his assessment asking for more troops. In the last two days, the White House National Security Adviser and the Secretary of Defense have both suggested that the general should keep his mouth shut. President Obama called him in Friday for a talking-to on the tarmac at Copenhagen airport.

Though a decorated Army four-star officer, the General's introduction to Beltway warfare is proving to be brutal. To be fair, Gen. McChrystal couldn't know that his Commander in Chief would go wobbly so soon on his commitment to him as well as to his own Afghan strategy when he was tapped for the job in AprilWe're told by people who know him that Gen. McChrystal "feels terrible" and "had no intention whatsoever of trying to lobby and influence" the Administration. His sense of bewilderment makes perfect sense anywhere but in the political battlefield of Washington. He was, after all, following orders...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Two articles in today's newspapers, sourced by anonymous U.S. administration officials, appear designed to promote an alternative to the beefed-up counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that General Stanley McChrystal has recommended. These anonymous officials are attempting to make the case that intelligence-driven assassinations of al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, combined with lawful domestic surveillance techniques, will be enough to effectively protect the U.S. from terror attacks. Promoters of this reasoning likely believe that the acceptance of this approach will undermine the argument for a costly counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. But the counter-terror/law enforcement approach comes with its own costs and risks, which promoters have an obligation to explain.

Click through to read more ...

Pritzker Military Library to Receive National Medal for Museum and Library Service

Nation's Highest Award for Community Service

Congratulations are in order for a SWJ friend - The Pritzker Military Library - job well done.

The Pritzker Military Library has been named one of 10 recipients of the 2009 National Medal for Museum and Library Service, the nation's highest honor for museums and libraries. The annual award, made by the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS) since 1994, recognizes institutions for outstanding social, educational, environmental, or economic contributions to their communities. The Pritzker Military Library will receive the National Medal at a ceremony to be held in Washington, D.C., including a $10,000 award in recognition of their extraordinary contributions.

"On behalf of our founder and president, James N. Pritzker, we are honored to be selected as a recipient of the 2009 National Medal," said Ryan Yantis, executive director of the Pritzker Military Library. "While our library is relatively young, we feel this award is a tribute to our members, staff, trustees, and volunteers for their steadfast service and innovative efforts. This recognition will inspire us to achieve even more with our programs, events and outreach."

"Every day, the Pritzker Military Library makes a real difference in their community," said IMLS Director Anne-Imelda M. Radice. "Their exemplary programs respond to community challenges, positively impact people's lives, and serve as models for the nation's libraries. I applaud their outstanding efforts and encourage others to follow in their footsteps."

Founded by Colonel (IL) James N. Pritzker, IL ARNG (Ret.), the Pritzker Military Library has become a national resource for study of the Citizen Soldier in American history. It is the only library in the United States devoted to military history that is free and open to the public, located not on a military base but in downtown Chicago -- a short walk from Navy Pier, Water Tower, and the Magnificent Mile. Stories of courage, valor, and sacrifice are told not only through an extensive collection of books, photographs, posters, and artifacts, but also through weekly programs on topics from military history and current affairs, enjoyed by thousands in person at the Library and around the world via live Internet webcasts.

"The Pritzker Military Library is a national treasure," said Hershel "Woody" Williams, who earned the Medal of Honor as a young Marine on Iwo Jima in World War II. "What they do with their programs to help tell the story of our American soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen is incredible. I am proud to be associated with such a fine and effective organization."

Williams, 86, first visited the Library in January 2008 and was interviewed about his experiences in earning the nation's highest award for valor in combat. He has since donated significant items pertaining to his service to the Library's rapidly growing collection. Williams lives in Ona, West Virginia, and reflects the growing national and international audience of the Library.

The size of the Library's collection has quadrupled in just six years. Many of these items are one-of-a-kind or limited edition memoirs, biographies, and personal papers of Citizen Soldiers. These materials are available to members, researchers, and school groups who visit its physical facility, but the Library extends its reach through a commitment to digital collections, with staff assigned to research and digitize historic photos, posters, prints, medals, uniforms, and more. These resources are accessible to scholars, researchers, and genealogist through the Internet.

Since opening in 2003, the Library has produced over 250 programs including lectures by award-winning authors, interviews with Medal of Honor recipients by the Library's executive producer for programs Ed Tracy, and an Emmy-nominated public affairs program on military issues; questions are taken from viewers attending in person and watching the live Internet webcast. Regular webcast audiences include senior citizen centers, veterans groups, and others around the world. All programs are recorded for later broadcast on WYCC-TV/Channel 20, a PBS affiliate, and also available for download as audio podcasts. The Library also houses a gallery with regular exhibitions of military related art, vintage posters, and photography.

Afghanistan and Leadership - Mark Moyar, Wall Street Journal opinioin.

'We're at a point in Afghanistan right now in our overall campaign," the US general says, "where increasingly security can best be delivered by the extension of good governance, justice, economic reconstruction." Afghan security forces "fight side by side with us" more and more frequently, he adds, and American troops are working hard to develop the Afghan security forces. Coalition forces are focusing on securing the population, because "the key terrain is the human terrain." This all sounds like Gen. Stanley McChrystal's proposed strategy for victory. But those words were spoken in May 2006 by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, then the top US military commander in Afghanistan. Should we be concerned that the McChrystal strategy advocates the same counterinsurgency approach that has failed to achieve success in years past?

Not necessarily. The easy part of any counterinsurgency is formulating the strategy and tactics. The hard part is implementing them. Achieving results requires, first and foremost, skilled and motivated tactical leaders in suf ficient numbers - the absence of which caused the 2006 strategy to fail. With the insurgent environment different in every Afghan valley, command must be decentralized. So finding and implementing the right tactics is primarily the job of battalion commanders and district police chiefs, not presidents or four-star generals...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Afghan War Units Begin Two New Efforts - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

The Pentagon is establishing two new units devoted to the Afghan war, highlighting the military's focus on the conflict even as the White House considers scaling back the overall US mission there. The units - a so-called Afghan Hands program run out of the Pentagon and a new intelligence center within Central Command, which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - are designed to help troops deepen their intelligence about the country's complex political and tribal dynamics.

The Defense Department also is expected to announce that Brig. Gen. John M. Nicholson, one of the military's top experts on counterinsurgency, will assume the helm of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, a Pentagon office established earlier this year to improve the military's performance in Afghanistan. The moves underline the military's efforts to remake itself in response to the Afghan war despite the Obama administration's signals that it is far from committed to the current counterinsurgency approach...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gates Wants Leaders' War Advice Kept Private - Ann Scott Tyson and Scott Wilson. Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates cautioned military and civilian leaders Monday against publicly airing their advice to President Obama on Afghanistan, just days after the top US general in that country criticized proposals being advocated by some in the White House. "In this process, it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations - civilians and military alike - provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately," Gates said in a speech at the annual meeting of the Association of the US Army. The Army's top general immediately echoed Gates's remarks, which seemed designed to rein in dissent within the ranks.

The remarks by Gates and Gen. George W. Casey Jr. came four days after Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander of US and international troops in Afghanistan, said publicly that a proposal to scale back significantly the US military presence in the country would be "shortsighted." Since then, the administration has sought to tamp down the appearance of any divisions over strategy between McChrystal, Obama's handpicked commander, and the White House. In a blunt assessment disclosed last month, McChrystal warned that the coalition's mission in Afghanistan could fail without a new military strategy and additional troops. Officials are reviewing that assessment and are discussing strategy in a series of meetings at the White House...

More at The Washington Post.

Tensions Rise Over Afghanistan War Strategy - Christi Parsons, Los Angeles Times.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Monday that President Obama's advisors should keep their guidance private, in effect admonishing the top commander in Afghanistan for publicly advocating an approach requiring more troops even as the White House reassesses its strategy. The comment by Gates came a day after Obama's national security advisor, James L. Jones, said that military commanders should convey their advice through the chain of command - a reaction to Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's public statements in support of his troop-intensive strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan.

The exchanges suggested some disarray in the Obama administration's attempts to forge a new policy on Afghanistan and underscored wide differences among top officials over the correct approach. In May, Obama tapped McChrystal, a special forces commander, to take charge of the Afghanistan effort and institute a sweeping counterinsurgency strategy. Obama and McChrystal spoke Friday aboard Air Force One on an airport tarmac in Copenhagen, and White House officials did not detail what the two talked about. Still, Pentagon officials dismissed suggestions Monday that the 55-year-old commander was in any professional jeopardy. Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said it would be "absurd" to think McChrystal had lost favor or standing with the administration...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

A General Within Bounds - Michael O'Hanlon, Washington Post opinion.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, has come under fire for making public comments about the war. While answering questions after an Oct. 1 speech - in which he avoided taking sides in the policy debate - McChrystal challenged a popular alternative to the approach that President Obama sent him to Afghanistan to pursue. An op-ed on this page Saturday argued that a battlefield commander should not get ahead of his president in public. Next, national security adviser James L. Jones faulted McChrystal for speaking outside his internal chain of command while the president is reviewing his strategy and basic assumptions about the war. Certainly, if given a do-over, McChrystal might make different, more nuanced statements; he was indeed too blunt and impolitic. But the criticism goes too far.

The Obama/McChrystal plan is classic counterinsurgency and focuses on protecting the Afghan population while strengthening Afghan security forces and government. McChrystal was asked about a "counterterrorism" strategy that would purportedly contain al-Qaeda with much lower numbers of American troops, casualties and other costs. McChrystal did not try to force the president's hand on whether to increase the foreign troop presence in Afghanistan. The general critiqued an option that is at direct odds with Obama's policy and conflicts with the experiences of the US military this decade. That is not fundamentally out of line for a commander...

More at The Washington Post.

Deadly Attack By Taliban Tests New Strategy - Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe, Washington Post. US commanders had been planning since late last year to abandon the small combat outpost in mountainous eastern Afghanistan where eight US soldiers died Saturday in a fierce insurgent assault. The pullout, part of a strategy of withdrawing from sparsely populated areas where the United States lacks the troops to expel Taliban forces and to support the local Afghan government, has been repeatedly delayed by a shortage of cargo helicopters, Afghan politics and military bureaucracy, US military officials said. The attack began in the early morning hours. Taliban-linked militiamen struck from the high ground using rifles, grenades and rockets against the outpost, a cluster of stone buildings set in a small Hindu Kush valley that has been manned by 140 US and Afghan forces. By the end of a day-long siege, eight Americans and two Afghan security officers were dead, marking the highest toll for US forces in over a year. The deaths brought into stark relief the dilemma the Obama administration faces in Afghanistan. Without more soldiers and supplies, the Taliban and allied insurgents are gaining ground, but committing more forces could sink the country deeper into an increasingly deadly and unpopular war.

Attacks on Remote Posts Highlight Afghan Risks - Sabrina Tavernese and Sangar Rahimi, New York Times. Insurgents attacked a pair of remote American military bases in Afghanistan over the weekend in a deadly battle that underscored the vulnerability of the kind of isolated bases that the top American commander there wants to scale back. The commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, is pressing for a change in strategy that would shift troops to heavily populated centers to protect civilians and focus less on battling the insurgents in the hinterlands. As though to reinforce his point, insurgents carried out a bold daylight strike on two bases on the Pakistani border, killing eight Americans and four Afghan security officers in the deadliest attack for American soldiers in more than a year, Afghan and American officials said Sunday. The assault occurred less than 20 miles from the site of a similar attack that killed nine Americans last year, which had already become a cautionary tale at the Pentagon for how not to win the war in Afghanistan.

Worst Losses for a Year as Taleban Storm NATO Outpost - Martin Fletcher, The Times. It began before dawn - a devastating, well-planned attack. About 300 insurgents swarmed out of a village and mosque and attacked a pair of isolated American outposts in a remote mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan with machineguns, rockets and grenades. They first stormed the Afghan police post at the foot of the hill in the province of Nuristan, a Taleban and al-Qaeda stronghold on the lawless Pakistan border. They then swept up to the NATO post. The battle lasted all day. American and Afghan soldiers finally repelled them, with the help of US helicopters and warplanes - but at heavy cost. Eight American soldiers and two Afghan policemen were killed, with many injured. It was the worst attack on NATO forces in 14 months, and one of the deadliest battles of the eight-year war. The insurgents seized at least 20 Afghan policemen whose fate last night remained unclear. The attack came at a crucial juncture in the war, with President Obama soon to decide whether to accept a request by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the 100,000-strong US and NATO force in Afghanistan, for 40,000 extra troops, or to reduce the counter-insurgency operation against the Taleban and focus on al-Qaeda.

Afghanistan Assault Points Out US Vulnerabilities - Laura King, Los Angeles Times. In one of the most lethal battles for American troops in the Afghanistan war, a wave of insurgents attacked a pair of relatively lightly manned bases near the Pakistani border over the weekend, triggering a daylong clash that left eight Americans and as many as half a dozen Afghan troops dead. It was precisely the kind of attack the top US commander in Afghanistan is hoping to stave off by recently ordering troops to withdraw from such small outposts, concentrating instead on defending population centers. The outposts attacked Saturday had already been slated to be abandoned soon, the military said. The toll was the highest in a single incident for American forces in Afghanistan since nine US soldiers died in a strikingly similar insurgent assault 15 months ago on an outpost in the same northeastern province, Nuristan. Military officials describe the attack on the jointly run US-Afghan outposts in the Kamdesh district as a tightly coordinated onslaught by hundreds of insurgents.

McChrystal Planned to Move Soldiers Killed in Afghan Siege - Mark Sappenfield, Christian Science Monitor. One fundamental tenet of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's controversial Afghanistan strategy aims at avoiding precisely the kinds of attacks that killed eight American soldiers Sunday. In what is being described as one of the boldest attacks of the Afghan insurgency, an estimated 300 militants sustained a day-long siege against a coalition outpost in Nuristan Province - a place where the rule of law is so tenuous and the terrain so forbidding that it is seen as one of the likeliest hiding places for Osama bin Laden. It is also has fewer people than Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Beyond the request for more resources that has engrossed America, McChrystal's battlefield assessment proposes deploying American troops in a profoundly different way. Rather than sending them to the farthest-flung corners of a far-flung nation to hunt down scores of militants hiding in remote mountain caves, it intends to protect the Afghan population first, giving the most Afghans the greatest opportunity of establishing something approaching a safe and normal life. Fourth of McChrystal's "four fundamental pillars" for a new strategy is: "prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened." In fact, the very troops in Nuristan forced to fight off unseen attackers firing down from ridge lines cloaked in inclement weather Sunday are poised to be redeployed under McChrystal's new leadership, according to the Washington Post.

American Strategy of Winning Trust of Afghan People is High Risk - Tom Coghlan, The Times news analysis. Attacks such as that which killed eight Americans in Nuristan are a risk inherent in a US strategy that prioritises putting soldiers inside Afghan village communities. The American system, developed over the past three years, aims to separate the population from the insurgents and ultimately to win their trust. That means being among the people, rather than remote from them, and giving up the safety of large bases for small combat outposts of a few dozen troops alongside local security forces. These small outposts are built as satellites to larger forward operating bases which provide artillery support. It was a combat outpost and an Afghan police base close by that were attacked in Nuristan. The outposts are vulnerable if the insurgents can attack with surprise and in large numbers. In the mountains of eastern Afghanistan many of the advantages the Nato forces have in equipment are offset by the local conditions. Nuristan is at high altitude and air cover can be affected at this time of year by the onset of winter. The first snows usually fall at the end of October. The insurgents in the region tend to include highly competent foreign elements with al-Qaeda links as well as Pakistani militants, operating from groups originally trained by the Pakistani Army to fight India in Kashmir, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba. The insurgents operate from safe havens just across the border in Pakistan and enjoy short resupply lines. The steep, wooded valleys mean that they can often get close to US bases without detection, and can routinely overlook American positions from surrounding mountains.

What I Saw at the Afghan Election - Peter W. Galbraith, Washington Post opinion.

... Afghanistan's presidential election, held Aug. 20, should have been a milestone in the country's transition from 30 years of war to stability and democracy. Instead, it was just the opposite. As many as 30 percent of Karzai's votes were fraudulent, and lesser fraud was committed on behalf of other candidates. In several provinces, including Kandahar, four to 10 times as many votes were recorded as voters actually cast. The fraud has handed the Taliban its greatest strategic victory in eight years of fighting the United States and its Afghan partners.

The election was a foreseeable train wreck. Unlike the United Nations-run elections in 2004, this balloting was managed by Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC). Despite its name, the commission is subservient to Karzai, who appointed its seven members. Even so, the international role was extensive. The United States and other Western nations paid the more than $300 million to hold the vote, and UN technical staff took the lead in organizing much of the process, including printing ballot papers, distributing election materials and designing safeguards against fraud...

More at The Washington Post.

Resourcing an Afghan Strategy - Interviewer: Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations

In his assessment of the Afghan conflict, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, painted a dire picture and is recommending an infusion of U.S. forces on top of the sixty-eight thousand Americans already allocated. But six months after unveiling a new objective for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region - focused on protecting the public and preventing al-Qaeda from reconstituting in Afghanistan - President Barack Obama is reportedly reconsidering the U.S. commitment to the fight amid mounting Democratic opposition to a surge of U.S. forces. Six analysts - Peter R. Mansoor, Andrew J. Bacevich, Amin Tarzi, Thomas E. Ricks, Candace Rondeaux, and John A. Nagl - offer a range of strategic choices for U.S. planners in Afghanistan.

Peter Mansoor - Provided the Afghan government can gain legitimacy, and that it can be a government that the Pashtuns and other peoples that fuel the Taliban can support, then in the long run we can gain our objectives in Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban insurgency. But you have to ask that question first. Provided that such an Afghan government develops, because clearly the current government is not wholly legitimate...

Andrew Bacevich - Washington has gotten itself all tied up in knots over the wrong question. The issue that really cries out for attention is not what to do about Afghanistan. The question that cries out for attention is: eight years into the so-called 'long war,' does the long war make sense as a response to the threat posed by jihadism? And from my point of view, the idea that fixing Afghanistan will provide any sort of antidote to the threat posed by jihadism is simply absurd...

Amin Tarzi - We are not very clear now on our objectives. The objectives as stated to the Afghan side are confusing them. In my view, the objectives have to be very clear, and the goals have to be achievable. We need to achieve them because the issue of confidence, the time on that is running out...

Thomas Ricks - Can we achieve our goals in Afghanistan if they don't get the troops that [McChrystal] has asked for? No, [but] it is not clear you can achieve your goals even if you get the troops. The president laid out in March what the strategy was, and all McChrystal has done is said, 'Okay, if you want to implement the strategy, here are the resources required to do it.' Now the president seems to be saying, 'Well, I'm not sure I want to spend that many resources...

Candace Rondeaux - Three important factors will have to be considered in shaping the strategy for Afghanistan. First and often least discussed is the impact of the U.S. military presence on regional actors. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and India each have distinct regional and global interests that must also be taken into account when weighing the calculus of a further troop surge in Afghanistan...

John Nagl - There are always other options, but I personally believe that the counterinsurgency campaign has the best chance of success. For it to succeed it will have to be resourced to a greater extent than it has been to date. We need additional troops to build a bigger Afghan army faster, but we also need additional troops to provide a latticework, a framework of security within which those nascent Afghan security forces can operate...

In full at the Council on Foreign Relations.