SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice. We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.
Congratulations! You have been selected as a member of an Afghan Embedded Training Team (ETT) or Police Mentor Team (PMT). This is a job that requires tactical competence, fierce independence, cultural awareness, and your ability to act as both diplomat and warrior. You have a pulse and have not been selected for command. Congratulations on your assignment! ...
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Foreign Policy Magazine Military Index page:
The health of the Army and Marine Corps, the services that have borne the brunt of the fighting in Iraq, are of greatest concern to the index's officers. Asked to grade the health of each service on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning the officers have no concern about the health of the service and 10 meaning they are extremely concerned, the officers reported an average score of 7.9 for the Army and 7.0 for the Marine Corps. The health of the Air Force fared the best, with a score of 5.7. The average score across the four services was 6.6. More than 80 percent of the officers say that, given the stress of current deployments, it is unreasonable to ask the military to wage another major war today. Nor did the officers express high confidence in the military's preparedness to do so. For instance, the officers said that the United States is not fully prepared to successfully execute such a mission against Iran or North Korea.A majority of the officers also say that some of the policy decisions made during the course of the Iraq war hindered the prospects for success there. These include shortening the time units spend at home between deployments and accepting more recruits who do not meet the military's standards. Even the military's ability to care for some of its own—mentally wounded soldiers and veterans—was judged by most officers to be substandard.These negative perceptions, however, do not necessarily translate into a disillusioned or disgruntled force. Sixty-four percent of the officers report that they believe morale within the military is high. Still, they are not without concern for the future. Five years into the war in Iraq, for example, a majority of the officers report that either China or Iran, not the United States, is emerging as the strategic victor in that fight. In an era when the U.S. military is stretched dangerously thin, it's a sign that the greatest challenges may still lie ahead.Nothing follows.
Much more at Forward Movement.
Haditha: "Rules of Engagement" Preview # 1
Haditha: "Rules of Engagement" Preview # 2
From the Frontline press release:
"A U.S. Marine and 15 Iraqi civilians were killed yesterday from the blast of a roadside bomb in Haditha," read a U.S. military press release in November 2005. Four months later, Time magazine would report that it was U.S. Marines—not a roadside bomb—who were responsible for the deaths of unarmed Iraqi civilians. Soon after, Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) would claim the Marines killed the Iraqis "in cold blood," igniting a media firestorm which labeled Haditha a "massacre" and one of the worst atrocities of the Iraq war. But what really happened that day reveals a far more complex story that gets to the heart of the war troops are fighting. Through interviews with the highest levels of the U.S. military, personal accounts from Marines involved, documents obtained by FRONTLINE, never-before-seen unmanned drone footage of the actual day's events, and an exclusive television interview with an intelligence officer who watched the day unfold, FRONTLINE investigates what occurred in Haditha.In Rules of Engagement, airing Tuesday, February 19, 2008, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS (check local listings), FRONTLINE examines how the rules of war are interpreted in theory and in battle and what that says about the war in Iraq...Paul concentrated on 'boots on the ground' - how Non-Commissioned Officers, Lieutenants and Captains are working with the Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens), Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army. Good stuff.
More at Washington Post.
Army Fighting Future Battles in Digital Laboratories Now
By Colonel Mark Forman
From February 11th through February 14th, the US Army's Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas conducted the annual "Digital War-fighter Experiment" or "DWE". The experiment involved nearly 190 Soldiers and civilians from various US Army installations across the country, and a contingent from the United Kingdom. The purpose of the experiment was to conduct a corps-level experiment in order to answer specific objectives supporting Army transformation; provide critical observations and insights to the Army.
The military officer students at the Army's Command and General Staff School, also located at Fort Leavenworth, replicated an Army division-level staff, "fighting" a future war using a scenario in a fictitious country. The experiment captured observations for analysis of advances in the decision-making capabilities for future Army Corps-level organizations...
Roundtable guests guests include Colonel Daniel Roper, Director of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Javed Rathore, Senior Vice President of the Pakistan Peoples Party, USA and a member of the PPP International Human Rights Committee; John Allen ("Jay") Williams, Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago; and Dr. Mohamed Toor, C.E.O. of the Pakistani American Democratic American Forum.
And in the first issue of the new look Survival: Global Politics and Strategy - On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster.
During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defense was driven by a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a 'capabilities based' method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant.Self-delusion about the character of future conflict weakened US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as war plans and decisions based on flawed visions of war confronted reality. This self-delusion has not been limited to the United States; many of the difficulties that Israel experienced in southern Lebanon in summer 2006, for example, can be traced to conceptual flaws similar to those that corrupted US thinking about conflict. A thorough study of contemporary conflict in historical perspective is needed to correct flawed thinking about the character of conflict, help define future challenges to international security, and build relevant military and civilian governmental capabilities to meet those challenges...Nothing follows.
Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan and Zaid Sabah explained what this legislative package held for Sunni, Shia and Kurdish political parties.
Sunni politicians wanted the amnesty law because Sunnis make up the vast majority of detainees in Iraq's jails. Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of the largest Sunni political bloc, said the law would "free a huge number of innocent detainees who spent a long time inside the prisons." Iraqi prisoners in U.S. custody, he added, would be transferred to Iraqi prisons so they would be covered by the law. The Kurds were pleased with the budget because it allocated 17 percent of the nation's revenue to their regional government. Sunni and Shiite lawmakers had sought to lower the Kurds' share to 14 percent, in their belief that Kurds make up as little as 13 percent of the country's population. But the Kurds reacted furiously to the proposal.Shiites have long wanted provincial elections because they want power to devolve to the provinces and away from the central government. The law passed Wednesday had initially stated that voting would begin Oct. 1. But details on that law, as well as the two other measures, were unclear because last-minute changes had been made to the drafts, officials said.More at Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor and Voice of America.
Discuss at Small Wars Council
concerning his attendance at the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leader's Course at the COIN Center for Excellence in Taji, Iraq.
- The results of a survey of forward-deployed Marines and Sailors soliciting their opinions on the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV).- The results of an in-theater collection effort to document lessons and observations concerning Fixed Wing Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Detachment Operations.Nothing follows.
Major General Mark Hertling, Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, speaks via satellite at the Pentagon on 11 February 2008.
Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Director of the Multi-National Force-Iraq's Communication Division, speaking with reporters in Baghdad on 10 February 2008.
Read the rest at Armed Forces Journal.
Discuss at Small Wars Council.
Next up - the following released by RAND today:
Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) by Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell.
This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists - a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency by David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns and Robert E. Hunter.
The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report's recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation's population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World by David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns and Robert E. Hunter.
This research brief summarizes a RAND report that analyzes insurgencies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq and calls for a major shift in investment priorities to give the United States the capabilities it needs for effective counterinsurgency.SWJ Editors Links
Classifying Criticism - Abu Muqawama
Discuss at Small Wars Council
By Seaman William Selby, USN
Special to American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9, 2008 -- U.S. troops found a diary belonging to an al Qaeda in Iraq leader that has Coalition forces believing the terrorist organization is "on its heels," a senior military official in Baghdad said this morning.
Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team on Nov. 3, 2007, captured a diary belonging to Abu Tariq, an al Qaeda emir in control of five battalions within two sectors, U.S. Air Force Col. Donald J. Bacon, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman, told online journalists and "bloggers" during a conference call...
Continue for more of the article, diary translation and links...
From the General Assessment:
After a year at the Embassy, it is my general assessment that the State Department and the Foreign Service is not competent to do the job that they have undertaken in Iraq. It is not that the men and women of the Foreign Service and other State Department bureaus are not intelligent and hard-working, it is simply that they are not equipped to handle the job that the State Department has undertaken. Apart from the remarkable achievements of Coalition forces in the pacification of Iraq, the few civilian accomplishments that we are presently lauding, including the debathification law and the staffing of PRT's are a thin reed. It was regrettable to see the President recently grab on to it.The purpose of the Surge, now one year old, was to pacify Iraq to allow the GOI to stand up. The State Department has not done its part coincident with the Commanding General's effort. This is not the fault of intelligent and hard working individuals skilled at the functions of the "normal embassy." The problem is institutional. The State Department bureaucracy is not equipped to handle the urgency of America's Iraq investment in blood and taxpayer funds. You lack the "fierce urgency of now."Foreign Service officers, with ludicrously little management experience by any standard other than your own, are not equipped to manage programs, hundreds of millions in funds, and expert human capital assets needed to assist the Government of Iraq to stand up. It is apparent that, other than diplomacy, your only expertise is your own bureaucracy, which inherently makes State Department personnel unable to think outside the box or beyond the paths they have previously taken.Bill Gertz in Washington Times' Inside the Ring has more.
A State Department official this week issued a blistering critique of Foreign Service bureaucrats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for undermining civilian stability efforts in Iraq.The Feb. 5 memorandum to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker stated that the military surge is working, but State Department support for civilian efforts to pacify the country is a disaster due to bureaucrats' "built-in attention deficit disorder."The Associated Press reports that Miranda was a Republican Party activist and former top GOP congressional aide who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the State Department said Miranda was "entitled to his opinions" but that they were not shared by President Bush or Secretary of State Rice..
A full copy of Miranda's assessment is here.
By Steven Metz
When I was a young professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College I joined a small committee responsible for strategy instruction. This was all new to me: I had to learn before I could teach. One of the ideas that most impressed me then—and continues to today—is a simple, elegant, yet powerful way of thinking about strategy: it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Feasibility means that there must be adequate resources to implement the strategy. Acceptability means that the "stakeholders" of the strategy have to buy in. Suitability means that the strategy had to have a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. This was the most important of all. A feasible and acceptable strategy was worthless if it did not offer a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. Reading Major General Dunlap's essay on counterinsurgency reminded me of this. His recommendations are feasible and acceptable but short on suitability...
Job well done and wishing you many years of success. More on AM's birthday and a little history of the blog to boot - here.
Naylor, while acknowledging Vickers did not address a recent report by the American Enterprise Institute's Afghanistan Planning Group by name, described the remarks as pouring cold water on AEI's recommendation for an Iraq-like surge for Afghanistan.
Those recommentations (via Army Times) included:
- Deploying an extra U.S. brigade into Kandahar and a Marine battalion into Helmand in 2008 and maintaining that force level through 2009.- Deploying two extra brigade combat teams into southern Afghanistan in 2009.- Expanding the Afghan National Army more quickly than currently planned.- Providing NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban are strongest, with the necessary "enablers" such as engineers, aviation, surveillance and command and control assets.- Using Commander's Emergency Response Program money to build forward operating bases for Afghan National Army units in eastern and southern Afghanistan.More on Vicker's remarks:
He acknowledged that "the insurgency has certainly picked up in Afghanistan the past couple of years, and the link with narcotics is a major challenge," but added that he is "still very optimistic about the long haul in Afghanistan."However, Vickers appeared sympathetic to one AEI recommendation: to grow the Afghan National Army more quickly than called for under current plans.More here.
Vickers vs. Kagan: The Afghan Rematch - Westhawk
Lingering Arguments for the Small Footprint Model of Counterinsurgency - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal
Discuss at Small Wars Council.
Much more.
Discuss at Small Wars Council.
War, even for us Clausewitzians (well, actually, especially for us Clausewitzians) is a Hegelian dialectic. There is a thesis, an antithesis, and the interaction of the two result in a synthesis. It is so obvious that it should scream out, that post-synthesis, in an unconventional environment, the byproducts will return to their origins, and their experiences will have secondary effects in their countries of origin. War changes all of us. Noted. But my bibliography dealt only with the US, UK, and France, and in each case dealt also with the states which had sent those men to war with the authority of the nation-state.
I like having friends that make me think...
I first met John Boyd on a very warm summer day in 1983 at Headquarters, Marine Corps. Frankly he did not make much of an impression to a then young Captain of Marines. The briefer went through an extensive set of slides extolling conflict over the ages. I recognized the various strands of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart (and thus indirectly T.E. Lawrence) weaved throughout the pitch. In the aftermath of a long run and a too large lunch, I preceded to take a somberly tour of the insides of my eyelids.
This mental rest stop did not impress my boss, a Vietnam veteran who was taken with Boyd's ideas. As penance for my nap, he insisted I take the brief again the next day. Although I did not know it at the time, I never got a more valuable or more intellectually enriching experience over a decade in the Pentagon...
This 1st edition includes A New Goldwater-Nichols Act, Navy Civil Affairs School Open for Business, Keys to a Successful KV Network, 56th Annual Civil Affairs Conference, Tip of the Day and Quote of the Day.
The 2nd edition of The Prince: A Newsletter for Civil Affairs Marines includes MSgt Craig J Fried: One of a Kind, Marine Corps Forming Consensus on CMO, 2008 Navy CA School Schedule, JFCOM's Deployable Training Team and SOCJFCOM's Joint Training Team Observer Trainer for CMO and Interagency Coordination, Jobs and Tip of the Day.
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Nadia Schadlow discusses the good news that General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force - Iraq, has decided to remain at his post through the fall.
What's depressing is that top political and military leaders in Washington asked him to consider the move in the first place. The proposal to shift Gen. Petraeus out of Iraq reflects the unwillingness of the military as a whole to make the larger cultural changes required to succeed in tough counterinsurgency missions.If history teaches us anything it is that removing a successful leader from a mission in progress is senseless. Moreover, consistent effort over time is particularly important in counterinsurgency situations in which the political dimension of war is paramount.
The military acknowledges the need for dedicated headquarters and support structures to conduct long-duration missions. Forces must have staying power, and be able to identify and retain lessons learned as well as to sustain personal relationships.Indeed, the military's own counterinsurgency (COIN) manual emphasizes the need to cultivate effective leaders in the host country. Younger officers deploying to and from Iraq have reinforced these themes, writing consistently about the importance of maintaining a stable presence and getting to know the political, social and cultural terrain.Much more here.
