Blog Posts

This publication is nested within A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Naval Operations Concept 2006 (NOC), and Marine Corps Operating Concepts For A Changing Security Environment, 2nd Edition. The focus of this concept is the establishment of a global, persistent forward presence tailored to build partnership capacity for security, while adapting existing forces and creating new capabilities for an uncertain future. Through these efforts we will enable multinational partnerships to address existing regional challenges, while mitigating the conditions that allow irregular threats to proliferate.

The development of this employment concept outlines the Marine Corps' strategy for combating irregular enemies in support of the requirements of the NDS. The NDS identifies "uncertainty" as the defining characteristic of the present and future strategic environment.

The Defense Intelligence Community remains convinced that a direct, large-scale military confrontation between the United States and another nation is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Few countries will seek comparable "full-capability" military forces, with most armed forces seeking asymmetric alternatives to functional capability. The US military preeminence in traditional forms of warfare, which we will continue to maintain, has driven our adversaries to irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods to further their aims. Together, these methods will comprise a pattern of complex irregular warfare...

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From the linked Danger Room blog entry:

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The updated version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations (with Change 1) has also been publicly released by JFCOM today. (H/T Norfolk at Small Wars Council)

By Cavguy

This is news the world doesn't hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious "Sunni Triangle," is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

- - Ullrich Fichtner, "Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq," Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the "Anbar Awakening" in this month's issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone's expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The article describes the key facets of the plan -- population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation.

More at Abu Muqawama.

Read it all.

Roundtable on Osinga's Science, Strategy and War at Chicago Boyz and moderated by Zenpundit.

Good stuff and several Small Wars Council members are participating.

Body Armor Wars in the Marine Corps - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

Much more at MountainRunner.

The March -- April 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site. Ton of good stuff, enjoy.

FM 3-0 Operations—The Army's Blueprint by General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army. TRADOC's commander introduces the newest version of FM 3-0, Operations, the Army's guide to operating in the 21st century.

Featured Articles

Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward by Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation. A good news update concerning efforts to modernize Iraq's economy.

Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Captain Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army. Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency.

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan by Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army. Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan.

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point by Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army. The "Anbar Awakening"—what some have called the "Gettysburg of Iraq"—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.

Polish Military Police Specialized Units by Major General Bogusław Pacek, Polish Army. Poland is taking the lead in developing NATO's special police units. The concept's designer rounds out the specifics behind these highly capable modular forces.

A Strategic Failure: American Information Control Policy in Occupied Iraq by Dr. Cora Sol Goldstein. U.S. press policy implemented in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad failed miserably. Decision-makers might have looked to occupied Germany circa 1945 for a better plan.

The Reflective Military Practitioner: How Military Professionals Think in Action by Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. and Colonel George Reed, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. Understanding the social processes at work in the Army's construction of professional knowledge can prevent inertia, ossification, and, ultimately, irrelevance.

Lessons in Leadership: The Battle of Balaklava, 1854 by Dr. Anna Maria Brudenell. Balaklava and its famous charge have become bywords for stubborn heroism, devotion to duty, and steadfastness in the face of overwhelming odds—but also futility, waste, incompetence, and poor communication.

Follow the Money: The Army Finance Corps and Iraqi Financial Independence by Lieutenant Colonel Laura Landes, U.S. Army. Without a sound currency and an interbank market, any appearance of progress in Iraq may be illusory.

Contest Winners

Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallen, U.S. Air Force. During stability operations, economic actions become as important as military actions.

Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability by James E. Shircliffe Jr. Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations.

Insights

Hybrid Wars by Colonel John J. McCuen, U.S. Army, Retired. To win a hybrid war, the U.S. must succeed on the conventional battlefield and in the "population battlegrounds" at home and abroad.

Listen to the Airman by Lieutenant Colonel Gian P. Gentile, U.S. Army. An Air War University monograph warns that we have become dogmatic in our single-minded pursuit of a proper COIN strategy. It should be required reading for all Army officers.

Get Smart on COIN

The Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) has established an Army-level knowledge management system to support Soldiers and leaders in the performance of their respective operational missions. BCKS's primary mission is to support the operational domain (deployed units) with a secondary mission to the institutional domain (schoolhouse). BCKS provides ongoing, near real-time support to the Army's battle command, doctrine development, leader development, and education and training programs. In January 2006 BCKS established the COIN Forum to provide an opportunity for military, government, and civilian personnel, as well as organizations, to come together to collaborate and share their professional knowledge on all aspects of counterinsurgency operations.

The Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable featured Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV on the Army's new new operations manual (FM 3-0) that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations to make it as important as defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

LTG Caldwell currently serves as the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

Here are the essential links - Roundtable Audio and Roundtable Transcript.

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Major General Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, and Major General Qassim Atta, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon spokesman, speak with reporters in Baghdad on 25 February 2008.

Rear Admiral Greg Smith, Director of MNF-Iraq's Communication Division, and Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault, Commander of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan speak in Baghdad on 24 February 2008.

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Chiarelli is currently the senior military assistant to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Prior to that he was the Special Assistant to the Commander of United States Central Command for the Development of Regional Military Capability. From November of 2005 through February 2006, he served as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Prior to that he was Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division to include the Division's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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friend LTC Bill Ostlund and is responsible for the Korengal River valley, the site of the toughest fighting now happening in Iraq or Afghanistan. The people in the Korengal River Valley don't support the coalition or the Afghan government; 2-503 has no one to drink tea with and nowhere near enough troops to provide security to the population.

read the story.

Korengal River Valley.

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Charlie Rose Show - R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary, Political Affairs, US Department of State on Kosovo.

Military.com has an exlusive interview with General Petraeus here.

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U.S. Army Colonel Stephen K. Scott on U.S. forces ensuring Iraqi Army will have enough equipment and weapons to defend itself.

U.S. Army Colonel Terry R. Ferrell on Coalition forces, Iraqi troops, and "Sons of Iraq" security volunteers working together to rebuild areas south of Arab Jabour, Iraq.

U.S. Army Colonel James J. Galvin, Jr. on creating online communities for soldiers to exchange information through candid digital conversations.

Mr. Joseph A. Benkert, PDASD, Global Security Affairs on how a proposed arms-control treaty that bans the use of cluster munitions and aid to countries that use them could affect U.S. operations with NATO allies.

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann on the Defense Department announcing it has sworn criminal charges and is seeking the death penalty against six detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainees charged include the alleged mastermind behind the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

U.S. Air Force Colonel Donald Bacon on U.S. troops finding a diary belonging to an al Qaeda in Iraq leader that has Coalition forces believing the terrorist organization is "on its heels".

U.S. Air Force Colonel Donald Bacon on Al Qaeda in Iraq increasingly exploiting children, making videos depicting boys training as terrorists and kidnapping other children to raise ransom money for their activities.

More: Audio, biographies and related DoD news articles.

Iranian Intelligence Ministry Broadcast Encouraging People to Snitch on Spies Features "John McCain" Masterminding a Velvet Revolution in Iran from the White House. With English subtitles, translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute. The transcript can be found here.

Also see Pressure and Aggression No Longer Guarantee the Achievement of our Goals -- We Must Consider 'Culture-Building' by Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner.

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Should old acquaintance be forgot, and auld lang syne?

Mentor: A wise and trusted counselor or teacher.

Without waxing poetic - mentors are crucial to leadership development and should a military mentor hall of fame exist - retired US Army Colonel John Collins would be one of the first inductees.

Colonel Collins has given his kind permission to post the following e-mail and attachment (letter to General Robert Kingston) -- a piece of history, a fine example of mentorship as it should be and proof-positive that the requirement for sage advice does not diminish with rank - enough said.

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.

Note: General Robert Barrow, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, also landed at Inchon during the Korean War but was, at that time, considered too senior for command of the RDJTF. Links were added to Colonel Collins' e-mail for background purposes.

The underlying assumption of strategy is that other competitive entities have interests that they pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy reflects a choice, a preference for a future state or condition. In an attempt to create this condition, strategy confronts adversaries and unforeseen events beyond one's direct control.

Strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can the strategist develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources. (The force that balances the objective, methods and available resources is an example of a Center of Gravity and reflects Chinese military thought to first "attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves").

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power may also be described as potential power. The power to initiate change; applied force to drastically change the existing sociopolitical condition. Initiating fundamental changes in the present with expected benefits to be realized in the future...

Listen to the full podcast here.

Executive Summary

There are 50 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): 25 in Afghanistan under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), and 25 in Iraq.1 Of these, the United States leads 12 in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations; but they have also been criticized for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and differences in staffing and mission.

To date, there has been no comprehensive review of PRT models to evaluate effectiveness or address shortcomings. This report seeks to answer three questions in order to begin filling the knowledge gap:

- Are PRTs achieving the goals for which they are funded?

- What are the best practices of countries that sponsor and contribute to PRTs?

Because there is very little standardization of mission and operations across PRTs, we used the following assumptions as the basis for our analysis and research.

- The PRT concept is part of a larger set of responses to post-conflict challenges.

- PRTs are part of an evolutionary process of civil-military relations and interagency cooperation.

In the four sections that make up the body of the report, we look at the major issues that arise for PRTs, from their management and funding in contributing countries to the coordination of activities in the field. These four sections are: Politics and Bureaucracy; Civil-Military Relations; Activities and Relationships; and Evaluating Impact. We conclude with recommendations that distill the most relevant action points for the United States government and other countries operating PRTs. Our conclusions are based on broad lessons gathered from research and interviews with stakeholders in the United States, Canada, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom. More detailed findings specific to each country can be found in Annexes A through F. A glossary of acronyms is included for reference.

Despite the absence of concrete metrics and unity of purpose, PRTs have reported enough positive feedback to suggest that sponsoring countries should continue funding them and expending energy and resources toward their improvement.

However, there are limitations to their capabilities, and it is increasingly important for policy makers to clearly define PRT objectives. This will help both to guide prioritization of activities in the field and to lay the groundwork for the creation of impact-based metrics to evaluate performance...

Read the entire workshop report here.

By Captain Timothy Hsia

The world today is indeed flat. It is possible now to quickly disseminate and share information globally in seconds rather than days. On today's battlefield, any soldier or insurgent can collaborate with their comrades across the globe in real time to influence or alter future decisions. If intelligence drives operations, then it is paramount that the US military conceal its intelligence capabilities. The digital boom of the past fifteen years is considered a blessing for the majority of people in the world; however it also poses a unique operational security (OPSEC) threat. Today's military leaders in the Middle East face a difficult conundrum concerning how to reduce OPSEC vulnerabilities when planning and executing future operations. The threat the military faces in terms of OPSEC ranges from the profundity of open source information readily available to the problems arising from joint operations can no longer be overlooked as our enemies actively seek to gain the upper hand by closely monitoring our activities...

Nation Of Andorra Not In Africa, Shocked U.S. State Dept. Reports