Small Wars Journal

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SWJ Blog is a multi-author blog publishing news and commentary on the various goings on across the broad community of practice.  We gladly accept guest posts from serious voices in the community.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 02/06/2008 - 4:52pm | 2 comments
US Army War College's Strategic Studies Insititute Counterinsurgency Panel Video.

Dr. Conrad Crane of the U.S. Army War College Military History Institute and Dr. Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute discuss changes in the nature of insurgency and the development of American counterinsurgency capability. Dr. Crane was the lead author for recently released U.S. Army doctrine for counterinsurgency; Dr. Metz is the author of "Rethinking Insurgency" which the Strategic Studies Institute published in 2007.

1. Introduction, Question # 1 and Follow-ups: What is new or has changed since the publication of Counterinsurgency -- US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5? Do you foresee an update to FM 3-24? What is being done concerning Interagency participation? (00:09:35)

2. Question # 2: What are the key counterinsurgency considerations future strategic leaders should prepare for? (00:03:21)

3. Question # 3: How should current or future strategic leaders approach the study of insurgency or counterinsurgency operations and is there a framework or outline that would be useful? (00:04:24)

4. Question # 4: What are some of the more controversial issues surrounding emerging counterinsurgency concepts? What are some of the pros and cons associated with the debate on counterinsurgency doctrine and concepts? (00:16:00)

5. Wrap Up: Last thoughts on counterinsurgency. (00:03:25)

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by SWJ Editors | Wed, 02/06/2008 - 4:24pm | 0 comments

Al Qaeda's Use and Recruitment of Children: Video depicts training of children for kidnapping, assassination, and terrorism against Iraqis.

Iraqi and U.S. forces rescue an Iraqi child who had been kidnapped and held for ransom, December 2007. Video courtesy of MNF-I.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 02/05/2008 - 8:46pm | 0 comments

Exploiting New Media briefing with Office of the Secretary of Defense speakers Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Hamm, Deputy Director of New Media, OSDPA, Ms. Jamie Findlater, New Media Specialist, and Mr. Tim Bergling, New Media Online Video Producer.

by William McCallister | Mon, 02/04/2008 - 7:02pm | 0 comments
Version 2.0 of Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society

The COIN and Irregular Warfare in Tribal Society Pamphlet is designed to assist staff officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and Marines in conducting COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society.

This pamphlet provides a general overview of tribal society and behavior to gain an appreciation of the cultural operating environment. The pamphlet is based on the premise that the key component of COIN and irregular warfare is to effectively communicate intent within the cultural frame of reference of the target audience.

Recommendations for improvement to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as individuals.

Nothing follows.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/04/2008 - 5:40pm | 0 comments

From the USC Center on Public Diplomacy web site - an interview with SWJ friend Matt Armstrong aka MountainRunner.

Matt Armstrong is a December 2007 graduate of the USC Master's in Public Diplomacy and the author of the widely visited and referenced blog MountainRunner, which is devoted to "Exploring the struggle for the minds and wills of men in the unrestricted warfare of the 21st Century".

 

His key interests and studies in Public Diplomacy are echoed in the manifesto of MountainRunner: "This blog is a device to discuss, explore and even link ideas in the four major, and overlapping and often mutually dependent, areas important to the future of America's national security: public diplomacy, unrestricted warfare, privatization of force, and civil-military relations."

Read the interview here. (Hat Tip Zenpundit).

Matt's SWJ posts:

In-sourcing the Tools of National Power for Success and Security - 3 January 2008.

What the SecDef Didn't Call For, But Should Have - 30 November 2007.

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by Bill Caldwell | Sun, 02/03/2008 - 1:50pm | 26 comments
The technology of the Twenty-first Century -- the "new media" -- has made it possible for virtually anyone to have immediate access to an audience of millions around the world and to be somewhat anonymous. This technology has enabled and empowered the rise of a new enemy. This enemy is not constrained by the borders of a nation or the International Laws of War. The new media allows them to decentralize their command and control and disperse their elements around the globe. They stay loosely connected by an ideology, send cryptic messages across websites and via e-mail and recruit new members using the same new media technologies.

Responding to this challenge requires changes in our approach to warfare. The one thing we can change now does not require resources -- just a change in attitudes and the organizational culture in our Army. Recent experiences in Iraq illustrate how important it is to address cultural change and also how very difficult it is to change culture: After MNF-I broke through the bureaucratic red-tape and was able to start posting on YouTube, MNF-I videos from Iraq were among the top ten videos viewed on YouTube for weeks after their posting. These videos included gun tape videos showing the awesome power the US military can bring to bear. Using YouTube -- part of the new media -- proved to be an extremely effective tool in countering an adaptive enemy. Here are some areas that our Army will need to address if we are going to change our culture with respect to this critical area...

by Robert Bateman | Sun, 02/03/2008 - 12:28pm | 0 comments
The history of combat trauma is one which draws fire every time. It is a topic wrapped in politics, both conventional and those internal to both the fields of psychology, psychiatry, and history. I hope this brief annotated bibliography will help some come to understand the foundations, the arguments, and the various issues in play on this topic. This list is rank-ordered in what I believe is their utility to those interested in the study of war, particularly my fellow historians and journalists, but also my peers in the military...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 9:01pm | 0 comments
What to Know Before You Go: 10 Questions to Ask Before, and During, a Mission

Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D

The attached paper is the pre-conference discussion draft that will be presented at the Stability Operations & State-Building: Continuities & Contingencies Conference at Austin Peay State University on February 13-15th, 2008. The editors of the Small Wars Journal have graciously agree to post it so that people will have an opportunity to read it before the conference.

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that warfare and "peace building" are forms of communicative action in Habermas' sense of the term. Drawing on Canadian Communications Theory, Symbolic Anthropology and the work of Bronislaw Malinowski, this paper examines three main areas of military operations in terms of communicative action -- communication about global policy, communication in the operational environment, and communication in terms of narrative-mythic structures -- and uses them to pose specific operational questions.

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by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 3:10pm | 7 comments
The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies has just released a new monograph that presents an alternative view of the character of warfare in the 21st Century. This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.

Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face "Hybrid Wars" that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.

Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Research Fellow Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time. Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a "Revolution in Warfare." Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and much more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one's goals at that particular time—identified as "Hybrid Wars" in Conflict in the 21st Century...

by Dave Dilegge | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 2:41pm | 0 comments
While not all inclusive, here are some blog, news and commentary items that caught my eye and interest this week...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 12:40pm | 0 comments
Debate Grows on Pause in Troop Cuts - Anne Scott Tyson, Washington Post

Senior Pentagon leaders said yesterday that Gen. David H. Petraeus's call for a pause in troop withdrawals from Iraq this summer represents only one view on the issue -- albeit an important one -- and that they would recommend that President Bush also consider the stress on U.S. ground forces and other global military risks when determining future troop levels.

The Debate To Which You Should be Paying Attention - Abu Muqawama

Gang, the most important debate this past week was not the one between McCain and Romney or the one between Obama and Clinton. The most important debate this week was the debate, still ongoing, within national security circles on how we manage commitments in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

We Are Winning. We Haven't Won. - Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations

Nine months ago, when I was last in Iraq, the conventional wisdom about the war effort was unduly pessimistic. Many politicians, and not only Democrats, had declared the surge a failure when it had barely begun. Today we know that the surge has succeeded: Iraqi and American deaths fell by approximately 80 percent between December 2006 and December 2007, and life is returning to a semblance of normality in much of Baghdad. Now the danger is that public opinion may be turning too optimistic. While Iraq has made near-miraculous progress in the past year, daunting challenges remain, and victory is by no means assured.

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by Dr. Jack | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 11:40am | 2 comments
The recent Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (29-31 Jan 2008) addressed the issue of Security Force Assistance and the way forward. The Symposium was entitled "Key Security Force Assistance Issues in an Age of Persistent Conflict." Here are some observations from the conference:

There are a number of issues and assumptions that received general agreement. These included that we are in an era of "persistent conflict" and that there will be a requirement for some level of security force assistance (train, advise, and assist, or TAA) to be provided for at least the next decade and beyond. There was also an acknowledgement that "stability operations" are a core mission of the military on par with offensive and defensive operations -- a concept from DOD 3000.05 and incorporated in the new FM 3-0 that will roll out in February 2008. The importance of joint and multinational operations and interagency participation in a "whole of government" was also embraced, although there are huge issues in the capacity and ability of the non-DOD agencies to make this happen in the near term...

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 11:39am | 0 comments
Afghanistan Study Group Report - General James Jones, USMC (Ret), and Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, The Center for the Study of the Presidency

Letter From the Co-Chairs:

Afghanistan stands today at a crossroads. The progress achieved after six years of international engagement is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future direction of their country. The United States and the international community have tried to win the struggle in Afghanistan with too few military forces and insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent comprehensive strategy to fill the power vacuum outside Kabul and to counter the combined challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy, and the stark poverty faced by most Afghans...
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/02/2008 - 4:31am | 0 comments

Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, gave the Pentagon Channel an exclusive interview on 31 January 2008.

Brigadier General Joseph Anderson, Chief of Staff of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, briefing on Al Qaeda in Iraq suspected in a deadly suicide bombing of a pet market in Baghdad, 1 February 2008.

In a briefing on 30 January 2008 MNF-I spokesman Major General Kevin J. Bergner describes the relationship between Iraq's Defense Minister and Multi-National Force Iraq.

by William McCallister | Fri, 02/01/2008 - 9:13pm | 0 comments
I would like to respond to what appears to be Afghanistanica's (on Abu Muqawama) main premise supporting his critique of my paper titled "Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Dust-up along the North-West Frontier."

His comment follows: "Trying to predict behavior through the lens of traditional community and Pashtunwali requires one to see cultures as static and unchanging. That is a recipe for failure."

I, of course have to respectfully disagree with a number of implicit assumptions embedded in the comment. Afghanistanica's implicit assumptions are revealed in the following words: "predict" i.e. predict behavior, "traditional" i.e. traditional community and Pashtunwali, "requires" i.e. requires one to see and "static and unchanging" i.e. to see culture as such and finally "failure"...

by Dave Dilegge | Thu, 01/31/2008 - 2:30am | 0 comments
While not all inclusive, here are some of the items that caught my eye and interest so far this week...
by William McCallister | Wed, 01/30/2008 - 8:50pm | 2 comments
Strategic Design Considerations for Operations in Pakistan's Tribal Areas:

Dust-up along the North-West Frontier

William S. McCallister

"It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovations can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: That is to say, whether to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayer or can they use force. In the first instance they always succeed badly and never compass anything, but when they can rely on themselves and use force; then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been destroyed".

-- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince

Background

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance various among individuals, groups and cultures. The current definition of good governance as outlined in a recent report on threats from safe havens and ungoverned areas is a case in point. (1) The report defines governance as the "delivery of security, judicial, legal, regulatory, intelligence, economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered". The definition implies a social service centric function for government emphasizing "delivery" and distribution of social services. It further implies that only democratic institutions are a safeguard against militancy, extremism and terrorism. Not all cultures view the role and function of government in quite the same way. Tribal society, particularly along the North-West frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan judges the role and function of effective government quite differently...

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/30/2008 - 5:00am | 0 comments
The Next Iraq Phase - David Ignatius, Washington Post

... The question is whether this Iraqi renaissance can continue as the United States reduces its surge of combat troops. The Iraqi military is still far from ready to take over the country's security. The military's transport systems won't be finished until the summer of 2009, and it could be two years before Iraq's military can operate fully independent of U.S. forces.

Gen. David Petraeus and other top military officials have begun debating what the post-surge level of U.S. troops should be. The commanders want a pause for assessment after July, when the last of the five additional combat brigades that made up the surge is withdrawn and the U.S. troop presence returns to its prior level of 15 brigades, or about 130,000 soldiers.

The debate centers on how long this pause should last and whether it should be followed by more troop cuts. Petraeus, who as field commander doesn't want to risk losing his hard-won gains, is said to favor an assessment period of more than three months, and perhaps leaving the full 15 brigades in place through the end of 2008. President Bush, who would like to leave office next January with Iraq as secure as possible, may also oppose further troop reductions after July...
by Bing West | Mon, 01/28/2008 - 6:42pm | 1 comment
Iraq's No. 1 Problem

By Bing West and Max Boot, Los Angeles Times

... A staggered Al Qaeda is steadily losing one redoubt after another because, in the most important shift in the war, the Sunni people turned against the terrorists and aligned with the American soldiers. Over 80,000 men (mainly Sunnis) have joined neighborhood watch groups that the U.S. calls Concerned Local Citizens. Essential in last year's battles to drive Al Qaeda out of Baghdad, the CLCs also provide Sunnis with a defense against Shiite militias.

Now, victory is within our grasp -- if only the Iraqi government could effectively reach out to Sunnis and Shiites alike who are fed up with violence and sectarian divisions.

Yet the perverse political system stymies such an outcome. In 2004, U.S. and U.N. officials pushed through an electoral process that resulted in votes for parties rather than individual candidates. This left party bosses in Baghdad free to appoint hacks who do not answer to any local constituency and face no penalty for failing to provide essential services. Water, electricity, garbage collection and job creation are in terrible shape, especially in Sunni areas, because the government is run by Shiites.

American battalion commanders have stepped in. Officers trained to attack cities, not run them, have temporarily assumed the duties of city managers, cadging resources and hounding Iraqi officials to disburse hoarded funds.

This situation cannot last indefinitely. American officers cannot take the place of the missing government of Iraq. The CLCs must be incorporated into the police. But the government headed by Nouri Maliki is moving with agonizing slowness, running the risk that civil war may be reignited...

More at the LAT

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/28/2008 - 7:32am | 1 comment
From today's Congressional Quarterly (subscription required) - Small Wars, Big Changes by John Donnelly.

... U.S. military leaders, including Rumsfeld's successor, Robert M. Gates, now recognize that the nature of warfare itself is changing, from conventional conflicts between nations to "small wars" — counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, religious and ethnic strife — and that the Army must change with it.

The new doctrine, spelled out in publications such as the newest Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in late 2006, is that the Army must be prepared to wage all types of warfare but focus much more of its attention on irregular, guerrilla conflicts like that in Iraq.

This is a fundamental change that will drive most other decisions within the Army — from recruitment to equipment — and will permeate every defense debate for the foreseeable future.

In fact, it already has. Military journals are full of articles and commentary on counterinsurgency. Last summer, eight months after the Army field manual appeared, the Air Force rushed out its own doctrine on the subject.

For the Army, the new doctrine means a seismic culture shift. It will still have guns and tanks, but it will also need more people skilled in languages, public affairs, economic development, even anthropology. Instead of grudgingly accepting the task of nation building, as it did in the Balkans and in Iraq at first, the new Army for the most part will have to embrace the role. In this way, the high-technology, smart-weapons "revolution in military affairs" that has captivated Pentagon strategists for decades is becoming a revolution beyond military affairs.

Though it is too early to tell precisely what the ramifications might be in general defense policy and the budget, most experts think the Army will not get a big budget increase, but will have to reorder its priorities, shifting money from, say, high-tech hardware to personnel...

Much more at CQ...

More here too, at Abu Muqawama

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 01/27/2008 - 3:28pm | 5 comments
Training a "Hybrid" Warrior at the Infantry Officer Course

Will a proof of concept exercise find a permanent home?

By Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brian J. Donlon

Reprinted with permission of the Marine Corps Gazette.

Speaking at the International Seapower Symposium on 17 October 2007, General Conway discussed the Marine Corps' role in the new maritime strategy. Looking from the present to the years 2020-2025, the Commandant echoed oft repeated trends: that the average age in developed nations will continue to grow older while underdeveloped nations will grow younger, creating a population of military age males for whom employment opportunities will be scarce; that 75-80% of the world's population will move towards an "urban sprawl" adjacent to a sea coast; and that state conflicts will continue to grow more rare as transnational and regional conflicts increase in scope and frequency. Largely due to these trends, the Commandant also spoke about the continuing likelihood of Marines being involved in complex irregular wars or what multiple experts have begun calling "hybrid" wars. (1)

As we enter the seventh year of "The Long War" the implications of these trends seem particularly significant, especially when, as the Commandant stated, one appreciates that a lot of "blue" exists on the map around the "Arc of Instability." It may be that the fight ahead will include many "Small Wars," fought amidst the remains of the old Islamic Caliphate. In the face of such a potential challenge, there has never been a more acute need for a "hybrid warrior," possessing a mind capable of operating in timeless environments, conventional and irregular...

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/26/2008 - 9:51pm | 1 comment
Via Tom Ricks, Washington Post

Here, the Air Force uses the jargon of modern warfare to discuss its competition with the Army and Navy. Usually, it is China that U.S. officers describe as a "peer competitor" -- that is, a real or potential adversary. But in these briefing slides, it is the other services that the Air Force is targeting...

More:

The U.S. Air Force Declares War! - Abu Muqawama

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by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/26/2008 - 6:43pm | 0 comments
Transcripts from 1 - 25 January 2008 Department of Defense Blogger Roundtables.

U.S. Army Colonel Edward J. Kornish on Afghan Police Force training. The Regional Police Advisory Command-South is making steady progress building a professional Afghan police force in Afghanistan's austere South region.

U.S. Army Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. on combating extremism south and east of Baghdad. The Army 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, deployed since February 2007, is fighting extremism in areas south and east of Baghdad, Iraq.

U.S. Army Brigadier General Edward Cardon on local security gains influence national action in Iraq. As Iraqis continue to organize at the local level to help with security, they are creating pressure on Iraq's national leaders to build on momentum.

U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith on Iraq still in Al Qaeda's grip. The coalition's success securing Baghdad and Iraq's Anbar province from al Qaeda will need to be repeated in other parts of Iraq.

U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel David L. Coggins on Iraqi Navy progress. Over the past year, NATO members have been working to train the Iraqi navy and its petty officers.

U.S. Army Major General Rick Lynch on Iraqis continuing to move forward. More than 31,000 citizens are now providing security assistance to coalition forces south of Baghdad and southern provinces.

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Cy Bartlett on Iraqi Air Force 'coming on strong.' Iraq's new air force passed its infancy in 2007 and will continue to grow over the next few years.

U.S. Army Colonel John S. RisCassi on U.S. forces eliminate al Qaeda sanctuary in Baghdad. A Baghdad neighborhood formerly overrun by al Qaeda has been cleared of the enemy and is starting to thrive again.

Mr. Louis P. Lantner, Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader, on micro-grants helping to rebuild Iraq's economy. Small grants to help Iraqi businesses rebound are paying dividends, as improved security has benefited economic recovery.

More: Audio, biographies and related DoD news articles.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/26/2008 - 10:37am | 1 comment
Down and dirty - Intelligence drives operations, or so it should, in any form of warfare. In the counterinsurgency fight this is particularly true - success or failure is dependent on accurate, timely and relevant intelligence. COIN is a small unit fight -- requiring dispersion and decentralization -- with local commanders requiring a 'real' capability to collect, process and disseminate intelligence. A first step in solving a long-standing tactical support shortfall is finally seeing the light of day.

Corps Creates Intel Cells at Rifle-company Level -- Kimberly Johnson, Marine Corps Times

A need for more intelligence analysts in the Corps is forcing infantry operations to get a whole lot smarter, under a new initiative that is for the first time pushing battalion-level intelligence know-how down to the rifle-company level.

The Corps is creating company-level intelligence cells — called C-LICs — in an attempt to plug the hole and curb the loss of valuable intelligence that often goes missing when units pass the baton on the battlefield, Marine officials said...

The C-LIC initiative, launched under the direction of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in Quantico, Va., will soon be battle-tested by California-based 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, on its next Iraq deployment, slated for early 2008.

Today's irregular warfare, with its lack of a uniformed enemy, makes intelligence gathering vital for enemy identification. To adapt to the emerging threat, infantry companies often create their own versions of ad hoc intelligence cells, said Vince Goulding, director of experimentation plans at the Warfighting Laboratory. But those individual efforts have been piecemeal, because the Corps had no standard training or equipment available, he said.

The new initiative for pushing intelligence analysis know-how down to the lower echelons, however, is about to change all that. Rifle companies will now be able to assess, analyze and disseminate information that they typically had relied on battalion or regimental command to produce...

Preparation for how units approach intelligence collection on the distributed battlefield has been as varied as the units themselves, said Capt. Gabe Diana, project officer for C-LIC at the Warfighting Laboratory.

"Databases were normally made by somebody in the companies, so what you'd see is five different databases within a battalion. Then come [relief in place] time, five more databases and there's just loads of information that's just lost," Diana said.

Rifle companies use the databases for vital intelligence procured from the local area, which can help avoid much of the time lost sending intelligence requests to the battalion or regimental level, Dickey said.

"If we can train ourselves at this level, we can produce the intelligence we're asking for," which could save days of waiting for responses over the duration of a unit's deployment, he said.
by Robert Bateman | Fri, 01/25/2008 - 7:36pm | 3 comments
Originally posted at Committee of Concerned Journalists.

I spend a lot of time trying to convince my colleagues in the Army and the Marines that the media are not the problem. I cite chapter and verse of the history of our relationship -- the dysfunctional periods, propaganda phases, the development of the ethics of good responsible American journalism -- and I'm usually able to demonstrate that while what passed for mid-19th century journalism truly was enough to drive one to distraction, in the 20th and thus far in the 21st, journalists really have been at least as professional as we, and quite often more so.

This self-appointed task, unfortunately, often remains an uphill battle, as many soldiers, Marines and their officers are convinced a media bias exists against the military in general and the ground forces in particular.

I wage my little internal struggle because I think it is right, and that my peers are often blowing small things out of proportion and seeing a bogeyman where there is none. I try to show them how this is part of a narrative that periodically recurs in military circles (the German army after WWI, the American army after Vietnam). I also try to demonstrate to them how they have been conditioned to accept the narrative as true without being critical of the assertions.

In short, I argue for journalists and journalism all of the time, and passionately.

And then the editors of the New York Times dig themselves a nice deep pit, fill it with slime and muck, and dive in headfirst...