Small Wars Journal

Blog Posts

SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/25/2008 - 4:02pm | 0 comments
Recent additions from the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute:

COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy (Seminar Report) - Dr. Steven Metz and Ralph Wipfli.

Participants at the seminar developed these key insights: Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it. The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach. Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important, if not more so. Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.

A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil - Dr. Max G. Manwaring.

Another kind of war within the context of a "clash of civilizations" is being waged in various parts of the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world today. Some of the main protagonists are those who have come to be designated as first-second-, and third-generation street gangs, as well as their various possible allies such as traditional Transnational Criminal Organizations. In this new type of war, national security and sovereignty of affected countries is being impinged every day, and gangs' illicit commercial motives are, in fact, becoming an ominous political agenda.

Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War - Mr. Henry D. Sokolski.

This book, completed just before Pakistani President Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in November 2007, reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years. It tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India.

Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces - Major Tony Pfaff.

Despite 4 years of millions of dollars in aid, equipment, education, and advisors, Iraqi police force development lags far behind the military. Numerous reasons are offered to account for this gap: corrupt practices left over from the previous regime, infiltration by militias, weak leadership, competition by better armed and organized criminal and militant groups, and so on. However, the military is also subject to these same influences, thus none of these explanations by themselves or in combination are satisfactory. The author argues that the poor political and security environment impacts social, political, and cultural factors in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. The author offers valuable insights into the creation of such programs as well as a number of policies and practices advisors may adopt to best facilitate the creation of a just and effective Iraqi police force.

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by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/25/2008 - 1:57pm | 0 comments
American Security Project - Iraq Lessons Learned Essays

Rebalancing Our National Power - Dr. Joseph Collins

... since 2003, while Iraq has been "Job One" for the Bush administration, it took four years to give its commanders the manpower and to develop the operational charter they needed to make meaningful progress. The Bush team has compounded those errors by funding the war through deficit spending.

All of this is spilt milk, some of which has been sopped up by the skill and determination of General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their team in Iraq. We should not, however, be complacent. The early phases of the war in Iraq have exposed numerous decision-system or organizational problems that the next President will ignore at his or her peril...

The New Face of War - Dr. Arthur Obermayer

The conflict in Iraq is the new face of war. The last protracted U.S. war where there were clearly demarked battle lines with uniformed soldiers separating the two sides was the Korean War, over a half century ago. Since then, it has been difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and victory has become more elusive. Today, the U.S. has the most sophisticated and strongest military might in the world, but that alone is not enough to prevail. The conflict in Iraq is only the most recent example of this trend, and it provides important lessons for American policy makers and the public to consider...

It Takes a Country to Fight a War - Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

In the spring of 2003, our military demonstrated that it is unequaled at traditional warfare. Our forces performed superbly in taking down Saddam Hussein's government quickly and with relatively few casualties. But the uncoordinated efforts to rebuild Iraq have fallen well short of the mark. This is a monumental task that, regrettably, has principally fallen to the Department of Defense, and the shortcomings of this effort should serve as a lesson that wars of national liberation require strong interagency coordination...

No More Iraqs - Dr. James Miller

Although the final chapter on the Iraq War has not been written, it is already clear that one of the preeminent lessons will echo that of the Vietnam War; that is "No More Iraqs." This bumper sticker maxim, however, will have widely divergent interpretations. Some will probably be right, several will certainly be wrong, and for some it is simply too soon to tell...

How We Leave Matters - Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

I hate this war and believe we should not have invaded Iraq. But this war, and the way we end it, will have profound implications for America's future use of force and our exercise of political will in the world. When we leave Iraq, we must do so in a way that protects American military power and manages other's perceptions of that power in order to avoid unintended -- and potentially bloody -- consequences in the future.

Instead of seeking to draw lessons from the Iraq experience that we may apply to future conflicts, my goal is to consider how we can apply what we already know to the current situation in Iraq in order to ensure that we draw this conflict to a close in a way that does not further endanger U.S. security...

More ASP lessons learned essays...

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/24/2008 - 8:06pm | 1 comment
Organizing for National Security: Unification or Coordination? - by James M. Keagle and Adrian R. Martin, Center for Technology and National Security Policy.

Overview

Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a second generation version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting "jointness" but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military.

These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages a new with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome.

This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment.

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by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/24/2008 - 6:27am | 0 comments

Brigadier General Jay Lindell, Commander of Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan Combined Air Power Transition Force on 24 January 2008.

Major General David Rodriguez, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-82, provided an update on ongoing security operations in Afghanistan on 23 January 2008

Major General Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North and the 1st Armored Division, provided an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq on 22 January 2008

Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Director of the Multi-National Force-Iraq's Communication Division, provided a detailed brief on Coalition Force efforts against al-Qaeda Iraq over the past year on 20 January 2008

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/23/2008 - 5:57pm | 0 comments

Charlie Rose Show - A conversation with Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan - 22 January 2008

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/22/2008 - 9:00pm | 0 comments

CNAS Press Release: John Nagl Joins Center for a New American Security

WASHINGTON, DC, January 22, 2008 -- The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is pleased to announce that John Nagl will join CNAS as a senior fellow in July 2008.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army, currently serves as commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas where he teaches U.S. soldiers how to train and advise Iraqi and Afghani forces. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Anbar province in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, taught national security studies at West Point, and served as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, 2005) and helped write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual published in December 2006. Nagl has also written or co-authored numerous articles and reviews, including the first CNAS issue paper, "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps." He frequently discusses national security issues in various national media venues.

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by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/22/2008 - 8:10pm | 1 comment

America's Marines - Extended Version - 10 States and 15 Locations
by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/21/2008 - 7:26pm | 0 comments

On 17 January SWJ conducted a phone interview with Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commanding General (Support), of Multi-National Division - Center (3rd Infantry Division / MND-C). MND-C arrived in-country last March as part of the "the surge" and the new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy directed by General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force -- Iraq (MNF-I). MND-C's area of responsibility are the security zones located along the southern edge of Baghdad and scales from the border of Saudi Arabia to the border of Iran.

The interview covered a wide-range of topics to include trends in security, training and employing Iraqi security forces, economic development, essential services and governance.

Highlight bullets from the interview follow.

Overview

BG Cardon is currently on his third deployment to Iraq. When he returned in March of '07 the situation was significantly worse than when he last left in January of '06 - just after the national elections. That said - he is amazed at the positive change between March and today as the Division's mission transitions from combat to reconstruction and believes this is attributable to four things.

1. A group of company commanders (with one or more previous tours in Iraq) who really understand the local dynamics to include the local population itself, the quality of the Iraqi security forces and the local governance apparatus.

2. The Concerned Local Citizens effort that basically slipped across into MND-C's AOR as a result of events ("Tribal Awakening") in Al Anbar Province. This is significant as the Concerned Local Citizens organization rejected extremists (not just al-Qaeda, but Sunni extremists in general) and forced them out of their tribal areas.

3. The events of 27 -- 28 August '07 in Karbala (fierce clashes between Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and the mainly Shiite Iraqi security forces, leaving hundreds of Shiite pilgrims dead or wounded) resulting in Sadr proclaiming a cease-fire which provided the local population some energy and breathing-room to reject the Mahdi Army.

4. The growing strength of Iraqi security forces is very impressive -- especially the Iraqi Army. Though still suffering from some equipment issues, the Army is now composed of experienced and capable personnel as well as effective commanders. The Division is also beginning to see improvements in the Provincial police forces - though the police are not as far along as the Army. Here, a bottom-up approach is underway that includes training (both army and police personnel) and converting members of Concerned Local Citizens groups over to the police...

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/21/2008 - 3:16am | 0 comments
Pentagon Weighs Top Iraq General as Chief of NATO - Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, New York Times

The Pentagon is considering Gen. David H. Petraeus for the top NATO command later this year, a move that would give the general, the top American commander in Iraq, a high-level post during the next administration but that has raised concerns about the practice of rotating war commanders.

A senior Pentagon official said that it was weighing "a next assignment for Petraeus" and that the NATO post was a possibility. "He deserves one and that has also always been a highly prestigious position," the official said. "So he is a candidate for that job, but there have been no final decisions and nothing on the timing."

The question of General Petraeus's future comes as the Pentagon is looking at changing several top-level assignments this year. President Bush has been an enthusiastic supporter of General Petraeus, whom he has credited with overseeing a troop increase and counterinsurgency plan credited with reducing the sectarian violence in Iraq, and some officials say the president would want to keep General Petraeus in Iraq as long as possible...
by SWJ Editors | Sun, 01/20/2008 - 5:13pm | 0 comments
War, Meet the 2008 Campaign by Michael Gordon, New York Times

... On the ground with the troops, it is clear that a major military change was in fact made in Iraq last year — not so much the addition of 30,000 troops, but the shift to a counterinsurgency strategy for using them. That strategy made the protection of Iraq's population a paramount goal in an effort to drive a wedge between the people and the militants and to encourage Iraqis to provide intelligence that the American military forces need to track down an elusive foe.

But counterinsurgency is inherently a long-term proposition, and that assumption has driven much of the military thinking about the future, even as it heightens the political debate at home.

"Unless you are suppressing insurgents the way the Romans did — creating a desert and calling it peace — it typically can take the better part of a decade or more," said Andrew Krepinevich, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

"The paradox," he added, "is that counterinsurgency requires convincing the Iraqis of our staying power. At the same time, the American people view success in terms of how quickly we can pull out."

The American military plans to return by mid-July to 15 combat brigades, the total in Iraq before the troop buildup. No decisions have been made on further reductions, but American officers foresee a continued need for American combat forces and generally anticipate a more gradual shifting of responsibilities to Iraqi forces than many of the candidates — a reflection of caution they say is warranted by years of sobering experience.

"It is about mitigating risk and not repeating mistakes of the past," said one senior American officer in Iraq, referring to this cautious approach.

The politicians are suggesting they can produce faster results. But the candidates who have lambasted President Bush for failing to ask the tough questions about what might happen the day after Saddam Hussein was swept from power often don't fully address hard questions about what might happen the day after the American military gets out...

More:

Leavenworth Officers Updated on Iraq Security - Scott Cannon, Kansas City Star

Al Qaeda in Iraq's Shrinking Area of Operations - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

75% of Baghdad Areas Now Secure - Jim Michaels, USA Today

A Flip of the COIN - Steve Schippert, ThreatsWatch

The Debate Over Aghan Strategy - The Belmont Club

Gates on NATO Allies - Abu Muqawama

NATO in Afghanistan: Friendly Fire from SecDef Gates - Kings of War

More on COIN and the Europeans - Abu Muqawama

Donald Rumsfeld Gates? - Westhawk

The Afghanistan Strategy Debate Continues - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Gates: NATO Allies Doing What They Can - Lolita Baldor, Associated Press

Sticks 'n' Stones and Allies (Afghanistan) - New York Times editorial

Tough Questions on Afghanistan - The Record editorial (Ontario)

The Charge Made by Robert Gates - The Globe and Mail editorial

Afghanistan was Never Canada's War - Thomas Walkom, Toronto Star

Analyst Backs Gates' NATO Criticism - Leander Schaerlaeckens, Washington Times

Pakistani Home-grown Jihadists - Joseph Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

More Troops to Afghanistan - Judith Latham, Voice of America

Gates' Criticism of Afghanistan Forces Riles NATO - Guy Raz, National Public Radio

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/19/2008 - 9:19pm | 1 comment

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, speaks with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq on 17 January 2008.

Major General Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, and Dr. Ali al-Dabbagh, Government of Iraq spokesman, provide an operational update of Phantom Phoenix from Iraq on 16 January 2008.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/18/2008 - 10:24pm | 1 comment
New Aircraft, Home for Afghan Air Force - Jason Straziuso, Associated Press

Calling it the "birth of our air force," Afghan President Hamid Karzai opened a new $22 million U.S.-funded military hangar on Thursday to house a fleet that is expected to triple in the next three years.

Standing in the cavernous hangar opposite Kabul's international airport, Karzai thanked the U.S. for helping to buy six refurbished Mi-17 transport helicopters and six refurbished Mi-35 helicopter gunships from the Czech Republic, as well as four An-32 transport planes from Ukraine.

The newly acquired aircraft will help transport Afghan troops — who are taking on an increasing role in the battle against the Taliban — on missions around the country.

The new aircraft and upgraded flight facilities are part of a $183 million U.S.-funded program to bolster the Afghan air force...

Images via AP - (Scroll 1/2 page)

H/T Major Alberdeston

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by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/18/2008 - 10:12am | 5 comments
Airpower Research Institute press release on Shortchanging the Joint Fight by Major General Charles Dunlap.

The counterinsurgency manual used by U.S. Soldiers and Marines undervalues the role airpower plays in fighting insurgencies, according to a monograph recently published by Air University officials.

That guidance, designated Field Manual 3-24 by the Army and Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 by the Marine Corps, has been widely celebrated since its publication in December 2006 for filling a gap in American military doctrine.

However, its relegation of airpower to a five-page appendix does not fully recognize the important part air, space and cyberspace operations can play in neutralizing insurgencies, according to Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the Air Force's deputy judge advocate general.

In his monograph "Shortchanging the Joint Fight?", General Dunlap lauds the manual, co-authored by the Army and Marine Corps, for skillfully addressing many important counterinsurgency issues but fears it may be adopted as the de facto U.S. joint solution for combating insurgencies.

"By failing to reconcile the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on the surface dimension, FM 3-24...falls short of offering U.S. decision makers a pragmatic, overall solution for the challenge of counterinsurgency," General Dunlap writes.

Efforts are underway to write a joint counterinsurgency doctrine in which all services will have input, and General Dunlap hopes the U.S. Air Force's "airminded perspective" is captured in the final product...

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by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/16/2008 - 8:37am | 6 comments

High-Profile Officer Nagl to Leave Army, Join Think Tank - Tom Ricks, Washington Post

"One of the Army's most prominent younger officers, whose writings have influenced the conduct of the U.S. troop buildup in Iraq, said he has decided to leave the service to study strategic issues full time at a new Washington think tank."

"Lt. Col. John Nagl, 41, is a co-author of the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations, which has been used heavily by U.S. forces carrying out the strategy of moving off big bases, living among the population and making the protection of civilians their top priority."

"A Rhodes scholar, Nagl first achieved prominence for his Oxford University doctoral dissertation, which was published in 2002 as a book titled "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam." The introduction to a recent edition of the book was written by Gen. Peter Schoomaker, at the time the Army's chief of staff..."

LTC Nagl will be joining the staff at the Center for a New American Security.

More...

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/16/2008 - 6:40am | 2 comments
Gates Faults NATO Force in Southern Afghanistan - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times

In an unusual public criticism, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he believes NATO forces currently deployed in southern Afghanistan do not know how to combat a guerrilla insurgency, a deficiency that could be contributing to the rising violence in the fight against the Taliban.

"I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations," Gates said in an interview.

Gates' criticism comes as the Bush administration has decided to send 3,200 U.S. Marines to southern Afghanistan on a temporary mission to help quell the rising number of attacks. It also comes amid growing friction among allied commanders over the Afghan security situation...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/15/2008 - 11:54pm | 2 comments
City without Joy - Australian Defence College Occasional Series by Michael Evans.

From the Foreword:

As a young Army officer, focusing on the likelihood of being deployed to Vietnam, Bernard Fall's Street Without Joy was probably the first military text that possessed real professional meaning for me. In this timely Occasional Paper, Dr Michael Evans, formerly Head of the Australian Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre and now the Australian Defence College Fellow, gives us an insightful and comprehensive review of urban military operations. He has traced the subject's origins and development to give us an up-to-date operational-strategic analysis of the significance of urban operations into the 21st century. In particular, Dr Evans makes a piercing historical link with Fall's work on rural insurgency in South-East Asia by calling his study City Without Joy—a play on Fall's title that captures the complexity and challenges of contemporary military operations in cities.

Dr Evans informs us that, while in the past it was often possible for commanders to bypass pitched combat in cities, that era has now passed. For a variety of demographic and operational reasons, the role of cities in 21st century war has begun to change. I was strongly reminded of this changing reality when in 2004, I assumed the position of Deputy Chief of Operations in the Headquarters, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I). Faced by the second year of the Iraqi insurgency, we in MNF-I, developed a pro-active 'cities strategy' initiative designed to counter the spread of urban-based insurgency. At times, some 15 major Iraqi cities were designated as part of our city strategy. Yet, we soon discovered the uncomfortable truth that enemy forces are not constrained by their adversary's strategic planning. Insurgents attacked Coalition forces in cities that were not on our list. And, of course, the most violent urban battle of all occurred in Fallujah—a city in the Sunni Triangle—that was not even part of the Coalition's original city strategy.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/14/2008 - 8:38pm | 0 comments

Captain David Adler (USS Port Royal) and Commander Jeff James (USS Hopper) brief the press on a recent incident about harassing messages from Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz on 13 January 2008

Speed boats from Iran approach US ship, raw video shot in the Strait of Hormuz

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/14/2008 - 8:32pm | 0 comments

Soldiers Radio and Television's Gale McCabe interviews Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker on 10 January 2008

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/14/2008 - 8:22pm | 0 comments

Brigadier General Joseph Votel, Deputy Commanding General for Operations for Combined Joint Task Force-82, provides an update on ongoing security and stability operations on 8 January 2008.

by Malcolm Nance | Sat, 01/12/2008 - 8:11am | 3 comments
The tense encounter between a squadron of US Navy Warships and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) and Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IIRN) boats is not a new adventure by any stretch of the imagination. However, the most recent incident is neither an attempt to create a modern-day Gulf of Tonkin incident nor a move by the IRGC to a new tactic with which to harass passing ships. There is a long history of American and Iranian naval confrontation that spans over 20 years here. An accurate reading of what has happened and what could happen, should inform the reader of what most likely did happen...
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/10/2008 - 3:06pm | 0 comments

Major General Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, and Major General Mark Hertling, Multi-National Division-North Commander, speak with reporters in Baghdad on 9 January 2008.
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/10/2008 - 3:57am | 2 comments
The Army and Marines and Military Government

By Brent C. Bankus and James Kievit

Despite the apparent preference of many of today's military officers to have some other entity (whether of the US government, the United Nations, or even private contractors?) be responsible for doing so, the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps actually have a long history of establishing and running "governments" in both smaller-scale contingency operations and in the aftermath of major theater war.

An early example began with General Winfield Scott's publishing, during his 1847 48 campaign in Mexico, a theater-wide code of conduct (General Order 20) that spelled out the rules under which both US service personnel and the indigenous population would be governed. Using relatively rudimentary control measures, General Scott instituted a system that would not only govern the local populace fairly -- and thereby, he intended, reduce insurgency incidents --, but also ensure consistent and disciplined interactions by, as well as with, US forces in the region. By most accounts Scott's "firm but fair treatment" paid huge dividends for his Army, which as a relatively small invading force had trouble enough keeping his overextended supply lines working, let alone contending with any potential large-scale insurgency. Of necessity General Scott established direct military administration over many Mexican towns and villages. Upon the capture of Mexico City in September 1847, General Scott appointed Brigadier General John Quitman, whose combined Army and Marine task force had spearheaded the successful combat assault, governor -- military and civil -- of that city...

Continue reading The Army and Marines and Military Government.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/10/2008 - 3:00am | 0 comments
Department of State On-the-Record Iraq PRT Briefing - Ramadi Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Kristin Hagerstrom, Diyala Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Dr. John Jones, and Baghdad 7 Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader John Smith On Reconstruction Progress in Iraq.

Good afternoon. Appreciate your attendance this afternoon. As you all know by now, the President met with and participated in a digital videoconference this afternoon with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, our Ambassador in Baghdad, Iraq, to discuss Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts. We're lucky today to have three Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders who are here with us to share their stories and to respond to questions...

Abu Muqawama on Rogers vs. Gentile in the Armed Forces Journal.

... For the rest of us, the real treat in this issue of AFJ is the debate between MAJ Chris Rogers and LTC Gian Gentile on the new counterinsurgency doctrine. Gentile has a big problem with the new counterinsurgency doctrine. Gentile has a big problem with the new counterinsurgency doctrine. In a previous, controversial essay for AFJ, he wrote...

Tom Barnett on Clint Watts' SWJ post Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?

Very solid analysis that at once: 1) makes you pessimistic on a repeatable solution for Afghanipakistan; but 2) makes you realize the geographic limits of al Qaeda's staying power and thus more optimistic that, by focusing again more on the source, we're progressing in our overall strategy (both the learning and adjustment that's occurred in Iraq and how developments there enable more focus on back to where it was inevitably headed).

Taliban Now Govern Musa Qala - The Captain's Journal.

Following closely on the heels of British negotiations with mid-level Taliban, the governorship of Musa Qala has been handed over to a Taliban commander...

More from Abu Muqawama - Marines to Afghanistan, Take 2.

The AP is reporting that US Marines are once again preparing to go to Afghanistan, this after Secretary Gates essentially told CMC earlier this fall "over my dead body." ...

Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim: The Great Reconciler? at Westhawk.

Critics of the situation in Iraq always begin their sentences by noting the absence of formal political reconciliation by the Iraqi government. They note the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi parliament and the apparent powerlessness of Mr. Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq's prime minister.

Looking at Iraq through a Western lens, with a focus on legislation passed, "summit" meetings concluded, and treaties signed, is a sure way of achieving self-deception. In perhaps the most dramatic shift inside Iraq since the days of Saddam's reign, the most important political power in the country is no longer held by men with formal posts in the government. Observers thus need to look elsewhere to see what is actually happening...

Operation Iron Harvest Targets al Qaeda in Miqdadiyah at The Long War Journal...

Coalition and Iraqi security forces have launched Operation Iron Harvest, the latest offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq in Diyala province. "Operations are now being concentrated in Miqdadiyah," according to a press release from Multinational Division Iraq...

.. and Operation Phantom Phoenix Targets al Qaeda Havens.

Despite the recent success in reducing the violence in Iraq, the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shia extremist terror groups is not over. Coalition and Iraqi forces have launched Operation Phantom Phoenix, a new operation targeting the terror groups throughout Iraq...

Charlie at OPFOR on General Charles Dunlap's NYT op-ed - We Still Need the Big Guns.

... Technology alone is not the answer to our future conflicts, people are the answer. Now, you can use technology to empower those people, much as rifle company commanders in Iraq are empowered by the ability to call in precision air strikes. The issue is that the focus should not be on the aircraft, the munitions, or the technology, it should be on the commander and the soldiers/Marines/airmen/sailors that wield them in the greater scheme of things.

We (in the service) don't get to pick the wars we have to go fight. If so, most would choose a "straight up fight" instead of a "bug hunt." Looking at the world today, and at the threats we face, we have to recognize that missions like foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, military cooperation agreements, training missions, and counter terrorism are the best ways to deter attacks against our homeland for the near term. The next attack on America won't be planned in some war room by generals of an enemy nation, it will be plotted like the last attack -on the slopes of a mountain in Pakistan, relying on human networks to leverage the most casualty-causing weapon on the weakest point in our target profile...
by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/08/2008 - 4:25pm | 0 comments
Added today to the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute web page - The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations by Colonel Jay Boggs (USA, Ret) and Joseph Cerami.

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

Nothing follows.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 01/08/2008 - 8:38am | 0 comments

Interview with Commander of Multi-National Forces, Iraq, General David Petraeus on 7 January 2008.

Colonel Charles Flynn, Commander of the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, speaks via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq on 7 January 2008.